VOL.

482,FEBRUARY9,2006
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
G.R.No.153979.February9,2006.*
REGINOSYCATIIS,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALS(17th
Division), REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ,
LUZVIMINDAA.PORTUGUEZandTHEBUREAUOFJAIL
MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION,MAKATICITYJAIL,THROUGHITSOFFICERIN
CHARGE WARDEN, CHIEF INSP. ISAGANI M. GAMINO,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Syndicated Estafa; Words and Phrases; Syndicates;
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1689 penalizes the offenders with life
imprisonmenttodeathregardlessoftheamountinvolved,providedthata
syndicate committed the crime of estafa; A syndicate is defined as
consistingoffiveormorepersonsformedwiththeintentionofcarryingout
theunlawfulorillegalact,transaction,enterpriseorscheme.P.D.No.
1689penalizesoffenderswithlifeimprisonmenttodeathregardlessofthe
amount involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A
syndicateisdefinedinthesamelawasconsistingoffiveormorepersons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme. Under the second paragraph, it is
providedthatiftheoffendersarenotmembersofasyndicate,theyshall
neverthelessbeheldliablefortheactsprohibitedbythelawbuttheyshall
bepenalizedby reclusiontemporal to reclusionperpetua iftheamountof
thefraudismorethanP100,000.00.
Same;Same;StatutoryConstruction;Wherearequirementismadein
explicit andunambiguousterms,nodiscretionislefttothejudiciaryit
mustseetoitthatitsmandateisobeyed.Petitionersinterpretationthatthe
termanypersoninthefirstparagraphofsection1couldmeanthateven
onepersoncanbeindictedforsyndicatedestafaiscontrarytotheprovision
ofthelaw.Itbearsstressingthatthelawmustbeconsideredasawhole,just
asitisnecessarytoconsiderasentenceinitsentiretyinordertograspits
truemeaning.Itisadangerouspracticetobaseconstructionupononlyapart
ofasectionsinceoneportionmaybequalifiedbytheotherportion.Infact,
thereisnoneedforanyconstructionorinterpretationofP.D.
_______________

*FIRSTDIVISION.

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANN
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
No. 1689 since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity.
Section1ofP.D.No.1689hasdefinedwhatconstitutesasyndicateand
suchdefinitioniscontrolling.Wherearequirementismadeinexplicitand
unambiguousterms,nodiscretionislefttothejudiciary.Itmustseetoitthat
itsmandateisobeyed.
Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Complaint or
Information;AggravatingCircumstance;Itisnowarequirementthatthe
aggravatingaswellasqualifyingcircumstancebeexpresslyandspecifically
alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be
consideredbythetrialcourtintheirjudgment,eveniftheyaresubsequently
provedduringtrial.Itisnowarequirementthattheaggravatingaswellas
the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the
complaintorinformation.Otherwise,theycannotbeconsideredbythetrial
courtintheirjudgment,even,iftheyaresubsequentlyprovedduringtrial.A
reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any
aggravatingcircumstance,thusJudgeBersaminiscorrectwhenhefound
that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of
conviction.
Bail; Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, of the Revised Rules of
CriminalProcedurenowprovidesthatallpersonsincustodyshall,before
convictionbyaregionaltrialcourtofanoffensenotpunishablebydeath,
reclusionperpetuaorlifeimprisonment,beadmittedtobailasamatterof
right.Section13,ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionprovidesthatallpersons,
exceptthosechargedwithoffensespunishablebyreclusionperpetuawhen
evidenceofguiltisstrong,shallbeforeconviction,bebailablebysufficient
sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. In
pursuancethereof,Section4ofRule114,asamended,nowprovidesthatall
personsincustodyshall,beforeconvictionbyaregionaltrialcourtofan
offensenotpunishablebydeath,reclusionperpetuaorlifeimprisonment,be
admittedtobailasamatterofright.Sincetheimposablepenaltyonprivate
respondents,incaseofconviction,isreclusiontemporal,theyareentitledto
bailasamatterofright.Notably,JudgeBersaminissuedhisOrderfinding

thecrimechargebailableandfixedtheamountofP150,000.00eachforthe
provisionallibertyofprivaterespondentsonlyafterpetitionerhadsubmitted
theircomment/oppositiontopetitionersmotiontofixbail.
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Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
Same; Section 17 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedureprovidesthatbailintheamountfixedmaybefiledwiththecourt
wherethecaseispending,orintheabsenceorunavailbilityofthejudge
thereof,withanotherbranchofthesamecourtwithintheprovinceorcity.
Section17,Rule114oftheRevisedRulesonCriminalProcedureprovides
thatbailintheamountfixedmaybefiledwiththecourtwherethecaseis
pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
anotherbranchofthesamecourtwithintheprovinceorcity.WhileBranch
96isopenandavailableonthedayprivaterespondentspostedtheirbail
withJudgeZenarosa,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatJudgeBersaminwas
availableatthatprecisemoment.Althoughitisallegedinthesupplemental
petition prepared by petitioners counsel, Atty. Rodeo Nuez, with the
conformityofProsecutorMalabaguiofiledbeforetheCAthatbothofthem
sawJudgeBersamindischarginghisfunctiononthatday,itisnotunder
oath.Moreover,itisnotspecificallystatedinthesupplementalpetitionthat
attheexacttimeJudgeZenarosaapprovedthebail,JudgeBersaminwas
available.Thus,petitionerfailedtorebutthepresumptionthatofficialduty
hadbeenregularlyperformedbyJudgeZenarosaundertherules.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
The Law Firm of Villanueva, Nuez & Associates for
petitioner.
AlvaroBernabeLazaroforrespondents.
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:
BeforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorarifiledbyReginoSy
Catiis(petitioner)seekingtonullifytheDecision1 datedJune14,
2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which sustained the Order

datedDecember18,2001oftheRegional
_______________

1PennedbyJusticeRobertoA.Barrios,concurredinbyJusticesBienvenidoL.

ReyesandEdgardoF.Sundiam.
74

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSAN
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City,2 allowing private
respondentstopostbailandtheOrderdatedDecember21,2001of
theExecutiveJudgeofthesamecourt3approvingthesuretybond
postedbyrespondentsandtheirrelease.
PetitionerfiledalettercomplaintdatedMay28,2001against
private respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez,
LuzvimindaA.PortuguezandacertainMargielynTafallabefore
theOfficeoftheCityProsecutorofQuezonCity,forviolationof
Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
PresidentialDecreeNo.1689(syndicatedestafa)andotherrelated
offenses. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 0110686.
Privaterespondents,exceptforTafalla,filedtheirjointcounter
affidavitsdenyingthechargesagainstthem.
OnOctober10,2001,AssistantCityProsecutorAlessandroD.
Jurado issued a Resolution4 finding the existence of a probable
cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and
Tafallawithnobailrecommended.TheResolutionwasapproved
byCityProsecutorClaroA.Arellano.
AnInformationwasfiledonthesamedaybyProsecutorJurado
againstprivaterespondentsandTafallabeforetheRegionalTrial
CourtofQuezonCityandraffledofftoBranch96,whichreads:
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D.
LOPEZ,LUZVIMINDAA.PORTUGUEZandMARGIELYNTAFALLA,
ofthecrimeof Estafa underArticle315,paragraph2(a)oftheRevised
PenalCodeinrelationtoP.D.1689,committedasfollows:
Thatonoraboutthe3rdweekofJanuary2000orsubsequenttheretoin

QuezonCityandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabove
namedaccused,conspiringand
_______________
2

Penned by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin (now Associate Justice of the Court of

Appeals);DocketedasCriminalCaseNo.Q01105430.
3PerJudgeMoninaA.Zenarosa.
4Rollo,pp.8994.

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VOL.482,FEBRUARY9,2006
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons
through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of
carryingouttheunlawfulorillegalact,transaction,enterpriseorscheme,
withintenttogainandbymeansoffraudanddeceit,didthenandthere
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and
several other persons in the following manner, to wit: by falsely or
fraudulently pretending or representing, in a transaction or series of
transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the public in
general to the effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign
exchange trading successively or simultaneously operating under the
following name and style of Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation,
Winggold Management Philippines Incorporated, Belkin Management
Consultancy,Inc.and/orBelkinProfitsLimitedorotherunregisteredforeign
entitiesinducedandsucceededininducingcomplainantandseveralother
personstogiveanddeliverandinfact,thelatterandsaidpersonsgaveand
delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$ 123,461.14 or its
equivalent inPhilippinePesosonthestrengthofsaidmanifestationsand
representations, the accused knowing fully well that the abovenamed
corporations registered with the SEC and/or those unregistered foreign
entitiesarenotlicensednorauthorizedtoengageinforeignexchangetrading
corporationsandthatsuchmanifestationsandrepresentationstotransactin
foreignexchangewerefalseandfraudulentthatresultedtothedamageand
prejudiceofthecomplainantandotherpersonsandthatthedefraudation
pertains to funds solicited from the public in general by such
corporations/associations.5

OnNovember7,2001,JudgeLucasP.BersaminissuedanOrder
findingprobablecauseagainstalltheaccusedandapprovedthe
recommendation oftheCityProsecutorthatthe chargebenon
bailable.Thecorrespondingwarrantsofarrestwereissued.6
_______________
5Id.,atp.87.
6Id.,atp.98.

76

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSAN
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
Areturn7 onthewarrantofarrestwasmadebyPO3JoselitoM.
Coronel,PNPCriminalInvestigationandDetectionGroup,Camp
Crame, Quezon City, with the information that except for
MargielynTafalla,whoremainedatlarge,allotheraccusedwere
alreadydetainedattheMakatiCityJail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by
JudgeBersaminsettingthecaseforarraignmentonNovember20,
2001.Privaterespondentsonthesamedayfiledanurgentmotion
tofixbail.
OnNovember20,2001,privaterespondents,whenarraigned,
enteredpleasofnotguilty.TheProsecutionwasrequiredtofile
theircomment/oppositiononprivaterespondentsmotiontofix
bail which they did through the Private Prosecutor with the
conformityofAssistantCityProsecutorArthurO.Malabaguio.8
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order
reconsideringhisearlierOrderofNovember7,2001bydeclaring
thattheoffensechargedisbailable.Infindingthattheaccusedare
entitledtobail,JudgeBersaminmadethefollowingdisquisitions:
xxx
InordertoimposethepenaltyoflifeimprisonmenttodeathunderSec.1,
P.D.No.1689,theestafaorswindlingmustbecommittedbyasyndicate.
Thelawplainlystatesthat asyndicateconsistsof fiveormore persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,

transaction, enterprise, or scheme, and the defraudation results in the

misappropriationofmoneyoroffundssolicitedbycorporations/associations
fromthegeneralpublic.
Herein,onlyfourpersonsareactuallycharged.Consequently,theestafa
chargedhasnorelationtothecrimepunishedwithlife imprisonmentto
deathunderSec.1,PresidentialDecreeNo.1689.
The allegation oftheinformationthattheaccusedconspiredwitheach
otherinasyndicatedmannerconsistingoffive(5)or
_______________
7Id.,atp.100.
8Id.,atpp.110118.

77

VOL.482,FEBRUARY9,2006
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with
intentionofcarryingouttheunlawfulorillegalact,transaction,enterpriseor
schemecannotchangethejuridicalnatureoftheoffensecharged. Ifthe
Governmenthaschosentoindictonlyfourpersons,withoutmore,the
obviousreasonisthatonlythepersonsactuallychargedwereinvolved
inthecommissionoftheoffense.Assuch,therewasnosyndicate.
Inalllikelihood,theallegationofinasyndicatedmannerconsistingof
five(5)ormorepersons ismadehereinsolelyforhaving bail denied.
Whetherthatistrueornotisbesidethepoint,buttheCourtcannotnowlend
itselftosuchalikelihoodwhich,accordingtotheforegoingdisquisition,
lackslegalbasis.Forthatmatter,theCourtmustrecantitsapprovalofthe
recommendationtodenybail.
The Prosecution represents that the Supreme Court has affirmed in
Peoplevs.RomeroaconvictionunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1689evenif
theaccusedchargedisonlylessthanfive(5)accused.
Such representation is grossly misleading. Far to the contrary, in
Peoplev.Romero,wheretwoaccusedwereactuallychargedbutonlyone
wasultimatelypenalizedduetothedeathoftheotheraccusedduringthe
pendencyofthecase,theSupremeCourtdidnotimposethehigherpenalty
of life imprisonment to death because the Prosecution failed to clearly
establishthatthecorporationwasasyndicate,asdefinedunderthelaw,

holding,instead,that,sincethecrimewasnotcommittedbyasyndicate,the
properpenaltyisthatprovidedinthesecondparagraphofSec.1,P.D.No.
1689,towit:

Whennotcommittedbyasyndicateasabovedefined,thepenaltyimposableshall
be reclusiontemporaltoreclusionperpetua iftheamountofthefraudexceeds
100,000.00pesos.

Yet, one should ask: Where, as here, the amount alleged in the
information clearly exceeds 100,000.00 pesos such that the second
paragraphofSec.1,P.D.No.1689,isapplicable,istheoffensestillbailable
considering that the range of the imposable penalty is from reclusion
temporaltoreclusionperpetua?
Theanswerisintheaffirmative.
Under Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information
shouldaver,amongothers,thequalifyingandaggravat
78

78

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANN
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
ingcircumstancesoftheoffenseinordinaryandconciselanguageandnot
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enableapersonofcommonunderstandingtoknowwhatoffenseisbeing
chargedaswellasitsqualifyingandaggravatingcircumstanceandforthe
courttopronouncejudgment.
Aperusaloftheinformationdiscloses thatnoaggravatingcircumstance
hasbeenallegedintheinformation.Theomissionconsequentlyprecludes
theStatefromprovinganyaggravatingcircumstancewhichwillraisethe
penaltytoitsmaximumperiodofreclusionperpetua.TheCourtitselfisalso
prohibited from imposing reclusion perpetua, since the requirement of
complete allegationsoftheparticulars intheindictmentisbasedonthe
rightoftheaccusedtobefullyinformedofthenatureofthechargesagainst
himsothathemayadequatelyprepareforhisdefensepursuanttothedue
processclauseoftheConstitution.
As stated in People v. Romero, supra, the penalty under the second
paragraphofSec.1,P.D.No.1689, whenthereisneithermitigatingor
aggravatingcircumstanceattendant,isthemediumperiodof reclusion
temporal,thatisfromsixteen(16)yearsandone(1)daytotwenty(20)
years.
Hence,theoffensechargedisunquestionablybailable.9

OnDecember26,2001,petitionerfiledwiththeCAapetitionfor
certiorari withprayerfortemporaryrestrainingorderand/orwrit
ofpreliminaryinjunction10 assailingtheOrderofJudgeBersamin
allowingprivaterespondentstopostbail.
Onthesameday,thenAssociateJusticeRomeoJ.Callejo,Sr., 11
Justice on Duty Per Office Memorandum of Presiding Justice,
issuedaResolution12 grantingpetitionersprayerfortheissuance
ofatemporaryrestrainingorder,thus,privaterespondentsandall
those acting for and in their behalf were temporarily restrained
fromenforcingandimplementingthe
_______________

9Id.,atpp.5457.
10DocketedasCAG.R.SPNo.68287.
11NowaMemberofthisCourt.
12Rollo,p.166.

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VOL.482,FEBRUARY9,2006
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
OrderofJudgeBersaminandfromfurtherproceedinginCriminal
CaseNo.01105430.
However, unknown to petitioner, private respondents had
alreadyfiledorpostedtheirsuretybondsonDecember21,2001
with the Office of Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa13 who
approvedthesameonthesamedayandorderedtheimmediate
releaseofprivaterespondentsunlessheldforotherlawfulcause.14
PetitionerfiledasupplementalpetitionwiththeCAonJanuary14,
2002assailingthe jurisdiction ofJudgeZenarosa inissuing the
OrderdatedDecember21,2001.
OnJune14,2002,theCAissueditsassaileddecisiondenying
duecoursetothepetitionanddismissedthesameafteritfoundno
graveabuseofdiscretioncommittedbyJudgeBersaminandJudge
Zenarosainissuingtheassailedorders.
Hence, the instant petition filed by petitioner raising the

followingissues,towit:
A
Whether or not the issuance of the questioned Decision
promulgatedJune14,2002bythe17thDivisionoftheCourtof
Appeals sustaining the validity of the 1st assailed Order dated
December18,2001ofHon.PresidingJudgeLucasP.Bersaminof
Branch96oftheRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCityrulingthat
thereshouldbeatleastfive(5)personsthatmustbechargedunder
Section1,PresidentialDecreeNo.1689isnotinaccordancewith
laworwithapplicabledecisionsofthisHonorableSupremeCourt.
B
WhetherornotthequestionedDecisionsanctioningthegrantof
bailinthe1stassailedOrderdatedDecember18,2001ofHon.
PresidingJudgeLucasP.BersaminofBranch96oftheRegional
TrialCourtofQuezonCityviolatedSection7,Rule114ofthe
RevisedRulesofCriminalProcedureandactuallydepartedfrom
the
_______________

13NowAssociateJusticeoftheCourtofAppeals.
14Rollo,p.58.

80

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSAN
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
accepted andusual coursein thedetermination ofbailabilityof
criminaloffenses.
C
Whether or not the questioned Decision sustaining the order of
release in the 2nd assailed Order dated December 21 of Hon.
ExecutiveJudgeMoninaA.ZenarosaoftheRegionalTrialCourt
ofQuezonCityviolatedSection17,Rule114oftheRevisedRules
ofCriminalProcedure15
Anentthefirstissue,petitionercontendsthatunderSection1of

P.D.No.1689,thetermanypersonmustbeunderstoodandread
in its singular meaning so that even only one person can be
indictedforcommittingestafaorotherformsofswindlingin
relationtoP.D.No.1689citingthecaseofPeoplev.Romero;that
Judge Bersamin erred when he already computed the possible
penaltyincaseofprivaterespondentsconviction;thatthecapital
natureofanoffenseforthepurposeofbailabilityisdeterminedby
thepenaltyprescribedbylaw,notbypenaltywhichmayactually
beimposedsincethelatterrequiresaconsiderationoftheevidence
ontrial;thatsincenoevidencehadyetbeenpresentedbyboth
prosecutionanddefense,JudgeBersaminhasagainshownbiasby
already computing the imposable penalty just to stretch the
application of the law and questionably grant bail in favor of
privaterespondents.
Wearenotpersuaded.
TheCAfoundthattheassailedorderofJudgeBersamincannot
becharacterizedasoneissuedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionforhe
correctly determined that the Information did not charge a
syndicatedEstafa;thatwithonlyfourchargedintheinformation,it
couldnotbeconsideredascommittedbyasyndicatewhichmust
consistoffiveormorepersonsandhecannotbefaultedforthat.
_______________
15Id.,at.p.19.

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VOL.482,FEBRUARY9,2006
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, increasing the penalty for certain
formsofswindlingorestafa,provides:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other
formsofswindlingasdefinedinArticles315and316oftheRevisedPenal
Code,asamended,shallbepunishedbylifeimprisonmenttodeathifthe
swindling(estafa)iscommittedbyasyndicateconsistingoffiveormore
personsformedwiththeintentionofcarryingouttheunlawfulorillegalact,

transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the

misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of
ruralbankscooperatives,samahangnayon(s),orfarmersassociations,or
offundssolicitedbycorporations/associationsfromthegeneralpublic.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty
imposableshallbereclusiontemporaltoreclusionperpetuaiftheamountof
thefraudexceeds100,000pesos.

Clearly,P.D.No.1689penalizesoffenderswithlifeimprisonment
to death regardless of the amount involved, provided that a
syndicatecommittedthecrime.Asyndicateisdefinedinthesame
law as consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intentionofcarryingouttheunlawfulorillegalact,transaction,
enterpriseorscheme.Underthesecondparagraph,itisprovided
thatiftheoffendersarenotmembersofasyndicate,theyshall
neverthelessbeheldliablefortheactsprohibitedbythelawbut
they shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetuaiftheamountofthefraudismorethanP100,000.00.
Petitionersinterpretationthatthetermanypersoninthefirst
paragraphofsection1couldmeanthatevenonepersoncanbe
indictedforsyndicatedestafaiscontrarytotheprovisionofthe
law.Itbearsstressingthatthelawmustbeconsideredasawhole,
justasitisnecessarytoconsiderasentenceinitsentiretyinorder
to grasp its true meaning.16 It is a dangerous practice to base
constructionupononlyapart
_______________

16JudgeNoliC.Diaz,StatutoryConstruction,2001edition,p.35.

82

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSAN
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
of a section since one portion may be qualified by the other
portion.17 In fact, there is no need for any construction or
interpretationofP.D.No.1689sincethelawisclearandfreefrom
anydoubtorambiguity.Section1ofP.D.No.1689hasdefined

what constitutes a syndicate and such definition is controlling.

Wherearequirementismadeinexplicitandunambiguousterms,
no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its
mandateisobeyed.18
In this case, the Information specifically charged only four
personswithoutspecifyinganyotherpersonwhohadparticipated
in the commission of the crime charged, thus, based on the
definitionofsyndicateunderthelaw,thecrimechargedwasnot
committedbyasyndicate.Wefindnoreversibleerrorcommitted
bytheCAwhenitupheldtherulingofJudgeBersaminthatwith
only four persons actually charged, the estafa charged has no
relation to the crime punished with life imprisonment to death
undersection1ofP.D.No.1689.
The wordings in the information that the accused conspired
witheachotherinasyndicatedmannerconsistingoffive(5)or
morepersonsthroughcorporationsregisteredwiththeSecurities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign
entitieswithintentionofcarryingouttheunlawfulorillegalact,
transaction,enterpriseorschemeisnotsufficientcompliancewith
therequirementsofthelawonwhatconstituteasyndicate.Itbears
stressingthatthefirstparagraphoftheaccusatoryportionofthe
Informationchargesonlyfourpersons.Torepeat,P.D.No.1689
hasprovidedforthedefinitionofasyndicateanditiscontrolling.
Ascorrectlyfoundbythetrialcourt,ifthegovernmenthaschosen
toindictonlyfourpersons,withoutmore,theobviousreasonis
that only the persons actually charged were involved in the
commissionoftheoffense,thus,therewasnosyndicate.
_______________
17Id.
18LuzonSuretyCo.,Inc.v.DeGarcia,140Phil.509,514;30SCRA111,116

(1969).
83

VOL.482,FEBRUARY9,2006

Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
PetitionersrelianceinPeoplev.Romerotosupporthisargument
ismisleading. First,theissueofwhetheronlyonepersoncanbe
indictedforsyndicatedestafawasnotanissueintheRomerocase.
Secondly, the Court did not impose the penalty of life
imprisonmenttodeathontheaccusedsincetheprosecutionfailed
toclearlyestablishthatthecorporationwasasyndicateasdefined
underthelaw.Thereisnootherwayofestablishingasyndicate
under P.D. No. 1689 than by the adherence to the definition
providedbylaw.
Sincethecrimechargedwasnotcommittedbyasyndicateas
definedunderthelaw,thepenaltyoflifeimprisonmenttodeath
cannot be imposed on private respondents. Judge Bersamin is
correct when he ruled that private respondents could only be
punishedwithreclusiontemporaltoreclusionperpetuaincaseof
convictionsincetheamountofthefraudexceedsP100,000.00.The
nextquestionis,whetherJudgeBersaminiscorrectinfindingthat
thecrimechargedisbailabledespitethattheimposablepenalty
rangesfromreclusiontemporaltoreclusionperpetua?
TheCourtanswersintheaffirmative.
Sections8and9ofRule110oftheRevisedRulesofCriminal
Procedure,whichtookeffectonDecember1,2000,provide:
Sec.8.Designationoftheoffense.Thecomplaintorinformationshallstate
thedesignationoftheoffensegivenbythestatute,avertheactsoromissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.Ifthereisnodesignationoftheoffense,referenceshallbe
madetothesectionorsubsectionofthestatutepunishingit.
Sec.9.Causeoftheaccusations.Theactsoromissionscomplainedof
asconstitutingtheoffenseandthequalifyingandaggravatingcircumstances
mustbestatedinordinaryandconciselanguageandnotnecessarilyinthe
languageusedinthestatutebutintermssufficienttoenableapersonof
commonunderstandingtoknowwhatoffenseisbeingchargedaswellasits
qualifyingandaggravatingcircumstancesandforthecourttopronounce
judgment.

84

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Clearly,itisnowarequirementthattheaggravatingaswellasthe
qualifyingcircumstancesbeexpresslyandspecificallyallegedin
the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
consideredbythetrialcourtintheirjudgment,even,iftheyare
subsequentlyprovedduringtrial.19 AreadingoftheInformation
shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating
circumstance,thusJudgeBersaminiscorrectwhenhefoundthat
thelesserpenalty,i.e.,reclusiontemporal,isimposableincaseof
conviction.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that all
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusionperpetua whenevidenceofguiltisstrong,shallbefore
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on
recognizanceasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Inpursuancethereof,
Section4ofRule114,asamended,nowprovidesthatallpersons
incustodyshall,beforeconvictionbyaregionaltrialcourtofan
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment,beadmittedtobailasamatterofright.Sincethe
imposablepenaltyonprivaterespondents,incaseofconviction,is
reclusiontemporal,theyareentitledtobailasamatterofright.
Notably,JudgeBersaminissuedhisOrderfindingthecrimecharge
bailable and fixed the amount of P150,000.00 each for the
provisionallibertyofprivaterespondentsonlyafterpetitionerhad
submittedtheircomment/oppositiontopetitionersmotiontofix
bail.
Petitioner claims that the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing
privaterespondentstopostbailalreadyprejudgedthecase;thathe
summarily decided the eventual and imminent dismissal of the
criminal casewithout eventhereception ofevidence; that such
prejudgmentcamefromarulingonamereissueofbail.

_______________
19Peoplev.Casitas,Jr.,445Phil.407,427;397SCRA382,398399(2003);

Peoplev.Bragat,416Phil.829,844;364SCRA425,437(2001).
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VOL.482,FEBRUARY9,2006
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
Suchargumentisbaseless.TheOrderwasissuedonthebasisthat
theallegationsintheInformationdonotestablishthatthecrime
chargedwascommittedbyasyndicateasdefinedunderthelaw
wherethepenaltyoflifeimprisonmenttodeathcouldbeimposed.
Nowhere in the Order did Judge Bersamin state that the act
complainedofisnotpunishableatall.
Petitionernextcontendsthatprivaterespondentsfilingofbail
with Executive Judge Monina Zenarosa, other than Branch 96
wherethecaseispending,isquestionableandnotinaccordance
with Section 17, Rule 11420 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure; that the records show that when private respondents
filed their bail with Judge Zenarosa, Branch 96 was open and
availableasprivaterespondentsthroughtheirrepresentativewere
abletopayfortheissuanceofthecertificationsontheInformation
andtheOrderdatedDecember18,2001;thatpetitionerscounsel
and the Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur Malabaguio had
personally received their respective copies of the Order dated
December18,2001insidethestaffroomofBranch96andthey
even attested that Judge Bersamin was physically present on
December21,2002,thedayprivaterespondentsfiledtheirbail
bondwithJudgeZenarosa;thatdespitethesecircumstances,Judge
Zenarosastillexercisedjurisdictionoverthebailfiledbyprivate
respondents and issued the Order dated December 21, 2001
approving the surety bonds and ordering the release of private
respondents; that the CAs justification that Judge Zenarosa
acceptedthebailbondduetothefactthatJudge
_______________

20SECTION17.Bail,wherefiled.(a)Bailintheamountfixedmaybefiled
withthecourtwherethecaseispending,or,intheabsenceorunavailabilityofthe
judgethereof,withanotherbranchofthesamecourtwithintheprovinceorcity.If
theaccusedisarrestedinaprovince,cityormunicipalityotherthanwherethe
caseispending,bailmaybefiledalsowithanyregionaltrialcourtofsaidplace,
or,ifnojudgethereofisavailable,withanymetropolitantrialjudge,municipal
trialjudgeormunicipalcircuittrialjudgetherein.
86

86

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSAN
Catiisvs.CourtofAppeals
Bersaminwasmomentarilyoutofhisofficeorpremisesatthetime
ofpostingofthebondwasnotbornebytherecords.
Wearenotpersuaded.
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedureprovidesthatbailintheamountfixedmaybefiledwith
the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or
unavailabilityofthejudgethereof,withanotherbranchofthesame
courtwithintheprovinceorcity.WhileBranch96isopenand
available on the day private respondents posted their bail with
JudgeZenarosa,itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatJudgeBersamin
wasavailableatthatprecisemoment.Althoughitisallegedinthe
supplemental petition prepared by petitioners counsel, Atty.
RodeoNuez,withtheconformityofProsecutorMalabaguiofiled
beforetheCAthatbothofthemsawJudgeBersamindischarging
hisfunctiononthatday,itisnotunderoath.Moreover,itisnot
specifically stated in the supplemental petition that at the exact
time Judge Zenarosa approved the bail, Judge Bersamin was
available. Thus, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that
official duty had been regularly performed 21 by Judge Zenarosa
undertherules.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED.TheassaileddecisionoftheCourtofAppealsdatedJune
14,2002isAFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.

Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), YnaresSantiago and

ChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.
Callejo,Sr.,J.,Nopart.
Petitiondenied,assaileddecisionaffirmed.
Notes.Everyjudgeshouldknowbyheartthatinindictments
forcapitaloffenseslikesyndicatedestafa,bailshallnot
_______________

21RULESOFCOURT,Rule131,Section3(m).

87

VOL.482,FEBRUARY9,2006
MaricalumMiningCorporationvs.
be granted when the evidence of guilt is strong. (Bitoon vs.
ToledoMupas,466SCRA17[2005])
An information needs only to allege the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense, the accompanying
detailscanbeestablishedduringtrialthroughevidentiaryoffer.
(Cruzvs.Sandiganbayan,467SCRA52[2005])
o0o
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