February 26, 2013: TESP10701R0/KSB

February 26, 2013
TESP10701R0/KSB
TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
SCOPE
2.
INTRODUCTION
3.
SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1
4.2
4.3
5.
Message Performance
System Performance
RELIABILITY AND SYSTEM DESIGN

6.1
6.2
7.
General SAS Functionality

Bay Level Functions
System/Station Level Functions
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
5.1
5.2
General System Design

System Architecture
Ethernet Topology
Reliability Aspects
General Design Requirements
IEC 61850 AND IEC 62439-1 COMMUNICATION PROFILE

7.1
7.2
Introduction Related to IEC 61850

Typical Architecture and Required Communication Services Related to IEC 61850
8.
CONFIGURATION TOOLS/SERVICE AND SUPPORT SYSTEM
9.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
9.1
9.2
10.
PROJECT EXECUTION
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
11.
Compliance With Standards

Vendors/SOLUTION PROVIDERS experience and Proposal for the SAS
Engineering
Factory Acceptance Test (FAT)
SAT (Site Acceptance Test)/Pre-commissioning and Commissioning
Design and Operating Requirements
Services, After Sales and Maintenance
DOCUMENTATION
TESP10701R0/KSB
Date of Approval: February 26, 2013
PAGE 2 OF 119
12.
CYBER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
13.
KEMA CERTIFICATION
14.
ADDITIONAL SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM
15.
DRAWINGS
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
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1.0
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
SCOPE
This Transmission Engineering Standard (TES) specifies Substation Automation System
(SAS) required for 110kV through 380kV system voltage for the transmission system of
National Grid, Saudi Arabia.
2.0
INTRODUCTION
2.1
The Substation Automation System (SAS) shall be installed to monitor, control and
protect all the substation equipment connected to SAS. Monitoring and control shall
be from the remote control center (Power Control Center/SCADA Master Stations)
as well through local means within the substation (e.g. Bay Oriented Local Control
with Mimic, Local HMI contained in the Control IED and Station HMI).
The Substation Automation System (SAS) comprises full station and bay protection
as well as control, monitoring and communication functions and provides all
functions required for the safe and reliable operation of the substation. It shall enable
local station control via a PC by means of a human machine interface (HMI) and
control software package, which shall contain an extensive range of Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) functions. It shall include Communications
Gateway, station bus, inter-bay bus, time synchronization system and intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs) for bay control & protection.
The attached diagram entitled, Substation Automation System Diagram
(Conceptual), Fig 07-01, is conceptual drawings for substation SAS configuration.
The Communications Gateway shall enable and secure the information flow with
remote Power Control Center and other remote Master Stations. Besides performing
protocol conversion, the Communications Gateway will perform Network/Port
Address Translation from internal SAS IP/Port addresses to external IP/Port
addresses in integrated units/computers.
The station bus shall provide the interconnections between the station level
subsystems (Front End/Station computer, Operators Workstation, Engineers
Workstation, printer etc.). The inter-bay bus shall provide independent station-to-bay
and bay-to-bay data exchange. The bay level intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) for
protection and control shall provide the direct connection to the switchgear without
the need of interposing components and perform control, protection, and monitoring
functions.
The SAS control and monitoring system (SCMS) shall implement a network
redundancy based on IEC62439-3 PRP 1 (Parallel Redundancy Protocol) as shown
in the attached Substation Automation System Diagram (Conceptual), Drawing Fig
07-01, and as further explained in this Standard. Implementation of IEC62439-3 PRP
1 (Parallel Redundancy Protocol) applies to both the station LAN and bay LAN at all
voltage levels.
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
2.2
All the SAS components shall comply with latest revision of SEC standards
wherever applicable.
2.3
Summary of Main Functional Parts of SAS
TESP10701R0/KSB
2.3.1
As a summary, the SAS shall contain (but may not be limited) to the
following main functional parts:
2.3.2
Bay Control Intelligent Electronic Devices (Control IEDs) for control and
monitoring.
2.3.3
Bay Protection Intelligent Electronic Devices (Protection IEDs) for the

internal substation's protection applications as well as for protection of
external equipment connected to the substation.
2.3.4
Unless otherwise specified, combined control/protection IEDs with the

control IED function and protection IED function (for each item of
switchgear to be controlled) may be combined into one unit. Combined
control/protection IEDs are to be used at the medium voltage levels only
(34.5 kV and below).
2.3.5
Redundant Managed hardened Ethernet switches providing managed

Ethernet Local Area Networks communications infrastructure.
2.3.6
Supporting Power Supply equipment such as inverters UPS, etc.
2.3.7
Peripheral equipment like printers, display units, key boards, Mouse, KVM
switches, etc.
2.3.8
Station Human Machine Interface (Station HMI)/ Station with process

database. The Station HMI shall contain as minimum: fully redundant two (2)
Front End/ Station Computers, fully redundant two (2) Operator's
Workstation, fully redundant one (1) Engineering Workstation, and related
applications software, operating systems and firmware to support full Station
HMI operation.
2.3.9
Separate Redundant Communications Gateway for remote supervisory

control via SCADA Master Station(s) and for interconnecting external SOE
Master Stations. One side of each Communications Gateway shall face the
internal SAS Inter-bay bus using IEC 61850 and the other side of each
Communications Gateway shall face the external SCADA and SOE Master
Stations which will communicate using IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 608705-104
protocols, and support IEC 61850 communication with SCADA master
stations for future use.
2.3.9
Redundant GPS Receivers (e.g. Master Clock).
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
2.3.10 Redundant standalone Firewalls to provide one of the means for cyber
security for the SAS.
2.3.11 Quantities of VF Modems to support the IEC-101 interconnections between
the SCADA Master Stations and the redundant Communications Gateways.
2.3.12 Collection of the relevant data concerning the substation and distribution of
the data where needed.
2.3.13 Data exchange between the different system components via the inter-bay
bus (for data exchange between bay level IEDs) and other communications
buses (such as station bus for interconnecting the station level subsystems:
Operators Workstations, Engineering Workstation, Front End Computers,
and Printers etc).
2.3.14 Bay-oriented local control panels with mimic diagram. One of the functions
of the Bay-Oriented local control panels with mimic diagram is to provide
emergency local operation of related Bay switchgear in the event of failure
and/or disabling of the Bay Control IED(s).
2.3.15 Local Control Cubicles (LCCs) for all High Voltage (above the medium
voltage (34.5 kV and below) level) switchgear which will be installed in the
related High Voltage GIS Switchgear Rooms which will house/contain the
Control IEDs, Bay-oriented local control panels with Mimic Diagram and
required Annunciator Panels.
2.3.16 For the Medium Voltage level (34.5 kV voltage and below), unless otherwise
specified differently in other sections/appendices of the main PTS,
combined Control/Protection IEDs which are to be mounted/installed in the
Low Voltage Compartments of the Metal Clad Medium Voltage Switchgear
as specified in latest revision of 32-TMSS-01 (for Metal Clad Switchgear)
and as specified in latest revision of 32-TMSS-03,( Metal Clad GIS
Switchgear), and with these IEDs fully integrated into this Metal Clad
Switchgear by the SAS Solution provider /Sub Solution provider .
2.3.17 SAS Cubicles/Panels which will contain SAS equipment which includes,
computers, Ethernet switches, firewalls/routers, VF modems, maintenance
displays, common alarm panels and related annunciators, terminal blocks,
MCBs, internal cabling/wiring, etc.
2.3.18 Protection Cubicles/Panels which will contain Protection IEDs. terminal
blocks, physical switches, MCBs, auxiliary relays, internal cabling/wiring,
etc.
2.3.19 All cabling/wiring/terminations required to provide for a fully functional
SAS installation to be provided/installed by the SAS Solution provider and
interconnected between SAS equipment as well as any SAS equipment and
external Communications/WAN/LAN equipment. The only exception to this
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
cabling/wiring requirement will be the cabling/wiring between the Control

IEDs and external switchgear, the Protection IEDs and external switchgear,
and thecombined Control/Protection IEDs and the external switchgear which
can be run and terminated at the switchgear end by the Substation Solution
Provider . (however for the IED to switchgear cable connections at the IED
end and this cable termination shall be performed by the SAS Solution
provider).
2.3.20 Other devices, equipment and software (not mentioned above) which will
provide for a fully integrated and operational SAS at the substation.
2.4
TESP10701R0/KSB
Definition of Terms
2.4.1
HMI
Human Machine Interface: Display screen, either part of an IED or as a
stand-alone device, presenting relevant data in a logical format, with which
the user interacts. An HMI will typically present windows, icons, menus,
pointers, and may include a keypad to enable user access and interaction.
2.4.2
IED
Intelligent Electronic Device: Any device incorporating one or more
processors, with the capability to receive or send, data/control from, or to an
external source, for example electronic multifunction meters, digital relays,
controllers. Device capable of executing the behavior of one, or more,
specified logical nodes in a particular context and delimited by its interfaces.
Also see definitions relating to Protection IED, and Control IED.
2.4.3
Bay
A substation consists of closely connected sub parts with some common
functionality. Examples are the switchgear between an incoming or outgoing
line, and the bus bar, the bus coupler with its circuit breaker and related
isolators and earthing switches, the transformer with its related switchgear
between the two bus bars representing the two voltage levels. The bay
concept may be applied to 1 1/2 breaker and double bus substation
arrangements by grouping the primary circuit breakers and associated
equipment into a virtual bay. These bays comprise a power system subset to
be protected, for example a transformer of a line end, and the control of its
switchgear that has some common restrictions such as mutual interlocking or
well-defined operation sequences. The identification of such subparts is
important for maintenance purposes (what parts may be switched off at the
same time with minimum impact on the rest of the substation) or for
extension plans (what has to be added if a new line is to be linked in). These
subparts are called 'bay' and may be managed by devices with the generic
name 'bay controller' and have protection systems called 'bay protection'. The
bay level represents an additional control level below the overall station
level.
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2.4.4
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Bay Level Functions

Functions that use mainly the data of one bay and act mainly on the primary
equipment of that bay. Bay level functions communicate via logical interface
3 within the bay level and via logical interfaces 4 and 5 to the process level,
i.e. with any kind of remote input/output or with intelligent sensors and
actuators. Control and data acquisition functions related to the bay level
functions may be performed at the bay level Control IED(s)/Local
HMI(s)/Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic Diagram, or indirectly
through the station HMI interface or the SCADA Master Station(s).
Protection functions related to the bay level functions are performed through
the bay level Protection IED(s) dedicated specifically for protective relaying
function(s).
TESP10701R0/KSB
2.4.5
Station Level Functions

Functions applying to the whole substation. There are two classes of station
level functions i.e. process related station level functions and interface related
station level functions. Control and data acquisition functions which are
related to the station level functions for each substation indicated in Section
2.1 and which may include control and data acquisition from the local HMI,
Station HMI, and with the SCADA Master Station(s) providing external
(outside the substation) control and data acquisition capabilities.
2.4.6
Process:
The scheme which contains the actual conventional switchgear which
includes Breakers, Disconnect Switches, Tap Changers, Instrument
transformers and all instrumentation like Gas Density Monitors, etc.
2.4.7
Process Level Functions

All functions interfacing to the process, i.e. binary and analogue input/output
functions for example data acquisition (including sampling) and the issuing
of commands. These functions communicate via the logical interfaces 4 and 5
to the bay level.
2.4.8
Process Related Station Level functions

Use data from more than one bay, or from each whole substation and act on
the primary equipment of more than one bay, or on the primary equipment of
each whole substation. Examples of such functions are: station wide
interlocking, automatic sequencers, and bus bar protection. These functions
communicate mainly via logical node 8.
2.4.9
Station HMI
The set of computers/workstations and other equipment inside each
substation where control, data acquisition, monitoring, configuration of SAS
equipment and other SAS functions on a station level takes place.
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2.4.10 Front End Computers/Station Computers

The set of computers where data gets directly transferred between the IEDs
(for recording/data acquisition and control functionality), and where
interfaces are provided for the Operator's and Engineering Workstations.
2.4.11 Local HMI
The set of equipment inside each substation where control, data acquisition,
alarms, configuration of SAS equipment, and other SAS functions on a bay
level takes place.
2.4.12 Operator Workstation
The computer (s),which are contained as part of the Station HMI and where
substation control/data acquisition, alarms/events/trends/disturbance records
recording/retrieval and other SAS equipment manufacturers recommended
functions are displayed and takes place. It is noted that the Operator's
Workstations and Engineering Workstation shall be dedicated separate
computers with separate dedicated displays, keyboards, and mice.
2.4.13 Engineering Workstation
The computer (s) where equipment configurations supported and other SAS
equipment manufacturers functions related to SAS Engineering is allowed to
take place. It is noted that the Operator's Workstation and Engineering
Workstation shall be dedicated separate computers with separate dedicated
displays, keyboards, and mice.
2.4.14 Control IED
An intelligent electronic device that provides for control functions on a bay
level. Depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, data acquisition
functions may also be provided as part of the Control IED. Also, depending
on the equipment manufacturer's design, a Local HMI may be integrated as
part of the Control IED, or the Control IED may be separate from the Local
HMI. As part of the design of the Control IED, there shall be a requirement
for IEC 61850 compatibility. For the purposes of this standard, Control IEDs
shall be physically separate devices from Protection IEDs, with dedicated
Control IEDs being installed for all voltage levels above the Medium
Voltage level, and where related Appendix of the main PTS specifies
dedicated Control IEDs at the Medium Voltage Level.
2.4.15 Protection IED
An intelligent electronic device that provides for protective relay functions,
primarily on a bay level. Depending on the equipment manufacturer's design,
the Protection IED may provide for a single protective relay function, or
multiple protective relay functions in the same Protection IED unit. Also,
depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, additional
features/functions of the Protection IED may include status recording
functions (such as fault recording and other status recording functions), data
acquisition and other features. Also, Protection IED's shall be considered as
Protective Relays which are integrated in the SAS and with IEC 61850
connectivity/functionality. For the purposes of this standard, Protection IEDs
shall be physically separate devices from Control IEDs, with dedicated
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Protection IEDs being installed for all voltage levels above the Medium
Voltage level, and where related Appendix of the main PTS to this standard
specifies dedicated Protection IEDs at the Medium Voltage Level.
2.4.16 Combined Control/Protection IED
An intelligent electronic device that provides for combined control and
protection functions on a bay level. Depending on the equipment
manufacturer's design, data acquisition functions may also be provided as
part of the Combined Control/Protection IED. Also, depending on the
equipment manufacturer's design, the combined Control/Protection IED may
provide for a single protective relay function, or multiple protective relay
functions in the same combined Control/Protection IED unit. Also,
depending on the equipment manufacturer's design, additional
features/functions of the combined Control/Protection IED may include
status recording functions (such as fault recording and other status recording
functions), and other features. Also, combined Control/Protection IED's shall
be considered as Protective Relays which are integrated in the SAS and with
IEC 61850 connectivity/functionality Also, depending on the equipment
manufacturer's design, a Local HMI may be integrated as part of the
combined Control/Protection IED, or the combined Control/Protection IED
may be separate from the Local HMI. For the purposes of this Standard,
combined Control/Protection IEDs shall be provided for all Medium Voltage
(34.5 kV and below) applications, unless separate dedicated Control IEDs,
and separate dedicated Protection IEDs are specified for some or all of the
Medium Voltage applications in the main PTS.
2.4.17 Station Bus
The medium through which communications takes place among the station
level subsystems such as Operators Workstation, Engineering Workstation,
Front End Computers, Printers etc. Station bus shall be fully compliant with
IEC 62439-3 (PRP1).
2.4.18 Inter-Bay Bus:
The medium through which communications takes place between the baylevel IEDs and the station HMI interface and which protection, control and
data acquisition/monitoring signals for the SAS pass through. The Inter-Bay
Bus shall be fully compliant with IEC 61850 for all voltage levels of the
substation, and also will be fully compliant with IEC-62439-3 PRP1 for all
voltage levels of the substation.
2.4.19 Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic Diagram
A panel, which is installed on a bay level which provides for local indication
of switchgear status, limited alarm indication, other sets of limited readings,
and local switchgear control (on an emergency basis upon failure of a Control
IED and/or local HMI.
2.4.20 Time Synchronization System: A redundant set of GPS receivers which
provide for time synchronization data to all equipment contained as part of
the SAS within each substation.
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
2.4.21 Communications Gateway

A set of redundant equipment which will provide for communications
interfacing between the SAS and equipment outside of each substation, and
which will also provide for required protocol conversions as needed for the
SAS to communicate with Master Station equipment outside each substation.
2.4.22 SCADA Master Station(s)
The station(s) (outside of each substation) where remote control and remote
data acquisition functions are performed for each substation. For purposes of
the SAS, interfacing between the station SAS and the SCADA Master
Station(s) will be through the Communications Gateways.
2.4.23 SOE Master Station
The station (outside of each substation) where SOE (Sequence of Events)
information which eventually gets routed to. For purposes of the SAS,
interfacing between the station SAS and the SOE Master Station will be
through Communications Gateways.
2.4.24 PTS
Project Technical Specification, which is the same as the Scope of Work and
Technical Specifications (SOW/TS).
Additional Definitions Relating to IEC 61850
For additional definitions relating to IEC 61850, refer to the latest revision of IEC
TS 61850-2.
3.0
SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
General System Design

3.1.1
The Substation Automation System (SAS) shall be suitable for operation,

monitoring, and maintenance of each complete substation including future
extensions which are identified in this entire standard document. The offered
products shall be suitable for efficient and reliable operation under the
environmental conditions specified in Section 14.
3.1.1
The systems shall be: State-of-the art based on IEC61850 for operation under
electrical conditions present in high-voltage substations, follow the latest
engineering practice & ensure long term compatibility requirements,
continuity of equipment supply and the safety of the operating staff.
3.1.2
The offered SAS shall support remote control and monitoring from remote
SCADA Master Stations via Communications Gateways.
3.1.3
The offered SAS shall provide for SOE (Sequence of Events) points support
and overall SOE functions, with SOE monitoring information forwarded to
both the Station HMI and the external SOE Master Station (which is located
outside of the substation) through the Communications Gateways.
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
3.1.4
The offered SAS shall provide for Protective Relay functions, (through baylevel Protection IEDs) for each substation.
3.1.5
The offered SAS shall provide for the substations interlocking functions,
both through hard-wired interlocks in the substation as well as a system of
software/GOOSE interlocks.
3.1.6
The offered SAS shall provide for other miscellaneous functions related to
substation control, data acquisition, protection and other functions as
described elsewhere in this Standard and the related Main PTS and other
Appendices to the Main PTS.
3.1.7
The system shall be designed such that personnel with little background
knowledge in microprocessor-based technology are able to operate the
system
easily after
having
received
some
basic
training.
Installation/Maintenance/Operating Manuals/ documentation describing the
features and functions of the system shall be provided. Necessary 'HELP'
files shall be built into the HMI and database software. Also, the Operator
Interface (through the Engineering Workstation and Operator's Workstation)
shall be intuitive such that operating personnel shall be able to operate the
system easily after having received basic training on the SAS.
3.1.8
Cubicles shall incorporate the control, monitoring and protection functions

specified, self-monitoring, signaling and testing facilities, measuring as well
as memory functions, event recording and disturbance recording. The basic
control functions are to be derived from a modular standardized and typetested software library.
3.1.9
Maintenance, modification or extension of components may not cause a shutdown of the whole SAS. Self-monitoring of single components, modules and
communication shall be incorporated to increase the availability and the
reliability of the equipment and minimize maintenance. In the cases of
modification or extension of components, if a shutdown of the SAS is
required, features, functions and configurations shall be provided to keep the
shutdown time of all or part of the SAS to an absolute minimum.
3.1.10 Preference will be given to suppliers who are in a position to provide

protection and control devices and other devices freely adaptable to the
required application functionality.
3.1.11 The SAS shall be expandable as and when required at the Bay, Station and
Process levels.
3.1.12 As part of the general system design of the SAS, alarm features shall be
included which shall forward alarms to the SCADA Master Station(s) (as
well as the SAS Central Alarm Unit and/or substation Annunciator system
which will be included as part of the SAS) if the SAS determines that any
component of the SAS is not operating properly (with such components
including the station HMI, local HMI, IEDs, Communications Gateways,
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inter-bay bus, Ethernet switches, GPS receivers and other components of the
SAS). For further details refer to Section 14.26 as well as latest revision of
TES-P-119.27 for SCADA points list and 38-TMSS-05 for Alarms list. It
should be noted that these are minimum requirements and the complete lists
to be provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER which will be subject to
review and acceptance.
3.1.13 Generally, part or all of the SAS will be installed inside the substation
building, which will be air conditioned. However in some cases, where
outdoor switchyards are used (refer main PTS) all bay-level unit hardware
(such as Bay Control IEDs and Bay Oriented Local Control Panels with
Mimic Operation) which need to be co-located with the outdoor switchgear
shall be designed and constructed to meet and fully operate without failure in
the outdoor environmental conditions in Saudi Arabia at the substation's
location. Refer to latest revision of standard 01-TMSS-01 (Outdoor
Environmental Conditions) for further details. However in the case of SAS
equipment located inside the substation building, the SAS equipment shall be
operational during both normal indoor conditions, and emergency indoor
conditions for a minimum 12 hour period where there is no heating/air
conditioning inside the substation building (for this matter, refer section 14.
of this standard for further detail on these requirements).
3.2 System Architecture
TESP10701R0/KSB
3.2.1
For safety and availability reasons the Substation Automation System shall
be based on a decentralized architecture and on a concept of bay-oriented
distributed intelligence.
3.2.2
Functions shall be decentralized, object-oriented and located as close as

possible to the process.
3.2.3
The main process information of the station shall be stored in distributed

databases.
3.2.4
The proposed SAS layout shall be structured in three levels, i.e. a Station, a
Bay and a Process level.
3.2.5
The Station level shall provide all the station level functions related to
monitoring, control and protection. It shall consist of the station level
subsystems such as operators workstations, engineering workstation, front
end computers, printers, etc. interconnected via the Station Bus. At bay level
the IEDs shall provide all bay level functions regarding control, monitoring
and protection, inputs for status indication and outputs for commands. The
inter-bay bus shall provide the interconnection between the bay level IEDs
and other bay level IEDs, the bay level IEDs and SAS front end
computers/Communications Gateways, and between SAS front end
computers and SAS Communications Gateways. The IEDs should be directly
connected to the switchgear without any need for additional interposition or
transducers.
It
shall
be
the
responsibility
of
the
SAS
Manufacturer/SOLUTION PROVIDER to determine the proper layout for
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the SAS and the independent from each other and its functioning shall not be
affected by any fault occurring in any of the other bay control units of the
station. The only exception to this section will be for GOOSE interlocks,
where GOOSE interlocking information from one bay control unit to other
bay control units and in the event of the failure of the bay control unit
(Control IED) GOOSE interlocks may not be functional.
3.2.6
The communication buses shall be realized using fiber-optic cables and

substation hardened Ethernet switches thereby guaranteeing disturbance free
communication. To maximize the physical protection of the fiber optic cables,
the fiber optic cables shall be run in GI Conduit pipes or other means
acceptable to the National Grid Saudi Arabia.. Furthermore for the redundant
schemes using Fiber Optic cables, routing of Fiber Optics cables shall be such
that "collapsed ring" schemes and routing of the redundant schemes in the
same routing media shall be avoided.
3.2.7
The communication buses (both station communications bus and inter-bay

communications bus) shall be designed in dual redundant fault-tolerant rings
at all voltage levels. For the links between individual bay IEDs to Ethernet
switches a "star" scheme shall be used. It shall be such that failure of one set
of fibers shall not affect the normal operation of the SAS. However failure of
any fibers shall be alarmed in SAS. Additionally, fiber optics cable
connection shall provide sufficient fibers for the actual connection plus 20%
of overall fibers provided (along with the required fiber optics
termination/connectors) to support ease of replacement in event of failures of
individual working fibers.
3.2.8
To increase system performance and availability

routing/communication buses requirement shall be as follows:
the
cable
a. The inter-bay busses shall be independent and redundant at each voltage

level.
b. Inter-bay buses shall be independent of each other for each voltage level,
as shown in the conceptual diagram, Substation Automation System
Diagram (Conceptual), Drawing Fig 07-01. The detailed requirements
related to the required common interconnections at the different levels
shall be designed by the Manufacturer/Solution provider .
3.2.9
TESP10701R0/KSB
The Station bus shall be fully redundant. At station level, the entire station
shall be controlled and supervised from the station HMI. It shall be possible
to control and monitor the bay from the bay level equipment in the event that
the communication link fails. The station wide interlocking shall also be
available when the station computer, IED(s), communications link, or other
component of the SAS fails. To support station wide interlocking upon failure
of the station computer, IED(s), communications link, or other component,
there shall be hard wired interconnection both within a bay and between the
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required bays for keeping the interlocking intact. For the substation's
interlocking requirements, manufacturer/SOLUTION PROVIDER shall meet
the latest revision requirements of 32-TMSS-01 for metal clad switchgear
(11kV, 13.8kV, 33kV or 34.5kV), 32-TMSS-02 for SF6 GIS (69kV through
380kV) and 32-TMSS-03 for metal clad gas insulated medium voltage
switchgear (11kV, 13.8kV, 33kV OR 34.5kV).
3.2.10 To provide highest reliability the station HMI and the Communications
Gateways shall work completely independent, i.e. the process data can be
retrieved directly from the bay level devices. Additionally the
Communications Gateway, Station HMI, communication buses (inter-bay bus
and station bus), GPS Receiver (which are part of the Time Synchronization
System) and Front End / Station Computer Unit, Firewalls and other related
hardware shall be built and configured fully redundant to ensure full
functionality and avoid single point of failure.
3.2.11 Clear control priorities shall prevent the initiation of operation of a single
switch at the same time from more than one of the available control levels, i.e.
SCADA Master Station(s), station level, bay level or apparatus level. To
ensure that clear control priorities exist, a hierarchy scheme between the
various control levels shall exist.
3.2.12 The priority shall always be on the lowest enabled control level. The station
level contains the station-oriented functions, which cannot be realized at bay
level, e.g. alarm list or event list related to the entire substation's SAS and
Communications Gateway required for the communication with remote
control centers.
3.2.13 Dedicated master clock (GPS Receivers which are part of the Time
Synchronization System) for the synchronization of the entire system shall be
provided. This master clock should be independent of all station computer
equipment and of the Communication Gateway and should synchronize all
devices via the communication buses
3.3
Ethernet Topology
The following described criterias have to be fulfilled concerning the Ethernet
switches and the topology.
3.3.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
Ethernet Switches
a.
The proposed Ethernet (LAN) Switches shall be modular, industrially

hardened, fully manageable and specifically designed to build Ethernet
networks for mission critical, real-time control applications in utility
substation environments.
b.
These hardened requirements include. (but may not be limited to)

temperature, EMC and power supply (DC from the station battery) which
are suitable to be installed in the substation operating at the voltage
PAGE 15 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
levels of the substation (indicated in Section 1 of this Standard, are

included in this specification.
c.
The proposed LAN switches shall be equipped with dual DC (125 VDC)
power supplies.
d.
The switches shall support priority tagging and open standards for ring
management.
e.
External switches are required as they have the advantage that there is no
interruption or reconfiguration of the Ethernet ring if one or several bay
devices are taken out of service.
f.
Ethernet switches for inter-bay buses shall have 100Base-FX technology

(fiber optic-100MBPS) for inter connection of all IEDs (control,
protection and combined protection/control IEDs) with EHV/HV and
MV inter bay buses (PRP1- Bay LAN) and have Gigabit Ethernet
1000Mbps to connect Ethernet switches inside each ring EHV/HV and
MV inter-bay buses (PRP1-Bay LANs) and each ring of station buses
(PRP1-Station LANs) provided by SOLUTION PROVIDER. There shall
be consistency throughput for all inter-bay signals being provided from
the IEDs located throughout the substation and shall be consistent with
IEC 61850 requirements.
g.
Security Features:
h.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Should provide multilevel security/user passwords to prevent

unauthorized users from altering the switch configuration.
SNMPv3 encrypted authentication and access security
Support authentication/Centralized
(RADIUS)
IEEE 802.1q VLANs to segregate and secure network traffic
Port based Network access control (IEEE 802.1x)
Secure Shell (SSH)/Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption.
password
management
Management Features:
Support enhanced traffic management, monitoring, and analysis,

through Embedded Remote Monitoring (RMON) software agent
supporting at least four RMON groups (history, statistics, alarms,
and events).
Telnet, CLI, LAN Switch Vendor GUI, and Web based

management interfaces.
Support for SNMP v3 interface to deliver comprehensive in-band

management.
PAGE 16 OF 119
3.3.2
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
System Architecture
The system architecture shall be based on completely distributed approach
also concerning the connection of any device to the system. Meaning any
device protection as well as control and station level devices shall be directly
connected to the Ethernet backbone.
3.3.3
4.0
Redundant Networks
a.
To ensure maximum performance and availability the network shall
b.
For the inter-bay bus level of the SAS which contains the Ethernet
Switch connections for the Control IEDs, the Protection IEDs, the
SAS Front End Computers, and Communications Gateways, as a
minimum, redundant LAN configuration shall be provided by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER at all voltage levels, with separate redundant
networks provided for the IEDs at each voltage level.
c.
The separate redundant networks at all voltage levels shall be

provided where the redundant inter-bay bus is interconnected with the
redundant station bus.
d.
Refer to Section 14 of this Standard for further redundancy

implementation requirements which is to be implemented by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER .
e.
The Bid proposal shall fully describe the proposed networks scheme.
This shall be supported by detailed network block/schematic
diagrams.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1
General SAS Functionality

4.1.1
Control Scheme Hierarchy

a.
A scheme with a predetermined hierarchy shall be provided for the

operation of the high-voltage apparatus. As such, the high voltage
apparatus within the station shall be operated from different places
(from the lowest level to the highest level):
TESP10701R0/KSB
Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic Diagram

(Mimic)
Control IED
Combined Control/Protection IED
Station HMI
PAGE 17 OF 119
b.
4.1.2
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Power Control Center (PCC/SCADA Master Station/LDC):
In the scheme shown above, operation of a specific piece of high

voltage apparatus shall be allowed to be performed by only one
operation at a time. To insure this, double operation interlocking shall
be employed. Double operation interlocking shall be employed as part
of the hard-wired interlocking scheme, as well as the
Software/GOOSE interlocking scheme resident in the Control IEDs
and the combined Control/Protection IEDs.
Control Scheme-Select-before Operate

For safety and security reasons the command execution is always to be given
in two stages, with the first stage being the selection of the object that is to
be controlled, and the second stage being the operation (execution) of the
object being selected. This select before operate scheme shall be applicable
for the Control IED level, the combined Control/Protection IED level, and
the Station HMI level Also, depending on the SAS Equipment
Manufacturers
design,
and
National
Grid
Saudi
Arabia
requirements/standards, either a direct select before operate scheme, a
direct operate scheme, or a modified two handed select-before-operate
scheme may be applicable for emergency operation through the Bay
Oriented Local Control Panels with Mimic.
4.1.3
Self Supervision
The entire SAS shall be designed with continuous self-supervision features
of the entire SAS installation, with self-diagnostic features for the SAS to
specifically pinpoint trouble/mal-operation areas of the SAS. Generally, the
self-diagnostic features will be built into the Station HMI, with displays
available for these diagnostics on the Operator's Workstation and/or
Engineering Workstation.
4.1.4
4.1.5
User Configuration
a.
The monitoring, controlling and configuration of all input and output

logical signals and binary inputs and relay outputs for all built-in
functions and signals shall be possible both locally and remotely.
b.
It shall also be possible to interconnect the built-in functions using

additional logics (AND-gates, OR-gates and timers) as well as to
configure additional functions such as over-current, over-voltage,
etc.(multi-activation of these additional functions should be possible).
Division of Functional Requirements

a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
The functional requirements shall be divided into two areas which are
shown in the two paragraphs below.
PAGE 18 OF 119
4.1.6
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
b.
The Bay level functions shall comprise of operations within one bay
only, with the bay comprising of one circuit breaker, associated
disconnectors (isolation switches), earthing (grounding switches) and
associated instrument transformers (PTs and CTs).
c.
System Level functions which look at the SAS and the substation as a
whole.
Direct Connection between PTs/CTs to SAS IEDs for Analog inputs

Analogue inputs for voltage transformers (PTs/VTs) and current
transformers (CTs) measurements shall be connected directly to the voltage
transformers (PTs/VTs) and the current transformers (CTs) without
intermediate transducers. The values of active power (W), reactive power
(VAR), frequency (Hz), and the rms values for voltage (U) and current (I)
shall be calculated on the Control IEDs, combined Control/Protection IEDs
and Protection IEDs. All readings on all SAS equipment shall be direct on all
displays, taking into account the scaling factors for each device (CTs and
PT/VTs).
4.2 Bay Level Functions

4.2.1
In a decentralized architecture the functionality shall be as close to the

process as possible.
4.2.2
In this respect, the following functions shall be allocated at bay level:
4.2.3
a.
Bay control functions including data acquisition/data collection

functionality in Bay Control IED's .and combined Control/Protection
IEDs
b.
Bay protection functions including data acquisition/data collection

functionality in
Bay Protection IED's.
and
combined
Control/Protection IEDs
c.
Data collection functionality.
Bay control functions

a.
Overview
Basic functions
TESP10701R0/KSB
Control mode selection(Local/Off/Emergency/Remote)

Select-before-execute principle
Command supervision:
o
Interlocking and blocking
PAGE 19 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
o
Double command
Autoreclosing (may be considered as either a control function
or protection function, depending on National Grid Saudi
Arabia requirements)
Synchrocheck, voltage selection (may be considered as either
a control function or protection function, depending on
National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements)
Interruption of drive latching in case runtime is exceeded
Monitoring pole discrepancy and trip function, if applicable
Transformer tap changer control raise/lower (for power
transformer bays)
Operation counters for circuit breakers and pumps, if
applicable
Hydraulic pump control and runtime supervision, if
applicable
Pump start cascading, if applicable
Anti pumping of circuit breaker (open/close)
Operating pressure supervision through digital contacts only
Display of interlocking and blocking
Breaker position indication on a three phase basis with
indication showing pole discrepancy conditions/alarms where
pole discrepancy between the phases is detected/indicated
Alarm annunciation
Measurement display
Local HMI (local guided, emergency mode)
Interface to the station level
Data storage for at least 200 events
Run Time Command cancellation
Extension possibilities with additional I/O's inside the unit,
installation of additional units and/or via fiber optic
communication and process bus
Additional functions, if any, specified in Main PTS/SCADA
& Protection Appendices.
Advanced functions
b.
Control Mode Selection
TESP10701R0/KSB
Disturbance recording with capabilities for all analogue and

binary values
Extension possibilities with additional I/O's inside the unit or
via fiber-optic inter-bay communications and process bus
As soon as the operator receives the operation access at bay

level the operation is normally performed via the local HMI.
During normal operation the local HMI is guided and allows
the safe operation of all switching devices via the bay control
IED or the combined control/protection IED.
PAGE 20 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
It will be ensured that Protection features for the station

(through the Protection IED's or the combined
control/protection IED used for the station protection function)
shall be functioning irrespective of the Control Mode.
In the event that the bay control IED or a combined

control/protection IED fails, the operator shall have access to
the essential bay switchgear via a separate bay-oriented local
control panel with mimic diagram for High Voltage
switchgear, or via the Low Voltage Compartment for Medium
Voltage switchgear. This is an emergency function.
i.
OFF Mode
It is not possible to operate any object, neither locally
nor remotely.
ii
iii.
TESP10701R0/KSB
EMERGENCY Mode
A.
The position indication shall be directly from

the primary equipment bay switchgear being
controlled.
B.
On the bay-oriented local control panel with

mimic diagram, for the two handed operate
principle, the device selection push button and
either the ON or OFF push button has to be
pushed simultaneously in order to close or open
the primary equipment bay switchgear. For the
single handed operate principle, as indicated
in latest revision of 32-TMSS-02 each device
will have its own OFF or ON push button
to press, and the operator will not be required to
use two hands to operate a device. Control
operation from other places (e.g. from
REMOTE or LOCAL) shall not be possible in
this operating mode.
LOCAL (BCU) Mode

A.
On the HMI the object has first to be selected.

In case of a blocking or interlocking conditions
the selection will not be possible and an
appropriate alarm annunciation shall occur.
B.
If a selection is valid the position indication will

show the possible direction and the appropriate
ON or OFF button shall be pressed in order to
close or open the corresponding object.
PAGE 21 OF 119
C.
iv.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Control operation from other places (e.g.

REMOTE) shall not be possible in this
operating mode.
REMOTE-STATION LEVEL mode

Control authority in this mode is given to the next
highest level (the Station HMI level) and the
installation can be controlled only remotely via the
Station HMI. Control operation from lower levels shall
not be possible in this operating mode.
v.
REMOTE-PCC LEVEL mode

Control authority in this mode is given to the highest
level (SCADA Master Station) via the Station HMI and
the installation can be controlled only remotely via the
PCC (SCADA Master Station/LDC). Control operation
from lower levels shall not be possible in this operating
mode. National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that control
from this mode shall also be available in the event of
failure of even the (redundant) Station HMI Front End
computers, in which PCC Control and Data Acquisition
information will be transmitted and received directly
from the Communications Gateways to the applicable
Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs
through the IEC 61850 Inter-bay bus.
c.
Command supervision
TESP10701R0/KSB
Bay/station interlocking and blocking

i.
Interlocking facilities have to be installed in the

switchgear to prevent damages and accidents in case of
false operation.
ii.
Within the bay itself, a system of hard-wired interlocks

and software/GOOSE interlocking controlled only
through the Bay Control IEDs (in conjunction with the
Bay Oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic) shall be
used. However, upon failure of a bay Control IED(s)
and/or combined Control/Protection IED(s) or
communications link(s), the hard-wired interlocking
shall operate and prevail. The SOLUTION PROVIDER
's proposed solution shall describe the bay interlocking
scenario in event of switching off or failure of a bay
Control SAS component(s) (Control IED(s) or
combined Control/Protection IED(s)),or other SAS
components.
PAGE 22 OF 119
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
iii.
Station interlocking systems shall be provided via

hardwired or inter-bay bus. However, upon failure of
station computer, IED(s), communications link (interbay bus), or other component of the SAS, the
hardwired station interlock shall operate and prevail. It
shall be a simple layout, easy to test and simple to
handle when upgrading the station with future bays.
The SOLUTION PROVIDER's proposed solution shall
describe the station interlocking scenario in event of
switching off or failure of a bay Control SAS
component(s) (Control
IED(s) or combined
Control/Protection IED(s)),or other SAS components.
iv.
Software/GOOSE "interlock override" functionality

shall be available as part of the SAS. However, there
shall be methods available to disable such a
software/GOOSE bay/station "interlock override
scheme and/or to allow only access to this
software/GOOSE "interlock override" scheme by
privileged users using strong passwords and other
security features.
Double operation interlocking

i.
Double operation interlocking prevents the operation of

two or more switches at the same time. The double
operation interlocking is a part of the station
interlocking; it shall preferably be hard-wired, but
provisions shall also be made in the SAS design for
software (GOOSE) double operation interlocking. It
shall be included for all the switches in the station. It
should be noted that unless interlocked for some
specific purpose (other than for Double Operation
Interlocking), there is no need of preventing
simultaneous operation of switches located in different
bays.
ii.
With a hard-wired solution the interlocking is

independent from the control authority of the station. If
a control IED and/or a combined Control/Protection
IED fails, the double operation interlocking does not
block the operation of the station. It shall still be
controlled from all the control authorities. Refer to
above Section i (under double operation interlocking) of
this Standard for further details pertaining to the overall
requirements for Double Operation Interlocking.
iii.
The proposed solution shall describe the double

operation interlocking scenario while an IED of
PAGE 23 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
another bay or another component of the SAS is

switched off or fails.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Other General Interlocking requirements

i.
For software/GOOSE interlocks, schemes which use

the Station HMI (or other Front End) Computer
equipment
to
make ANY software/GOOSE
interlocking decisions or transfer software/GOOSE
interlocking
data
shall
NOT
be
used..
Software/GOOSE interlocking scheme shall ONLY
utilize the Bay Control IED equipment, the combined
Control/Protection
IED
equipment,
and
intercommunications (through GOOSE messages)
between
Control
IEDs
and
combined
Control/Protection IEDs to support software/GOOSE
interlocking requirements.
ii.
For the backup hard wired interlocking

scheme/solution, Solution provider shall consult with
National Grid Saudi Arabia during the Base Design
stage of the project to determine if there is a need to
incorporate hard-wired interlock bypass/override in
the related SAS design.
iii.
For interlocking signals which are required between

voltage levels in each substation which will be used for
software/GOOSE interlocking, these interlocking
signals described in this paragraph shall be transmitted
and received between voltage levels in hardwired form
and inputted/outputted to the other voltage levels
through GGIOs/Digital Inputs/Digital Outputs between
the related Control IEDs. This is required to guarantee
that separate dedicated IP Subnets can be allocated for
each voltage level in each substation.
iv.
For the relation between software/GOOSE and backup

hard wired interlocks, a series downstream
principle will be used. This series downstream
principle will first check the conditions of the
software/GOOSE interlocks and if the interlocking
conditions are satisfied at the software/GOOSE level at
the control or combined control/protection IED, then
the control signal will then pass to the hard wired
interlocks, and if it is determined at the hard wired
interlocking level that the interlocking conditions are
satisfied, the control signal will then pass to the related
switchgear device.
PAGE 24 OF 119
v.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Finally, the hard wired interlock scheme shall be

configured in such a way that, once the National Grid
Saudi Arabia obtains enough satisfactory operating
experience with the software/GOOSE interlocking
scheme, then National Grid Saudi Arabia personnel can
later easily disable the hard wired interlock scheme
and later only rely on software/GOOSE interlocking for
the bay/station interlocking functionality.
Synchronism and energizing check

i.
The synchronism and energizing check functions shall

be bay-oriented and distributed to the bay control
and/or protection devices. These features are:
A. Adjustable voltage, phase angle and frequency
difference.
B. Energizing for dead line-live bus, live line-dead bus
or dead line-dead bus with no synchro-check
function.
C. Synchro-check between live line and live bus with
synchro-check function.
D. Settings for manual close command and autoreclose
command shall be adaptable and adjustable for the
operating times of the specific switchgear.
E. Determination of a live line/dead line or a live
bus/dead bus shall be provided automatically at the
IED level for the particular bays where the IED's
are installed by looking at the configuration of
related circuit breakers, disconnects (isolators) and
earthing (grounding) switches.
F. Furthermore, use of "sampled value" messages
from adjacent IED's to transmit analog information
from PTs (VTs) (either line or bus PTs (VTs)) shall
NOT be accepted for performing synchro-check
inside an IED.
G. Depending on National Grid Saudi Arabia
requirements as stated in the related Appendix of
the main PTS, synchronism and energizing check
may be required to be performed by dedicated
Synchrocheck Relays/IEDs and NOT Control or
combined Control/Protection IEDs
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 25 OF 119
ii.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Voltage selection
A. The voltages relevant for the synchro-check
functions are dependent on the station topology, i.e.
on the positions of the circuit breakers and/or the
isolators.
B. The correct voltage for synchronizing and
energizing is derived from the auxiliary switches of
the circuit breakers, the isolator, and earthing
switch and related PTs and shall be selected
automatically by the Bay Control IEDs and/or
Protection IEDs. The correct voltage selection shall
also be dependent on the bay/station one-line
scheme (e.g. double bus bar-single breaker, breaker
and one-half, double bus, etc.) for each substation
to be equipped with SAS.
C. Voltage selection (which is required for
synchronism and energizing check as described
Section i under Synchronism and energizing check)
shall be an integral function of the IED or
Synchrocheck Relay, and NOT through external
means.
D. Depending on National Grid Saudi Arabia
requirements as stated in related Appendix of the
main PTS, voltage selection may be required to be
performed
by
dedicated
Synchrocheck
Relays/IEDs and NOT Control IEDS or combined
Control/Protection IEDs
TESP10701R0/KSB
Auto-reclosing and related synchro-check functions

i.
These functions can be considered as either control or

protection functions.
ii.
Depending on the National Grid Saudi Arabia

requirements as indicated in related Appendix of the
main PTS, autoreclosing and synchro-check (related to
auto-reclosing) may be implemented in a general
Control IED or combined Control/Protection IED (used
for general substation switchgear control) or a
dedicated Autoreclosing functional unit (Control IED
or
combined
Control/Protection
IED
or
Autoreclosing/related Synchro-Check built into a
PAGE 26 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Protection IED) integrated into the Protection portion

of the SAS.
iv.
The autorecloser should be settable for the following

modes of operation:
A. First autoreclosure sequence:
Three-phase autoreclosure
Single/three-phase autoreclosure
Single-phase autoreclosure
B. Further auto-reclosure sequences:
No further auto-reclosure sequences
Further auto-reclosure sequences (totally 2, 3 or
4 sequences), always three-phase sequences
iv.
It shall be possible to perform all three-phase

autoreclosure sequences with or without synchrocheck.
v.
If synchro-check is required for any autoreclosure

sequence, refer the sub heading Synchronism and
energizing check above and its subsections for a
description of the synchro-check, and voltage selection
functionality
Run Time Command cancellation

If the control action is not completed within a specified time,
the command shall get cancelled, and an alarm/event shall be
raised at the Station HMI level (which may be reported to the
PCC (SCADA Master Station level). For operation of
switchgear which involves drive latching the latching shall be
interrupted by the Control IED or combined Control/Protection
IED and the drive motor power (for the latched device) shall
be interrupted also by the Control IED or the combined
Control/Protection IED. National Grid Saudi Arabia requires
that the Run-Time Command Cancellation functionality and
the Command cancellation execution timer be embedded in the
Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs either
through the use of dedicated IEC 61850 Logical Nodes, or
general timer/logic gates which are incorporated in the IED
which can be configured by the user/manufacturer (by
software) through the IED configuration process.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Pole discrepancy monitoring/relaying (if applicable)
PAGE 27 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
A Pole Discrepancy monitoring function, based on the

measurement of phase over-currents and current differences
between phases as well as on breaker pole status (which is
determined by reading the auxiliary contacts on each pole of
the breaker) has to be provided. Also, depending on the SAS
Equipment manufacturer's design, additional Pole Discrepancy
Relaying may be included in the SAS as an integrated
function. If the additional Pole Discrepancy Relaying is
provided as part of the SAS, the Pole Discrepancy Relaying
feature integrated into the SAS shall support Stage I and Stage
II Pole Discrepancy Relaying functions, as well as being able
to initiate Pole Discrepancy Trip signals to remote substations
via
Protection
Signaling
equipment
(PSE),
and
Communications equipment (PSE and Communications
provided by other parts of the project, as applicable). Refer to
related Appendix of the main PTS to determine additional
information on whether Pole Discrepancy monitoring/relaying
will be through separate Pole Discrepancy Relays, or
integrated into the functionality of SAS (Note: If main PTS
specifies separate dedicated external Pole Discrepancy Relays,
there will still be a requirement to monitor Stage I and Stage II
Pole Discrepancy from the external Pole Discrepancy Relay(s)
through SAS as part of the alarm function of SAS.).
Transformer tap changer control

i.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Voltage regulation for single transformers or parallel

transformers with on-load tap-changer shall either be
included in the numerical control unit for the power
transformer or located in a separate tap changer control
device which is associated with the power transformer.
ii
In the event that a separate tap-changer control device

is selected, this shall be an integral part of the SAS like
any bay oriented Control IED or Protection IED.
iii.
OLTC scheme shall be .accomplished by the Control

IED's and/or dedicated Tap Changer IEDs (which
have IEC 61850 interfaces) which will be performing
the regulation and tap changing function.
iv.
National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that a built-in

numerical control unit is preferred instead of a separate
tap changer unit. Also, the Transformer tap changer
control scheme shall meet latest revision of TES-P119.26 for control schemes for each Substation's
Equipment.
PAGE 28 OF 119
d.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Interface between Control IEDs and Maintenance Laptop Computer

and also between combined Control/Protection IEDs and Maintenance
Laptop Computer:
All IEDs used for the Control functions shall be provided with a serial,
Ethernet RJ45 and/or optical front connector for connection to a
Maintenance Laptop Computer.
e.
Interface between the Control IEDs, the combined Control/Protection

IEDs and the inter-bay Bus pertaining to IEC 61850 and IEC 62439-3
PRP1:
For IEDs used for dedicated control, and/or combined
control/protection, each Control IED and combined Control/Protection
IED shall have full interfacing to the inter-bay communications bus
only through IEC 61850 and IEC 62439-3 PRP 1. Use of Protocol
Converters to convert from legacy protocols (e.g. DNP 3.0,
MODBUS, IEC-103, etc.) to IEC 61850/IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 will
NOT be accepted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia. REDBOX is not
acceptable for IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to National
Grid Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer enclosed drawing Fig
07.01 which shows where REDBOX is acceptable.
4.2.4
Bay protection functions

a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
General
For all voltage levels except for the Medium Voltage level, the
protection functions shall be independent of the control
functions (i.e. the Protection IED will NOT be performing
Control IED functions). For the Medium Voltage level, unless
specified in the main PTS, both control functions and
protection functions for a bay can be provided in one IED
(which will be known as a combined Control/Protection IED).
Refer to the related Appendix of the main PTS involving Relay
and Protection for further details on the functionalities
involved, as well as other details.
Furthermore, at the High Voltage level, for trip

applications/trip commands, where there is a dedicated
Protection IED, the Protection IED shall perform the tripping
functions ONLY, and this tripping function shall NOT be
passed on to a Control IED (either through hard-wired means
and/or through use of GOOSE messages).
The protection functions are an integral part of the Substation

Automation System.
All protection functions realized in the IEDs should be based

on numerical technology.
PAGE 29 OF 119
b.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
All IEDs shall be serial integrated for data sharing and meet
the real-time communication requirements for automatic
functions. The data presentation and the configuration of the
various IEDs shall be compatible with the overall system
communication and data exchange requirements.
All IEDs used for the protection functions (Protection IEDs

and the combined Control and Protection IEDs) shall also be
provided with a serial, Ethernet RJ 45 and/or optical front
connector for connection to a Maintenance Laptop Computer.
For IEDs used for dedicated protection and/or combined

control/protection, each Protection IED and combined
Control/Protection IED shall have full interfacing to the interbay communications bus only through IEC 61850 and IEC
62439-3 PRP 1. Use of Protocol Converters to convert from
legacy protocols (e.g. DNP 3.0, MODBUS, IEC-103, etc.) to
IEC 61850/IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 will NOT be accepted by the
National Grid Saudi Arabia. REDBOX is not acceptable for
IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to National Grid
Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer enclosed drawing
Fig 07-01 which shows where REDBOX is acceptable.
This Standard only describes general Protection Requirements,

with more specific protection requirements outlined in related
portions of the main PTS/standards. Refer to the related
Appendix of the main PTS/standards for Protection (Protective
Relaying) functions for the IEDs.
Self-supervision
Continuous self-supervision function with self-diagnostic possibilities
shall be included.
c.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Event and disturbance recording function
Each Protection IED and combined Control/Protection IED

shall contain an event recorder capable of storing at least 256
time-tagged events. A Protection IED and combined
Control/Protection IED shall also provide the user, either
locally or remotely, with complete information on the last ten
disturbances.
A disturbance recorder with a minimum of 5 seconds recording

time for at least 10 disturbances shall provide the user with
time-tagged disturbance records.
At least the analogue inputs as well as 16 binary signals must

be recorded.
PAGE 30 OF 119
d.
4.2.5
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
The pre-fault and fault currents and voltages shall be recorded

for each disturbance and be made available for further
evaluation purposes.
Local HMI
The local human machine interface (HMI) shall be frontmounted and based on a user-friendly, menu-structured
program, and performed with the use of a permanently
installed human machine interface unit, type-tested together
with the protection terminal.
In addition service values of current and voltages as well as

active and reactive power (if voltage measurements included)
shall be available. Also the characteristic analogue values
related to the activated functions (e.g. impedance in case of
distance protection) should be available.
Line protection
a.
b.
General
The Protection IED and combined Control/Protection IED

devices which incorporate numerical line protection shall be
selected for the protection of lines according to specific
network configurations and conditions. The scheme must
ensure reliable isolation for all kind of faults that might occur
on the specific line as per protection requirements stipulated in
Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS/Protective
Relay Standard.
Depending on the voltage level and complexity, the following

line protection functions may be required:
Distance function
Distance function requirements shall be compatible to the relay
requirements indicated in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main
PTS/Protective Relay Standard.
c.
Differential function
Differential function requirements shall be compatible to the relay
d.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Earth fault function
PAGE 31 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Earth fault function requirements shall be compatible to the relay

e.
Fault location
Fault location function requirements shall be compatible to the relay
PTS.
f.
Transformer protection
General
i.
The transformer protection shall be suitable for the

protection of two- or three-winding transformers,
auto-transformers, reactors, and generator-transformer
block units, as per protection requirements stipulated
in Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS or
standard.
ii.
The numerical transformer terminal shall be designed

to operate correctly over a wide frequency range and to
accommodate for system frequency variations and
block generator start-ups.
Current differential function

Refer to the Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS or
Protective Relay Standard for further details.
Other functions
Refer to the Protective Relaying Appendix to the main PTS or
Protective Relay Standard for further details.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Breaker failure protection

i.
The breaker failure protection shall comprise two time

stages. The first stage shall be bay-oriented and shall
re-trip the local circuit breaker.
ii.
The second stage shall be station-oriented, requiring

information from other bays, and shall trip the circuit
breakers in adjacent bays.
iii.
Refer to the Protective Relaying Appendix to the main

PTS or Protective Relay Standard for further details.
PAGE 32 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
4.3 System/Station level functions

4.3.1
Control
a.
The different high-voltage switchgear and medium voltage switchgear

within the station shall be operated from different places:
4.3.2
TESP10701R0/KSB
from the remote control centers (SCADA Master Station(s))

from the station level
For High Voltage switchgear from the Control IED(s) in the
LCC(s) (in the bays)
For High Voltage switchgear from the Bay-Oriented Local
Control Panel(s) with Mimic Diagram
For Medium Voltage switchgear from the Control
IED(s)/combined Control/Protection IED(s)
For Medium Voltage switchgear from the Low Voltage
Compartment(s)
b.
Operation shall only possible by one operator at a time.
c.
The operation shall depend on the conditions of other functions, such

as interlocking, synchrocheck, etc. (see description in chapter Bay
control functions).
Status supervision
a.
The position of each switchgear, e.g. circuit breaker, isolator, earthing

switch, transformer tap changer etc., shall be supervised permanently.
Every detected change of position shall be immediately visible in the
single-line diagram on the station HMI screen, recorded in the event
list, and a hard copy printout shall be produced. Alarms shall be
initiated in the case of spontaneous position changes.
b.
The switchgear positions shall be indicated by two auxiliary switches,

normally closed (NC) and normally open (NO), which shall give
relevant signals. An alarm shall be initiated if these position
indications are inconsistent or if the time required for operating
mechanism to change position exceeds a predefined limit.
c.
The SAS shall also monitor the status of substation auxiliaries (which
will include, but not be limited to auxiliary relays such as trip current
supervision, DC supervision, etc.).. The status and control of
auxiliaries shall be done through separate one or more Control IEDs
and all alarm and analogue values shall be monitored and recorded
through the respective Control IEDs. It is noted also by the National
Grid Saudi Arabia that monitoring of the status of auxiliaries shall
NOT be performed from dedicated Protection IEDs or combined
Control/Protection IEDs.
PAGE 33 OF 119
4.3.3
4.3.4
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Measurements
a.
The measured values shall be displayed locally on the Local HMI

contained as part of an IED, Station HMI and in the control center
(SCADA Master Station(s)). At the Station HMI level, facilities shall
exist to discard abnormal values (through the Station HMI Filtering
functions) and when an abnormal value is reached, generate an
alarm/event indicating that an abnormal value (s) has been detected.
b.
All analogue values shall be updated (both in Local HMIs (contained

as part of the IEDs), and Station HMI equipment every 2 seconds, or
faster.
c.
Threshold limit values shall be selectable for alarm indications.
Event and alarm handling

a.
Events and alarms shall be generated either by the switchgear, by the

control IEDs, by the protection IEDs, by the combined
control/protection IEDs, or by the station level unit.
b.
They shall be recorded in an event list in the station HMI. Alarms

shall be recorded in a separate alarm list and appear on the screen. All,
or a freely selectable group of events and alarms shall also be printed
out on an event printer.
c.
The alarms and events shall be time-tagged with a time resolution of 1

ms National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that the time tagging of the
alarms and events shall be performed at the IED itself only, and NOT
through SAS Computer equipment..
d.
During the Base Design Stage, the Solution provider shall submit the
Events and Alarms List (Signals List) for National Grid Saudi Arabia
approval, and once approved the Solution provider will use this
approved list as a basis for development of his SCD files for SAS.
e.
As a minimum, the Signals and Events List shall contain all applicable
points as identified in TES-P-119.27 the SOE Points List and the
approved Annunciator Alarms List for the Substation. Also, in
development of the Events and Alarms List, separate dedicated lists
shall be generated for SOE, SCADA, and the Station HMI contained
as part of the Substation Automation System for review and approval.
f.
Finally as part of the events and alarms handling requirement, when

there are cases where IEC 61850 DOES NOT provide for
alarms/events as part of the logical node (LN) signals definitions
(under IEC 61850) and where these alarms/events signals are required
PAGE 34 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
under latest revision of Engineering Standard TES-P-119.27 (for

SCADA) the SOE Points List, and the National Grid Saudi Arabia
approved Annunciator Alarms List for the Substation, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall provide suitable auxiliary binary input contacts
(and/or binary outputs) as part of each IED design to extend non IEC
61850 alarms/events by hard-wired means to other components of the
SAS (which will appear as one of the GGIOs included as part of the
SAS Data Acquisition function which will be reported to the Station
HMI, the SCADA Master Stations and other equipment).
g.
4.3.5
TESP10701R0/KSB
In/Out facility for the protection is isolating trip out put only during
maintenance of relays. However during this condition all alarms to
remote Master stations shall be isolated in order to avoid receiving any
nuisance alarms during maintenance. Facility for isolating alarms shall
be provided as part of relays or at the Gateways.
Time Synchronization System

a.
A dedicated clock synchronization unit shall set the time within the
SAS. Time synchronization of all SAS equipment shall be
independent of the station level equipment e.g. station computer or
Communications Gateway. Time Synchronization shall be from
redundant GPS receivers located on the property of each substation.
The time shall then be distributed to the control IEDs, combined
Control/Protection IEDs and protection IEDs and other SAS
equipment via the communication buses. An accuracy of 1ms (from
the actual time) within the substation (and for ALL SAS components
within the substation which require time signals) is required.
b.
Hardware/Firmware for the GPS receivers supplied by the

SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide for a antenna, decoder, other
hardware, interfaces with the SAS and Firmware as per the latest IRIG
B122 or other National Grid Saudi Arabia approved standard time
code format (e.g. SNTP and others).
c.
Software for the GPS receivers shall include a software package to

implement GPS-based time as per at least IRIG B122 standard time
code format (Day of Year and Time update rate of once per second,
AM 1 KHz carrier, resolution of + 1 mS, expressed in hh, mm, ss,
ddd) or other National Grid Saudi Arabia approved standard time code
format and able to synchronize time and date into the SAS, with all
components of the SAS receiving consistent time and date
information.
d.
Upon failure of any GPS receiver in the time synchronization system,

the GPS receiver shall transmit an alarm to both the Station HMI
equipment in the SAS, and the remote SCADA Master Station(s).
PAGE 35 OF 119
e.
4.3.6
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
In the event of failures of both GPS clock receivers which are beyond
the control of the GPS clock receivers (e.g. shutdown of the GPS
satellite network, atmospheric conditions blocking reception of GPS
signals at the GPS receivers, etc.) there shall be a means of time
synchronization by the use of either internal SAS clocking sources
(e.g. internal clocks inside the IED(s), etc). or tertiary clocking
sources from the respective SCADA Master Station(s). In this respect,
during the Base Design Stage, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall state
the holdover clocking accuracy of the internal SAS clocking sources,
the clocking drift of these internal SAS clocking sources and the
maximum allowable time which the SOLUTION PROVIDER feels
that the infernal SAS clocking sources will provide accurate (+ 1 ms
accuracy from real time) timing. If in the event that based on the
SOLUTION PROVIDER provided information, that the internal SAS
clocks will NOT provide accurate time information in the event of
both GPS receivers failing, the National Grid Saudi Arabia during the
Base Design will instruct the SOLUTION PROVIDER to utilize the
existing SCADA Master Station(s) Clocks as a tertiary
clocking/synchronization source and incorporate this SCADA Master
Station(s) clock as a tertiary clocking/synchronization source.
Telecontrol
Remote access to each substation data shall be enabled via the control centers
(SCADA Master Stations) upon request. The respective owners in the utility
organization may use some or all information related to the conditions of high
voltage apparatus.
4.3.7
Station HMI-Presentation and Dialogues and Design

a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
General
The operator Station HMI shall provide basic functions for

supervision and control within the substation.
The Station HMI shall be fully redundant and shall provide the
functions for supervision and control of the substation. Access
to the redundant Front End Computers shall be through the
Operator's Workstations and the Engineer's Workstation.
However to meet the redundancy requirements a backup
workstation (included as part of a Maintenance Laptop
Computer) shall be provided with software and firmware fully
loaded which can be used to act as either the Operator's
Workstation or Engineering Workstation in the event of failure
of either the Operator's Workstations or Engineering
Workstation contained as part of the SAS.
The operator shall give commands to the switchgear on the

screen via mouse clicks.
PAGE 36 OF 119
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
The Station HMI shall give the operator access to alarms and
events displayed on the screen. Aside from these lists on the
screen, there shall be a printout of alarms or events in an event
log.
An acoustic alarm which shall be provided in each Operators

Workstation Console shall indicate abnormalities, and all
unacknowledged alarms shall be accessible from any screen
selected by the operator. Furthermore, a horn shall be provided
as part of the acoustic alarm requirement to alert substation
operator personnel who may be elsewhere inside the substation
that an alarm has been received in SAS, and that alarm has not
been acknowledged. Also, as part of the horn requirement, a
horn disable switch shall be employed to allow the substation
operator to disable the horn from operating (e.g. disabling the
horn may be needed when the substation operator leaves the
substation after completing local switching activities).
The following standard pictures shall be available from the

Station HMI (and which can be selected by the station
operator) as a minimum:
i.
Single-line diagram on an overall station level showing

the switchgear status and measured values
ii.
Single-line diagram on each specific bay level for all

bays showing the switchgear status and measured
values
iii.
Control/blocking dialogues with interlocking and/or

blocking information details. As part of the Control
dialogue, the control dialogue shall tell the operator
whether the device operation is permitted or blocked,
and if the device operation is blocked, the reason why
the device operation is blocked (e.g. non satisfaction of
an interlocking condition, blocking of a breaker due to
an SF6 gas Stage II alarm, etc.).
iv.
Measurement dialogues
v.
Alarm list, station / bay-oriented
vi.
Event list, station / bay-oriented
vii.
System status
viii.
Checking of parameter settings
ix.
Interlocking details
PAGE 37 OF 119
x.
b.
c.
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Overall SAS block/schematic display/diagram showing

the communication buses, Ethernet switches, all the
SAS devices (IEDs, computers) and their
interconnections. This overall system block diagram
shall provide the status indication for all the SAS
devices.
HMI design principles
Consistent design principles shall be provided with the HMI

concerning labels, colors, dialogues and fonts. Non-valid
selections shall be dimmed out, or have another distinguishing
feature on the associated display to indicate that there is a nonvalid selection taking place.
As a minimum, the object status shall be indicated using

different status indicators for:
i.
Control mode selection (Local that is through Station

HMI)/Supervisory that is through other levels of the
hierarchy)
ii.
selected object under command
iii.
selected on the screen
iv.
not updated, obsolete values, not in use or not sampled
v.
alarm or faulty state
vi.
warning or blocked
vii.
update blocked or manually updated
viii.
control blocked/interlocking condition present
ix.
normal state
Process status displays and command procedures
The process status of the substation in terms of actual values of

currents, voltages, frequency, active and reactive powers as
well as the positions of circuit breakers, isolators and
transformer tap changers shall be displayed in the station
single-line diagram, as well as on the related bay one-line
diagrams.
In order to ensure a high degree of security against undesired

operation, a special "select-before-execute" command
procedure shall be provided. After the "selection" of a switch,
PAGE 38 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
the operator shall be able to recognize the selected device on

the screen, and all other switchgear shall be blocked. After the
execution of the command the operated switching symbol
shall flash until the switch has reached its new position.
d.
TESP10701R0/KSB
The operator shall only be in a position to execute a command,

if the switch is not blocked and if no interlocking condition is
going to be violated. The interlocking statements shall be
checked by the interlocking scheme implemented at bay level.
After command execution the operator shall receive a

confirmation that the new switching position has been reached
or an indication that the switching procedure was unsuccessful
with the indication of the reason for non-functioning.
As part of the command procedures hierarchy, if operation of

each SAS controlled substation is initiated through the Station
HMI, except for one case as defined below, command
selection and command execution procedures from the PCC
shall be blocked for all devices controlled from the SAS. As a
result of this, an appropriate alarm/event indication shall be
given to the PCC (Power Control Center) indicating that
"Local" control only available, and that remote control
(through the PCC) is not possible.
For some National Grid Saudi Arabia substations, blocking of

control from the SCADA Master Station(s) of the manual tap
changing function of certain transformers shall not be allowed
when the Station HMI is placed in the Local position. In this
case, a software bypass feature shall be implemented in the
SAS Applications Software package to allow for bypassing of
the Station HMI (when the Station HMI is in Local) to allow
the SCADA Master Station(s) signals to directly pass through
to the related IEDs used for Tap Changing control without
Station HMI involvement.
SAS System supervision display
The SAS shall be comprehensively self-monitored such that

faults are immediately indicated to the operator, possibly
before they develop into serious situations. Such faults are
recorded as a faulty status in a system supervision display.
This display shall cover the status of the entire SAS including
IEDs, communication links (inter-bay bus and station bus),
Ethernet switches, HMI equipment, Time Synchronization,
Communications Gateway equipment, GPS receivers,
Firewalls, Inverters/UPS, printers and other SAS equipment.
PAGE 39 OF 119
e.
Event list
The event list shall contain events that are important for the
control and monitoring of each substation.
The event and associated time for each event (within 1 ms of

"real time" for each event) has to be displayed.
The operator shall be able to call up the chronological event

list on the monitor at any time for each whole substation or
sections of it.
A printout of each display/event list shall be possible on the

hard copy printer. Furthermore, sufficient buffering capability
shall exist in the Station HMI to store events (for future
printing) which are intended to be printed on the hard copy
printer in event of a hard copy printer malfunction (e.g. "out of
paper", printer off, etc.) or operator commands to disable the
hard copy printer.
Similar to alarm list descriptions, the descriptive text character

field which is provided for the individual event list description
shall support a minimum character length of 60 characters.
The events shall be registered in a chronological event list in

which the type of event and its time of occurrence are
specified. It shall be possible to store all events in the
computer.
The chronological event list shall contain:

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Position changes of circuit breakers, isolators and

earthing devices
Indication of protective relay operations
Fault signals from the switchgear and entire SAS
Indication when analogue measured values were
outside upper and lower limits. Suitable provision shall
be made in the system for the final user to define at
least two levels of operation on either side of the value
or which shall be available as user defined for each
measurands.
Loss of communication.
Filters for selection of a certain type or group of events shall

be available. The filters shall be designed to enable viewing of
events grouped per:
i.
ii.
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Date and time

Bay
PAGE 40 OF 119
iii.
iv.
v.
f.
Device
Function
e.g.
trips,
protection
operations,
autoreclosures, level where function was performed
(e.g bay level through an IED, Station HMI, etc.) etc.
Alarm class
Alarm list
Faults and errors occurring in the substation shall be listed in

an alarm list and shall be immediately transmitted to the
control center (SCADA Master Station(s)). The alarm list shall
substitute a conventional alarm tableau, and shall constitute an
evaluation of all station alarms. It shall contain
unacknowledged alarms and persisting faults. The date and
time of occurrence shall be indicated.
The alarm list shall consist of a summary display of the present

alarm situation. Each alarm shall be reported on one line that
contains:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
ii.
iii.
iv.
the date and time of the alarm

the name of the alarming object (which shall be very
specific and clear to enable the operations personnel in
easily identifying and locating the alarming device)
a descriptive text
the acknowledgement state
Whenever an alarm condition occurs, the alarm condition must

be shown on the alarms list. Alarm shall have first out feature.
Trip alarm and non trip alarm shall be clearly distinguished.
Alarm description shall be generally per latest revision 38TMSS-05 or TES-P-119.27 (Note: TES-P-119.27 takes
priority in the Alarm Description on the Station HMI). As a
minimum, for easier understanding by National Grid Saudi
Arabia operations personnel, clearly distinguishable
descriptions/display texts shall be provided for the following
states of alarms:
i.
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Unacknowledged and persisting alarms (e.g. one color

and flashing)
Acknowledged and persisting alarms (e.g. one color
and steady)
Unacknowledged and fleeting alarms (e.g. a second
color and flashing)
Acknowledged and cleared alarms (e.g. a third color
and steady)
Whenever an operator chooses to also have an audible alarm

indication (operator selectable at the site), all unacknowledged
alarms shall also have an audible indication. Also, for the
PAGE 41 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
audible alarm reporting facility when the operator chooses to

mute the audible alarm facility, there shall be a clear indication
to the SAS that the audible alarm facility is muted.
g.
Filters for selection of a certain type or group of alarms shall

be available as for events.
Similar to event list descriptions, the descriptive text character

field which is provided for the individual alarm list description
shall support a minimum character length of 60 characters.
A printout of each display/alarm list shall be possible on the

hard copy printer. Furthermore, sufficient buffering capability
shall exist in the Station HMI to store alarms (for future
printing) which are intended to be printed on the hard copy
printer in event of a hard copy printer malfunction (e.g. "out of
paper", printer off, etc.) or operator commands to disable the
hard copy printer.
For certain alarms contained as part of the alarm list (e.g.

alarms which may also appear as part of the SCADA Points
List alarms, SOE indicators, Substation Annunciators, etc.),
National Grid Saudi Arabia standard alarm naming
conventions for the Station HMI display(s) shall be followed
by the SOLUTION PROVIDER.
Object picture
When selecting an object such as a circuit breaker or isolator in the
single-line diagram, the associated bay picture shall be presented first.
In the selected object picture, all attributes like:
type of blocking
authority
local / remote control
PCC(SCADA Master Station(s))/SAS control
errors
etc.,
Shall be displayed.
h.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Control dialogues
The operator shall give commands to the system by means of

mouse clicks on the single-line diagram. It shall also be
possible to use the keyboard for issuance of commands. Data
entry is performed with the keyboard.
Dedicated control dialogues for controlling at least the

following devices shall be available:
PAGE 42 OF 119
i.
ii.
i.
It shall be possible to restrict activation of the process pictures

of each object at the Station HMI level(bays, apparatus...)
within a certain user authorization group. Each user shall then
be given access rights to each group of objects, e.g.:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
No engineering allowed
Engineering/configuration allowed
Entire system management allowed
The access rights shall be defined by passwords assigned

during the log-in procedure. Only the system administrator
shall be able to add/remove users and change access rights.
Dynamic Busbar Coloring
Busbar transfer for a specific feeder. Dynamic busbar coloring

gives the operator a quick overview of the state of the
substation and shows at a glance whether any specific part of
the substation e.g. busbar segment is earthed, energized, or deenergized.
This function helps preventing incorrect switching; especially

in emergency situations when often time is of the essence. The
operator has to have a clear, precise and fast system overview,
infeed sources and consumers e.g. from the utility grid. With a
better overview the operator is able to respond quicker to any
contingency.
Station HMI-Reports
a.
The reports shall provide time-related follow-ups of measured

analogue values and calculated analogue values and other data
collected by the Station HMI. The data displayed shall comprise:
TESP10701R0/KSB
Display only
Normal operation (e.g. open/close apparatus)
Restricted operation
System administrator
For maintenance and engineering purposes of the station HMI,

the following authorization levels shall be available:
i.
ii.
iii.
4.3.8
Breakers, disconnectors and earthing switches

Transformer tap-changers (when the tap changing
functionality is not bypassed at the Station HMI level).
User-authority levels
j.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Trend reports:
PAGE 43 OF 119
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Day (mean, peak)

Month (mean, peak)
Semi-annual (mean, peak)
Year (mean, peak)
Historical reports:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Day (at user selected interval, with the minimum

capability of a 15 minute resolution per interval)
Week
Month
Year
b.
It shall be possible to select displayed values from the database in the

process display on-line. Scrolling between e.g. days shall be possible.
Unsure values shall be indicated.
c.
It shall be possible to select the time period for which the specific data
are kept in the memory.
d.
Following printouts shall be available from the Station HMI display

(on the Operator's or Engineering Workstation or both) which shall be
printed on demand:
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Daily voltage and frequency curves depicting time on X-axis

and the appropriate parameters on the Y-axis. The time
duration of the curve is 24 hours.
Weekly trend curves for real and derived analogue values.
Printouts of the maximum and minimum values and frequency
of occurrence and duration of maximum and minimum values
for each analogue parameter for each circuit in 24 hour period..
Provision shall be made for logging information about breaker
status, including number of operations along with the current
value at the time of interruption (opening of the breaker)
within the allocated period set by the user, along with date and
time indications
Equipment operation details shift-wise and during 24 hours
Printout on adjustable time period as well as demand for MW,
MVAR, Current, Voltage on each bus (as applicable), feeder,
and transformer, as well as Tap Positions, temperature, as well
as status of all pumps for switchgear, and fans for transformers
Printout and display on adjustable time period as well as on
demand system frequency and average frequency
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide representative
sample of printouts and reports which will be available with
the SAS supplied by the SOLUTION PROVIDER.
PAGE 44 OF 119
4.3.9
4.3.10
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
For printouts related to monthly, semi-annual and yearly

reports, mean values and peak values shall be available at the
intervals selectable by the user.
Station HMI-Trend display (historical data)

a.
It shall be possible to illustrate all types of process data as trends input and output data, binary and analogue data.
b.
The trends shall be displayed in graphical form as column or curve

diagrams with a maximum of 10 trends per screen. Adjustable time
span and scaling ranges (with adjustments easily settable by the user)
must be provided.
c.
It shall be possible to change the type of value logging (direct, mean,

sum, or difference) on-line in the window.
d.
It shall also be possible to change the update intervals on-line in the

picture as well as the selection of threshold values for alarming
purposes.
Automatic disturbance file transfer

All recorded data from the IEDs with integrated disturbance recorder as well
as dedicated disturbance recording systems (e.g. stand-alone TFR/DFR
equipment supplied by other portions of this contract) shall be automatically
uploaded (event triggered once per day) initially to the Station HMI
computer equipment, and eventually to the Engineering Workstation with
data stored on hard disk of the Engineering Workstation. In performance of
the automatic disturbance file transfer function, the IED's (with integrated
disturbance recorder function) and dedicated disturbance recording systems
shall have sufficient buffering capability to store all disturbance records for a
minimum 48 hour period without the possibility of buffer overwrites, and
loss of data. This is required due to the possibility of loss of communications
links between the IEDs, dedicated disturbance recording systems and the
Station HMI computer equipment. National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that
Automatic Disturbance File Transfer shall be available for ALL IEDs which
will have disturbance records which have to be transferred by this feature
irrespective of the IED manufacturer.
4.3.11
Disturbance analysis and evaluation

a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
The substation's monitoring system which will be incorporated into

the SAS shall provide all relevant information for faultfinding,
analysis, and troubleshooting. Suitable and user-friendly fault
evaluation software shall be included in the scope of supply, providing
PAGE 45 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
short fault summaries and automatic printouts of the fault history and
fault location.
4.3.12
b.
The workstation contained as part of the Station HMI which is used

for disturbance analysis and evaluation shall have all necessary
software, including software used by ALL IEDs from various SAS
manufacturers which generates disturbance records, to evaluate the
required information for proper fault analysis.
c.
Disturbance/fault analysis software tools and data formats shall use

common electric utility industry formats used by the National Grid
Saudi Arabia (e.g.-COMTRADE), and shall avoid using manufacturer
specific proprietary formats.
d.
The protection engineer may also have his own PC-based system
which will be located outside each substation (and not provided under
this contract) which will also be used to evaluate all the required
information for proper fault analysis, independent of the Power
Control Center. However, connectivity facilities shall be provided by
the SAS in the substation to allow connection between the external
Protection Engineering workstation (not provided under this contract)
and the disturbance archive facilities provided as part of the SAS
Station HMI/Engineering Workstation.
IED parameter setting

It shall be possible to access all Protection IEDs, Control IEDs, and combined
Control/Protection IEDs for reading the parameters (settings) for the
Protection IEDs, Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs and
writing (configuring) the parameters (settings) for the Protection IEDs,
Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs from the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Station HMI/Engineering Workstation-read/write privileges for

parameters
Local HMI-read privileges only for parameters
Computer outside each Substation (e.g. a Computer located in
Protection Engineering of the National Grid Saudi Arabia)-read
privileges only for parameters
Maintenance Laptop Computer which plugs into the IED Serial and/or
Optical Port-read privileges with emergency write privileges for
parameters
The setting of parameters or the activation of parameter sets shall only be

allowed after entering a password at the appropriate User Authority Level.
4.3.13
Automatic sequences
a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
The available automatic sequences shall be listed and described, (e.g.

sequences related to the transfer of power through bus couplers,
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changes from bus 1 to bus 2, activation/deactivation of

feeders/transformers, etc.) The automatic sequence can be initiated by
the operator. It should be noted that the operator can activate the
customer pre-defined switching sequence by giving a single command
only. The sequence control function performs a series of single control
commands step-by-step. Each command is supervised and checked by
the usual interlocking functions implemented by the associated bay
controller (Control IED(s) and combined Control/Protection IED(s))
and other devices, i.e. the blocking criteria, synchrocheck, interlocking
logic, etc. Thus the procedure is identical to manual single step
commands and therefore ensures the same degree of secure operation.
b.
4.3.14
4.3.15
TESP10701R0/KSB
There shall also be provision in the software to write custom

Automatic sequences by the user. In this way, it would be possible for
the user to have specific switching operations, for example: load
shedding on selected feeders under certain conditions. For the user
requirement for writing custom Automatic sequences, the SAS shall
be designed with Automatic Sequence development tools which can
be easily understood by typical substation operators, and dispatchers.
Load shedding
a.
If load shedding is required, the criteria for the shedding and the
criteria for the choice of the feeders to be shed should be described.
b.
The choice of feeders to be shed shall be shown at station level and

shall be modified either locally (at the SAS installation) or remotely..
c.
The load shedding functionality shall be realized by combining

frequency functions at bay level, priority settings downloaded from
the station level to the bay as well as other operational requirements as
it pertains to load shedding (e.g. instructions remotely issued from
SCADA Master Station(s) to shed load through the opening of
breaker(s) at the substation).
Power system monitoring

a.
It is envisaged that monitoring shall be applied not only to specific

and individual sections of the substation but also to a complete
substation monitoring system. This Power System Monitoring
approach shall become an integral part of the Substation Automation
System (SAS) and the results shall support the accomplishment of a
greater benefit from using a value-based system to select monitoring
appropriate for the specific circumstances and based on sound
engineering and economic judgment.
b.
One important aspect is that the wealth of data available from

numerical protection IEDs/relays, combined Control/Protection
IEDs, and Control IEDs shall be used for monitoring the condition
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
of circuit breakers, transformers, tap changers etc. by means of a costeffective data sharing approach.
4.3.16
TESP10701R0/KSB
c.
This system monitoring should be the first step in creating a

comprehensive power system monitoring scheme, collecting
information from the substation.
d.
With respect to the Power System Monitoring requirements specified

in Sections 4.3.15.a to c above power system monitoring of the SAS
shall only be limited to the substation(s) itself where the SAS is
installed.
Station SCADA functions

a.
As part of the SAS design for the substation, there shall be the full
ability to provide normal SCADA functions for the substation, which
include data acquisition, control, and monitoring for the station. This
will be accomplished through an interconnection between the SCADA
Master Station(s) through the Communications Gateways and other
SAS equipment which in turn will send the control and/or data
acquisition signals through the SAS to the IEDs inside the substation
for further action and vice versa.
b.
For the station SCADA functions, the SAS shall emulate the
functional features of RTU Standard based on latest revision of 38TMSS-03
c.
Given that the SAS will now replace the SCADA RTU with IEDs and
the local/station HMI, the overall SAS will serve the SCADA function
for the station(s) where SAS will be implemented. In this respect, the
SCADA points list requirement as indicated in latest revision of TES119.27 shall be implemented as part of the SAS SCADA functions for
each substation.
d.
Additionally, as part of the Station SCADA function, the

upload/download of the SCADA data and control signals from the
SAS to the Power Control Center (SCADA Master Station(s)) shall be
in accordance with both IEC-101 and IEC-104 communications
protocols between SCADA Master Station equipment (located at the
Power Control Center-SCADA Master Stations) and the
Communications Gateway equipment provided by the SAS (and as
such, the Communications Gateways included in SAS shall be
equipped with the required interfaces for both IEC-101 and IEC-104
as described later in this Standard. The selection of which protocol
will be finally used (either IEC 101 or IEC 104 or both) for
communications between the SCADA Master Station(s) and the
Communications Gateways used in the SAS will be provided by the
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
National Grid Saudi Arabia at the time of final commissioning of the

substation(s) covered by the PTS.
4.3.17 Station SOE functions
a.
Provide and install a new Sequence of Events Recording System as

part of each substation's SAS that satisfy the SOE Signal requirements
of each substation.
b.
For the substation SAS involved under this project, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall do the following:
Implement the SOE point requirements of the involved station

in accordance with the SOE Signal Requirements.
Prepare SOE Input signal interface drawings and I/O

Tabulation sheets consisting of I/O point assignments which
will be contained as part of the station HMI interface, and the
corresponding IEDs for each substation.
Submit the I/O Tabulation Sheets as a hard copy and as a soft

copy in a CD (soft copy shall be readable by the version of
Adobe Acrobat Reader used by the National Grid Saudi
Arabia).
Perform FAT (Factory Acceptance Tests) and SAT (Precommissioning and commissioning) of the SOE functions for
each substation.
c.
For the station SOE functions, the SAS shall emulate the functional
features of SOE standard based on latest revision of 38-TMSS-04
d.
SOE Points List shall be based on the requirements of main PTS/SOE

point lost standard.
4.3.18 Station protection functions

a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
General
Station protection functions are protection functions that

normally cannot be directly allocated to a particular bay. This
concerns essentially the busbar and breaker failure protection
schemes.
All protection functions realized at the station level should be

based on numerical technology and have a decentralized
architecture (with bay units connected to a central unit).
Remote access shall be made via the central unit. In any case it
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
should be possible to install the station protection scheme in a

decentralized or centralized arrangement.
b.
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall also refer to other portions of

this Standard as well as related Appendix of the main PTS for
additional specific requirements for Protection which will also
be applicable for station protection functions.
Self-supervision
Continuous self-supervision function with self-diagnostic possibilities
shall be included.
c.
User configuration
It shall be possible to monitor, control and configure all logical input
and output signals and binary inputs and relay outputs for all built-in
functions and signals.
d.
e.
TESP10701R0/KSB
Event and disturbance recording function:
As part of the decentralized station-oriented protection

scheme, the bay units should contain an event recorder able to
store at least 100 time-tagged events.
Also at the bay level a disturbance recorder with a minimum of

5 seconds recording time for at least 10 disturbances shall
provide the user with time-tagged disturbance records. At least
the analogue inputs connected to the bay unit, as well as 16
binary signals must be recorded.
The phasors of the pre-fault, fault and post-fault signals shall

be recorded for each disturbance and be made available for
further evaluation purposes.
Local HMI
The local human machine interface (HMI) shall be frontmounted and based on a user-friendly, menu-structured
program, and performed with the use of a permanently
installed human machine interface unit. This is valid for the
central unit. For the bay units it is only valid in case of a
decentralized arrangement.
In addition, service values of the connected analogue inputs

shall be available.
PAGE 50 OF 119
f.
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Busbar protection
A fully numerical scheme busbar protection system shall be

provided.
Refer to related Appendix of the main PTS or protection

standards for further details on the Busbar protection that shall
be provided.
Furthermore, relating to the interfacing between Busbar

protection and the SAS, the interfacing shall be fully compliant
with IEC 61850 and IEC62439-3 PRP 1 and with this
interfacing, the use of protocol converters (e.g. from IEC-103
to IEC 61850) will NOT be allowed. REDBOX is not
acceptable for IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to
National Grid Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer
enclosed drawing Fig. 07-01 which shows where REDBOX is
acceptable.
The Station HMI (Human Machine Interface) should

graphically display the busbar configuration with a dynamic
(permanently up-to-date) busbar image.
All the measured and set parameters as well as signal and

tripping commands shall be possible to be visualized in the
Local HMI.
In order to meet the modern substation's system requirements,

communication facilities between the numerical busbar
protection system and other components of the substation's
SAS shall be provided.
The operation of the numerical busbar protection system shall

be controlled either locally or remotely. Refer to related
Appendix of the main PTS/standards for further details on
these control requirements.
The SAS Station HMI Engineering Workstation shall be

primarily used for parameter settings related to the numerical
busbar protection system. Readings related to the parameter
settings shall be available at the Local HMI, the SAS Station
HMI Engineering Workstation, the Maintenance Laptop
Computers, and also, where connected to the external
Protection Engineering Workstation (external Protection
Engineering Workstation provided by others). Parameter
settings and readings shall be possible with an easy to use and
easy to understand user interface and shall also be possible
without the knowledge of programming by using a menu/GUI
driven program.
PAGE 51 OF 119
g.
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Disturbances in the SAS Station HMI, or any other component

of the SAS which is outside the numerical busbar protection
scheme shall not influence the protection.
Pre-engineering for future configurations should be possible
Breaker failure protection
A fully numerical based breaker failure protection system shall

be provided.
Refer to related Appendix of the main PTS or Protection

Standards for further details on the Breaker Failure protection
that shall be provided.
Depending on the requirements of related Appendix of the

main PTS/standards, and other National Grid Saudi Arabia
engineering and operational requirements, the Breaker Failure
Protection may or may not be combined with the numerical
Busbar Protection system.
Furthermore, relating to the interfacing between Breaker

Failure protection and the SAS, the interfacing shall be fully
compliant with IEC 61850 and IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 and with
this interfacing, the use of protocol converters (e.g. from IEC103 to IEC 61850) will NOT be allowed. REDBOX is not
acceptable for IEDs. For other equipment it is subjected to
National Grid Saudi Arabia review and acceptance. Refer
enclosed drawing Fig. 07-01 which shows where REDBOX is
acceptable.
All the measured and set parameters as well as signal and

tripping commands shall be possible to be visualized in the
Local HMI contained as part of the numerical Breaker Failure
Protection system.
In order to meet the modern substation's system requirements,

communication facilities between the Numerical Breaker
Failure protection system and other components of the
substation's SAS shall be provided.
The operation of the Numerical Breaker Failure Protection

System shall be controlled either locally or remotely. Refer to
related Appendix of the main PTS/standards for further details
on these control requirements.
The SAS Station HMI Engineering Workstation shall be

primarily used for parameter settings related to the Numerical
Breaker Failure Protection System. Readings related to the
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parameter settings shall be available at the Local HMI, the

SAS Station HMI, Engineering Workstation, the Maintenance
Laptop Computers, and also when connected to the external
Protection Engineering Workstation (external Protection
Engineering Workstation provided by others).. Parameter
settings and readings shall be possible with an easy to use and
easy to understand user interface and shall also be possible
without the knowledge of programming by using a menu/GUI
driven program.
5.0
Disturbances in the SAS Station HMI or any other component

of the SAS which is outside the Numerical Breaker Failure
Protection Scheme shall not influence the protection.
Pre-engineering for future configurations should be possible.
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
5.1
Message Performance
5.1.1
The given (message) performance times are referring to the total transfer time
t that includes the IED's internal processing time as defined in IEC 61850 as
well as the transmission time used over the communications network (interbay bus, switches, etc.). Different requirements concerning performance for
messages apply depending on the application. Referring to the IEC 61850
standard part 5, one can distinguish the different performance classes for the
various applications (e.g. control and protection, metering and power quality,
etc.) which must be adhered to by the SOLUTION PROVIDER in the
message performance requirements for the overall design of the SAS.
5.1.2
As part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's proposal, and as well as during the

Base Design Stage of the Project, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide
message performance estimates (in terms of the total transfer time t
referenced in Section 5 of this Standard for the different performance classes
for the various applications. As part of the providing of these message
performance estimates, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall identify any
weaknesses in the SAS which may impact on the message performance
requirements based on IEC 61850.
5.2
TESP10701R0/KSB
System Performance
5.2.1
It is expected that a SAS during its lifetime will have to face different
situations concerning the number of events appearing in each substation and
the resulting load on the SAS communication network.
5.2.2
During the normal load situation only occasional alarms and events are
occurring at the substation with analog reporting as load demand changes.
5.2.3
The updating times on the operator station under normal and calm conditions
in the substation shall be as follows:
PAGE 53 OF 119
Function
Typical values
Exchange of display (first reaction)
<1s
Presentation of a binary change in the process display < 0.5 s

Presentation of an analogue change in the process display < 1 s
From order to process output
< 0.5 s
From order to updating the display
< 1.5 s
5.2.4
In terms of the overall SAS design, the most important issue when planning
each substation's communication are a proper assignment of freely allocable
logical nodes to physical devices and the arrangement of the communication
network itself to minimize point-to-point communication requirements.
5.2.5
Combining data objects into object oriented of multi-command messages

should be planned by the SOLUTION PROVIDER in a suitable way which
can result in a noticeable reduction in the total traffic.
5.2.6
When defining the actual network and stacks, the SOLUTION PROVIDER
is encouraged to combine data objects in such a way that the traffic is
minimized.
5.2.7
To verify system performance requirements, the SOLUTION PROVIDER

shall perform a preliminary study involving a LAN simulation to
measure/predict expected system performance of the SAS communications
system (including inter-bay bus, station bus, switches and other elements of
the SAS communications system) for the following conditions:
a.
b.
c.
6.0
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Normal (Typical) operating requirements

Expected emergency and abnormal loads on each substation
Other times when the SOLUTION PROVIDER may expect a system
performance degradation due to actions performed by the SAS in the
substation, such as excessive protection signaling, abnormal receipt of
alarms, performance of updates as well as other factors
5.2.8
For the LAN simulation study, for all cases, the SOLUTION PROVIDER
shall state the assumptions used and the conditions stated in his study, any
weak points which may be apparent in the LAN communications system (e.g.
inter-bay bus, switches, station bus, etc.) as well as methods which the
SOLUTION PROVIDER will use to minimize LAN traffic on the system (to
avoid LAN bottlenecks).
5.2.9
Also, for the LAN simulation study, this shall be performed during the base
design stage of the project
RELIABILITY AND SYSTEM DESIGN

6.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
Reliability Aspects
PAGE 54 OF 119
6.1.1
The SAS shall be designed to satisfy the very high demands for reliability and
availability concerning:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
solid mechanical and electrical design

protection against electrical interference (EMI)
high-quality components and boards
modular, well-tested hardware
thoroughly developed and tested modular software
easy-to-understand
programming
language
for
application
programming
detailed graphical documentation, IEC 61131-3, of the application
software
built-in supervision and diagnostic functions
after-sales service
security
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
experience of security requirements

process know-how
select-before-execute at operation
process status representation as double indications

distributed solution
independent units connected to the local area network
back-up functions
panel design appropriate to any harsh electrical environment and
ambient conditions
panel grounding immune to transient ground potential rise
The SAS must provide a high MTBF (mean time between failures)
and a low MTTR (mean time to repair) rate, the values to be indicated
by the SOLUTION PROVIDER during the Base Design Stage of the
Project.
The availability calculation for the substation's 'substation control'
functionality shall include the following cases:
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
local bay control with full functionality (interlocking and

synchrocheck)
substation control
control by PCC (SCADA Master Station(s))
For the availability calculation, travel time of maintenance
personnel to and from the site shall be disregarded, and shall
assume that all repair/replacement spares are on-site.
However, the availability calculation shall take into account
the MTTR (Mean Time to Repair) figures of the SAS
component with the estimated highest repair/replacement time.
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall indicate the guidelines
utilized for availability calculations.
For the 'substation control functionality, the availability must reach at

least 99.995% over the expected 20 year lifetime of the SAS. The SAS
shall be designed in order to provide this availability. Also as part of
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Bid Proposal the SOLUTION

PROVIDER shall state the expected availability of the substation
control functionality performed by the SAS and for what duration,
and also under what conditions and assumptions (e.g. conditions and
assumptions pertaining to MTBF and MTTR of individual
components of the SAS, environmental conditions which the SAS is
operating under, etc.) which the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's expected
availability (of the substation control functionality performed by the
SAS) is based on. National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that the expected
availability figures developed for the substation control functionality
are considered only preliminary (since not is all known about the
National Grid Saudi Arabia approved final design of the SAS at the
bid stage), and that the SOLUTION PROVIDER will be required to
develop final availability calculations for the National Grid Saudi
Arabia approved SAS installation(s) during the later design stages of
the project.
t.
6.2
TESP10701R0/KSB
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall clearly define how the offered

architecture meets the availability requirements as part of his Bid
Proposal and the later Base Design Proposal, As such, as part of this
definition, a system block diagram shall therefore be submitted.
General Design Requirements

6.2.1
In order to meet the requirements of this specification, the design of the SAS
is within the manufacturers/SOLUTION PROVIDER's responsibility but
subject to approval by the National Grid Saudi Arabia.
6.2.2
As a minimum, the following important requirements should be guaranteed in

any case:
a.
Distributed architecture that allows the placement of bay equipment in

a kiosk and the station equipment in a central building
b.
The IEDs at bay level like the Protection IEDs, Control IEDs and
combined Control/Protection IEDs are directly connected to the interbay bus.
c.
In the case of Main1 Main 2 protection schemes, the two protection

terminals (Protection IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs)
have to be of different hardware and software, and where indicated in
related Appendix of the main PTS/standards, from different
manufacturers.
d.
The station-oriented protection schemes should have a decentralized

architecture and shall meet the requirements of related Appendix of
the main PTS/protection standards.
e.
Re-closing and associated synchro-check functions can be considered

as control functions, unless otherwise specified that these (reclosing
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and associated synchro-check) functions are protection functions as

indicated in related Appendix of the main PTS/Protection Standards.
6.2.3
f.
A separate Control IED unit or combined Control/Protection IED unit

has to be associated to each circuit breaker. The minimum number of
control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs shall be
considered accordingly for each substation. For the control function
for High Voltage switchgear, only dedicated Control IEDs will be
utilized and provided. For the control function for Medium Voltage
switchgear, combined Control/Protection IEDs will be utilized and
provided, unless the related Appendix of the main PTS requires the
use of dedicated Control IEDs (for Control), and dedicated Protection
IEDs (for Protection) for certain (or possibly all) items of Medium
Voltage switchgear.
g.
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall present the internal and external

layout of the different cubicles, as well as the locations within each
Substation of these cubicles during the Base Design stage of the
Project.
Bay-oriented arrangements
For each type of bay (line, transformer, coupler, and other bays) the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall present the principal arrangement of the
cubicles: type of hardware units and associated functions.
6.2.4
Station-oriented arrangements
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall present a detailed schematic diagram and
the drawings of the station level and the optical connections.
6.2.5
Other Protection Scheme requirements

The protection scheme is an integral part of the SAS, and the protection relays
(Protection IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs) shall therefore be
connected to the inter-bay bus in order to provide unrestricted access to all
data and information stored in the relays (Protection IEDs and combined
Control/Protection IEDs), and for monitoring protection parameters remotely.
7.0
IEC61850 AND IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 COMMUNICATION PROFILE

7.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
Introduction Related to IEC 61850

7.1.1
The definition of the IEC61850 communication profile shall assure that the
offered solution complies with the minimum requirements requested in the
standard and also shall ensure that the offered architecture can be realized
with the proposed products and their implemented services.
7.1.2
For interoperability, not only data have to be standardized but also the access
to these data called services. The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall include in
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
his Proposal a filled out interoperability list of each typical device provided in
the offered system to determine compliance with IEC 61850 requirements.
Some of the relevant areas to be covered by the profile with regard to IEC
61850 are:
a.
Communication Services
Abstract Communications Services (ACSI) (7-2)
b.
Data Modeling
Common Data Classes (7-3)

Logical Nodes (7-4)
The data modeling is not specifically listed but the supplier shall
comply fully with the logical nodes described in the standard for the
devices where they are required. As a minimum all the mandatory data
of the used logical nodes must be supported.
7.2
Typical Architecture and Required Communication Services Related to IEC 61850

The SAS architecture shall be based on a completely distributed approach. To
support the distributed approach as a minimum the below given communication
services between the particular system devices have to be supported:
7.2.1
7.2.2
7.2.3
7.2.4
7.2.5
7.2.6
7.3
Time synchronization: SNTP or IRIG-B

IEC GOOSE: Interlocks, other IED-IED-communication
Sampled Values
File transfer FTP or IEC61850/MMS
Reporting: Buffered reports
Commands: Control model Select-before-operate with Enhanced Security for
primary equipment, Simple direct control for LED reset and the like
Profile/Requirements relating to IEC 62439-3 PRP 1

The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall include in his Bid Proposal a filled out
interoperability list of each applicable device provided in the offered system to
determine compliance with IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 requirements. Some of the relevant
areas to be covered by the profile with regard to IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 will include the
following:
TESP10701R0/KSB
7.3.1
Confirmation that all IEDs supplied shall provide a IEC 62439-3 PRP 1
DAN (Double Attached Node) connection to redundant ring inter-bay busses.
7.3.2
On the Station HMI and Communications Gateway ends, the plan/proposal to

interconnect redundant ring inter-bay busses supporting IEC 62439-3 PRP 1
traffic to the Station HMI and Communications Gateway computers, and
whether the Station HMI/Communications Gateway computers will have
interfaces which will fully support IEC 62439-3 PRP 1.
PAGE 58 OF 119
8.0
7.3.3
Transit times of IEC 61850 signals through IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 equipment
(e.g. SANS, DANS, Redboxes, etc.).
7.3.4
Confirmation that the Ethernet switches proposed by the SOLUTION

PROVIDER can carry the IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 Ethernet packets which will be
sent and received by the end devices on the IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 Links.
7.3.5
Other information which the SOLUTION PROVIDER deems relevant to the

evaluation of his proposal.
CONFIGURATION TOOLS /SERVICE AND SUPPORT SYSTEM

8.1
Depending on the Equipment Manufacturers design, the configuration of the Front

End Computers shall be made either at the Engineering Workstation, or Operator
Workstations in the Windows environment. The various functionalities shall be
customized by easy-to-use interactive configuration tools. The configuration shall
include the visual presentation of the object, adaptations needed in the process
database, and adaptations of the communication configuration data.
8.2
Portable Maintenance Laptop Computers (which plug into the IED serial, Ethernet RJ
45, and/or Optical Port) as a service unit shall be provided for on-site review of
settings, and emergency on-site modifications of the Control IED and Protection IED
devices. This service unit shall be used for documentation, IED Parameter
readings/settings (IED Parameter settings on an emergency basis only), testing and
commissioning, etc.
8.3
The service & support system shall be used for the following purposes:
8.3.1
8.3.2
8.3.3
8.3.4
8.3.5
8.3.6
8.3.7
8.3.8
8.4
9.0
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
System configuration
System testing
Help functions
Program documentation
Down and uploading of programs
System commissioning
Data base management
Changing peripheral parameters
The service & support system shall be able to monitor data in the operating
substation's control system and to present changing variables on the display screen in
graphic representation.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
9.1
Compliance with standards

9.1.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
For design and type testing of the protection and control equipment as well as
other equipment associated with the SAS as well as overall implementation of
the SAS, the following standards, protocols, and industry practices shall be
applicable:
PAGE 59 OF 119
a.
General
b.
EN 50081-2 Emissivity (Industry)

EN 50082-2 Immunity (Industry)
Cyber Security
TESP10701R0/KSB
IEEE 1613: IEEE Standard Environmental and Testing

Requirements for Communications Networking Devices in
Electric Power Substations
IEEE C37.90.2: IEEE Trial-Use Standard Withstand
Capability of Relay Systems to Radiated Electromagnetic
Interference from Transceivers
IEEE C37.90.1: IEEE Standard Surge Withstand Capability
Test for Protective Relays and Relay Systems
IEC 60068-2-30 Ed 3.0 (2005-08), Environmental Testing
IEC 60255-5 Ed 2.0 Electrical Relays - Part 5: Insulation
coordination for measuring relays and protection equipment Requirements and tests
IEC 60255-21-1 Ed 1.0 (1988-09), Electrical Relays Part 21:
Vibration, shock, bump and seismic test on measuring relays
and protection equipment-Section One: Vibration tests
(sinusoidal)
IEC 60255-21-2 Ed 1.0 (1988-09), Electrical Relays Part 21:
Vibration, shock, bump and seismic test on measuring relays
and protection equipment-Section Two: Shock and Bump tests
(sinusoidal)
CE-marking
d.
IEC 60255: Electrical relays

IEC 60038: IEC Standard voltages
IEC 60068: Environmental testing
IEC 60664: Insulation coordination for equipment within lowvoltage systems
IEC 61850: Communications networks and systems in
substations
Suitability for substation environment:
c.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
IEC 62443-2-1, Ed 1.0 Industrial communication networksNetwork and system security- Part 2-1 Establishing an
industrial automation and control system security
NERC CIP North American Electric Reliability CouncilCritical Infrastructure Protection
IETF RFC-2196, Site Security Handbook
IETF RFC-3093 Firewall Enhancement Protocol
IEEE 1686-2007 IEEE Standard for Substation Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs) Cyber Security Capabilities
PAGE 60 OF 119
e.
ANSI/ISA-99 Security for Industrial Automation and Control

Systems
NIST SP 800-41, Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy
NIST SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems (IDPS),
NIST SP 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Security
NIST SP 800-147 BIOS Protection Guidelines
NIST SP 800-40 Version 2.0 Creating a Patch and
Vulnerability Management Program
NIST SP 800-123 Guide to General Server Security
NIST SP 800-53, Rev 3 Information Security
US DHS Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control
Systems
US DHS Improving Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security
with Defense-in-depth Strategies
US DHS Recommended Practice for Securing Control System
Modems
IEC TS 62351-Parts 1 to 8 & 10, Data and Communications
Security
Ethernet Switch Standards
IEEE 802.3
IEEE 802.3u
IEEE 802.3ab
IEEE 802.3z
IEEE 802.3x
IEEE 802.3ad
IEEE 802.1d
IEEE 802.1w
IEEE 802.1p
IEEE 802.1q
IEEE 802.1x
IEEE 1613
IEC 61850-3
IEC 61850-5
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
10BASE-T specification
100BASE-TX, 100BASE-FX specification
1000BASE-TX specification
1000BASE-LX specification
Flow Control
Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP)
for creation of Ether channels with other LACP
compliant devices
Spanning Tree Protocol support for redundant
Backbone connections and loop-free network
with improved fault tolerance
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP)
Specification for traffic prioritization.
Specification for VLAN tagging.
Specification to allow for dynamic, port-based
security providing user authentication
Standard for Networking Devices in Electrical
Power Substations which specifies electrical
immunity, temperature ratings and other
environmental requirements
Communication Network and Systems in
Substations Part 3-General Requirements
Communication Network and Systems in
Substations
-Part5
Communication
requirements for functions and Device models
PAGE 61 OF 119
f.
IETF RFC 768

IETF RFC 783
IETF RFC 791
IETF RFC 792
IETF RFC 793
IETF RFC 826
IETF RFC 854
IETF RFC 894
IETF RFC 1112
IETF RFC 2236
IETF RFC 1519

IETF RFC 2030
IETF RFC 1541
IETF RFC 2284
IETF RFC 2475
IETF RFC 2865
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
User Datagram Protocol (UDP)

Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
Internet Protocol (IP)
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
Telnet Protocol Specification
Standard for transmission of IP Datagrams over
Ethernet Networks
Internet
Group
Management
Protocol
(IGMPv1)
Internet
Group
Management
Protocol
(IGMPv2)
Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR)
Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTPv4)
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
An architecture for Differentiated Services
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Services
(RADIUS)
Other National Grid Saudi Arabia Standards

Latest revision of the following National Grid Saudi Arabia standard
to be followed
Commissioning Tests and Checks of Power

Transmission Network Equipment
TES-P-103.05
Uninterruptible Power System
TES-P-119.26
Control Schemes for Substation Equipment
TES-P-119.27
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
TES-P-119.30
Auxiliary Power Systems (AC/DC)
01-TMSS-01
General
Requirements
for
All
Equipment/Materials
31-TMSS-01
Relay and Control Panels
32-TMSS-01
Metal clad Switchgear 11kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV
or 34.5 kV
32-TMSS-02
SF6 Gas Insulated Switchgear69 kV through
380 kV (but with exceptions noted in other
parts of related Appendix to the main PTS)
32-TMSS-03
Metal clad Gas Insulated Medium Voltage
Switchgear 11kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV or 34.5 kV
38-TMSS-03
Remote Terminal Unit
38-TMSS-04
Sequence of Events Recorder System
38-TMSS-05
Annunciator Systems
46-TMSS-03
UPS 5kVA through 100kVA, if applicable
Additional National Grid Saudi Arabia standards (not included
above) which are referenced in main PTS document
TESP10701R0/KSB
TCS-P-105
PAGE 62 OF 119
9.2
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Vendors/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's experience and Proposal for the SAS

9.2.1
Only National Grid Saudi Arabia approved manufacturers of control and

protection systems for electricity transmission and distribution applications
will be accepted. Preferred manufacturers will be those who have experience
in deliveries of the full scope of station automation systems (SAS) and
services. This experience has to be substantiated by means of reference
installations having been in service under similar environmental conditions
for at least 2 years.
9.2.2
For single equipment a field experience of at least 2 years is requested.
9.2.3
In order to assess the vendors/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's experience with

the enquiry, as well for the National Grid Saudi Arabia to evaluate the
vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's for the SAS, during the bidding stage of
the Project, the vendor/SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit a Bid Proposal
for the SAS. As part of the vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Proposal, the
vendor/SOLUTION PROVIDER is required to present the following:
TESP10701R0/KSB
Technical design specification and description of the SAS

Catalogues and brochures of the equipment and devices offered
Reference list
Interoperability List referenced in Section 7 of this Standard.
Clause-by-Clause compliance statement (including any SOLUTION
PROVIDER deviations/exceptions) to this Standard the related
Appendix involving Protective Relay equipment and the portions of
the main SOW/TS (PTS) pertaining to Substation Automation
Systems (SAS)
Listing of equipment manufacturer's recommended operating spare
parts for two years operation of the SAS, and a compliance statement
to related Appendix of the main PTS as it relates to SAS Spare Parts.
Listing of equipment manufacturer's recommended special tools, test
equipment and software which is needed to operate and maintain the
SAS
Proposed Software Upgrade and Software Maintenance Agreement
Vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS preliminary training plan
and proposal for SAS Training identified in related Appendix of the
main PTS
Statement of the Preliminary Expected Availability for the Substation
Control functionality of the SAS
Definition on how the offered SAS Architecture meets the Availability
requirements
SAS Block/Schematic Diagram
Identification of each critical non-redundant SAS equipment item
MTBF Figures for each critical non-redundant SAS equipment item
SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposal for supply of AC Power to SAS
equipment requiring the supply of AC Power-See Section 14 of this
Standard for SOLUTION PROVIDER required documents
PAGE 63 OF 119
10.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Vendor's/SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposed redundant networks

scheme for the SAS, which is identified in Section 3 of this Standard,
including the proposed communications architecture showing all
communications/WAN interconnection details
General SAS architecture details
Narrative of Bay Interlocking, Station Interlocking and Double
Operation Interlocking scenario, as well as a narrative of the
interrelationships between the software/GOOSE interlocking scheme
and the hard-wired interlocking scheme.
Dual ACTIVE Communications Port Scheme for all IEDs and
confirmation of compliance to IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 for the dual
ACTIVE Communications Port Scheme for all IEDs
SOLUTION PROVIDER s proposal for SAS Solution provider
(s)/SAS Solution provider (s), as well as main Substation SOLUTION
PROVIDER details pertaining to his SAS Subcontracting Plan.
Any other information which the National Grid Saudi Arabia may
require the vendor/SOLUTION PROVIDER to provide during the
Bidding Phase of the Project pertaining to the SAS
Preliminary Outage estimate required as part of a SAS
Upgrade/Reconfiguration (See Section 14 of this Standard for further
details)
Data Schedule as applicable (for SAS equipment such as UPS, RTU,
etc.)
Preliminary list of materials
PROJECT EXECUTION
During the project execution phase the following activities have to be considered:
Engineering
FAT
Site installation
SAT/Commissioning
10.1
Engineering
10.1.1 During the engineering phase the following milestones are very important and
have to be agreed upon between the SOLUTION PROVIDER and the
National Grid Saudi Arabia:
TESP10701R0/KSB
a.
Complete single-line diagram, including position of the different

objects (CTs, PTs, isolators, etc).
b.
Acceptance of: event list, alarm list, the main pictures displayed at
station level & used in the single-line diagram etc.
c.
Acceptance of: the lists of events and alarms (including their names)
with the indication of the particular signal to be sent (station event list,
remote signal list, etc).
PAGE 64 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
d.
Cubicle layout.
e.
Backup database entries pertaining to the SCL (Substation

Configuration Language) used to program each IED object.
10.1.2 Refer to other clauses of Section 10 also for additional documentation to be

submitted during the various phases of the Project.
10.2
Factory Acceptance Test (FAT)

10.2.1 The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit a test specification for the factory
acceptance test (FAT) of the Substation Automation System for approval by
the National Grid Saudi Arabia as part of the base design engineering package
for the project. This will include (but may not be limited to) a listing of the
tests, FAT System Configuration diagrams showing all equipment which will
be included as part of the FAT testing (with the FAT System Configuration
diagrams also showing a one-line diagram for the simulated switchgear for
the simulated bays/diameters which will be used for the testing), test
procedures and test forms/reports, which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will
perform for the SAS components as part of the FAT. For all SAS equipment,
applicable type test certificates shall be submitted, and if required by National
Grid Saudi Arabia, copies of the applicable type test reports shall be
submitted.
10.2.2 The manufacturing phase of the SAS shall be concluded by the factory
acceptance test (FAT). The purpose is to ensure that the SOLUTION
PROVIDER has interpreted the specified requirements correctly and that the
FAT includes checking to the degree required by the user. The general
philosophy shall be to deliver a system to site only after it has been
thoroughly tested and its specified performance has been verified, as far as
site conditions can be simulated in a test lab. If the FAT comprises only a
certain portion of the system for practical reasons, it has to be assured that this
test configuration contains at least one unit of each and every type of
equipment incorporated in the delivered system.
10.2.3 National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that authorization for release of shipment of
the SAS shall be provided only when the ALL the following conditions are
met:
TESP10701R0/KSB
SOLUTION PROVIDER has provided ALL Type Test Reports for

SAS equipment which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will provide as
part of the SAS, and that these Type Test Reports have been accepted
by the National Grid Saudi Arabia through one (1) third party SAS
FAT Witnessing Inspector, and five (5) National Grid Saudi Arabia
witnessing engineers.
PAGE 65 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
National Grid Saudi Arabia has approved the SOLUTION

PROVIDERs final SAS FAT Test Book/Document prior to the start
of SAS FAT Testing.
SOLUTION PROVIDER has successfully completed ALL SAS FAT
Tests required by the SAS FAT Witnessing Inspector in accordance
with the National Grid Saudi Arabia approved SAS FAT Test
Book/Document and related Test Sheets.
After completion of the SAS FAT Tests (with test sheets signed by the
SAS FAT Witnessing Inspector and the Manufacturers
Representative), the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall forward the
completed SAS FAT Test Book along with all Test Sheets with ALL
tests documented, and if the National Grid Saudi Arabia deems the
test results and test documentation as being acceptable, a National
Grid Saudi Arabia authorization for release for shipment document
will be issued for the SAS.
10.2.4 For the portion of the FAT which deals with the SCADA and SOE functions
of the SAS, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall verify as part of the FAT that
all the required functions and requirements of the National Grid Saudi Arabia
for the SCADA, and SOE functions are met.
10.2.5 It is extremely important that the SOLUTION PROVIDER have a full
traceability of all test data generated during the Type Tests, Factory Tests
(FT) and the FAT to assure that repeating of tests is minimized during all
stages of the testing process. Full traceability shall include full recording of
values on test sheets, appropriate test instructions and other data to allow the
National Grid Saudi Arabia to confirm that ALL functionalities as indicated
in the SAS Equipment Manufacturer's Specifications/Technical Brochures,
applicable accepted International Standards, and National Grid Saudi Arabia
specifications/requirements are complied with. Failure of the SOLUTION
PROVIDER to provide a full traceability record of these tests may require
the National Grid Saudi Arabia to demand that the SOLUTION PROVIDER
repeat such tests (for National Grid Saudi Arabia /Independent Inspection
Agency Witness) which have no traceable record to satisfy to the National
Grid Saudi Arabia that such equipment contained in the SAS meets ALL SAS
Equipment Manufacturer's Specifications/Technical Brochures, applicable
accepted International Standards and National Grid Saudi Arabia
specifications/requirements.
10.3
SAT (Site Acceptance Test)/Pre-Commissioning and Commissioning

10.3.1 The commissioning of the primary equipment and the wiring between the
primary equipment and cubicle terminals of the SAS shall be included as part
of the pre-commissioning/commissioning of the SAS during the final stages of
construction of each substation. However, National Grid Saudi Arabia may
require that, in the event that there are delays in the availability of primary
equipment and wiring (for commissioning) as compared to the completion of
the SAS, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall use suitable simulators which can
simulate all functions of the primary equipment (including the GIS switchgear,
and all other equipment which the SAS is connected to), and test the
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 66 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
interfacing of the SAS with the simulated equipment. Prior approval for the
Simulator (including its hardware and software parts) shall be obtained from
National Grid Saudi Arabia to ensure its adequacy/suitability.
10.3.2 Also, IEDs used for protection, control, etc., the redundant inter-bay bus (and
associated communications hardware/software), the redundant station bus (and
associated communications hardware/software),the Time Synchronization
System (redundant GPS receivers) and the local/station HMI (including all
computer equipment), Operator/Engineering Workstations and related
peripheral equipment (e.g. all displays/keyboards, printers, etc.) and all
interconnecting communications devices (e.g. VF modems, Firewalls, etc.) and
inverters/UPS equipment providing power for SAS are to be considered
component
parts
of
the
SAS,
and
shall
undergo
precommissioning/commissioning requirements as part of the SAT.
10.3.3 The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall, as part of the base design engineering
package which he will develop will include a listing of the tests, test
procedures and test forms/reports which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will
perform for the SAS components as part of the SAT (precommissioning/commissioning tests), which is to be submitted for National
Grid Saudi Arabia review and approval.
10.3.4 All primary equipments site pre-commissioning/commissioning tests shall be
prepared by SOLUTION PROVIDER in accordance with TCS-P-105 IEC
61850 requirements regarding commissioning of SAS, and commissioning
tests for the SAS as required under this standard and the main PTS document,
and equipment manufacturer's commissioning test recommendations. This
documentation (pertaining to site pre-commissioning/commissioning tests
prepared by the SOLUTION PROVIDER) shall be submitted to National Grid
Saudi Arabia for National Grid Saudi Arabia review and approval not less than
six (6) months before the scheduled date of tests.
10.3.5 In cases where the SOLUTION PROVIDER cannot provide to the National
Grid Saudi Arabia adequate type test documentation for all SAS components
from the respective manufacturers of SAS equipment, and/or in cases where
the FAT Testing was performed with missing tests which are required by the
National Grid Saudi Arabia and/or in cases where factory production test runs
were not submitted, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall be required to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the National Grid Saudi Arabia through
performance of the pre-commissioning/commissioning tests that the required
tests which were not documented by the SOLUTION PROVIDER either
during the Type Testing stage and/or the FAT Testing stage and/or factory
production test run stage.
10.3.6 Depending on the overall complexity of the SAS, and to avoid repeating of
tests, the National Grid Saudi Arabia may allow some of the tests which were
to be provided as part of the SAS SAT to be performed during the final
substation commissioning stage of the project (e.g.. this may include the
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 67 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
testing of binary inputs which were not performed during the SAS SAT, full
functionality tests with the interconnected SCADA Master Stations, etc.). In
this respect, as part of the development of the SAS SAT Test Book/Document,
the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall identify which tests that he will perform
during the SAS SAT, and which tests will be remaining to be tested by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER which are related to the SAS during the final
commissioning stage of the project which will then be submitted for National
Grid Saudi Arabia approval.
10.3.7 For the SCADA function of the SAS, in addition to the precommissioning/commissioning SAS SAT requirements specified in Sections
10.3.1 through 10.3.5 of this Standard, the following shall be included as a
minimum:
a.
SCADA System Pre-Commissioning

Verification of proper operation of all SCADA Input and Output
points from the related IEDs and the Station HMI for all SCADA
points on the National Grid Saudi Arabia approved SCADA Points
List for each substation. For the SCADA Input points, this requires
simulated triggering of all analog, binary, and other SCADA input
points from a simulator which is to be supplied by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER and checking that these points appear on the related IEDs
(including Local HMI displays, and Bay-oriented Local Control
Panels with Mimic Diagram (for emergency operation)), the Station
HMI and the SCADA Master Station Simulators connected to the
Communications Gateways. For the SCADA Output (Control) points,
this will require verification of operation of the related switchgear (or
SOLUTION PROVIDER provided simulator representing the related
switchgear if the related switchgear is not available) from the Local
HMI and Station HMI equipment. Also for the SCADA Output
(Control) points, if the actual switchgear is not available for testing,
and a simulator is used, the simulator shall be equipped to read the
actual control output from the IED (Control IED, combined
Control/Protection IED), at the actual control output of the IED (at the
terminal block of the IED, or downstream past the terminal block) as
well as on the Local HMI on the IED.
b.
SCADA System Final Commissioning

Ultimate test to verify that all SCADA Input and Output points are
telemetered and controlled from the Power Control Center (SCADA
Master Stations). For the connection to the SCADA Master Station(s)
in the Power Control Center, this requires communication connection
availability. In the absence of communication link to National Grid
Saudi Arabia Power Control Center SCADA Master Station(s), a
National Grid Saudi Arabia approved simulator (which shall be
provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER) shall be used which will
interconnect with the Communications Gateway ports (through
SOLUTION PROVIDER supplied VF Modem equipment for IEC
TESP10701R0/KSB
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
101 connections, and redundant Firewall equipment for IEC 104

connections) and which will verify the operation of all SCADA input
and output points used as part of the SAS. Also, for the SCADA
System Final Commissioning tests, refer to Section 10.3.7. of this
Standard for further details pertaining to specific testing requirements
for binary inputs, control outputs, and analog indications.
10.3.8 For the SOE function of the SAS, in addition to the precommissioning/commissioning requirements specified in Sections 10.3.1
through 10.3.5 the following shall be included as a minimum:
a.
SOE Function Pre-Commissioning

Verification of proper operation and termination of all SOE Input
signals. This requires simulated triggering of all SOE input points and
checking that they are properly printed and displayed in the simulator,
Local HMI and Station HMI Panel. SOE System Pre Commissioning
is a Pre-Requisite to the issuances of Technical Completion Certificate
(TCC).
b.
SOE Function Final Commissioning

Consist of end-to-end test of all SOE Signals to show that they can be
monitored at the Station HMI and the SOE master station in the
associate control center. This requires communication connection
(LAN/WAN or party line or both) availability. In the absence of
communication link to National Grid Saudi Arabia Power Control
Center SOE master station, a National Grid Saudi Arabia approved
simulator(which shall be provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER )
shall be used which will interconnect with the Communications
Gateway ports (through SOLUTION PROVIDER supplied and
installed redundant Firewall equipment) and which will verify the
operation on the simulator display of all SOE input points used as part
of the SAS.
10.3.9 For the Protection IEDs contained as part of the SAS and for the Protection
functionalities for the combined Control/Protection IEDs, in addition to the
pre-commissioning/commissioning requirements specified in Sections 10.3.1
through 10.3.5 of this Standard National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements for
pre-commissioning/commissioning of Protective Relays (as defined elsewhere
in the main PTS and related Protective Relaying Appendix of the main
PTS/Protection Standards shall be followed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER .
10.3.10For the pre-commissioning and commissioning requirements relating to
EMI/RFI immunity, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide as part of his
overall pre-commissioning and commissioning testing scheme (which will be
submitted to the National Grid Saudi Arabia during the Base Design Phase of
the Project), a proposal for testing all SAS equipment from immunity to
external EMI/RFI sources which may occur within each substation. National
Grid Saudi Arabia notes that if the SOLUTION PROVIDER submits adequate
TESP10701R0/KSB
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
type test data for part or all of the SAS equipment items showing that some, or
all the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS equipment items meet the applicable
IEC requirements for EMI/RFI immunity (including IEC 61850 requirements),
National Grid Saudi Arabia will waive the field EMI/RFI immunity test
requirements for the SAS equipment items whose adequate type test reports for
EMI/RFI immunity are provided.
10.4
Design and Operating Requirements

10.4.1 General
It should be explained how a few modifications can be performed by local,
trained personnel. In this respect, different classes of access are established:
a.
b.
c.
d.
view only
operation
modifications
responsible for the allowance of permission
10.4.2 Project-specific adaptations

The specific functionality and boundary conditions of the SAS shall be
adapted to the requirements which are related to the particular voltage level
and the specific substation's layout.
10.4.3 Local support
TESP10701R0/KSB
a.
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall assure long-term maintenance and

availability of SAS spares with required SAS spares to be located in
facilities In-Kingdom. Moreover, a guarantee shall be submitted for
the availability of spares during the lifetime of the SAS equipment,
which will coincide with the lifetime of each substation's equipment
which is provided under the contract (usually with a minimum life
span of 20 years).
b.
In terms of software for all components of the SAS, the SOLUTION

PROVIDER shall guarantee that if replaced hardware parts require
new or updated software/firmware to operate the replaced hardware
parts that this new or updated software/firmware shall be provided as
part of the supply of the replacement part.
c.
In the event that the SAS Equipment Manufacturer, or other SAS

equipment vendors supply of certain material contained as part of the
SAS will be discontinued by manufacturer, and the SAS Equipment
Manufacturer or other SAS equipment vendors offer functionally
equivalent, or functionally better components (e.g. IEDs, computers,
Ethernet Switches, etc.), as a replacement item, the SAS Equipment
Manufacturer and/or other SAS equipment vendors shall guarantee the
functionally equivalent, or functionally better component can be fully
integrated into the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS installation with
PAGE 70 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
no loss of the original functionality of the SAS installation provided

by the SOLUTION PROVIDER . However, National Grid Saudi
Arabia will allow for additional functions and features which will be
provided by the replacement item over and above the original
functionality of the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS installation.
10.4.4 Quality assurance and inspection
a.
The quality assurance of design and development, production,

installation and servicing of material and workmanship shall be
governed by ISO 9001.
b.
The SAS shall be fully-sized pre-assembled and tested at the vendors

facility before shipment and shall be subject to inspection by the
responsible representative designated by the National Grid Saudi
Arabia.
10.5 Services, After Sales and Maintenance

10.5.1 General
a.
In order to reduce maintenance, training and commissioning costs, it is

required to use the lowest number of different hardware platforms as
possible.
b.
The complete SAS system should be accessible for the manufacturer

via modems (two at least) after permission is granted by the National
Grid Saudi Arabia. The modems referenced in this section are in
addition to the modems needed for the IEC-101 connections for the
Communications Gateway equipment which is referenced elsewhere
in this Standard.
10.5.2 Training
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall also provide training as described in
related Attachments of the main PTS and the scope of each service shall be
given.
10.5.3 Operating Spare parts
a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit as part of the Bid Proposal

completed lists of specified equipment manufacturer's recommended
operating spare parts. He shall also present an efficient spare parts
concept based on compatible components. The completed lists of all
equipment manufacturers recommended operating spare parts will be
provided under a letter issued by the equipment manufacturer's
Applications Engineering department which will provide the specific
listing. Lists that do not meet these criteria which are included in the
SOLUTION PROVIDER's Bid Proposal WILL NOT be accepted by
the National Grid Saudi Arabia. As a minimum, the SAS Spare Parts
PAGE 71 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
requirements must meet the minimum quantity requirements as

referenced in related Appendix of the main PTS, along with
Equipment Manufacturer additions to meet Equipment Manufacturer
recommendations.
b.
The equipment manufacturer's recommended operating spare parts

shall be adequate for at least two (2) years and supplied as part of the
project Lump-Sum price.
10.5.4 Special Tools, Test Equipment and Software

a.

completed lists of all equipment manufacturer's recommended special
tools, test equipment and software which will be required to efficiently
operate and maintain the Substation Automation System (SAS). The
completed lists of all equipment manufacturer's recommended special
tools, test equipment and software will be provided under a letter
issued by the equipment manufacturer's Applications Engineering
department which will provide the specific listing. Lists that do not
meet these criteria which are included in the SOLUTION
PROVIDERs Bid Proposal WILL NOT be accepted by the National
Grid Saudi Arabia.
b.
All equipment manufacturer's recommended special tools, test

equipment, and software shall be supplied by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER as part of the project Lump-Sum price.
10.5.5. Software Maintenance and Software Upgrade Agreement
TESP10701R0/KSB
a.

and provide as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS, a software
maintenance and software upgrade agreement covering all software
and firmware covered under the SAS and which will provide for all
SAS software/firmware upgrades and SAS software/firmware "fixes"
(e.g. Service Pack upgrades to operating systems, upgrades to
applications programs/software, upgrades to SAS Equipment
Manufacturers antivirus software (if antivirus software is offered by
the SAS Equipment Manufacturer), "fixes" to repair software bugs in
the system, etc.).
b.
The SOLUTION PROVIDER 's software maintenance and software

upgrade agreement will NOT be required to cover software
maintenance related to database additions to the Station HMI
Computer and Station Communications Gateway equipment which
may be required as a result of the installation of additional IEDs and
additional SAS equipment provided under future projects.
c.
Depending on the complexity of the software/firmware upgrade and/or

software/firmware "fixes", during the period covered under this
software maintenance and software upgrade agreement, National Grid
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Saudi Arabia may require the use of SOLUTION PROVIDER 's

personnel to perform the software/firmware upgrades and/or
software/firmware "fixes", either by on-site installation of the
software/firmware, or by SOLUTION PROVIDER 's remote access to
the SAS site (e.g. by remote modem and/or secure WAN link with
permission for SOLUTION PROVIDER 's use of a remote modem
and/or secure WAN link granted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia).
d.
This software maintenance and software upgrade agreement will be

valid for a period of two years after the final acceptance of the SAS by
the National Grid Saudi Arabia.
e.
Software/firmware maintenance and software/firmware upgrades

which are supplied by the software maintenance and software upgrade
agreement shall be supplied by the SOLUTION PROVIDER as part
of the project Lump-Sum price.
10.5.6 Maintenance
a.
The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit a maintenance concept

taking into consideration the available spare parts.
b.
This maintenance concept should cover the following strategies:
11.
special maintenance
predictive maintenance
periodical maintenance
condition maintenance
on-fault maintenance
DOCUMENTATION
11.1
During the Base Design Stage of the project, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
submit the following documentation related to the Base Design for the SAS as a
minimum. The documentation shall be both in hard copy and CD format. The
documentation shall be consistent, CAD supported:
TESP10701R0/KSB
List of Drawings
Assembly Drawing
System main objective and basic features
Design principles
Schematic Drawings
Construction Time Schedule (design, manufacturing, commissioning periods)
Listing of type tests and copy of type test reports
Listing of routine tests
Listing, and description of tests, and test specifications for tests which will be
performed as part of the Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) phase
Site commissioning requirements (including listing, description of tests,
procedures/ test specifications and test forms/reports which will be included
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as part of the Pre-Commissioning Test Plan and Procedures, and the Final
Test/Commissioning Test Plan and Procedures)
Operations Requirement
Technical data and catalogues
Product Manuals which do not appear in the Technical data and catalogues
List of all international standard references
List of all technical requirements that are to be provided by other
manufacturers for items not manufactured by the same SOLUTION
PROVIDER 's manufacturer
System Block and Logic Diagrams
Training Plan and Resume's of SOLUTION PROVIDER 's trainers during all
phases of the training.
Control Room Layout and other room layouts in the substation showing
locations of SAS equipment relative to other equipment
Typical Standard Alarms/Events Pictures for SOE functions which will
appear on the Station HMI
Typical Standard Pictures from Station HMI as specified in Section 4 of this
Standard.
List of all items included as part of the SAS
Overall single-line diagram for the entire substation (with
demarcations/boundaries drawn on the diagram to show each bay)
Bay single-line diagrams
Bay oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic Diagram detail drawings
Relay and Metering single-line diagrams for each entire substation (prepared
in accordance with National Grid Saudi Arabia Engineering requirements for
Relay and Metering single-line diagrams)
General system architecture
Location of the substation's buildings
Control and operating principles
Protection principles
Functional Design Specification (FDS)
List of Signals
Calculation for uninterrupted power supply (UPS) dimensioning (if a UPS is
used as part of the Project to supply AC power to SAS equipment requiring
AC Power)
Calculation and design details for the Inverter scheme (if redundant inverters
are used as part of the Project to supply AC power to SAS equipment
requiring AC Power)
Concept for maintenance, including any SOLUTION PROVIDER proposals
for operations and maintenance of the SAS for a two year period after
National Grid Saudi Arabia accepts the SAS installation.
Time plan for the project realization
Circuit Diagrams
List and Scheme for Colors, Symbols, Labels, Dialogues and Fonts to be used
in all components of the SAS
LAN Simulation Study results
Cable Routing Details within each substation for SAS equipment
interconnections
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Cubicle Layout Drawings (including Rack Face Elevation Drawings inside

the Cubicles)
Other SAS equipment Layout Drawings
Power Input Distribution drawings for all SAS equipment
Bay Interlocking and Station Interlocking drawings/details, including
interlocking concept drawings
Narrative description of the Bay Interlocking and Station Interlocking
schemes
LAN
Configuration/interconnection
and
Ethernet
Switch
Configuration/interconnection details for all LANs/Ethernet Switches and
interconnected SAS equipment which will be part of the SAS
Message Performance Estimates for all IEC 61850 messages
Cyber-Security Plan/Scheme for SAS
CT/PT interconnections with IEDs
Details pertaining to the rating of Relay Output contacts within IEDs (this
may be included as part of the technical literature for the IEDs)
Details/drawings pertaining to interconnections between IEDs and Switchgear
Trip Coils and Switchgear Close Coils
Details/drawings relating to the Protection IED intertripping scheme (between
Protection IEDs)
Narrative description of the Protection IED intertripping scheme (between
Protection IEDs)
IP addressing plan/proposal for all SAS equipment
Maximum surge levels of the CTs and PTs offered, and the related surge
withstand capability of the inputs to the related Control IEDs and Protection
IEDs.
Description and Narrative Explanation of the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's
Redundant Ethernet Switch Scheme
MTBF and MTTR figures for all equipment contained as part of the SAS
Time estimates of Protection IED Intertripping Time (between Protection
IEDs)
Details of SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposed software (Operating Systems,
application software, engineering tools, communication systems management
software, other software utilities such as for data backup, system recovery,
etc.) for SAS Computer Equipment (including PCs, Station HMI equipment
and Maintenance Laptop Computers)
SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Proposal/Technical Brochures for SCL Software
Tools, and other configuration software
Typical SCADA Points List for each type of switchgear and other devices
requiring SCADA monitoring
Typical SOE Points List for each type of device which requires SOE
monitoring
Sizing
calculations
for
Station
HMI
computer
equipment
software/firmware/hardware
Copy of the Software Maintenance and Software Upgrade Agreement
Environmental specifications for all SAS equipment
Client/Server Interconnection requirements/details
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Description of Engineering Workstation functionality, and whether or not a

stand-alone Engineering Workstation is to be provided
SOLUTION PROVIDER 's proposal related to the reporting of SAS
equipment alarms to external SCADA Master Station(s)
Bay Oriented Arrangements as specified in Section 6 of this Standard.
Station Oriented Arrangements as specified in Section 6 of this Standard.
Backup database entries pertaining to the SCL as specified in Section 10 of
this Standard.
Terminal Block Details and Specifications for all Terminal Blocks which are
to be provided
Deviations from TMSS requirements and Alternative Scheme from TMSS
Outage Details required as part of a SAS Upgrade/Reconfiguration (See
Section 14 for further details)
Environmental Details-(See Section 15 of this Standard ).
It is necessary to present the technical description and the technical data for
the whole system and for all equipment and functions. This shall also include
technical details related to enabled features/functions such as windows remote
desktop, IEC 62439-3 (PRP 1) feature for Ethernet cards, internal IP routing
within windows (if any), split view on windows to two monitors etc.
Any other information needed (not described above) which will provide the
National Grid Saudi Arabia with a complete picture of the offered SAS
11.2
During the Detailed Design Stage of the Project, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
update and revise the initial SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Base Design for the SAS
based on previous National Grid Saudi Arabia comments during the Base Design
Stage of the Project. Additionally, the SOLUTION PROVIDER may provide
additional design drawings/documentation of his SAS for National Grid Saudi Arabia
review and comment during the Detailed Design Stage of the Project. After the
SOLUTION PROVIDER completes his detailed design of the SAS, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall submit all detailed design drawings and related documents (both in
hard copy and in soft copy in a format acceptable to the National Grid Saudi Arabia)
for final National Grid Saudi Arabia review and approval of the SAS as a whole.
11.3
At least four (4) weeks prior to the start of pre-commissioning by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER, he shall submit the following documentation related to precommissioning for the SAS as a minimum. The documentation shall be both in hard
copy and CD format. The documentation shall be consistent, CAD supported:
Copies of Routine Test Reports
Copies of Valid Calibration Certificates for all test equipment used to precommission the SAS
Copies of the initial SCL (Substation Configuration Language) files for all IED's
installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER (in accordance with IEC 61850 format)
which will be used by the SOLUTION PROVIDER
during the PreCommissioning and Final Test/Commissioning phases of the SAS for the Project
Copies of initial SCD (Substation Configuration Description) and CID
(Configured IED Description) files
Copies of other initial configuration data (such as relays/IED settings, etc).
Copies of the results of the Factory Acceptance Tests for all SAS equipment.
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Copies of the National Grid Saudi Arabia approved Pre-Commissioning Test Plan
and Procedures
NOTE:
Some of the documentation indicated in Section 11.3 of this Standard may be
required by the National Grid Saudi Arabia at a time earlier than the minimum of four
(4) weeks prior to the start of pre-commissioning of the SAS. If this is the case,
National Grid Saudi Arabia will notify the SOLUTION PROVIDER accordingly as
part of the Base Design stage of the Project.
11.4
At least two (2) weeks prior to the start of final test/commissioning by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER , the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit the following
documentation related to final test/commissioning for the SAS as a minimum. The
documentation shall be both in hard copy and CD format. The documentation shall
be consistent, CAD supported:
11.5
Prior to final acceptance by the National Grid Saudi Arabia, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall submit the following documentation for the SAS as a minimum.
The documentation shall be both in hard copy and CD format. The documentation
shall be consistent, CAD supported:
TESP10701R0/KSB
Copies of Valid Calibration Certificates for all test equipment used for final
testing/commissioning of the SAS
Copies of the National Grid Saudi Arabia approved Final Test/Commissioning
Test Plan and Procedures
Copies of all Pre-commissioning Test Data (for tests which were performed as
part of the Pre-Commissioning Test Phase of the project)
Copies of final SCD (Substation Configuration Description) and CID
(Configured IED Description) files
Copies of the final SCL (Substation Configuration Language) files for all IEDs
installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER (in accordance with IEC 61850
format) which will be used by the SOLUTION PROVIDER during Final
Test/Commissioning phases of the SAS for the Project
Copies of other final configuration data (such as relays/IED settings, etc).
Operator's/Operations Manuals for all SAS equipment

Copies of the final SCL (Substation Configuration Language) files for all IEDs
installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER (in accordance with IEC 61850
format) if different from the files provided at the part of final commissioning
Copies of final SCD (Substation Configuration Description) and CID
(Configured IED Description) files if different from the files provided at the part
of final commissioning
Copies of other final configuration data (such as relays/IED settings, etc) if
different from the files provided at the part of final commissioning
Copies of all Commissioning Test data (for tests which were performed as part of
the Commissioning Test Phase (both {Pre-Commissioning and Final
Test/Commissioning phases) of the project)
All "As-Built" documentation for the SAS
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11.6
12.
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
For the hard copy requirements, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall submit a
minimum quantity of the sets of drawings/documents which are specified in the main
PTS document for National Grid Saudi Arabia review. For the soft copy
requirements, documents and drawings which are prepared by SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall be readable by the Adobe Acrobat Reader version which is in use
by the National Grid Saudi Arabia at the time of the documents/drawings submittal,
and a minimum of two (2) CD copies shall be distributed by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER to the National Grid Saudi Arabia. For drawings and documents which
will ultimately be submitted by the SOLUTION PROVIDER in final form to the
National Grid Saudi Arabia's CAD system, the final format which will be used for
submission to the National Grid Saudi Arabia's CAD System shall be in accordance
with the National Grid Saudi Arabia./ CAD requirements (SEEDS I & SEEDS-II).
CYBER-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Cyber-Security-hardened network with the use of defense-in-depth Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) cyber-security standards, protocols, and industry practices shall be provided.
12.1
The communications network shall be security-hardened with the use of IEC, IEEE
and IETF security standards and practices.
12.2
In addition to traditional IEC, IEEE and IETF network security practices, the
communications network shall also be security hardened with the use of Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) standards and practices according to the NERC-CIP, NIST,
ISA standards and practices. For more explicit security requirements, National Grid
Saudi Arabia may also opt to require Solution provider to harden the SAS network
based from internationally agreed cyber-security practices like the Cyber Security
Procurement Language for Control Systems, and other defense-in-depth strategies
based from aforementioned standards, which are designed to harden control system
facilities.
12.3
IEC utility-centric protocols, IEC 62443-2-1 (latest edition), and IEC 62351 (as soon
as applicable), shall be complied with to harden the IEC 61850 network against
attacks by internal and external utility users.
12.4
Use of Transport Level Security shall be implemented for secure interactions,

authentication, confidentiality and integrity, particularly in IEC 61850 ACSI
(Abstract Communication Service Interface) over TCP/IP, MMS (ISO 9506), IEC
60870-5-104, and IEC 60870-6 TASE.2 (ICCP), and TCP/IP, in general.
12.5
External firewalls (redundant) Intrusion Detection Systems/ Intrusion Prevention

Systems shall be designed to secure the network from both internal and external
users.
12.6
Management Information Bases (MIBs) for Network and System Management

specific to power utility applications shall be defined with the use of IEC 62351-7 to
enhance network integrity, system and application health, intrusion detection, and
other security/network management requirements unique to power system
operations.
TESP10701R0/KSB
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12.7
Threats and vulnerabilities in the network and administration shall be identified and
fortified against cyber-attacks. Ready countermeasures and defenses shall always be
pre-planned and available.
12.8
Secured network segmentation and zoning shall be implemented to prevent spread of

Trojans and rootkits that have entered not by way of network
12.9
USB and CD/DVD ports shall be deactivated. Unused ports shall be closed. Periodic
port scanning shall be automatically configured with option for manual
configuration.
12.10 Ports into which maintenance laptops will be plugged into the embedded operating
systems in the IEDS and PLCs shall be installed with intrusion detection devices or
software. Updated anti-virus software shall be installed in these IEDs and PLCs to
counteract the latest discovered Industrial Control System Trojans and rootkits. Such
hardening measures shall also apply to the computer equipment and switches from
the station level to the bay level.
12.11 Access to OPC and database servers, if used, shall be secured and measures against
SQL or database injection shall be provided.
12.12 Maintenance laptops shall be configured such that only currently authorized users in
the substation can log in.
12.13 Security measures shall be applied in the 7 OSI (Open System Interconnection)
layers.
12.14 Measures shall be provided to secure the IEC-101 communications to the control
centers and related devices like modems and telephone equipment shall be
performed.
12.15. The IEC-1O4 communication lines shall be firewalled. All ends of electronic
perimeters shall be firewalled and secured.
12.16 Likewise, the premises cabling system shall be secured to prevent data from being
sniffed or corrupted from the cables, junction boxes, patch panels and other
vulnerable portions of the premises cabling system.
12.17. In case of attack, emergency measures shall be pre-planned for implementation
during the attack and disaster recovery shall be pre-planned to recover lost data and
put substation operation back to normal in the shortest possible time.
12.18 Cyber-security testing and cyber-security quality assurance shall be part of the
Factory Acceptance Procedures (FAT) and Site Acceptance Procedure (SAT).
12.19 Training shall include topics on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) cyber-security in
general, and the cyber-security measures employed in this project.
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12.20 As part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS design and implementation, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide the it's Cyber-Security proposal and scheme
in the form of a manual which the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall implement (after
National Grid Saudi Arabia. approval of its Cyber-Security proposal and scheme)
pertaining to providing a Cyber-Security hardened network for the SAS which is
consistent with all Cyber-Security requirements as specified in this Appendix, as
well as other National Grid Saudi Arabia. related Cyber-Security requirements which
are related to the SAS communications interconnection with equipment outside each
substation.
12.21 The aforementioned cyber-security Manual shall show specific deployment
instructions to be followed in implementing cybersecurity in the operating systems,
applications, database. For example, where in the configuration of the OS default
open and existing ports in the MS operating systems are closed or deactivated shall
be addressed. How are the remote access, MS operating sytem's Outlook Express,
Messenger, MSN Explorer, Windows Media Player, Games de-activated. How are
IPsec, VPN, SNMP configured, how is the firewall of the OS made compatible to the
firewall configuration of Solution provider SAS applications, what are the BIOS
settings that are enabled or disabled to implement security are some of the required
content of Solution provider security manual. Additionally, to illustrate the required
content, there are Windows services that should be disabled to harden the OS: e.g.
IIS admin, Mnmsrvc, MSFtpsvc, Fax, Tapisrv, etc. there are more or less 25 of these
services. Security policies of OS and Solution provider applications may need to be
firmed on whether to use OS or Solution provider application defaults. e.g.
password age, password minimum/maximum characters, lockouts, etc. How is OPC
and database servers are secured shall be addressed. Dialog boxes of the OS shall be
shown to illustrate the deployment instructions. Above mentioned samples are meant
to show required content from the Solution provider security manual. Such examples
are not meant to be complete.
12.22 The manual shall detail the SOLUTION PROVIDERs solutions to cyber-security
issues indicated in the standards and industry practices indicated in Item 12.2 and
other clauses under this section on cyber-security requirements.
12.23 As part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's Cyber-Security proposal and scheme, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide, install, test and commission all required
hardware, software, and other equipment which is required to provide for a fully
operational and National Grid Saudi Arabia. approved SAS Cyber-Security scheme
for the substation.
12.24. Manual shall also contain operator-and-maintenance-centric instructions and
suggestions that could maintain cyber security in the course of National Grid Saudi
Arabia. operations and maintenance of substation.
12.25. SOLUTION PROVIDER shall include in his proposed manual content pertaining to
cyber security training program proposals. Content shall include importance and
details of content of security in the design, manufacture, factory/site testing,
operation and maintenance of proposed SAS system.
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12.26. In the National Grid Saudi Arabia. review of the SOLUTION PROVIDER proposed
cyber security manual, National Grid Saudi Arabia. will use applicable portions of
standards and defense-in-depth practices on Industrial Control Systems cyber
security from IEC 62443-2-1, IEC 62351, NERC-CIP, IETF, IEEE, NIST, US-DHS
documents.
12.27
In the case where the SAS Equipment Manufacturer offers anti-virus software for his
SAS installation, the SAS Cyber-Security proposal shall include the requirements for
supply and installation of the anti-virus software. As part of the supply and
installation of the anti-virus software, only versions of the SAS Equipment
Manufacturers anti-virus software which has been tested (and if required debugged) at the SAS Equipment Manufacturers test laboratory facilities, and which
has been certified by the SAS Equipment Manufacturer to fully function properly on
the SAS which is being supplied under the project shall be used in the SAS.
Furthermore, with regard to updates to the SAS Equipment Manufacturers antivirus software (including, but may not be limited to updates/new virus/worm/Trojan
definitions), the same SAS Equipment Manufacturers testing and certification
requirements as described in this section will still be required.
12.28
Also, as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Cyber-Security proposal, overall

SAS design, and SAS implementation scheme, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
consider and address possible EMI and RFI problems which may affect SAS
equipment from neighboring switchgear, and other cables and devices in the
substation, and shall insure that the installed SAS equipment cubicles, and other SAS
equipment enclosures (as well as SAS related cabling) are properly grounded and
shielded (to prevent EMI/RFI affecting the SAS equipment and cabling) and SAS
equipment and cabling installed outside the cubicles/enclosures are also not affected
by substation EMI/RFI sources.
13.0 KEMA CERTIFICATION

As part of the FAT (Factory Acceptance Test), the equipment supplier/vendor must show that
he is currently KEMA certified as part of meeting IEC 61850 requirements for the SAS
equipment that is being offered.
14. ADDITIONAL
SUBSTATION
REQUIREMENTS
AUTOMATION
SYSTEM
(SAS)
GENERAL
This section describes additional Substation Automation System (SAS) general requirements.
14.1
Environmental Requirements
14.1.1
14.1.2
TESP10701R0/KSB
All equipment which comprises and is part of the Substation Automation

System (SAS) shall be hardened to operate under the environmental
requirements (Service Conditions) specified in the latest revision of 01TMSS-01.
Additionally, all equipment which is part of the Substation Automation
System (SAS) shall be capable of operating satisfactorily for a twelvehour minimum period in conditions where there is no air conditioning or
PAGE 81 OF 119
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heating operating in the building or buildings where the Substation

Automation System equipment is located. For purposes related to these
requirements in this paragraph, refer to the Ambient Temperature
(Outdoor) and maximum relative humidity indicated on latest revision of
01-TMSS-01.
14.1.3
Furthermore, during the Base Design Stage, the SOLUTION PROVIDER

shall submit environmental specifications for all SAS equipment as per
Sub-clause 5 of IEC 61850-3, Environmental Conditions, and the IEC
61850-3referenced environmental standards (IEC 60870-2, 60694,
60870-2, 60654-4, 61000 series) pertaining to the following
environmental parameters: National Grid Saudi Arabia. notes that in case
of conflict between the referenced IEC standards, and latest revision of
01-TMSS-01, shall apply.
Temperature
Humidity
Barometric pressure
Mechanical and seismic
Pollution and corrosion EMI immunity
o
o
o
o
o
o
14.1.4
14.2
Induced disturbances (induced transients)

Surges
Oscillatory waves
Fast Transients
Radiated electromagnetic disturbances
Power frequency disturbances.
SOLUTION PROVIDER should note also that as per sub-clause 5 of

61850-3, "When communications equipment is an integral part of another
device in each substation, then the environmental requirements for the
device itself shall apply to the communications equipment."
Grouping/Location of Equipment
14.2.1
The following are National Grid Saudi Arabia recommendations for

grouping/location of some of the SAS equipment which should be
considered by the SOLUTION PROVIDER as part of the overall design
and implementation of the SAS. These National Grid Saudi Arabia.
recommendations for grouping/location of equipment shall be considered
as conceptual only, and may be subject to revision during the Base
Design Stage of the Project.
a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
For the grouping/location of SOLUTION PROVIDER

proposed redundant sets of Ethernet Switches, for each
voltage level, the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's design and
implementation shall consider two independent groups of
cubicles for the Ethernet switches, with the first group of
cubicles dedicated for the first set of redundant Ethernet
Switches, and the second group of cubicles dedicated for the
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second set of redundant Ethernet Switches. The SOLUTION

PROVIDER's design and implementation shall allow
National Grid Saudi Arabia. Operations and Maintenance
personnel to perform maintenance on a specific set of Ethernet
Switches without impacting the remaining set of Ethernet
Switches used in the redundant Ethernet Switch scheme.
b.
For the grouping/location of redundant Station HMI

equipment, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall consider
assigning one (1) station HMI per cubicle and shall NOT
consider the grouping/location of two (2) or more Station
HMIs per cubicle. The SOLUTION PROVIDER's design and
implementation shall allow National Grid Saudi
Arabia.Operations and Maintenance personnel to perform
maintenance on a specific set of Station HMI equipment
without impacting the remaining set of Station HMI
equipment used in the redundant scheme. For this
grouping/location recommendation, the National Grid Saudi
Arabia.will consider the grouping/location of one (1) Station
HMI in the same cubicle containing one (1) Communications
Gateway unit and/or one (1) GPS receiver unit. This
grouping/location recommendation shall eliminate failure of
all redundant Station HMIs based on a single point of failure
inside a cubicle. Additionally, to avoid possible EMI problems
related to the Station HMIs and the related wiring inside the
cubicles, National Grid Saudi Arabia. requires the cubicles
containing the Station HMI equipment be located in the
Control Room of each substation.
NOTE: Keyboards, displays, and mouse equipment which are
contained as part of the Station HMI equipment are
recommended by the National Grid Saudi Arabia.to be located
outside the cubicles (on a furniture to be provided by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER) containing the remaining Station
HMI equipment for ease of access by National Grid Saudi
Arabia.maintenance personnel.
c.
TESP10701R0/KSB
For the grouping/location of redundant Communications

Gateway equipment, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
consider assigning one (1) Communications Gateway per
cubicle and shall NOT consider the allowing of the
grouping/location of the two (2) Communications Gateways
inside one (1) cubicle. The SOLUTION PROVIDER 's design
and implementation shall allow National Grid Saudi Arabia
Operations and Maintenance personnel to perform
maintenance on a specific set of Communications Gateway
equipment without impacting the remaining set of
Communications Gateway equipment used in the redundant
scheme. For this grouping/location recommendation, the
National Grid Saudi Arabia. will consider the
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grouping/location of one (1) Communications Gateway unit in

the same cubicle containing one (1) Station HMI equipment
and/or one (1) GPS receiver unit. This grouping/location
recommendation shall eliminate failure of the two (2)
Communications Gateways based on a single point of failure
inside a cubicle. Additionally, to avoid possible EMI problems
related to the Communications Gateway equipment and the
related wiring inside the cubicles, National Grid Saudi Arabia.
requires the cubicles containing the Communications Gateway
equipment be located in the Control Room of each substation.
TESP10701R0/KSB
d.
For the grouping/location of the redundant GPS receivers used

in the Time Synchronization System, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall consider assigning one (1) GPS receiver per
cubicle. The SOLUTION PROVIDER's design and
implementation shall allow National Grid Saudi Arabia.
Operations and Maintenance personnel to perform
maintenance on a specific set of GPS receiver equipment
without impacting the remaining set of GPS receiver
equipment used in the redundant scheme.
For this
grouping/location recommendation, the National Grid Saudi
Arabia. will consider the grouping/location of the GPS
receiver equipment inside the cubicles containing either the
Station HMI equipment or the Communications Gateway
equipment (or cubicles containing both the Station HMI and
the Communications Gateway equipment), provided that there
is sufficient space for maintenance of all installed equipment
inside the cubicles. This grouping/location recommendation
shall eliminate failure of the two (2) GPS receivers based on a
single point of failure inside a cubicle. Additionally, to avoid
possible EMI problems related to the GPS receiver equipment
and the related wiring inside the cubicles, National Grid Saudi
Arabia. SA requires the cubicles containing the GPS receiver
equipment be located in the Control Room of each substation.
e.
For the grouping/location of Station HMI equipment and/or

Communications Gateway equipment in the cubicles, if the
Station HMI and/or Communications Gateway cubicle does
not
contain
a
working
maintenance
display/keyboard/mouse/KVM switch, the cubicles containing
the Station HMI equipment and/or Communications Gateway
equipment shall have hardware, software, and firmware
provided and installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER for
such maintenance displays/keyboards/mice/KVM switches,
with the quantities of materials used for this maintenance
function (and locations of the materials in which cubicle)
determined by the National Grid Saudi Arabia. after review of
the overall layout of the cubicles used for this purpose, as well
types of hardware, software and firmware installed for the
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Station HMI equipment and/or Communications Gateway

equipment.
14.3
f.
For the grouping/location of the remaining SAS equipment,

the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall interface with the National
Grid Saudi Arabia. during the early portions of the Base
Design Stage process to determine National Grid Saudi
Arabia. recommendations pertaining to grouping/location of
the remaining SAS equipment.
g.
Grouping/locations for all SAS equipment shall be proposed

by the SOLUTION PROVIDER during the Base Design Stage
of the contract.
Voltage Operating Requirements

For the operation of all Substation Automation System(SAS) equipment, all SAS
equipment shall operate fully and satisfactorily with an input voltage (to all SAS
equipment) which is consistent with National Grid Saudi Arabia. standard input
voltage ranges for substation control and protective relay equipment.
14.4
Licensing of Software used in the SAS

All software provided to the National Grid Saudi Arabia.which is installed in all SAS
equipment items which are contained as part of the original SAS installation,
software contained as part of the Maintenance Laptop Computer(s) used in the SAS,
as well as all software which is part of the software maintenance and software
upgrade agreement for the SAS shall be licensed to the National Grid Saudi Arabia.
for an unlimited time period.
14.5
CT/PT and Terminal Block Requirements

14.5.1 As part of the SAS, for purposes of design and interconnectivity to the
Substation Automation System (SAS), CTs (current transformers) and PTs
(Potential Transformers) shall be directly connected to the related Control
IEDs and Protection IEDs through conventional hard-wired (copper cable)
methods which are used by the National Grid Saudi Arabia. under previous
SAS projects. For the hard-wired (copper cable) connection between the CTs
and PTs and the IED equipment, the Control IED and Protection IED
equipment must have CT and PT inputs which must be surge protected to
withstand any surges which may be generated by the related PTs and CTs in
the substation. In this case, SOLUTION PROVIDER, as part of his Base
Design Package shall state the maximum surge levels of the CTs and PTs
offered, and the related surge withstand capability of the inputs to the related
Control IEDs and Protection IEDs.
14.5.2 For the Terminal Blocks used inside the cubicles which provide for the direct
connection between CTs/PTs and IEDs used as part of the SAS through a
hard-wired (copper cable) connection (as indicated in Section 14 of this
Standard) only National Grid Saudi Arabia. SA approved CT/PT Terminal
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Blocks and termination methods shall be provided and installed by the

SOLUTION PROVIDER .
14.5.3 For the CTs that are being offered with the Substation Automation System,
the secondary sides of the CTs shall withstand severe fault currents of either
up to 40 times nominal for 1 second, or actual fault currents appearing on the
CT secondary for 1 second, whichever is greater. Also the secondary side of
the CTs shall withstand 2 times nominal current continuously. Furthermore,
the CT inputs to the Control IEDs and Protection IEDs shall withstand all
fault current ratings as stated in this section (Section 14 of this Standard).
14.5.4 For the PTs that are being offered with the Substation Automation System,
the primaries of the PTs shall withstand all input voltage level requirements
as specified in latest revision of 01-TMSS-01 for the voltage level being
offered for the PTs. Furthermore, on the secondary side of the PTs, and the
interconnection of the PTs with the inputs of the Control IEDs and the inputs
of the Protection IEDs, as a minimum the surge withstand requirement shall
take into account the respective Basic Insulation Level (BIL) voltage levels
(as defined in 01-TMSS-01) which may be seen on the primary side of the
PTs, and reflected back to the secondary side of the PTs.
14.5.5 CT and PT Terminal Blocks for relays and metering to be provided in
switchgear, relay panel and other equipment shall be per 31-TMSS-06. Refer
to other portions of this standard and related National Grid Saudi Arabia.
standards for further details pertaining to CTs and PTs and Terminal Block
details.
14.6
Client/Server interconnection requirements

For purposes of design and implementation of the SAS, each server installed as part
of the SAS shall be able to support and connect to a minimum of five (5) clients. As
part of the Base Design Stage, SOLUTION PROVIDER shall state the minimum
client/server interconnection requirements.
14.7
Connection to Multiple Master Stations and External Equipment and sizing of

Station HMI and Redundant Communications Gateway
14.7.1 For the purposes of data acquisition and control, the Substation Automation
System (SAS) installation shall be connected to multiple Master Stations and
external equipment which are outside each substation (connection will be
made through communications media to external equipment). The multiple
Master Stations and external equipment may include one or more SCADA
Master Stations, SOE Master Stations, external engineering workstations
which may be used for Protective Relay engineering and other applications,
and other external workstations/equipment.
14.7.2 SCADA Master Station & SOE Master Station connection inside Each
Communications Gateway shall have IEC 60870-5-101 (IEC 101)
connections (three (3) IEC-101 connections for SCADA to three Control
Centers) and IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC-104) connections (three (3) IEC-104
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connections for SCADA to three Control Centers) and one (1) IEC-104 for
SOE available to it as part of the Communications Gateway design. National
Grid Saudi Arabia.will make the assignment (of either IEC-101, or IEC-104
or both to connect to SCADA/SOE Master Station equipment) prior to the
completion of commissioning for the project.
14.7.3 Firewalls physically independent from the gateways shall be installed to
secure the gateway, which is the one of the end-points of the SAS electronic
perimeter. Two (2) firewalls be required for IEC 104 and other remote access
requirements.
14.7.4 Means to secure the IEC 101 communications shall be provided by the
Solution provider .
14.7.5 The Substation Automation System (SAS) shall be sized to accommodate and
shall connect to all external Master Station(s) and other external equipment
as specified in the PTS.
14.7.6 To support the interfacing of the IEC-101 connections referenced in Section
14.7.2 of this Standard, SOLUTION PROVIDER shall supply, install test
and commission one (1) National Grid Saudi Arabia. approved VF Modem
per IEC-101 connection referenced in Section 14.7.2.. This will require the
supply, installation, testing, and commissioning of a total of six (6) National
Grid Saudi Arabia approved VF Modems.
14.7.7 In terms of the routing of the data and the type of data which will be
terminated at the external Master Station(s) and other external equipment (as
required by the National Grid Saudi Arabia.), National Grid Saudi Arabia.
will provide the details of the routing and type of data during the Base Design
Stage of the project, so that the SOLUTION PROVIDER can implement
these National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements during the Detailed Design
and implementation stages of the project.
14.7.8 As part of the requirement for the SAS to connect to multiple SCADA
Master Stations, Command Arbitration facilities shall be supplied and
installed as part of the SAS. In this respect, Command Arbitration is
defined/means that if the same object/device (switchgear) is selected for a
control operation at the same time (or in very close time proximity) by two or
more SCADA Master Stations, the SCADA Master Station that gets access to
the device first will have control permission granted, while the other SCADA
Master Station(s) will be denied control of that object/device (switchgear).
As part of Command Arbitration, the SCADA Master Station(s) which had
the object/device (switchgear) permission denied will receive a message from
the SAS back to the SCADA Master Station(s) that control of the specific
object/device (switchgear) was denied.
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14.8
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
Commonality of Equipment within the SAS Installation

In order to reduce the overall Spares requirements for the SAS installation and for ease
of maintenance, the National Grid Saudi Arabia. requires the SOLUTION PROVIDER ,
whenever possible, to consider the supply of the equipment as part of the SAS which is
the same manufacturer and model number on a common basis within the substation.
Some examples of the SAS equipment which can be supplied with the same
manufacturer and/or model number include IEDs, printers used as part of HMI
equipment, displays used for the Station HMI, GPS units, Communications Gateways,
Ethernet Switches, Station HMI computers, Operator/Engineering Workstations, SAS
Communications equipment (Firewalls/VF Modems) and other SAS equipment.
14.9
Power Input Distribution Requirements for SAS Equipment

For the power input distribution requirements for the all SAS equipment items, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall present (through detailed drawings and other equipment
details) the overall power input distribution scheme for all SAS equipment items. As a
guideline, the following is required by the National Grid Saudi Arabia:
14.9.1
For all SAS equipment, except the Protection IEDs, the Ethernet switches
and ac powered SAS equipment if any, the power input distribution
requirements shall be provided from the substation DC battery voltage
(usually 125 VDC, but NOT the -48 VDC Communications DC battery
voltage) in each substation. Wherever possible the dual substation DC battery
supplies shall be utilized.
14.9.2
For the Protection IEDs, the power input distribution requirements shall
follow current National Grid Saudi Arabia practices for input power
distribution for stand-alone Protective Relays.
14.9.3
For the Ethernet Switches, the power input distribution requirements shall be
from dual 125 VDC sources, which will power redundant power supplies in
the Ethernet Switch equipment.
14.9.4
For the SAS equipment requiring an AC Power input, refer to Section 14.25
of this Standard for the AC Power input scheme.
14.9.5
Refer TES-P-119.30 auxiliary AC and DC panel distribution requirements.
14.10 Various National Grid Saudi Arabia Standard Display Requirements for SAS
14.10.1
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For the various National Grid Saudi Arabia Standard Display requirements
which may include (but may not be limited to) labels, colors, line
thicknesses, dialogues, fonts, alarm lists and symbols which will be provided
by SOLUTION PROVIDER as part of his SAS, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall design and provide all portions of the SAS with the
National Grid Saudi Arabia Standard Display requirements which are in
effect at the design stage of the Project.
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TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
14.10.2
Regarding this item, the SOLUTION PROVIDERs SAS equipment shall

have the flexibility to accommodate both ANSI standard terminology and
IEC standard terminology which can be accomplished through field changes
to accommodate the various National Grid Saudi Arabia operational
requirements for the various National Grid Saudi Arabia operating areas.
14.10.3
For the Local HMI displays contained as part of each IED, the following
shall be applicable:
a.
For the Control IEDs, as well as the combined Control/Protection

IEDs, the Local HMI display shall be a minimum size of 4.5 inches,
and shall be large enough to display all switchgear items on the bay
which the Control IED as well as the combined Control/Protection
IED will be controlling
b.
For the Protection IEDs, the Local HMI display shall be sufficient in
size for the National Grid Saudi Arabia maintenance personnel to
obtain and interpret related readings for the Protection IEDs.
c.
For all types of IEDs Local HMI requirements, either a backlit Local
HMI display or a active matrix LCD display shall be provided to
allow for National Grid Saudi Arabia maintenance personnel to read
details and parameters in low ambient light conditions
14.11 Additional Protection Scheme Details

The protection scheme shall be an integral part of the SAS, and the protection IEDs
shall therefore be directly connected to the inter-bay bus, in order to provide
unrestricted access to all data and information stored in the Protection IEDs and for
changing protection parameters remotely.
14.12 Maintenance Laptop Computers-Additional Requirements
14.12.1
For Maintenance Laptop computers which are to be used for setting/reading

of parameters and/or configuration of IED components in the SAS, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER is to provide all software/firmware and hardware
which will lock the Maintenance Laptop Computer to insure and guarantee
that only software/programs used for setting/reading of parameters and/or
configuration of IEDs, related SCL software Tools (as described in Section
14 of this Standard and related operating systems and virus detection
software (and updates to these programs/software) are installed in these
Maintenance Laptop Computers.
14.12.2
These Maintenance Laptop Computers shall be of the latest Laptop PC

Version, and will contain all required software which will be used for
setting/reading of parameters, SCL development software, and/or
configuration of IED components in the SAS, as well as related operating
systems and virus detection software.
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14.13
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
14.12.3
Furthermore, each Maintenance Laptop Computer shall be equipped with the

required communications port type(s) (Serial, Ethernet RJ 45 and/or optical)
and connecting cables which will be required to interface with the IED
port(s) used for communications with each Maintenance Laptop Computer.
14.12.4
Additionally each Maintenance Laptop Computer shall be provided with a

required AC adapter to allow for powering the Maintenance Laptop
Computer from an input AC Power supply in the range of 100Volts AC to
240Volts AC, 60 Hz or as specified in main PTS.
14.12.5
For this project three (3) Maintenance Laptop Computers along with all
required software and firmware to configure the SAS installation from each
Maintenance Laptop Computer will be required to be supplied by the
Solution provider .
14.12.6
Finally, all Maintenance Laptop Computers shall be delivered by the

SOLUTION PROVIDER to the National Grid Saudi Arabia prior to the start
of the SAS FAT, or Final Substation Commissioning, whichever is earlier.
Operating System for SAS Computer Equipment

For the Operating System environment for all computer equipment which is provided
as part of the SAS (including all PCs, Station HMI equipment, and Maintenance
Laptop Computers), the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall utilize the latest, tested and
approved Windows Operating System. Also, the Windows Operating System which is
supplied shall be equipped with the latest Service Packs and other updates which will
support the applications programs contained in each SAS computer equipment item.
14.14
Additional Security Measures for SAS Computer Equipment

For all computer equipment (including PCs, Station HMI equipment, and
Maintenance Laptop computers) used as part of the SAS, appropriate security
measures shall be provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER to prevent unauthorized
access to these computers. These security measures may include the setting of
passwords with password lockout after 3 failed attempts, establishment of user
authority levels, installation of other security devices, and other methods which are
approved by the National Grid Saudi Arabia. Also, refer to Section 12 of this
Standard, for further details pertaining to Cyber-Security for the SAS installation.
14.15
Use of IEC 61850 in its Totality

14.15.1 For the SOLUTION PROVIDER's implementation of SAS for the substation,
the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall use the IEC 61850 standard in its totality
(except for portions of IEC 61850-9-2 relating to the Process Bus), which
will include (but may not be limited) to the Standard's Parts on symbols,
terminologies, acronyms etc.
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14.15.2 With reference to compliance to IEC 61850, the SOLUTION PROVIDER

shall adhere to compliance with the latest version of all IEC 61850 ISSUES
(Technical Issues) and Versions (Editions) which are in effect for IEC 61850
which are approved by IEC at the time of the bid closing of the project,
except for the requirements as indicated in Section 14.15.1 above of this
Standard.
14.16
Additional Substation Configuration Language (SCL) Software Tool Requirements

14.16.1 As part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's providing the special tools, test,
equipment and software (as identified in Section 9 of this Appendix) the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide SCL Tool software.
14.16.2 The SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide a version of the SCL Tool
software which is visual and graphical, and provides a drag-and-drop-select
type of user-friendly version based from the SCL standard of 61850 (IEC61850-6), which is XML based. Such version should provide at the same
time that configuration which is being done with drag-and-drop-select type of
user-friendly interface, and at the same time creating the XML text-based
version of the 61850 SCL.
14.17
14.16.3
During later stages of Project implementation, the National Grid Saudi

Arabia will direct the SOLUTION PROVIDER with regard to the computers
where the SCL Tool software (after National Grid Saudi Arabia approval)
will be installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER on the National Grid Saudi
Arabia designated computers.
14.16.4
As part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's providing this SCL Tool software,

a minimum of five (5) licensed versions of this SCL Tool software, with each
software license being a full version of the SCL Tool software.
Dual Active Communications Port Requirements for all IED's, interfacing on the
computer ends to support IEC 62439-3 PRP 1 compliance, and redundancy
implementation requirements
14.17.1
Each Bay-level IED (which will include ALL Control IEDs. Protection
IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs) shall be provided with dual
ACTIVE IEC 61850 and Ethernet compatible communications ports (with
two ACTIVE transmit and two receive communications ports per IED) for
interconnection/interface with redundant networks connection (redundant
networks connection as referred to in Section 3 of this Standard) which will
use fiber optics cable for each interconnection/interface. Bay-level IEDs with
either single IEC 61850 & Ethernet compatible communications port (single
transmit and single receive communications port per IED) or dual IEC 61850
and Ethernet ports containing one active port and one inactive port will NOT
be accepted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia.
14.17.2
To meet the redundancy requirements for dual ACTIVE Communications

Ports on IEDs and redundancy requirements in general, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall utilize the IEC-62439-3 (PRP 1) Parallel Redundancy
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Protocol scheme which is now in force and which will be (anticipated to be)
integrated into the future IEC 61850 Version (Edition2).
14.18
14.17.3
As part of the Bid Proposal the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide the
schematic diagram and description showing the dual ACTIVE
communications port connections of each IED with the redundant networks
as well the redundant networks diagram and description which will be
supplied by the SOLUTION PROVIDER for the SAS.
14.17.4
As indicated in the conceptual diagram, Drawing Fig 07-01, Substation

Automation System Diagram (Conceptual), IEC-62439-3 (PRP 1) Parallel
Redundancy Protocol shall be implemented in the station level and the bay
level. At the station level all the computers (Operator Workstations,
Engineering Workstations, etc) shall have dual ports as a DAN defined in the
IEC-62439-3 for connection to dual station LAN in IEC-62439-3 (PRP 1)
scheme.
14.17.5
IEC-62439-3 (PRP 1) Parallel Redundancy Protocol shall be applied at both

high voltage levels (110 kV through 380kV) and medium voltage levels (34.5
kV and below)
Displays and Peripherals

14.18.1 A Large Screen Color Display (52 inch or larger), which will be wall
mounted, and which shall be either Plasma type, or LCD type shall be
provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER . This display shall be a Branded
Full High Definition Resolution display which will be provided from
reputable manufacturers. This Large Screen Color Display shall display
information pertaining to the overall Station One-Line Diagram for all
voltage levels and alarms. The Large Screen Color Display shall not replace
the other displays which will be provided for the SAS (e.g. for Station HMI
equipment, Operator Workstations, Engineering Workstation etc.).
Additionally, as part of the 52 inch Large Screen Color Display, appropriate
Mounting Hardware for Wall Mounting of this Display shall be provided and
installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER , and mounting the 52 inch Large
Screen Display on a National Grid Saudi Arabia designated Wall location in
the Substation will be performed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER .
Furthermore, the 52 inch Large Screen Display shall be dedicated for the
display of the overall Station One Line Diagram for the Substation, and for
no other purpose.
14.18.2
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The Displays used for the Operators Workstations, Engineering

Workstation, and Station HMI equipment shall be 27 Inch or larger and shall
be branded High Definition Displays. Additionally as part of the Display
requirements as stated in Section 14.18.1 of this Standard appropriate
peripherals (e.g. Keyboards/Mice, etc.) shall be supplied and installed by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER .
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14.18.3
The Displays used for maintenance of the computer equipment (front end
computer equipment and Communications Gateways, etc.) shall be 19 inch or
larger and shall be branded High Definition Displays. Additionally as part of
the Display requirements as stated in Section 14.18.2 of this Standard
appropriate peripherals (e.g. Keyboards/Mice, KVM switches etc.) shall be
supplied and installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER .
14.18.4
Regarding the peripheral requirements for printers and consumable

requirements for the printers, the minimum requirements for printers and the
consumable requirements for the printers which the SOLUTION PROVIDER
will supply and install as part of the SAS will be as follows:
One (1) Alarm/Event printer which will be a 24 pin Dot Matrix

Printer. For the Alarm/Event Printer, the Alarm/Event Printer shall be
able to be turned off easily by the operator without impacting the SAS
operation, this printer shall use a tractor feed for paper with an
adjustable carriage which can handle tractor feed paper sizes from 6
Inches to 13 inches in width. The Alarm/Event printer shall be able to
operate from a network (LAN) connection with required NIC
cards/ports installed inside the printer to allow Ethernet
Communication to SAS computers through an RJ-45 connection. The
Alarm/Event printer shall be a branded industrial grade printer, with
consumables/spare parts for the printer readily available for the
Alarm/Event Printer within Saudi Arabia. Also, the SAS shall be able
to buffer Alarms/Events when the Alarm/Event printer is turned off,
and when an operator arrives at the substation site and turns on the
Alarm/Event printer, the operator can print out alarms/events based
on the operators requirements. Finally, as part of the supply of the
Alarm/Event Printer, three (3) years worth of estimated consumables
(paper, ink/ribbons and other consumables to support 3 years
operation).
One (1) Color Laserjet printer which can print both A4 sized and A3
sized color documents. The Color Laserjet printer will generally be
used for printing display images from the various workstations as part
of the SAS (e.g. station one-lines, bay one-lines, some alarm/event
indications, etc). The Color Laserjet printer shall be able to operate
from a network (LAN) connection with required NIC cards/ports
installed inside the printer to allow Ethernet Communication to SAS
computers to SAS computers through an RJ-45 connection. The Color
Laserjet printer shall be a branded industrial grade printer, with
consumables/spare parts for the printer readily available for the
Alarm/Event Printer within Saudi Arabia.
Finally, as part of the supply of the Color Laserjet Printer, three (3)
years worth of estimated consumables (paper, laserjet cartridges and
other consumables to support 3 years operation).
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14.19 Engineering Workstation and Operator's Workstation requirements for the SAS
14.19.1
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide a separate Stand-Alone Engineering

Workstation (which will be independent of the two separate stand-alone
Operator's workstations), and both the Engineering Workstation, and the
Operator's workstations will be integrated into the SAS.
14.19.2
The Engineering Workstation functionality shall be used for general

Engineering functions for the SAS in the substation, such as configuration of
equipment, determination of parameter settings, etc.
14.19.3
Additionally, the stand-alone Engineering Workstation will include providing

data connectivity with external PSE equipment and possibly other external
equipment which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will propose subject to
National Grid Saudi Arabia approval during the Base Design Stage of the
project. For the stand-alone Engineering Workstation scheme, as part of the
data connectivity requirements between this external equipment and the
stand-alone Engineering Workstation, SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
perform all interconnections and provide other hardware/software required to
make the data connectivity scheme possible, as well as to confirm full
operation of this external equipment with the remote workstations which will
be located outside the substation for monitoring/managing the external
equipment. However, to show the initial preliminary data connectivity
scheme with external equipment, this shall be proposed by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER during the Bid Phase of the project, with this data connectivity
shown on the Bid Phase SAS Overview Drawing.
14.19.4
All the other external standalone systems such as TFR (Transient Fault
Recorder)/DFR (Digital Fault Recorder) and possibly other external
equipment which the SOLUTION PROVIDER will propose during the Base
Design Stage of the project, require dedicated Ethernet connection for
communication with their respective remote master workstations (located
outside the substation).
14.19.5
The stand-alone Engineering Workstation shall be provided with remoteaccess Ethernet connection.
14.19.6
The Operator's workstations shall provide for full operation of the Station
HMI platform to allow for full SAS Control (when the Operator's workstation
is selected for this control), and will provide for retrieval of alarms/events
and other data from the Station HMI Front End Computers.
14.19.7 For both the Engineering Workstation and the Operator's Workstation the
computers, displays and peripheral equipment provided by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall be industrially hardened computers suitable for use in a
substation environment (with substations up to an operating voltage of 380
kV) and shall be fully in compliance with the SAS equipment manufacturer's
recommendations, as well as other requirements of this Standard. The
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engineering Workstation shall be provided with one (1) dedicated display

monitor. The Operators Workstations shall be provided with two (2)
dedicated displays/monitors.
14.20
Use of BICSI (Building Industry Consultancy Services International) Information

Transport Systems and Cabling Infrastructure Standards for Communications Wiring
for the SAS
14.20.1 Where applicable inside the substation (e.g. where GPR (Ground Potential
Rise) and induced voltages do not have an impact on the reliability of the
data communications infrastructure used as part of the SAS in certain areas of
each substation), or where the use of BICSI standards do not conflict with
IEC 61850 requirements for communications using IEC 61850 for the SAS,
or where the use of BICSI standards do not conflict with the acceptable
performance of the SAS, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall use the BICSI
(Building Industry Consulting Services International) Information Transport
Systems and Cabling Infrastructure Standards for data communications
wiring.
14.20.2 The BICSI's ITS/Distribution System, a vendor-neutral system is contained in
several documents, main documents of which are:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Telecommunications Distribution Methods Manual (TDMM)

Network Design Reference Manual (NDRM)
Information Transport Systems Installation Manual (ITSIM)
Electronic Safety and Security Design Reference Manual (ESSDRM)
Customer-Owned Outside Plant (COOSP)
NECA/BICSI
568-2006,
Installing
Commercial
Building
Telecommunications Cabling
Wireless Design Reference Manual (WDRM),if a wireless system is
used as part of the overall SAS
14.20.3 BICSI's Information Transport System is centered around the implementation

of following industry standards:
a.
b.
c.
d.
14.20.4
Applicability of above standards and BICSI's ITS to Substation Automation

System
a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
TIA/EIA 568-B, Commercial Building Telecommunications Cabling

Standard and associated revisions and addendums (TIA/EIA 568 B.1,
B.1-1, B.1-2, B.1-3, B.1-4, B.1-5, B.1-7).
TIA 942, Telecommunications Infrastructure for Data Centers.
NECA/BICSI
568-2006,
Installing
Commercial
Building
Telecommunications Cabling, and
Other standards referenced in Section 13.
EIA/TIA 568-B and associated revisions and addendums, and

NECA/BICSI 568-2006 along with the Sections 14.20.2.a, 14.20.2.b,
14.20.2.c, 14.20.2.d, 14.20.2.e and 14.20.2.f shall be implemented to
provide guidance for the cabling infrastructure for the Ethernet
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networks to be located in the substation outside the Station HMI layer.

However, National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that for all the inter-bay
communications bus connections using Ethernet Switches contained as
part of the SAS (which is also referenced in Section 2 of this
Appendix) shall be by Fiber Optics Cable, and Copper Ethernet cable
connections between Ethernet switches shall NOT be used.
b.
TIA 942, Telecommunications Infrastructure for Data Centers, should

guide cabling at the Station HMI/Communications Gateway layer.
c.
Also, where applicable as part of the SAS installation, National Grid

Saudi Arabia standards on hand-holes, manholes, trenches, and ductbanks, ducts and sub-ducts shall be used. But where there is no
National Grid Saudi Arabia standard, the BICSI practices, notably,
Customer-Owned outside Plant (COOSP) shall be used.
d.
To guide the SOLUTION PROVIDER in the use of BICSI standards

and practices, and related EIA/TIA 568B standards and practices, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall employ either SOLUTION PROVIDER
personnel, and/or the personnel of SOLUTION PROVIDER 's who are
RCDD certified (which is a BICSI certification) to lead their SAS
Communications Cabling Infrastructure design and installation group
(RCDD - Registered Communications Distribution Designer).
14.21 Use of Plug-In Modules (Cards) for ease of Maintenance

14.21.1
To facilitate easy and quick maintenance of each SAS equipment item

included in the overall SAS, the National Grid Saudi Arabia requires the
SOLUTION PROVIDER to design and construct each SAS equipment item
to maximize the use of plug-in modules (cards) in each SAS equipment item.
14.21.2 Additionally, to minimize the troubleshooting time of each SAS equipment

item, the National Grid Saudi Arabia also shall require the SOLUTION
PROVIDER's SAS equipment to have full provision for fast fault location,
and isolation of troubles to minimize equipment downtime during an
equipment fault condition. This can be accomplished by use of LED fault
indicators on each plug-in module (card) showing if the plug-in module
(card) is operational or faulty or through other means. If LED indicators are
not provided as part of each plug-in module's design and construction, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER is to indicate the methods that can be used to
minimize troubleshooting time of each SAS equipment item to isolate a
problem down to the defective plug-in module (card) and/or modules (cards).
The methods used for the troubleshooting pertaining to each SAS equipment
item shall be provided as part of the technical brochures/specifications for
each SAS equipment item which will be provided by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER as part of his Bid Proposal, as well as the Base Design stage of
the project.
14.21.3 Also, as part of the technical brochures/specifications for each SAS
equipment item, the technical brochure/specifications shall describe the type
TESP10701R0/KSB
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and number of plug-in modules (cards) contained in each SAS equipment

item, as well as the functions of each plug-in module (card) contained in each
SAS equipment item.
14.21.4 Also, the technical brochures/specifications shall include such information as
number and type of inputs and outputs on the module (card), a technical
description of the module (card), removal/installation details of the module
(card), and other details which will facilitate National Grid Saudi Arabia
evaluation of each SAS equipment item, and later maintenance of each SAS
equipment item.
14.21.5 Also, National Grid Saudi Arabia requires the use of plug-in modules for
each SAS equipment item as indicated below:
14.22
a.
Internal power supplies inside each SAS equipment item.
b.
For all SAS equipment items using Ethernet connections (except for
the Ethernet switches) plug-in Ethernet Communications Port/NIC
cards (with a maximum of two (2) Ethernet Communications
(Transmit/Receive) Ports per plug-in module (card)
c.
For Control IEDs and combined Control/Protection IEDs, plug-in

modules (cards) shall be used for the interconnection of external
CTs/PTs with the plug-in module (card)-otherwise known as a
Transformer Input Module.
d.

modules (cards) shall be used for the binary (discrete) inputs (from
external equipment) with the plug-in module (card)-otherwise known
as a Binary Input Module. .
e.

modules (cards) shall be used for the relay outputs to external
equipment with the plug-in module (card) otherwise known as the
Binary Output Module.
MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) for critical non-redundant SAS equipment
14.22.1 For critical non-redundant SAS equipment which will impact on the overall
availability of the provided SAS (e.g. Control IEDs, Protection IEDs,
combined Control/Protection IEDs, Bay-oriented Local Control Panels with
Mimic Diagram, etc.), National Grid Saudi Arabia requires that a very high
reliability and availability must be provided for this equipment. Due to this,
the National Grid Saudi Arabia requires a minimum MTBF period of 20
years for this critical non-redundant SAS equipment.
14.22.2 The SOLUTION PROVIDER, as part of the design and construction of this
equipment should provide that, as part of the overall design and construction
that the National Grid Saudi Arabia required MTBF period of a minimum of
twenty (20) years be provided for each critical non-redundant SAS
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equipment item. Where needed to meet the National Grid Saudi Arabia
preferred minimum MTBF period, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
consider such measures as providing internal redundancy of certain
components which have a high probability of failure (such as internal power
supplies and other components) which can be used to increase the MTBF
period requirement to the National Grid Saudi Arabia required minimum of
twenty (20) years.
14.22.3 As part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's Bid Proposal, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall identify each critical non-redundant SAS equipment item,
and provide his minimum MTBF period for each critical non-redundant SAS
equipment item.
14.23 Additional Features and Functions of the Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with
Mimic Diagram and Alarm/Annunciator facilities and other LCC/Low Voltage
Compartment Requirements
14.23.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
In addition to the features and functions of the Bay-oriented Local Control

Panel with Mimic Diagram and Low Voltage Compartment specified in
other sections of this Standard National Grid Saudi Arabia requires that the
following features and functions should also be included for this panel:
a.
Provisions should be included in the design of this equipment to

accept the minimum number of alarm/annunciation indications (e.g.
low SF6 gas, and others) for each LCC Cubicle (for High Voltage)
and Low Voltage Compartment (for Medium Voltage) for each
voltage level specified in the related National Grid Saudi Arabia
Transmission Materials Standards Specifications for switchgear.
b.
Alarm/annunciation capabilities shall be totally independent of the

SAS and shall still operate on the failure or shutdown of SAS
components. Alarm/Annunciation facilities which are built into the
LCCs/Low Voltage Compartments shall be fully compliant with the
related National Grid Saudi Arabia Transmission Materials
Standards/Specifications for switchgear. As part of the technical
brochures/specifications submittal for this panel, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER is to identify the alarm indications which can be reported
to this alarm/annunciation equipment.
c.
Also, indications should be provided for the switchgear closed

(energized) or switchgear open (de-energized) on the panel.
d.
The primary purpose of the Bay-Oriented Local Control Panel with

Mimic (for High Voltage) and the Low Voltage Compartment (for
Medium Voltage) is for local emergency control operation of
switchgear in the event of failure of a Control IED or combined
Control/Protection IED and related Local HMI. As such,
indications/settings shall be provided on this equipment to indicate
that this equipment is the primary (local emergency control)
mechanism for items of switchgear in conditions where the Control
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IED and related Local HMI have failed. The indications/settings

showing emergency operation shall be through a high intensity LED
indicating emergency operation of the switchgear equipment.
e.
The mimic diagram provided as part of the Bay-Oriented Local

Control Panel with Mimic (for High Voltage) and the Low Voltage
Compartment (for Medium Voltage) as well as the alarm and
switchgear closed/switchgear opened indications shall be as per
National Grid Saudi Arabia requirements.
f.
Hard-wired Interlocks shall be available in these panels which shall

be available and operational in conjunction with software/GOOSE
interlocks (see other portions of this Standard for the general
description of the software/GOOSE interlocks and the
interrelationship between the Hard-Wired and software/GOOSE
interlocks), or in the event of failure of the software/GOOSE
interlocks, the Hard-Wired Interlocks will work alone. If required and
specified by the National Grid Saudi Arabia during the Base Design
Stage of the project, a separate Hard-Wired Interlock Bypass
Switch/Key Switch which will be installed in the LCC/Control Panel,
which if the Hard-Wired Interlock Switch/Key Switch is in the Hard
Wired Interlock Bypass On position will bypass all Hard-Wired
Interlocks to switchgear in that Bay, and which if the Hard-Wired
Interlock Switch/Key Switch is in the Hard-Wired Interlock Bypass
Off position, all Hard-Wired Interlocks will be available for all
switchgear in that Bay (no matter what the switch position the
LCC/Low Voltage Compartment Control Switch is in).
g.
For LCCs controlling High Voltage switchgear, dedicated separate

hardware for Synchronizing Panel (as indicated in latest revision of
31-TMSS-01) shall be provided. This hardware shall include the
following:
TESP10701R0/KSB
Two (2) Digital Voltmeters

Two (2) Digital Frequency Meters
One (1) Indicating Synchroscope
Two (2) Lamps to indicate presence of incoming or
running voltages
Two (2) Incoming Voltage Selector Switches to select
Incoming Voltages for each Voltmeter/Frequency Meter
combination, as well as to establish the two voltages for
comparison for the Synchroscope/Lamps to use
Synchrocheck functionality/relay (see other sections of this
Standard and related Appendix of the main PTS to determine
Synchrocheck functionality/relay requirements).
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The primary purpose of this hardware specified in this section is to

support safe operation of the bay Breaker in the event that the LCC
has to be run in Emergency mode in the event of a failure of the
associated Control IED in the Bay LCC. The secondary purpose of
this hardware specified in this section is to support manual
synchronization at associated Generator start-up time for a generator
that may be feeding a substation feeder.
TESP10701R0/KSB
h.
Additionally, for the LCCs controlling High Voltage switchgear,

additional Digital Meters (which are addition to the requirements of
Section 14.23.1.g above shall be provided and installed by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER to monitor incoming/outgoing kW/kVar
entering/leaving feeder(s) from the bay that the LCC is controlling.
i.
For the LCC Control Switch inside the LCC Panel(s) for High
Voltage in lieu of the requirements of the applicable switchgear
Materials Standard (32-TMSS-02 for 69 kV up to 380 kV), the
Control Switch shall be a four position switch with each position of
the Control Switch corresponding to the functionality as described in
Section 4.2.3.b and its subsections of this Standard.
j.
For the Low Voltage Compartment Control Switch inside the Low
Voltage Compartment(s) for Medium Voltage in lieu of the
requirements of the applicable switchgear Materials Standard (32TMSS-01 for 11 kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV and 34.5 kV), the Control
Switch shall be a four position switch with each position of the
Control Switch corresponding to the functionality as described in
Section 4.2.3.2 and its subsections of this Standard).
k.
For the Medium Voltage Switchgear dedicated Meters shall be

provided and installed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER in accordance
with latest revision of 32-TMSS-01 (for Metal Clad Switchgear 11
kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV, and 34.5 kV) and 32-TMSS-03 (for Metal Clad
Gas Insulated Switchgear 11 kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV, and 34.5 kV).
Specific types of meters which are required for each type of Medium
Voltage Switchgear panel are defined and specified under applicable
sections of 32-TMSS-01 (for Metal Clad Switchgear 11 kV, 13.8 kV,
33 kV, and 34.5 kV) and 32-TMSS-03 (for Metal Clad Gas Insulated
Switchgear 11 kV, 13.8 kV, 33 kV, and 34.5 kV). These dedicated
Meters shall be in addition to the IEDs (which may also provide a
metering function) which will be installed in these cubicles).
l.
As part of the technical brochures/specifications to be submitted by

the SOLUTION PROVIDER for all Digital Meters, details in terms of
what analog indications can be read, and how these analog indications
can be read from each digital meter shall be included.
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m. Provisions should be made to integrate/interconnect the hard-wired

bay/station interlocking scheme with the panel controls to guarantee
that closure of specific switchgear (or switchgears) will not occur
upon occurrence of a hard-wired bay/station interlock condition if
hard-wired interlock bypass is disabled/off (Note: Hard-Wired
Interlock bypass functionality, if it is implemented will be decided
during the Base Design Stage of the project.)
14.24
n.
For the High Voltage, the Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with
Mimic Diagram, related emergency alarm/annunciator panels, lamps,
physical switches, Synchroscope, and Digital Meters shall be
integrated into the LCC Cubicle for the specific Bay, and will be
combined with the Control IED and other related equipment for that
Bay.
o.
For the Medium Voltage, the Mimic diagram and related

switches/indicators, related emergency alarm/annunciator panels,
physical switches, and Digital Meters shall be integrated into the Low
Voltage Compartment for the switchgear for the specific Bay, and will
be combined with the IED and other related equipment for that Bay.
Connection between redundant Communications Gateway equipment and other

communications equipment
14.24.1
To support the system integration requirements of the SAS with Master

Station/Workstation equipment installed external to each substation, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall be required to provide, install and connect
all communications cabling from the redundant Communications
Gateways and other SAS Ethernet switches, and Firewalls (supplied by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER under the SAS portion of the contract) to
redundant non-SAS routers/switches (supplied and which will be installed
generally inside the substation's communications room either under other
portions of this contract or other related contracts).
14.24.2
Where the non-SAS routers/switches have fiber optics ports available for
connection with the SAS, National Grid Saudi Arabia requires that the
cabling which is to be provided, installed and connected by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER between the redundant Communications
Gateways and the non-SAS routers/switches shall be fiber cabling and
shall be MM or SM cabling (non-SAS router/switch ports which the
14.24.3
SOLUTION PROVIDER must connect to will be identified to the

SOLUTION PROVIDER by the National Grid Saudi Arabia during the
Base Design Stage of the contract). If the non-SAS routers/switches DO
NOT have fiber optics ports available, then SOLUTION PROVIDER
shall utilize shielded Cat 5 E cable to complete the connections between
the non-SAS routers/switches and the SAS equipment.
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14.24.4
14.25
In terms of the use of either IEC-101 or IEC-104 or both for the SCADA
and SOE connections for each Communications Gateway, this decision
will be made by the National Grid Saudi Arabia at the time of
commissioning of the Substation.
SAS equipment requiring the use of AC Power

14.25.1
For the SAS equipment which is to be provided by the SOLUTION

PROVIDER, the National Grid Saudi Arabia prefers that all the SAS
equipment provided should be able to operate from the substation's dual
DC battery source (which is generally 125 VDC, but NOT the -48 VDC
Communications Battery Source). National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that
the use of AC Power to power SAS equipment shall be minimized by the
SOLUTION PROVIDER as far as possible. However, if portions of the
SOLUTION PROVIDER's SAS installation requires the use of AC Power
(e.g. to provide power to printers, modems etc.), the SOLUTION
PROVIDER will provide, during the Bid Proposal stage his planned
scheme for providing AC Power (which will either be a UPS scheme or a
redundant inverter scheme).
14.25.2
Also, as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's Bid Proposal, the

SOLUTION PROVIDER shall identify which SAS equipment items will
require the use of AC Power and at what AC voltage level he will use to
provide AC power to the SAS equipment requiring the use of AC Power.
14.25.3
If a UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) will be used as part of the

SOLUTION PROVIDER's planned scheme for providing AC Power to the
SAS equipment requiring AC Power, the UPS installation will be as per
latest revision of 46-TMSS-03, as well as comply with the related latest
revision of Engineering specifications TES-P-103.05 which involve
Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS). The Battery backup for the UPS
installation shall be for a minimum eight (8) hour period for manned
substations and twelve (12)-hour period for unmanned substations.
14.25.4
All tests per Table 3 and Table 4 (including optional tests) of IEC 620403 or equivalent international standard to be indicated by Solution provider
shall be performed. Load test shall cover both manual and automatic,
transfer, and retransfer characteristics between UPS inputs and alternate
supply, In addition the following tests shall be performed: no load test,
forced air cooling tests (if applicable) and surge withstand capability.
14.25.5
TESP10701R0/KSB
If an inverter scheme is used as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's

planned scheme for providing AC Power to the SAS equipment requiring
AC Power, the inverter scheme shall use redundant inverters and which
will provide the following equipment which will also meet the following
requirements:
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Each inverter of the redundant inverter scheme shall be able to

synchronize the AC output of the inverter with the other
inverter.
The inverters used will be suitable for use in high voltage

substation environment in each substation where the inverters
will be installed.

provide for full AC power requirements for ALL the
equipment contained as part of the initial SAS equipment
installation which requires the use of AC Power plus a 25
percent growth factor.

operate with an input from the substation DC Voltage Source
to each inverter which will be the substation's battery voltage
(generally 125 VDC, but not the -48 VDC Communications
Battery Voltage).
The inverter must be sized and specification must be such that

it must be able to absorb transients as per specified in clause 8
of TES-P-103.
Alarm facilities shall be provided as part of each inverter's

installation to notify the SAS Station HMI, and ultimately the
SCADA Master Station(s) of a failure of the inverter.
National Grid Saudi Arabia prefers that a "hot standby"

scheme be provided as part of the redundant inverter scheme
to save wear on the inverter which is not supplying AC power
to the SAS equipment which requires AC Power. A static
switch between the two inverters shall be provided to
accomplish this. However if this is not possible, an alternate
"load sharing" scheme shall be utilized which will distribute
50 percent of the load to the first inverter, and the other 50
percent of the load to the second inverter during normal
operation of both inverters. Under this alternate scheme, upon
the failure of one inverter, the full load shall be transferred to
the remaining operational inverter.
A manual Transfer switch shall be provided to transfer the AC

load from the inverters of the redundant inverter scheme to an
alternate AC Mains source in the event of failure of both
inverters. Alarm facilities shall be provided to the Station HMI
and ultimately the SCADA Master Station(s) identifying that a
transfer to the alternate AC Mains source has taken place. As
part of the manual Transfer Switch scheme, SOLUTION
PROVIDER is to identify the time that is required for the
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transfer to the alternate AC Mains source to take place.

Furthermore, the manual Transfer Switch shall be designed to
operate in a fast enough period to insure that there will be NO
disruption of SAS Components and the overall SAS
Installation during all periods when the Switch is operated.
i
The scheme shall be designed to be "fail-safe and bump

less to provide for continuous operation for AC Power to be
supplied to AC Powered SAS equipment in the event of a
single component failure, or switching between components.
Continuous operation for AC Power for SAS equipment
requiring AC Power shall guarantee that NO disruptions to
SAS Operation will occur as a result of a single component
failure or switching between components contained as part of
the redundant Inverter scheme.
The inverters shall be able to operate satisfactorily under full

load conditions with an input DC voltage between the
following voltage limits:
The lowest voltage limit will either be the calculated

voltage of the substation after eight hours with no
station service to operate the DC chargers or 90 Volts
DC whichever is lower.
The highest voltage limit will be 137 Volts DC.
Where two 125V DC supplies (DC 1 and DC 2) are being

supplied for the substation, one inverter shall operate from the
DC 1 source and the other inverter shall operate from the DC
2 source.
If two 125 VDC supplies (DC 1 and DC 2) are being supplied

for the substation, for the SAS AC Power distribution scheme,
the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall design and implement two
schemes for the AC Load distribution which will allow the
National Grid Saudi Arabia to easily switch from one scheme
to the other by energizing or de-energizing an AC tie breaker
during the operation of the SAS. The schemes are as follows:
TESP10701R0/KSB
The first scheme involves feeding AC Power to the

first set of redundant SAS components (e.g. Front End
Computer/Station HMI 1, 1, Operator Workstation 1,
etc.) from the inverter being provided power from DC
1, and feeding AC Power to the second set of
redundant SAS components (e.g. Front End
Computer/Station HMI 2, Communications Gateway
2, GPS receiver 2, Operator Workstation 2, etc.) from
the inverter being provided power from DC 2. This is a
modified load sharing scheme.
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HMI servers (1 & 2), GPS servers (1 &2) and

Gateways (1 &2) shall be fed directly from station DC
supply and AC supply is not acceptable for these loads.
Further HMI servers, GPS servers and Gateway
servers shall be provided with dual DC power supply
modules. For servers and other equipment with dual
power supply module, each power supply module shall
be fed from separate DC source.
14.25.6
TESP10701R0/KSB
The second scheme involves feeding AC Power for the

entire SAS installation portion which requires AC
Power from both inverters either using a hot-standby
alternative, or a load-sharing alternative (see Section
14.25.4.6 of this Standard, for a further description of
both alternatives).
Also, as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's SAS Bid Proposal, if an

inverter scheme is used as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's planned
scheme for providing AC Power to the SAS equipment requiring AC
Power, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide for the following
information as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's SAS Bid Proposal.
a.
Mean Time between Failures (MTBF) of each inverter used as

part of the Redundant Inverter scheme, as well as the overall
MTBF of the redundant inverter scheme.
b.
For the redundant inverter scheme, system block diagrams and

catalog descriptions of all the material used for the scheme
(and if required, system schematic diagrams) shall be
provided.
c.
List of field tests for inverter based on Table of IEC 60146-3

for National Grid Saudi Arabia approval at base design stage.
d.
AC Load sizing calculations for ALL of the SAS equipment

in the initial SAS installation which will require AC Power,
provisions for sizing for a 25 percent growth factor for AC
Load and the capacity of the inverters proposed for the
redundant inverter installation. National Grid Saudi Arabia
notes that AC Load sizing calculations for SAS equipment
requiring AC Power in the initial SAS installation for some of
the SAS equipment requiring AC Power that is considered by
the SOLUTION PROVIDER as being a non-essential AC load
(e.g. being provided AC power through Substation Station AC
service) will NOT be accepted by the National Grid Saudi
Arabia.
PAGE 105 OF 119
e.
14.25.7
14.26
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
If a "hot standby" scheme is not provided, SOLUTION

PROVIDER, as part of his inverter scheme proposal, shall
indicate how he plans to save wear on the inverter which is not
supplying AC Power, as well as part of the scheme, describe
how he plans to switch AC load from the faulty inverter to the
remaining good inverter used as part of the redundant inverter
scheme, and include the following time calculations:
The time that it will take for transfers of AC load to

take place, from the faulty inverter of the redundant
inverter scheme to the remaining good inverter.
The time that it will take for transfers of AC load to

take place from the inverters to the alternate AC Mains
source.
National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that the Control IEDs, Protection IEDs,
combined Control/Protection IEDs and Ethernet Switches (used in the
Inter-Bay Bus and Station Bus) contained in the SAS shall NOT be
provided AC power as a primary power source, but instead, be provided
power from each substation's DC battery source (which is generally 125
VDC, but NOT the -48 VDC Communications Battery Source) as a
primary power source.
SAS Equipment Alarms requiring reporting to SCADA Master Station(s)

Currently, TES-P-119.27 does not provide for reporting of alarms related to the failure
(urgent condition) or non urgent conditions of SAS (Substation Automation System)
equipment. In this respect, the SOLUTION PROVIDER is to provide as part of his
Base Design, a listing of alarms (both urgent and non-urgent) related to his SAS
equipment which should be reported to external SCADA Master Station(s) for
National Grid Saudi Arabia evaluation.
14.27
National Grid Saudi Arabia Interface during Station HMI development

The concerned National Grid Saudi Arabia engineers shall be permitted by the
manufacturer/SOLUTION PROVIDER to participate during the preparation of HMI
diagrams and the SAS database mentioned in section 4 of this standard..
14.28
Station HMI-Communications Gateways, Workstations (Operators and Engineering)

and IED's-Other Considerations/Requirements:
14.28.1
The supplied software shall have provision for the National Grid Saudi
Arabia to expand the Single Line diagram, Mimics and database to
accommodate future additions, without the involvement of the SAS
supplier.
14.28.2
The redundant computers used as part of the Station HMI Front End shall
be provided with full capability to provide simultaneous full updates of
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all databases of the redundant Station HMI Front End computers. As part
of this full updating capability, the databases of the redundant Station
HMI computers shall be identical at all times.
14.28.3
The redundant computers used as part of the Communications Gateways

shall be provided with full capability to provide simultaneous full updates
of all databases of the redundant Communications Gateway computers.
As part of this full updating capability, the databases in all redundant
Communications Gateway computers shall be identical at all times.
14.28.4
All Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer hardware

(including Station HMI Front End computers, Communications Gateway
computers, displays, and other computer peripheral equipment) shall be
industrial grade substation-hardened computer hardware equipment
which is suitable for, and will be fully operational in each substation
where the Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer
hardware equipment will be installed..
14.28.5
For the Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer hardware,

National Grid Saudi Arabia prefers that a totally Solid State Hard Disk (to
provide maintenance-free operation of the Hard Disk) be used as the main
storage device for the Station HMI and Communications Gateway
operating system, Station HMI and Communications Gateway databases,
and other Station HMI and Communications Gateway software. If the
SOLUTION PROVIDER cannot provide or the SAS equipment
manufacturer does not recommend a totally Solid State Hard Disk as part
of his Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer hardware,
then the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide and install in each
Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer two (2) mechanical
Hard Disks with full RAID 1 data backup abilities (so that each
mechanical Hard Disk in the Station HMI computer hardware will
contain an identical image at all times).
14.28.6
Also, for the Station HMI, Communications Gateway, Operators

Workstations, and Engineering Workstation computer hardware, the
computer hardware shall contain at least one (1) CD/DVD RW drive to
allow transfer of data and other software from the Hard Disk(s) to
removable CD/DVD media and vice versa. Such data/software transfer
capabilities shall be able to be operated from the Computer Hardware
keyboard, and shall be easy to use, allowing for operators to perform the
data/software transfer from Hard Disk(s) to removable CD/DVD media
and vice versa. In terms of access to the CD/DVD RW drive (in terms of
Read/Write capability from the CD/DVD RW drive to and from computer
memory/hard disk drives), this CD/DVD RW drive shall be configured so
that only personnel with the highest level of authority (Administrator, or
equal) shall have access to this CD/DVD RW drive.
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14.28.7
Also, to support this data/software transfer capability as referenced in

Section 14.28.5 above, the Station HMI Computer hardware shall be
equipped with alarm facilities to notify personnel outside each substation
(e.g. personnel in SCADA Master Station(s)) that the Station HMI
computer hardware Hard Disk(s) is/are nearly full and which require the
transfer of data from the Station HMI computer hardware Hard Disk(s) to
removable CD/DVD media. These alarm facilities shall be user
configurable allowing the user to set the alarm point (e.g. percentage of
remaining hard disk capacity) where a Hard Disk(s) nearly full alarm will
be generated.
14.28.8
To support the possible expansion of the SAS under future projects, as a

minimum, the Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer
hardware, Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer
firmware, and Station HMI and Communications Gateway computer
software shall be sized to meet the following requirements.
14.28.9
TESP10701R0/KSB
a.
The software operating system, databases, and all applications

software which is required as part of the initial SAS
installation plus
b.
Future database additions pertaining to a 50 percent expansion

of the IEDs which may be installed under future projects
(assuming that the same type of IEDs (and proportion of
specific Control IEDs, and Protection IEDs) will be used on
future projects which are used in the original SAS) plus
c.
Anticipated
software/firmware
upgrades
and
software/firmware "fixes" which will be performed for a two
year period under the software maintenance and software
upgrade agreement plus
d.
Storage of all alarm, event and other data which will be stored
in the Station HMI for a period of three years after National
Grid Saudi Arabia final acceptance of the SAS plus
e.
A thirty (30) percent additional spare capacity over and above

the combined requirements of Sections 14.28.8.a through
14.28.8.d above.
f.
As part of the Base Design Stage, the SOLUTION

PROVIDER is to provide his calculations for sizing of the
Station HMI computer hardware, software and firmware based
on the combined requirements of Sections 14.28.8.a through
Sections 14.28.8.e above.
In the event that the IEDs are not able to interface and communicate with
the Station HMI equipment, the IEDs shall have sufficient buffering
capability to store normal quantities of alarms, values and events for a
minimum period of 24 hours without having alarms, values and events
PAGE 108 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
data erased or overwritten inside each IED. Also, upon the restoral of the
communications between the Station HMI equipment and the IEDs, each
IED shall provide an automatic transfer of alarms, values and events date
from each IED to the Station HMI equipment without disrupting SAS
operations, which will clear the IED buffers of backlogged alarms, values
and events.
14.28.10
Also, for the Substation Configuration Description (SCD) files used in

the IEDs and other equipment, the IED name field of the SCD file shall
allow for the use of a minimum of 11 alphanumeric characters to support
the National Grid Saudi Arabia Operational requirements as part of the
National Grid Saudi Arabia's standard IED naming scheme. SOLUTION
PROVIDER 's supply of IED equipment which does NOT support this
minimum requirement of 11 alphanumeric characters will NOT be
accepted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia.
14.28.11
For the redundant Communications Gateway equipment, each

Communications Gateway shall be an integrated computer unit which
will provide for protocol conversion (IEC 61850 to IEC 60870-5-101,
and IEC 61850 to IEC 60870-5-104), Network/Port Address Translation
(from internal SAS IP and Port addresses to external IP and Port
Addresses), and various watchdog and Communications Gateway
supervisory functions, and other Communications Gateway functions
depending on the SAS Equipment Manufacturers equipment offerings.
Use of separate boxes (e.g. separate routers/switches and protocol
conversion units) for the Communications Gateway function will NOT be
accepted by the National Grid Saudi Arabia.
14.28.12
National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that it will NOT accept the combined
functions of a Communications Gateway and Station HMI Front End
Computer in the same computer hardware unit. As such, physically
separate computers shall be provided for the separate functions of Station
HMI Front End and Communications Gateway.
14.28.13
As some SAS equipment manufacturers require the use/supply of

protocol converters (e.g.-either internal and/or external protocol
converters to convert from IEC 60870-5-103 to IEC 61850), National
Grid Saudi Arabia notes that, except for one exception, use of Protocol
Converters will NOT be accepted. The one exception where protocol
conversion will be allowed will be the integrated computers used for the
Communications Gateway equipment, where the protocol conversion will
be installed inside the Communications Gateway computer equipment
(both hardware and software). REDBOX is not acceptable for IEDs.
For other equipment it is subjected to National Grid Saudi Arabia review
and acceptance. Refer enclosed drawing Fig 07.01 which shows where
REDBOX is acceptable.
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 109 OF 119
14.28.14
14.29
14.30
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
For all computers used in the SAS installation for the substation which
the SOLUTION PROVIDER will be providing, the computer equipment
shall NOT use Manufacturer discontinued/obsolete processors and other
items inside the computer equipment that are no longer supported by
spare parts on the open market. Some examples of this include obsolete
microprocessors installed in the computer equipment, low capacity hard
disk drives which are no longer market supported low
capacity/obsolete/discontinued memory, obsolete video ports and other
items/factors.
Alarms/Events reporting related to SOE functions and Alarms/Annunciators

14.29.1
For the alarms/events reporting related to the SOE functions, the Station
HMI shall provide a filtering capability to report SOE alarms/events on
the Station HMI which will display these SOE alarms/events with a
similar "look and feel" which currently exists on stand-alone SOE RTU
HMI equipment which the National Grid Saudi Arabia currently uses.
14.29.2
For the SOE Functional Display for the SAS, this "look and feel" shall be
similar and compatible with the current features of existing stand-alone
SOE Recorder products within the National Grid Saudi Arabia
14.29.3
To insure that a similar "look and feel" for SOE Alarms/Events is

attained, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide a typical standard
Alarms/Events picture of the Station HMI SOE functionality for National
Grid Saudi Arabia evaluation as part of his Base Design Package
submittal.
14.29.4
Pertaining to the descriptions of alarms/events regarding to SOE

functions which will appear on the Station HMI/Operator's Workstation,
if the alarms/events description for an event which shares the same signal
between SOE and SCADA (under TES-P-119.27), and with alarms seen
on Annunciator panels and where is a conflict in the names of the same
common signal between the SCADA description, the SOE description
and alarms descriptions seen on Annunciators, the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall bring this to the attention of the National Grid Saudi
Arabia during the Base Design Stage, so that the National Grid Saudi
Arabia can provide the correct name for the SOLUTION PROVIDER to
use in developing the various databases for SAS.
Applicability of 31-TMSS-01 to Substation Automation Systems

14.30.1
For the cubicles containing Control IEDs (and related equipment),

Protection IEDs (and related equipment), combined Control/Protection
IEDs (and related equipment), latest revision of 31-TMSS-01 shall be
complied with by the SOLUTION PROVIDER where applicable.
14.30.2
It is indicated that SAS does provide many of the functionalities as

described in latest revision of 31-TMSS-01but in some different methods
(e.g. how controls are configured, etc.).
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 110 OF 119
14.30.3
14.31
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
However, as National Grid Saudi Arabia notes that as SAS installations

vary between different SAS equipment manufacturers, there may be some
deviations to the requirements of 31-TMSS-01 which the SOLUTION
PROVIDER should indicate in his Base Design Submittal, and in which
these SOLUTION PROVIDER deviations requiring National Grid Saudi
Arabia approval.
Evaluation of SAS Quantities and Types of Materials during Bid Phase

Due to the significant differences in the various SAS product offerings amongst the
various SAS equipment manufacturers, the National Grid Saudi Arabia will NOT do a
detailed evaluation or approve exact quantities and types of materials used for the SAS
during the Bid Phase of the Contract. This detailed evaluation and approval by the
National Grid Saudi Arabia of the quantities and types of materials used in the SAS
will only be performed by the National Grid Saudi Arabia during the various design
stages of the Contract (Base Design, and Detailed Design) once the National Grid
Saudi Arabia personnel receive adequate training and orientation by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER on the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's SAS Product offerings, and after
determining the overall design philosophy/scheme/details of each substation where the
SOLUTION PROVIDER will install SAS equipment.
14.32
SAS Equipment Manufacturers Recommendations for Provision/Installation Practices

14.32.1
14.33
For provision/installation practices related to SAS, the SOLUTION

PROVIDER shall follow the SAS Equipment Manufacturers
Recommendations and Practices for provision/installation of SAS
equipment under this contract. Where there is a conflict between the SAS
Equipment Manufacturers Recommendations and Practices for
provision/installation of SAS equipment and other standards/requirements
stated in the overall main PTS document (including all attachments to the
PTS document), the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall bring this conflict to
the attention of the National Grid Saudi Arabia during the Base Design
Stage of the contract for possible National Grid Saudi Arabia resolution.
Disabling of Control Functions for Certain Switchgear

14.33.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
Although this specification requires full functionality of control functions

for all switchgear items which the Control IED and/or combined
Control/Protection IED will control, the National Grid Saudi Arabia may
request the SOLUTION PROVIDER to disable software/electronic
control functionality (through the Control IEDs, combined
Control/Protection IEDs and/or the Station HMI Workstation), and will
require the SOLUTION PROVIDER to only implement local control of
certain switchgear items through the High Voltage LCC Cubicle(s)
(through the Bay-oriented Local Control Panel with Mimic Diagram)
and/or Medium Voltage Low Voltage Compartment(s).. An example of
this is earthing switches both on the busbar level and the line level. If this
disabling is required, the National Grid Saudi Arabia will notify the
PAGE 111 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
SOLUTION PROVIDER during the Base Design Stage of the Contract,

so that the SOLUTION PROVIDER can implement the required National
Grid Saudi Arabia items in this regard.
14.34
Familiarization by SOLUTION PROVIDER of Requirements through Site Survey

during Bid Phase
As Applicable.
14.35
Minimizing SAS Shutdown Time and Outage Coordination during future SAS
Upgrades/Reconfigurations
14.35.1
TESP10701R0/KSB
Initial Design of SAS to Account for Minimizing Future Outage Time

during future SAS Upgrades/Reconfigurations
a.
The SAS installation provided by the SOLUTION

PROVIDER shall take into account the long term operational
requirements for the SAS and the overall substation overall.
As part of these long term operational requirements, there may
be a requirement to perform upgrades and reconfigurations to
the SAS, which may require outage of certain functions of the
SAS installation (e.g. software/GOOSE interlocking, control,
etc.).
b.
The SAS installation provided by the SOLUTION

PROVIDER shall be designed and configured in a manner
such that when upgrades/reconfigurations to the SAS are
required at a later date (either by other contracts, and/or by the
National Grid Saudi Arabia), that such outage time shall be
minimized to the maximum extent possible.
c.
In this respect, as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER 's Bid

submittal, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide his
estimate for outage time of the SAS (and which components
of the SAS will be affected) during typical SAS
upgrade/reconfiguration activities (with these typical
upgrade/reconfiguration activities including (but may not be
limited to) installation of a new IED, installation of a new
Ethernet
Switch,
upgrade
of
Station
HMI
Computers/Gateways, and other upgrades/reconfigurations
which the SOLUTION PROVIDER may foresee/expect
during the expected life of the SAS installation).
d.
Additionally, as part of the SOLUTION PROVIDER's

estimate for outage time for upgrade/reconfiguration, the
SOLUTION PROVIDER shall state what specific components
of his SAS design will need to be upgraded/reconfigured and
tested (e.g. upgrades/reconfigurations of SCD files, and
specific hardware/firmware and software), and the time
estimate
for
these
portions
of
the
SAS
Upgrade/Reconfiguration.
PAGE 112 OF 119
14.35.2
14.35.3
14.35.4
Minimizing
Outage
Time
during
actual
upgrades/reconfigurations of SAS installations
performance
of
a.
In
cases
where
this
Contract
requires
an
upgrade/reconfiguration of the SAS to meet project
requirements (as identified in this standard), the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall identify what items of the SAS will require
an outage, and perform all steps/activities, and equipment
necessary (as part of any upgrades/reconfigurations of the
SAS) to minimize such outage time.
b.
The steps/activities will require the use of offline simulators

(which is to be supplied by the SOLUTION PROVIDER ) to
fully test and debug upgraded/reconfigured SCD file software
and other software (before loading the upgraded/reconfigured
software onto each main SAS installation), as well as other
measures necessary to minimize outage time.
c.
The SOLUTION PROVIDER is to provide basic details of his

requirements for the minimization of outage time during SAS
upgrade/reconfiguration activities as part of his Bid submittal,
with full details of his outage plan during the Base Design
Stage of the project.
SAS Outage Coordination

a.
In cases where SAS outages are required as part of an existing

SAS installation to perform SAS upgrades/reconfigurations
required as part of this standard, such outages (including
duration of SAS outages) shall be planned and proposed by
the SOLUTION PROVIDER well in advance (at least 45 days
in advance of the proposed SAS outage date) of the time
proposed by the SOLUTION PROVIDER for the SAS outage,
so that National Grid Saudi Arabia can coordinate activities
for National Grid Saudi Arabia and other personnel to place
Substation Operators and other National Grid Saudi Arabia
personnel at the SAS site during the period of the SAS outage,
when necessary.
b.
For SAS Outage requirements, general Substation Outage

coordination requirements/procedures shall also be followed
as identified in other portions of this standard document.
Development/Testing of SCD Files, CID Files and GOOSE CrossReferences for ultimate configuration of each substation
a.
TESP10701R0/KSB
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
As one step in minimizing the outage time in the future for the
SAS for each substation, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
PAGE 113 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
be required to develop and test a second set of files

(containing the SCD files, the compiled CID files, and
GOOSE Cross-References) which will reflect each
substation's ultimate substation configuration (including the
full future expansion as referenced in the main PTS
document). This second set of files is in addition to the first
set of files (containing the SCD files, the compiled CID files,
and GOOSE Cross-References) which will be used for each
substation's initial configuration.
TESP10701R0/KSB
b.
During the SAT (Testing/Commissioning) stage of the

PROJECT, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall test the first set
of files (containing the SCD files, the compiled CID files, and
GOOSE Cross-References for the each substation's initial
configuration) on the actual hardware which is to be installed
for each substation.
c.
Also, during the SAT (Testing/Commissioning) stage of the

PROJECT, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall also test and
verify the proper operation of the second set of files
(containing the SCD files, the compiled CID files, and
GOOSE Cross-References for the each substation's ultimate
configuration) with the actual hardware which is to be
installed in each substation, as well as any additional units
(e.g. additional IED's used as "dummies", simulators, etc.) to
verify that the second set of files will be fully operational
when installed to support each substation's future ultimate
expansion.
d.
The sequence of testing in this regard will involve first loading

of the second set of files on all equipment (to verify that each
substations future ultimate configuration will be fully
operational with the second set of files), and after tests are
successful on the second set of files, then the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall load the first set of files to verify that each
substation's initial configuration (prior to initial energizing of
each substation) is fully operational.
e.
After all tests are complete, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall

certify that both the first set of files (containing the SCD files,
the compiled CID files, and GOOSE Cross-References for the
each substation's initial configuration) and the second set of
files (containing the SCD files, the compiled CID files, and
GOOSE Cross-References for the each substation's ultimate
configuration) are fully error free and can be loaded on the
equipment at any time.
f.
Details of the testing scheme/procedure which is used and

identified in Section 14.35.4.a to Section 14.35.4.e above shall
PAGE 114 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
be provided by the SOLUTION PROVIDER as part of his

overall detailed Test/Commissioning Plan which will be
submitted by the SOLUTION PROVIDER to the National
Grid Saudi Arabia for final review and approval.
14.36
Identification of connections between SAS and external SCADA Master Stations &
SOE Master Stations under standard.
14.36.1
The external SCADA Master Station(s) which the substation will be

connected to (for providing the SCADA functionality of SAS) are as
follows:
a.
b.
c.
14.36.2
The external SOE Master Station(s) which the substation will be

connected to (for providing the SOE functionality of SAS) are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
14.36.3
14.37
Main Power Control Center

Emergency Control Center
National Control Center
Main Power Control Center

Emergency Control Center
National Control Center
For the hardware connection requirements (to SCADA and SOE Master
Stations), the boundary of the SAS portion will be at the substation
Communications equipment. However the SOLUTION PROVIDER
shall provide and perform the extension of double shielded CAT5
enhanced and/or SM/MM fiber optic cabling and its termination by
providing the necessary fiber optic transceivers on the router/switch
equipment in the substation communication room. SOLUTION
PROVIDER will be required to fully integrate all SCADA and SOE
functionality (at the SAS level) with the external SCADA and SOE
Master Stations and fully test these functionalities in coordination with
National Grid Saudi Arabia personnel who will be located at the
respective Master Stations
Sizing of SAS for future Ultimate Substation Configuration

In addition to the requirements for future expansion of SAS computer equipment as
indicated in Section 14.28 of this Standard, in the SOLUTION PROVIDER s design
and implementation of the SAS for the substation, the SOLUTION PROVIDER shall
size the SAS to provide the capability to support the requirements for both the current
substation configuration (as shown on the Station One Line drawing contained in the
main PTS) as well as ALL future bays/diameters for the future ultimate Substation
configuration also as shown on the Station One Line drawing contained in the main
PTS. This capability shall include all proposed SAS software and hardware devices
(such as Front End Computers, Station HMI, Engineering Workstation, Operator
Workstations, System Software, LANs/Ethernet Switches etc.). In sizing the SAS for
the future substation configuration, the SOLUTION PROVIDER will NOT be
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 115 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
required to provide additional LCC/Control IEDs for the future bays/diameters for the
substation.
14.38
Substation Automation System (including DSM) Scope of Work at Remote

Substations
14.38.1 SOLUTION PROVIDER shall provide upgrade/modifications/additions for
the IEC61850 based Substation Automation System (including DSM) at the
remote end XXXXXX Substation in order to meet any addition or change in
SCADA telemetry point(s) requirements. The SAS equipment shall consist
of, but not limited to the following:
a.
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
b.
SAS System Software (ex. Microscada/Sicam PAS/PACiS)
c.
Application Software
d.
Communication Gateways
e.
Local HMI
f.
Engineering Workstation
g.
Operator Workstation
h.
Station LAN
i.
Inter-bay Bus
j.
Control Panels for additional controllers as necessary
k.
Substation Equipment Interface
l.
Wiring, Cables and Connectors
m.
Reconfiguration/design and development of SCD (Substation
Configuration Descriptor) as necessary.
n.
Operating Spare Parts
o.
Operations and Maintenance document of added equipment.
14.38.2 SOLUTION PROVIDER shall perform upgrade/modifications/additions
compatible with existing equipment and manufactured by the same National
Grid Saudi Arabia.
14.38.3 SOLUTION PROVIDER shall coordinate with the manufacturer of SAS at
XXXXXX Substation for all the software and hardware modifications/additions
required.
14.38.4 SOLUTION PROVIDER shall ensure that expansion/modification works shall
not degrade performance of existing substation automation system.
14.38.5 SOLUTION PROVIDER is required to participate in or to request for pre-bid
site survey and clarification with National Grid Saudi Arabia operational site
personnel to gather and ascertain technical data necessary for him to bid, design
and install the required equipment, such data as the type of existing SAS system
software, communication gateways, HMIs, IEDs, Station LAN, Inter-bay Bus,
Control Panels and other related information.
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 116 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
14.38.6 Points lists for the SCADA shall be established by SOLUTION PROVIDER
using one line diagrams provided in the main SOW/TS and applicable tables of
points, other guideline provided in latest revision of TES-P-119.27, Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition. Finalization of all point lists shall be done during
base design stage subject to approval of National Grid Saudi Arabia.
14.38.7 The SAS upgrade/modifications/additions provided by the SOLUTION
PROVIDER shall be designed and configured in a manner such that, outage time
shall be minimized to the maximum extent possible. The section 13.35 above
shall also be applicable as necessary for minimizing the outage time
requirements.
14.38.8 SOLUTION PROVIDER shall prepare and/or revise the SCADA drawings, SAS
System Block Diagram, SCADA Tele-Information Plan sheets and all other
related drawings of the substations and submit to the National Grid Saudi Arabia
for review and approval before finalizing.
14.38.9 SOLUTION PROVIDER shall implement the SCADA Tele-Information plan
requirement for the substations in this project.
14.38.10 SOLUTION PROVIDER shall prepare procedures and conduct installation
check-out and performance testing in coordination with NATIONAL GRID
SAUDI ARABIA REPRESENTATIVES, which shall include, but not limited to
the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
TESP10701R0/KSB
SAS SAT: A Site Acceptance Test shall be conducted and shall be

witnessed by National Grid Saudi Arabia Representative at the Substation
after upgrade/modifications/additions to the SAS.
SAS System Pre-Commissioning: Verification of correct point
assignments in the SAS System Software/HMI configuration and accuracy
of analogue input, status input and control output points.
SAS System Commissioning: Final test to verify that all SCADA points
are tele-metered and controlled from the Power Control Center.
All applicable standards, equipment/material specifications, testing/
inspection/ commissioning, documentation/ drafting requirements that are
specified for the SAS in this standard shall be applied for the expansion of
SAS at the remote substations.
The necessary documentation of all works done in this project shall be
submitted to National Grid Saudi Arabia. All SAS documentation,
drafting, and drawings shall comply with the National Grid Saudi Arabia
drafting standards specified in the main Scope of Work and provided both
in soft and hard copies.
PAGE 117 OF 119
TES-P-107.01, Rev. 0
15. DRAWING ATTACHMENT:

Please find enclosed Substation Automation System Diagram (Conceptual), Fig 07-01
TESP10701R0/KSB
PAGE 118 OF 119

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TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

RELIABILITY AND SYSTEM DESIGN

General SAS Functionality

General System Design

IEC 61850 AND IEC 62439-1 COMMUNICATION PROFILE

Introduction Related to IEC 61850

CONFIGURATION TOOLS/SERVICE AND SUPPORT SYSTEM

Compliance With Standards

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

CYBER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

ADDITIONAL SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

Summary of Main Functional Parts of SAS

Bay Protection Intelligent Electronic Devices (Protection IEDs) for the

Unless otherwise specified, combined control/protection IEDs with the

Redundant Managed hardened Ethernet switches providing managed

Supporting Power Supply equipment such as inverters UPS, etc.

Station Human Machine Interface (Station HMI)/ Station with process

Separate Redundant Communications Gateway for remote supervisory

Redundant GPS Receivers (e.g. Master Clock).

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

cabling/wiring requirement will be the cabling/wiring between the Control

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

Bay Level Functions

Station Level Functions

Process Level Functions

Process Related Station Level functions

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

2.4.10 Front End Computers/Station Computers

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

2.4.21 Communications Gateway

General System Design

The Substation Automation System (SAS) shall be suitable for operation,

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

Cubicles shall incorporate the control, monitoring and protection functions

3.1.10 Preference will be given to suppliers who are in a position to provide

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

Functions shall be decentralized, object-oriented and located as close as

The main process information of the station shall be stored in distributed

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

The communication buses shall be realized using fiber-optic cables and

The communication buses (both station communications bus and inter-bay

To increase system performance and availability

a. The inter-bay busses shall be independent and redundant at each voltage

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD

The proposed Ethernet (LAN) Switches shall be modular, industrially

These hardened requirements include. (but may not be limited to)

Date of Approval: February 26, 2013

TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING STANDARD