Santos vs.

Manarang
Facts: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal
property which, by his last will and testament, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this
will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they
may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed
upon with my creditors.
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos;
one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates
(the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a
committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be
presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14, 1908, the
plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to
reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of testator.
This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present
proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due
him. Relief was denied in the court below, and now appeals to this court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners claim is within the purview of the committees jurisdiction.
Ruling: YES
The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be
compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be
nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the
recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real
property or specific articles of personal property. When a committee is appointed as herein
provided, no action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator
upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the
seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced
against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)
It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure
has established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at
least two restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and
which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all
legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due
his heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In
case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they
must be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an
insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if
the express mention of a debt in the will requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the

committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take
precedence over preferred debts?
If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not
applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when
then the legal portion is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been distributed, what
security have the differences against the interruption of their possession? Is the administrator
required to pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what
authority has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an
executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due
the estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the
contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power
to determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust
the amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before
this body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is
their remedy. To allow the administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would
put him in the dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed
that this may not occur. The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of
property by will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal
portions due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by sections
614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will
must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of
the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid
before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.
Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of
error he alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim
against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt
may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a
third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is anasset of the estate. It would be absurd
to speak of a testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The
creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no
binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the
testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil
Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are
demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific
articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum
mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt.
As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it
is a legacy.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy
and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all
debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view
the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the

correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first
instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must
present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Gotamco vs. Chan Seng

Issue:

Facts: Antonio Tanpoco died in the year 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000
among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan Kim Hong, the claimant, whom he
described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to his three
adopted sons, Tan Kimco. Tan Kimbio and Tan Kim Choo, and appointed Go Siu San, a resident of
Manila, as executor of his will, which provided that no bond should be required. Two Chinese
named Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue, one of Tarlac and the other of Manila, were appointed and
qualified as commissioners, and later they published the usual notice to creditors to present their
claims within six months at the office of Attorney M. G. Goyena, of Manila. The commissioners
presented their report to the court in which, among others, they reported the allowance of the claim
here in question. At the time all of the heirs, including Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in
China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as also had the widow of the deceased. When such
report has been filed, the executor filed a motion asking for the appointment of an attorney of his
own choice as curador ad litem for the minor heirs which, among other things, that the heirs who
are interested in the estate of the above entitled action are all minors, to wit: Tan Kimco, age 20;
Tan Kim Hong, age 12; Tan Kimbio, age 11; and Tan Kim Choo, age 4; and that all the above heirs
are now in China, and the day of their return to the Islands is unknown to the administrator of the
estate which court ignored but appointed Mr. Canillas who considered such appointment as only
formality such that he did not make any investigations thereof and hence, the report was approved.
In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect their
interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of the claim in
favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, on November 27, 1922, Judge Harvey ordered an
investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was made by Mr. Felipe
Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad litem of all the minor heirs, including the
claimant, who made a written report to the court. The report concluded with a recommendation for
the removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan
Kim Hong. After the report was filed, a hearing was had and testimony was taken, and Judge
Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor, and in his order of removal, among other things, said that
commissioners Te Sue and that he had not received any claim; that the claims which appears in the
report were taken from the books of the business of the deceased, Antonio Tanpoco; nevertheless,
the claim of Tan Peng Sue does not appear in the report of these commissioners on claims although
it appears in the books and was afterwards accepted by the commissioners last appointed. After
such proceedings, nothing was further done until November 14, 1923, when the present
administrator applied to the court for authority, among other things, to pay the claim in question, to
which the appellee appeared and objected. The court denied the application of the present guardian
to the claimant to require the administrator to pay the claim in question upon the ground that it was
void and fictitious, from which Tan Kim Hong appeals, contending that the lower court erred in
hearing and sustaining the objections to the allowance of the claim, and in denying the motion of
the administrator for authority to pay the claim, alleging that the report of the committee allowing
the claim was made and filed on June 29, 1921, and contends that it became automatically final on
July 14, 1921; that the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the
Code, and that her failure to take the statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses, citing and relying
upon the case of De los Santos vs. Reyes.

Whether or not the claim was timely filed and presented and that such filing became final.
Held:
NO. The court found as a fact that in the De los Santos vs. Reyes case, supra, there was a
substantial compliance with all of the statutory requirements, and the decision in that case was
based upon that fact. But there is a marked distinction between the facts there and those in the
instant case. Here, all of the parties in interest were minors. The evidence is conclusive that at the
time the alleged claim was allowed, Tan Kim Hong was only twelve years of age, and that all of the
other parties were minors. There is no claim or pretense that Tan Kim Hong had a guardian or that
anyone had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or to represent him, or that his
claim was ever presented. There is no claim or pretense that any of the parties in interest had any
knowledge of the fact that the claim was presented and allowed before they came to Manila from
China in September, 1922. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence that the claim in question in any
manner, shape or form was ever presented to the commissioners by anyone. For aught that appears
in the record, the claim was allowed by the commissioners on their own motion and of their own
volition. It also appears that the entries which were made in the books of the deceased were made
by his bookkeeper, and there is nothing to show that they were made by the authority of the
deceased. It is very significant that the will of the deceased was made sometime after the entries
were made, and that no reference whatever is made in the will to the claim in question.
A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the
final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the matters
submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the
conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the
pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or admitted by the parties, or deemed to exist upon
their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only is a judgment which is
pronounced between the parties to an action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . .
.
In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking,
the allowance of the claim would be like rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or
even the making or presentment of a claim.
Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with all of the formalities and
requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty upon justice. It appears from the record before us
that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to allow the claim; that as to the claim in
question their proceedings were null and void ab initio, and hence they were not res judicata, and in
addition to that, it clearly appears that the allowance of the claim was a fraud upon the appellee.
Affirmed.

Sheker vs. Sheker

Facts: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued
an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be
incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money
claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the
money claim was not filed and served personally.
Petitioner still contends that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceedingthe rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim.He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules
of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in
a suppletory manner.
Issue:
Did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action
for a mere contingent claim .Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment
of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing
fees within a reasonable time.[9]After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the
action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim
against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a
written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of IliganCity,
Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively,
are REVERSED andSET ASIDE.The RegionalTrialCourtofIliganCity, Branch 6, is
hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in
accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Held: YES.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings.The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is
an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the
filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will.Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money
claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims
to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate.In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with
and dependent upon the principal remedy.

Quisumbing vs. Guison

Facts: The deceased, Consuelo Syyap, during her life time executed a promissory note dated
November 9, 1940 for P3,000 in favor of Leonardo Guison payable sixty (60) days from the date
thereof, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The debtor Consuelo Syyap died
thereafter. And on the same year, intestate proceedings were instituted and notice given to creditors
to file their claim within six (6) months, which period for filing claims expired on August 31, 1941.
In the inventory filed on April 30, 1941, by the administrator of the estate of the deceased, the said
obligation of P3,000 was acknowledged as one of the liabilities of the decedent. However, the
creditor Leonardo Guison died in 1941, and his son Mariano Guison, who was appointed as
administrator of the intestate estate of his deceased father, filed the claim of P3,000 against the
estate in 1943. Claimant in his reply to the answer of the estate of Syyap, stated that he believed in
good faith that he was relieved of the obligation to file a claim with the court, because said
administrator had assured him that he should not worry about it, since the debt was in the inventory
and he would pay it soon as he was authorized by the court to do so.
The administrator later on, in contrary, contends that the court erred or abused its discretion in
allowing the appellees claim under Sec.2 Rule 87, eighteen months after the expiration of the time
previously limited for the filing of claims and without previous application for extension of time
having been filed by the claimant.
Issue:
(1) whether the claim filed by the claimant may be allowed by the court after hearing both parties,
without necessity on the part of the claimant to file a previous application for, and on the part of the
court to grant, an extension of time not exceeding one month within which the claim may be filed;
and
(2) Whether cause was shown by the claimant why he did not file the claim within the time
previously limited
Held:
(1) After a careful consideration of this case, we hold that the claim filed by the appellee may
be considered as implying an application for time within which to file said claim, and the
order of the lower court allowing such claim impliedly granted said appellee an extension
of time within which to file said claim. It would have been a waste of time on the part of
the court and the parties in this case, if the court had dismissed the claim and required the
appellee to file, first, an application for a period not exceeding one month within which to
file his claim, and then to file his claim within the time granted by the court, when the
latter would allow the claim after all. Strict compliance with the said requirement of
section 2 of Rule 87 would be necessary if a claim had to be presented to and passed
upon by the committee on claims according to the old law; but now as it is to be filed
with and passed upon by the court itself, no harm would be caused to the adverse party by
such a procedure as was followed in the present case.

Moreover, the appellant, in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee, did not object to
it on the ground that the former had not previously applied for an extension of time not
exceeding one month within which to present his claim. It is to be presumed that both the
attorneys for the appellant as well as for the appellee knew that the claim was being filed
under the provisions of section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court, because the time
previously limited had then already expired, and had appellant objected to the claim on
the above-mentioned ground and the court considered it necessary for the appellee to do
so, the latter would have complied literally with the law.
(2) The last sentence of section 2, Rule 87, provides that the court may, for cause shown and
on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding
one month. As it does not state what cause shall be considered sufficient for the purpose,
it is clear that it is left to the discretion of the court to determine the sufficiency thereof;
and when the court allows a claim to be filed for cause or causes which it considers as
sufficient, on appeal this court can not reverse or set aside the action of the court below
unless the latter has abused its discretion, which has not been shown by the appellant in
this case. That nothing is more equitable than what was done by the lower court in this
case, is evident. Appellant does not only acknowledge in the inventory the existence of
the debt, but does not deny it in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee in the court
below, and had been paying interest due thereon up to January, 1943, that is, two months
before the filing of the claim. Attorney for appellant, in opposing the claim and appealing
to this court from the decision of the court below, relies only on the technicality that no
previous application for extension of time has been filed by the claimant-appellee.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.