FRENZEL V.

CATITO
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He arrived in the
Philippines and engaged in businesses. After two years, he married Teresita Santos, a Filipino
citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce.

Sometime in 1983 he arrived in Sydney and met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of
Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she was married to Klaus Muller when she was in
Germany.

Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working, move to the
Philippines and get married.

They bought several properties in Manila and Davao using the money of Alfred. He also sold all
his properties in Australia before moving in the country. They also opened an HSBC Savings
Account in Hong Kong in the name of Ederlina.

Ederlina went to Germany to file a divorce however Ederlina had not been able to secure a
divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who
himself was still married.

Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. They lived separately.

Alfred filed a Complaint dated October 28, 1985, against Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila.
Alfred alleged, inter alia, that Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent, managed to transfer
funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same bank.

In the meantime, on November 7, 1985, Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and
personal properties, sum of money, and damages.

Quezon City Trial Court decided in favor of Alfred but the Davao Trial Court is in favor of Ederlina.
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the three parcels of
land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even if Alfred was the
buyer of the properties, he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same
because as an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The
sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and void ab initio. Applying the pari
delicto doctrine, the petitioner was precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent.

CA affirmed the decision of Davao City Court.

ISSUE: W/n the lower court erred in applying the in pari delicto rule in the case at bar.

HELD: No. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.

Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.

Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee,
the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A contract that
violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court
of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by
knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain
an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.

Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him
or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. Equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the stronger position it
signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. The
rule is expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR
EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.

HEIRS OF JUAN SAN ANDRES V. RODRIGUEZ

FACTS: Juan San Andres was the owner of the lot situated in Liboton, Naga city. The sale was evidenced
by a deed of sale. Upon the death of Juan Andres, Ramon San Andres was appointed as administrator of
the estate, and hired geodetic engineer. Jose Panero prepared a consolidated plan of the estate and also
prepared a sketch plan of the lot sold to respondent. It was found out that respondent had enlarged the
area which he purchased from Juan. The administrator sent a letter to the respondent to vacate the said
portion in which the latter refused to do.
Respondent alleged that apart from the original lot, which had been sold to him, the latter likewise sold to
him the following day the remaining portion of the lot. He alleged that the payment for such would be
affected in 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale after a survey is conducted. He also
alleged that under the consent of Juan, he took possession of the same and introduced improvements
thereon. Respondent deposited in court the balance of the purchase price amounting to P7,035.00 for the
aforesaid 509-square meter lot.
On September 20, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. It ruled that there was no
contract of sale to speak of for lack of a valid object because there was no sufficient indication to identify
the property subject of the sale, hence, the need to execute a new contract.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on April 21, 1998 rendered a decision reversing the
decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that the object of the contract was determinable, and

that there was a conditional sale with the balance of the purchase price payable within five years from the
execution of the deed of sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid sale.
HELD: YES. The Civil Code provides that By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
As thus defined, the essential elements of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
As shown in the receipt, dated September 29, 1964, the late Juan San Andres received P500.00 from
respondent as "advance payment for the residential lot adjoining his previously paid lot on three sides
excepting on the frontage; the agreed purchase price was P15.00 per square meter; and the full amount
of the purchase price was to be based on the results of a survey and would be due and payable in five (5)
years from the execution of a deed of sale.
Petitioner's contention is without merit. There is no dispute that respondent purchased a portion of Lot
1914-B-2 consisting of 345 square meters. This portion is located in the middle of Lot 1914-B-2, which
has a total area of 854 square meters, and is clearly what was referred to in the receipt as the "previously
paid lot." Since the lot subsequently sold to respondent is said to adjoin the "previously paid lot" on three
sides thereof, the subject lot is capable of being determined without the need of any new contract. The
fact that the exact area of these adjoining residential lots is subject to the result of a survey does not
detract from the fact that they are determinate or determinable. As the Court of Appeals explained:
Concomitantly, the object of the sale is certain and determinate. Under Article 1460 of the New Civil Code,
a thing sold is determinate if at the time the contract is entered into, the thing is capable of being
determinate without necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. Here, this definition
finds realization.
Thus, all of the essential elements of a contract of sale are present, i.e., that there was a meeting of the
minds between the parties, by virtue of which the late Juan San Andres undertook to transfer ownership
of and to deliver a determinate thing for a price certain in money. As Art. 1475 of the Civil Code provides:
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price. . . .That the contract of sale is perfected was confirmed by the
former administrator of the estates, Ramon San Andres, who wrote a letter to respondent on March 30,
1966 asking for P300.00 as partial payment for the subject lot. As the Court of Appeals observed:
Without any doubt, the receipt profoundly speaks of a meeting of the mind between San Andres and
Rodriguez for the sale. Evidently, this is a perfected contract of sale on a deferred payment of the
purchase price. All the pre-requisite elements for a valid purchase transaction are present.
There is a need, however, to clarify what the Court of Appeals said is a conditional contract of sale.
Apparently, the appellate court considered as a "condition" the stipulation of the parties that the full
consideration, based on a survey of the lot, would be due and payable within five (5) years from the
execution of a formal deed of sale. It is evident from the stipulations in the receipt that the vendor Juan
San Andres sold the residential lot in question to respondent and undertook to transfer the ownership
thereof to respondent without any qualification, reservation or condition.
A deed of sale is considered absolute in nature where there is neither a stipulation in the deed that title to

the property sold is reserved in the seller until full payment of the price, nor one giving the vendor the right
to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.
Applying these principles to this case, it cannot be gainsaid that the contract of sale between the parties is
absolute, not conditional. There is no reservation of ownership nor a stipulation providing for a unilateral
rescission by either party. In fact, the sale was consummated upon the delivery of the lot to respondent.
Thus, Art. 1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof.
The stipulation that the "payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in
five (5) years from the execution of a formal deed of sale" is not a condition which affects the efficacy of
the contract of sale. It merely provides the manner by which the full consideration is to be computed and
the time within which the same is to be paid. But it does not affect in any manner the effectivity of the
contract. Consequently, the contention that the absence of a formal deed of sale stipulated in the receipt
prevents the happening of a sale has no merit.
The claim of petitioners that the price of P7,035.00 is iniquitous is untenable. The amount is based on the
agreement of the parties as evidenced by the receipt (Exh. 2). Time and again, we have stressed the rule
that a contract is the law between the parties, and courts have no choice but to enforce such contract so
long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. Otherwise, court would be
interfering with the freedom of contract of the parties. Simply put, courts cannot stipulate for the parties
nor amend the latter's agreement, for to do so would be to alter the real intentions of the contracting
parties when the contrary function of courts is to give force and effect to the intentions of the parties.
ATILANO V. ATILANO
FACTS: In 1916, Eulogio Atilano I acquired lot No. 535 by purchase. In 1920, he had the land subdivided
into five parts, identified as lots Nos. 535-A, 535-B, 535-C, 535-D and 535-E, respectively. After the
subdivision had been effected, Eulogio I executed a deed of sale covering lot No. 535-E in favor of his
brother Eulogio II. Three other portions, namely, lots Nos. 535-B, 535-C, and 535-D, were likewise sold to
other persons. Eulogio I retained for himself the remaining portions of the land, presumably covered by
the title to lot No. 535-A. upon his death, the title to this lot passed to Ladislao, in whose name the
corresponding certificate was issued.
On 1959, Eulogio II and his children had the land resurveyed so that it could be properly subdivided.
However, they discovered that the land they were actually occupying on the strength of the deed of sale
was lot No. 353-A and not lot 535-E, while the land which remained in the possession of Eulogio I, and
which was passed to Ladislao was lot No. 353-E and not lot No. 535-A.
On 1960, the heirs of Eulogio II alleging, inter alia, that they offered to surrender to the possession of lot
No. 535-A and demanded in return the possession of lot No. 535-E, but the defendants refused to accept
the exchange. The plaintiffs' insistence is quite understandable, since lot No. 535-E has an area of 2,612
square meters as compared to the 1,808 square-meter area of lot No. 535-A.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants alleged that the reference to lot No. 535-E in the deed of
sale was an involuntary error; that the intention of the parties to that sale was to convey the lot correctly
identified as lot No. 535-A. On the basis of the foregoing allegations the defendants interposed a
counterclaim, praying that the plaintiffs be ordered to execute in their favor the corresponding deed of
transfer with respect to Lot No. 535-E.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid sale in view of the real intention of the parties.

HELD: YES. When one sells or buys real property a piece of land, for example one sells or buys the
property as he sees it, in its actual setting and by its physical metes and bounds, and not by the mere lot
number assigned to it in the certificate of title. In the instant case, the portion correctly referred to as lot
No. 535-A was already in the possession of the vendee, Eulogio Atilano II, who had constructed his
residence therein, even before the sale in his favor even before the subdivision of the entire lot No. 535 at
the instance of its owner, Eulogio Atillano I. In like manner the latter had his house on the portion correctly
identified, after the subdivision, as lot No. 535-E, even adding to the area thereof by purchasing a portion
of an adjoining property belonging to a different owner. The two brothers continued in possession of the
respective portions the rest of their lives, obviously ignorant of the initial mistake in the designation of the
lot subject of the 1920 until 1959, when the mistake was discovered for the first time.
From the facts and circumstances, the object is lot No. 535-A and its designation as lot No. 535-E in the
deed of sale was a simple mistake in the drafting of the document. The mistake did not vitiate the consent
of the parties, or affect the validity and binding effect of the contract between them. The new Civil Code
provides a remedy by means of reformation of the instrument. This remedy is available when, there
having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the
instrument purporting to embody the agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident
In this case, the deed of sale executed in 1920 need no longer be reformed. The parties have retained
possession of their respective properties conformably to the real intention of the parties to that sale, and
all they should do is to execute mutual deed of conveyance.
MELLIZA V. CITY OF ILOILO

FACTS: Juliana Melliza during her lifetime owned, among other properties, 3 parcels of residential land in
Iloilo City (OCT 3462). Said parcels of land were known as Lots Nos. 2, 5 and 1214. The total area of Lot
1214 was 29,073 sq. m.

On 27 November 1931 she donated to the then Municipality of Iloilo, 9,000 sq. m. of Lot 1214, to serve as
site for the municipal hall. The donation was however revoked by the parties for the reason that the area
donated was found inadequate to meet the requirements of the development plan of the municipality, the
so- called Arellano Plan.

Subsequently, Lot 1214 was divided by Certeza Surveying Co., Inc. into Lots 1214-A and 1214-B. And still
later, Lot 1214-B was further divided into Lots 1214-B-1, Lot 1214-B-2 and Lot 1214-B-3. As approved by
the Bureau of Lands, Lot 1214-B-1, with 4,562 sq. m., became known as Lot 1214-B; Lot 1214-B-2, with
6,653 sq. m., was designated as Lot 1214-C; and Lot 1214-B-3, with 4,135 sq. m., became Lot 1214-D.

On 15 November 1932, Juliana Melliza executed an instrument without any caption providing for the
absolute sale involving all of lot 5, 7669 sq. m. of Lot 2 (sublots 2-B and 2-C), and a portion of 10,788 sq.
m. of Lot 1214 (sublots 1214-B2 and 1214-B3) in favor of the Municipal Government of Iloilo for the sum
of P6,422; these lots and portions being the ones needed by the municipal government for the
construction of avenues, parks and City hall site according the Arellano plan.

On 14 January 1938, Melliza sold her remaining interest in Lot 1214 to Remedios Sian Villanueva
(thereafter TCT 18178). Remedios in turn on 4 November 1946 transferred her rights to said portion of
land to Pio Sian Melliza (thereafter TCT 2492). Annotated at the back of Pio Sian Mellizas title certificate
was the following that a portion of 10,788 sq. m. of Lot 1214 now designated as Lots 1412-B-2 and 1214B-3 of the subdivision plan belongs to the Municipality of Iloilo as per instrument dated 15 November
1932.

On 24 August 1949 the City of Iloilo, which succeeded to the Municipality of Iloilo, donated the city hall
site together with the building thereon, to the University of the Philippines (Iloilo branch). The site donated
consisted of Lots 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D, with a total area of 15,350 sq. m., more or less. Sometime
in 1952, the University of the Philippines enclosed the site donated with a wire fence. Pio Sian Melliza
thereupon made representations, thru his lawyer, with the city authorities for payment of the value of the
lot (Lot 1214-B). No recovery was obtained, because as alleged by Pio Sian Melliza, the City did not have
funds. The University of the Philippines, meanwhile, obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7152
covering the three lots, Nos. 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D.

On 10 December 1955 Pio Sian Melliza filed an action in the CFI Iloilo against Iloilo City and the
University of the Philippines for recovery of Lot 1214-B or of its value. After stipulation of facts and trial,
the CFI rendered its decision on 15 August 1957, dismissing the complaint. Said court ruled that the
instrument executed by Juliana Melliza in favor of Iloilo municipality included in the conveyance Lot 1214B, and thus it held that Iloilo City had the right to donate Lot 1214-B to UP.

Pio Sian Melliza appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 May 1965, the CA affirmed the interpretation of
the CFI that the portion of Lot 1214 sold by Juliana Melliza was not limited to the 10,788 square meters
specifically mentioned but included whatever was needed for the construction of avenues, parks and the
city hall site. Nonetheless, it ordered the remand of the case for reception of evidence to determine the
area actually taken by Iloilo City for the construction of avenues, parks and for city hall site.

In the present petition, Melliza maintains that only Lots No. 1214-C and 1214-D were included in the sale,
and that the purpose of the second paragraph of the deed of sale was only to better identify the lots.
Melliza also argues that the interpretation given by the lower courts would render the sale invalid for it
lacks an essential element of a sale, a determinate (or determinable) object. Respondents, however,
maintain that the object of the sale remains determinate, as it could be ascertained what lots were needed
by the Municipality of Iloilo for the Arellano Plan at the time of the execution of the sale.

ISSUE: W/n there was a determinate object of the sale, rendering the sale valid.
HELD: YES. The paramount intention of the parties was to provide Iloilo municipality with lots sufficient or
adequate in area for the construction of the Iloilo City hall site, with its avenues and parks. For this matter,
a previous donation for this purpose between the same parties was revoked by them, because of
inadequacy of the area of the lot donated. Said instrument described 4 parcels of land by their lot
numbers and area; and then it goes on to further describe, not only those lots already mentioned, but the
lots object of the sale, by stating that said lots were the ones needed for the construction of the city hall
site, avenues and parks according to the Arellano plan. If the parties intended merely to cover the
specified lots (Lots 2, 5, 1214-C and 1214-D), there would scarcely have been any need for the next

paragraph, since these lots were already plainly and very clearly described by their respective lot number
and areas. Said next paragraph does not really add to the clear description that was already given to
them in the previous one. It is therefore the more reasonable interpretation to view it as describing those
other portions of land contiguous to the lots that, by reference to the Arellano plan, will be found needed
for the purpose at hand, the construction of the city hall site.
The requirement of the law that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing, is fulfilled as long as,
at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate
without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties (Art. 1273, old Civil Code; Art.
1460, New Civil Code). The specific mention of some of the lots plus the statement that the lots object of
the sale are the ones needed for city hall site; avenues and parks, according to the Arellano plan,
sufficiently provides a basis, as of the time of the execution of the contract, for rendering determinate said
lots without the need of a new and further agreement of the parties.