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The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was a provocation. Moscow needed a strong reaction from Saakashvili. The objective of the Russian invasion was not to overrun Georgia or overthrow Saakashvili, by the way. The objective was to destroy NATO and drive the Americans out of Europe. At first glance, this proposition may seem outlandish. But I can assure the reader, the president of Russian said as much on 15 July 2008.
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JRNyquist : Making the Enemy’s Strategic Objectives Intelligible
The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was a provocation. Moscow needed a strong reaction from Saakashvili. The objective of the Russian invasion was not to overrun Georgia or overthrow Saakashvili, by the way. The objective was to destroy NATO and drive the Americans out of Europe. At first glance, this proposition may seem outlandish. But I can assure the reader, the president of Russian said as much on 15 July 2008.
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The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was a provocation. Moscow needed a strong reaction from Saakashvili. The objective of the Russian invasion was not to overrun Georgia or overthrow Saakashvili, by the way. The objective was to destroy NATO and drive the Americans out of Europe. At first glance, this proposition may seem outlandish. But I can assure the reader, the president of Russian said as much on 15 July 2008.
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Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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Scarica in formato PDF, TXT o leggi online su Scribd
Making the Enemy’s Strategic Objectives Intelligible
I am delighted with Michael Bąkowski’s piece, “The Great Provocation,”
because it leads us to a discussion touching on the most significant events of the last 18 months. I will now make Bąkowski’s case for him, which is not so strange, because what he presented in “The Great Provocation” is what I’ve been presenting in my work for many years. With regard to the status of the former Soviet-dominated countries, I had previously written that the “decisive argument for the authenticity of Saakashvili’s revolution in Georgia is found in the Russian military strike of August 2008: The Kremlin displayed its evil intentions and then was forced to abandon its military offensive by Western economic pressure.” What I wrote, of course, is true. But there is much more to this story. Without accusing Saakasvhili of being a false democrat or secret Kremlin agent, we should not miss the fact that enemies unwittingly help one another all the time; for Saakashvili over-reacted to the violence in South Ossetia, giving Russia a pretext for an invasion. This overreaction may be due to Saakashvili’s youth, his impulsiveness, or his advisors. Michael Bąkowski has suggested that Saakashvili is an agent of Moscow, but this need not be the case. The Russians also possess mind control drugs of various kinds which can produce aggressiveness in a targeted individual. The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was a provocation. Moscow needed a strong reaction from Saakashvili. The objective of the Russian invasion was not to overrun Georgia or overthrow Saakashvili, by the way. The objective was to destroy NATO and drive the Americans out of Europe. At first glance, this proposition may seem outlandish. But I can assure the reader, the president of Russian said as much on 15 July 2008. In my 15 August 2008 column at FinancialSense.com [1], titled “Russia’s Concept for Dominating Europe,” I wrote as follows: “The Kremlin strategists believe that the United States is on the brink of a crippling dislocation. According to a July 29 Pravda article, an anonymous Russian diplomat revealed that the ‘Russian administration believes the United States may soon suffer from a serious political crisis.’ The sequence begins with a financial crash, advances to political unrest and finally to the dissolution of American military power. As the Russian diplomat warned, ‘America is standing on the verge of a large-scale crisis of its own existence.’” The statement of the Russian diplomat was part and parcel of a larger provocation, of which the Georgia invasion was an integral part. This invasion also coincided with a potentially disruptive Russian attack on the American financial system, which was intentionally revealed to the U.S. Treasury Secretary on the eve of the war in Georgia. In other words, the Russian government was attempting to provoke President Bush. This was not as unlikely as it might appear. George W. Bush already had an international reputation as a hothead, involving the United States in two conflicts (Afghanistan and Iraq). What would the world say if the United States launched military strikes against Russian tanks in Georgia? Would they welcome this sort of thing, or chalk it up to Bush’s general insensitivity to European opinion? In fact, President Bush was being pushed by his advisors to launch strikes against the Russian forces in Georgia. On 15 July 2008 all of Russia’s ambassadors from around the globe were called to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. President Dmitri Medvedev explained Russia’s objectives. “Russia is indeed stronger and able to assume greater responsibility for solving problems on a regional and global scale.” The Russian president explained that the Cold War was not an American victory after all, because America’s adversary had “survived.” It was time, he said, to established “a new equilibrium.” In an allusion to President George W. Bush, Medvedev noted that “the habit … of resorting to force … is increasing…. In such circumstances it is important to maintain restraint and to evaluate situations carefully.” If the presidents of Georgia and America could be provoked into a series of overreactions, and if Russia was seen to act within certain limits, NATO might be disrupted. Medvedev said he was “convinced that with the end of the Cold War the underlying reasons for most of the bloc politics and bloc discipline simply disappeared.” In other words, NATO’s continued existence was precarious, and so was America’s position in Western Europe. According to Medvedev, NATO’s violation of Yugoslavian sovereignty in 1999 would now enable a devastating Russian counterstroke. History ought to be remembered, he said, “We simply cannot accept the attempts taking place in individual countries to highlight the ‘civilizing, liberating mission’ of the fascists and their accomplices.” (An oblique reference in which Medvedev explained that those who welcome American style democracy in the former Soviet territories were the same as those who welcomed the Germans as liberators in 1941 – and should be dealt with accordingly.) “Characteristically,” continued Medvedev, “it is those states that have such a passion for rewriting history … that are at the same time the most zealous advocates of illegal acts, like the Kosovo precedent…. And those same states are the ones who have become ultra-nationalist in their policies, harassing national minorities and denying rights to the so-called ’stateless’ citizens in their countries.” Medvedev is explaining the design, the pretext, and the model for upcoming events in Georgia. “For us,” noted Medvedev, “this task is particularly important, since in many cases we are talking about abuses against Russians and Russian-speaking populations. And protecting and defending those rights is obviously one of our responsibilities.” So the provocation was already set, and the reaction of the Georgian president already assumed. Medvedev clearly knew that Russia is going to invade Georgia. “I have focused on these aspects because Europe today needs a positive rather than negative agenda.” In other words, the invasion of Georgia is not an end in itself. As the Russian president hinted, the real purpose of this operation was to highlight the obsolescence of NATO by raising tensions in a way that underscored the dangers of American involvement in European affairs, as well as the dangers inherent in NATO and “obsolete bloc politics.” The old treaties will not keep the peace, Medvedev explained, because they are unfair. Russia is a great power and deserves greater influence. “I’m absolutely convinced that this requires new approaches. That is why we proposed to conclude a new treaty on European security and to start this process at a European-wide summit.” According to Medvedev, there are “flaws in the architecture of European security….” What Russia wants is “a truly open and collective security system.” What he is saying, basically, is that NATO must be eliminated, and America kicked out of Europe. And what would be the catalyst for this process? An increase of tensions between America and Russia may not signify an increase in tensions between Germany and Russia, or France and Russia. “A strategic partnership between Russia and the EU could act as the so-called cornerstone of a Greater Europe without dividing lines….” In order to achieve this, Russia hoped to stage a provocation that George W. Bush could not resist. This provocation would also include an open attempt to seriously disrupt shaky American financial institutions. Obviously, the Germans and French would not be happy if the Americans pushed them in the direction of war with Russia. Both countries have an economic stake in regional peace. Germany, especially, is tied to Russia in ways that only German politicians – looking at their private finances – can fully explain. By pushing on Georgia, the Russian leadership was attempting to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies. What Mr. Bąkowski has pointed out in his piece, is the “provocative” nature of Moscow’s strategic method. It is now clear that the invasion of Georgia in 2008 was not intended to overthrow Saakashvili or install a Moscow puppet. The invasion was a provocation, plain as day. To make Mr. Bąkowski’s argument for him: If we examine the Georgian events from this perspective, we see that Moscow needed a reliable partner in Tbilisi who could start the war in a way that later indicated the fault was on both sides — that it wasn’t a simple case of naked Russian aggression. This idea, in fact, was hinted at by Russian President Medvedev when he assured his diplomatic corps that everything would unfold in accordance with international legality. If there was to be outrageous behavior, the Americans would be the ones to add fuel to the fire. But President George Bush, going against his advisors, avoided the trap. The authenticity of the Rose Revolution depends on whether Russia’s split with Georgia was meant to serve as a “provocation” for the purpose of undoing NATO. We do not know the answer, and we have no evidence that Saakashvili sent troops into South Ossetia on secret orders from Moscow. On the other hand, the Kremlin provocation did require a specific set of actions from the Georgian president, and the Georgian president provided those actions. If we study Medvedev’s speech with care, we can see that the Russian president was giving a great deal of the game away. His language, however, was subtle. Few analysts realized how important this particular speech was. With the recent revelations from former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, it is worthwhile to reassess events in Georgia. At the same time, we should remember President Medvedev’s reference to “fascists and their accomplices.” Here is an admission that anti-Kremlin forces exist in Georgia, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States. Here is a belt of countries that could be used against Moscow, if only the people of those countries realize what has been going on since 1991. | 11 Comments