White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

Radio-to-core
protection in LTE
The widening role of the security gateway

SENZA
CONSULTING

Monica Paolini
Senza Fili Consulting

White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

1. Introduction
Protecting the LTE radio-to-core link
LTE ushers in mobile networks that have a more flexible and less hierarchical framework, higher performance and richer functionality.
But it also increases the porosity of the mobile network and its vulnerability to malicious attacks and accidental traffic disruption.
Security has become a hot topic among LTE operators. While the attention focuses almost exclusively on mobile devices, they are far
from being the only targets for attack and entry points to mobile networks. Attacks can be launched from the internet as well as from
roaming and MVNO partners.
Unauthorized access to the network may come from infrastructure elements such as the eNB. Adoption of small and femto cells,
which are easier to access than traditional macro cells are, further increases the vulnerability of the network. If left unprotected, the
RAN-to-core link offers another route that can cause disruption in mobile networks.
To avoid congestion or service interruption, and provide a consistent QoE to their subscribers, mobile operators have to protect their
entire networks devices, base stations or femto cells, backhaul links, and the core network against abnormal traffic flows that may
stem from intentional attacks (e.g., malware), unintended events (e.g., configuration errors), or unusual but legitimate traffic spikes
(e.g., during a sports event), and may result in spikes both in the
control plane (signaling floods) and in the data plane (RAN
congestion). In the context of end-to-end network protection,
LTE radio-to-core protection:
securing the radio-to-core link is of crucial importance to
The evolution of the security gateway
ensuring the overall security in mobile networks.
In this paper we focus on the security and protection of the
radio-to-core link, and discuss how the strategically located
security gateway (SeGW) enables operators to meet their
performance, reliability and service requirements as they go
through three distinct, but often overlapping, phases in their LTE
deployments:
Launch: initial phase with limited adoption and coverage.
Growth: full network buildout, with increase in coverage,
traffic load and subscriber adoption.
Advanced services: addition of VoLTE and RCS, introduction
of advanced policy functionality, expansion of Wi-Fi offload,
and small-cell deployments.

2013 Senza Fili Consulting www.senzafiliconsulting.com

IPsec and SeGWs are the dominant solution,

endorsed by 3GPP, to protect the LTE radio-to-core
link.
SeGWs role has started to expand beyond
security. It protects the network against sudden
and unexpected surges in signaling and user data
traffic, whether the result of malicious attack,
configuration error, or spikes in subscriber activity.
Scalability, multi-vendor interoperability and low
latency are required in the SeGW to support LTE
networks as they evolve from the initial launch to a
mature phase marked by higher traffic loads and
the introduction of advanced services.

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

2. Security, scale and aggregation

The role of the security gateway (SeGW)
Radio-to-core link protection requires a dedicated effort. 3GPP standards make a strong case for the adoption of IPsec encryption and
mutual authentication of the radio-to-core link to secure the link between the eNB and the MME, and recommend IPsec in untrusted
1
links. Initially mobile operators have been cautious in the adoption of IPsec because of the additional cost, overhead (estimated to be
2
14% by NGMN ) and complexity it entails, but there is an emerging consensus among operators that IPsec is needed to secure
untrusted sites and is highly desirable even in trusted sites. To date, severe security breaches and network disruption have been
infrequent, but they carry high costs because they may encourage churn, shrink revenues and damage the operators brand
reputation.
As defined by 3GPP, the SeGW terminates the IPsec tunnel at the mobile core edge, and hence provides for the encryption and
decryption of IPsec traffic, and for mutual authentication with eNBs in the RAN. The SeGW is inserted at the edge of the core network
to secure the S1-MME and S1-U traffic from eNBs, aggregate it, and then forward it to the MME and SGW (Figure 1), protecting the
network from man-in-the-middle attacks. The SeGW can also carry the control-plane X2 interface among eNBs to coordinate
transmission in the RAN.
The IPsec tunnel that is initiated at the eNB can be terminated directly at the MME and SGW. This approach, however, can result in
higher costs and less efficient network utilization, because IPsec termination is a computationally intensive function for which the
MME and the SGW are not designed and optimized. Without a SeGW, IPsec termination may overload these elements and, to
prevent this, operators have to invest in additional processing capacity.

Figure 1. The SeGW position within an LTE network. Source: Senza Fili
1. 3GPP TR 33.401, 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE): Security Architecture, 2012. The decision of whether the radio-to-core link is trusted is left to the mobile
operator, because it is tied to the operators internal criteria, which typically include factors such as control over the physical site where the eNB is located and over the
backhaul link (i.e., use of the operators own backhaul infrastructure versus third-party leased links), security level at the cell site, sharing of network components with
other mobile or fixed networks, and regulatory requirements.
2. NGMN, Small Cell Backhaul Requirements, 2012.

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

Figure 2. Sources and impact of unexpected data and signaling traffic overload on network performance. Source: Senza Fili
The SeGW was initially developed to provide the scalability and performance needed to meet operators radio-to-core security
requirements, but its strategic position on the border between the RAN and the core network makes it the ideal candidate to
aggregate traffic directed to the core and hence to provide functionality that goes beyond enabling efficient IPsec encryption and
mutual authentication. The edge of the core is an ideal place to monitor incoming traffic from the RAN and to identify and manage
suspicious or unexpectedly high traffic flows, in both the control plane (signaling) and the user plane (data traffic), that may disrupt
network access and service availability. In doing so, the SeGW reduces the capacity requirements on the MME and SGW that would
otherwise have to process all the traffic from the RAN. The SeGW gives operators a valuable vantage point from which to gain
visibility into the combined control and user plane traffic, before it gets segregated in the MME and SGW, respectively. In addition,
the SeGW facilitates IPsec implementation in multi-vendor deployments, because it can provide full interoperability across elements
from different vendors.
The role of the SeGW in filtering incoming traffic is not limited to the identification and management of intentional malicious attacks;
it includes many other types of anomalous traffic (Figure 2). Some occasional traffic spikes are subscriber-driven, occurring, for
example, as a result of weather disruption, highway accidents, or planned events such as concerts or games where many people
congregate. While this traffic is entirely legitimate, the network may not have sufficient capacity to manage and transport it, and
service availability may be partially or completely compromised as a result. Signaling traffic overload can also be generated
unintentionally by erroneous configuration settings or other software malfunctions in the UE applications or OSs or in other network
elements. This type of traffic is not malicious, but it is unexpected and can have the same impact as user-driven traffic spikes.
In both cases user-plane traffic overload and control-plane traffic overload a scalable SeGW can recognize and manage unusually
high traffic levels and protect the network in real time, before the traffic hits the core network in the MME or SGW, in order to
contain or prevent disruption.
The disruption can be brought on innocently by traffic overload in either signaling or data. Signaling overload may cause congestion in
the MME or other core elements such as the HSS, and lead to access or service denial even if there is sufficient capacity in the data
plane to satisfy access and service requests. In this situation, signaling overload prevents efficient utilization of network resources.
User-plane traffic overload has a similar impact on subscriber experience (i.e., disruption of service), but, unlike signaling overload, it is

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

typically driven by limited availability of RAN resources i.e., there are more users demanding access than the network has capacity
to support.
The capability of the SeGW to detect and manage unexpected traffic patterns malicious or not is both necessary and
advantageous. Regardless of the cause, unusually intense traffic flows can severely compromise network and service availability. The
disruption may be limited to one or a few eNBs or have a wider impact on the network. It may affect only a subset of subscribers who
cannot get access or use some services, or it may entirely shut down parts of the network.

3. The evolution of security and protection requirements

Three phases in LTE deployments
As mobile operators roll out their networks, their requirements for performance, security and traffic load evolve (Figure 3). During the
initial launch stage, the focus is on basic functionality and reliability. As the number of subscribers grows, scalability becomes a top
priority. As network utilization grows, it keeps evolving too, with mobile operators introducing advanced functionality and support for
new services. Each operator moves at its own pace across the stages, and may see some overlap across stages, but the trend toward
more stringent requirements has to be kept in mind from the start, when setting the course for network deployment.

Figure 3. Radio-to-core protection during three phases in LTE deployments. Source: Senza Fili

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

3.1. Balancing security and performance

Phase 1: The initial stage of LTE deployment
During the initial stage of LTE deplyoments, operators initially require only basic security IPsec with encryption and mutual
authentication but the decisions they make have a long-lasting impact along several dimensions:

Where and how should the operator deploy IPsec?

The first decision for mobile operators is to choose whether to deploy IPsec across all their sites, or only in untrusted sites. An
increasing number of operators are choosing to deploy IPsec across both trusted and untrusted sites as they recognize that even
trusted sites can become targets of security threats. A decision to integrate IPsec in trusted sites at a later stage may increase
deployment costs and complexity.

Should SeGWs be deployed in a distributed architecture or a centralized one?

The choice between a distributed (SeGW closer to the eNB) or centralized (SeGW closer to the core) architecture is tied to
multiple factors, which include the overall network architecture strategy, the services it supports, the backhaul infrastructure,
and the distribution of subscribers within the footprint. For instance, an operator that chooses an approach with MME and SGW
distributed across the footprint, to minimize latency in order to support services such as VoLTE, will have to deploy SeGW closer
to the eNB. Alternatively, an operator may have a centralized EPC but choose to have a distributed SeGW architecture
throughout the footprint, or in some areas. A distributed SeGW architecture provides more flexibility and lower latency for the
eNBtoeNB X2 interface. A centralized architecture requires fewer but higher-capacity SeGWs, and more redundancy options.

What are the capacity and performance assumptions that need to made when selecting the SeGW?
A scalable solution is required to accommodate the growing traffic load originating from wider network coverage, a growing
number of subscribers with LTE devices, and higher per-subscriber traffic usage. However, operators have to dimension their
initial deployment on the basis of traffic growth that is inherently difficult to predict. The trend toward sustained and steep traffic
growth continues unabated, but the future pace and volume are not known. Operators still need, though, to find a good initial
balance to avoid overcommitment or insufficient capacity.
Concurrently, high traffic loads raise performance requirements even further. A low packet-processing rate in encrypting and
decrypting data can turn the SeGW into a bottleneck, unable to process control-plane and user-plane traffic, or to do so at the
required latency, and more vulnerable to denial of service attacks. The disruption from overloaded SeGWs eventually spreads
from the core to the RAN, which in turn becomes unable to address services requests and hence to use the available capacity,
leading to inefficiencies in the use of precious and limited radio resources. A high packet-per-second processing rate in the SeGW
can reduce overall network capex and opex because it is conducive to a higher RAN utilization. The introduction of a SeGW may
also reduce the capacity requirements on the MME and SGW, leading to capex and opex savings in the core network.

What are the interoperability requirements to ensure smooth integration across vendors?
The SeGW has to be smoothly integrated within the existing infrastructure on both the RAN and the core sides, and it must be
interoperable with equipment from the vendors that the operator has selected. Interoperability requirements on the eNB side
are stricter, because the eNB initiates the IPsec channel that the SeGW terminates. Although the interfaces are based on
standards, vendor-specific implementations are often not fully interoperable with each other. As operators look to multi-vendor
RANs and shared-infrastructure partnerships, interoperability acquires more prominence as the basis for a reliable user
experience and lower costs. SeGW interoperability has to be established with all the vendors involved on both the RAN and

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

core sides. Although establishing interoperability may initially be time-consuming for both vendors and operators, in the long
term it lowers the risk of vendor lock-in and gives operators more freedom in choosing their RAN vendors.
The initial stage in deploying a mobile network is hectic. Operators have to balance multiple performance requirements and deadlines
against funding availability. But choosing scalable and future-proof solutions at this stage, while avoiding over-engineering, is crucial
to a smooth long-term expansion of the network without expensive and disruptive upgrades.

3.2. Taking LTE mainstream

Phase 2: Traffic growth and network expansion
As subscribers move to LTE smartphones and discover that with faster networks they can do more, not only is the number of
subscribers on LTE networks growing, but so is the traffic per subscriber. The growth in network traffic load is difficult to predict as
usage patterns, charging models, and device mixes continue to evolve. Operators need flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing capacity
requirements. The first operators to launch LTE networks, having now entered the second phase, face the challenges of managing and
protecting traffic in an environment of accelerated expansion of coverage and capacity requirements.
In January 2013, Verizon reported that LTE now accounts for 50% of traffic in its network and 23% of subscribers suggesting that LTE
subscribers are much heavier data users than their 3G counterparts. At the same time, coverage has gone up to include 89% of the
network footprint. In Japan, NTT DOCOMOs LTE network covers 75% of the population with 23,000 base stations and serves 10% of
subscribers. More than 20% of its subscribers use more than 3GB per month each, twice as many subscribers as a year ago.
The challenges in managing the increased traffic load are intensified by the trend of the past few years toward more complex and
unpredictable traffic flows, which are due to the convergence of multiple factors:

Ecosystem fragmentation increases the likelihood of abnormal and unexpected traffic overload that may be caused by
application or software updates, or by malware introduced by applications (especially if not downloaded from trusted stores that
check application integrity).

Heavier use of real-time applications such as video and audio streaming, gaming, and voice creates more stringent requirements
for latency and QoS-based access.

A higher number of applications per device drives up the background signaling activity due to frequent update requests from
applications especially those for chatty apps such as social networking and communications, which require frequent checks
for updates.

Mobile networks have become more attractive targets for hackers and hacktivists. Malicious attacks are on the rise, and their
growth is likely to accelerate. While most of the attacks now use UEs as the entry point, other vulnerable elements in mobile
networks are likely to be more widely targeted in the future.

The increase in traffic affects both the control plane and the user plane, with the expectation that growth in the control plane will
3
exceed that in the user plane by 30% to 50%, according to 4G Americas . In Canada, Telus reports an increase in signaling traffic of
4
2,700% during a period in which data traffic doubled .
3. 4G Americas, New Wireless Broadband Applications and Devices: Understanding the Impact on Networks, 2012.
4. http://www.cartt.ca/news/13804/Cable-Telecom/IEEE-Traffic-tsunami-causing-congestion-in-wireless-nets-says-Telus-Spadotto.html

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

While LTE has a more efficient control plane than 3G, generating a lower signaling load for the same user-plane load, the networkwide volume of signaling traffic will continue to increase due to increased use per mobile device, as subscribers rely on them for a
larger number of services and applications which they use more frequently. Frequent connection requests and transmission in smaller
packet sizes result from chatty apps, VoLTE, advertisements, and, generally, a higher number of applications installed in mobile
devices.
Growth in user data and signaling traffic, and wider coverage, create the need to expand the capacity of the radio-to-core link and of
its terminating point in the SeGW. In both cases, it is crucial that the solution adopted during the initial phase scale smoothly to meet
the new requirements, retaining the same performance level and having a comparable impact on capex and opex.
The growth and expansion stage in LTE entails a difficult balancing act for mobile operators caught between the need to improve
performance and capacity, on the one hand, and adhering to high security and reliability standards, on the other all in an
environment where subscribers are eager to increase their use of their mobile plans, but resist paying more for them. As a result,
mobile operators need a flexible and incremental expansion process that enables them to gradually expand the SeGW capacity in line
with the traffic growth, and to avoid expensive solution upgrades or the integration of new ones.

3.3. New requirements, new functionality

Phase 3: LTE evolution
As data traffic and subscribers move to LTE, operators need to do more than increase their capacity. They have to continue to
innovate and expand the functionality and services offered. Change will affect different areas and impact network protection in
multiple ways.
In the RAN, the wider use of small cells, femto cells and Wi-Fi to offload traffic from overloaded macro cells introduces a much more
complex network topology, with overlapping layers, higher levels of interference, and a higher density of elements. Mobility
management, interference mitigation, and traffic coordination among RAN layers increase the traffic requirements especially on the
signaling side. The introduction of traffic management techniques such as COMP and eICIC require a low latency on the X2 interface
and the backhaul. The widening adoption of small cells and femto cells increases the vulnerability of mobile networks to malicious
attacks by adding a large number of RAN elements with largely unprotected physical access, driving the need for the robust mutual
authentication that IPsec provides.
From a device perspective, M2M devices, many of which may be unattended and not tightly monitored, present an entirely new set
of security challenges that have not yet been fully explored or tested. Most M2M devices operate without physical human
supervision and can be easily located, especially if they are not mobile. This makes them more vulnerable to physical malicious access
and hence to attacks targeting the mobile network or the networks of the operators customers. While in most cases M2M devices
will generate low traffic volumes, the need for frequent reports or status checks is likely to disproportionately increase the signaling
load over the user-data load, increasing the capacity requirements in the control plane.
The introduction of VoLTE, RCS, gaming and video services creates tighter latency requirements across the network, and it is crucial
that the radio-to-core link not become a latency bottleneck. The processing rate and capacity at the SeGW have to be sufficiently high
to keep latency low. In addition, traffic prioritization, traffic shaping and load balancing in the SeGW may also enable operators to
preserve the QoE for applications with low latency requirements.

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

Furthermore, real-time applications such as VoLTE or video streaming impose a particular challenge because they use small packets
and hence more processing has to be done at the SeGW to transport the same volume of user-plane traffic. Effectively, these
applications increase the capacity load on the SeGW, and fast packet processing for encryption and decryption is essential to minimize
the adverse impact of small-packet traffic on overall network utilization and performance.
Finally, the wider adoption of shared RAN and backhaul infrastructure among operators, and of third-party backhaul solutions that
accompany the increased penetration of small cells and femto cells, raises the percentage of untrusted sites in which the IPsec
protection is a de facto requirement. That will put additional pressure on mobile operators to select IPsec and SeGW solutions that
scale smoothly.
RANs with a higher density and variety of elements create a much more demanding interoperability environment, in which the SeGW
has to interoperate with an expanding array of equipment solutions and vendors. In the case of infrastructure sharing, RAN
equipment is selected and operated by different entities over which the mobile operator has no control. The capability of the SeGW
to adapt to these inherently complex RAN topologies is vital for operators that rely on infrastructure sharing arrangements to contain
costs and optimize network utilization.
To ensure reliable performance, operators need to see more deeply into how the network manages traffic so they can correct
problems in real time as they arise. Tracking key performance metrics at the S1 and X2 interfaces e.g., handoffs and attach
completion time, and dropped packets ensures reliable performance for real-time applications such as VoLTE, and efficient mobility
management in the RAN.
A future-proof radio-to-core SeGW has to scale to include support for a wider range and higher density of RAN elements and mobile
devices, as well as cope with a higher percentage of untrusted sites, emerging security threats, and an increasingly demanding and
diverse traffic mix. As operators move to the third phase, the SeGW continues to perform its basic task in protecting the radio-to-core
link, but it also has to provide the processing power, latency, and traffic optimization needed to support new services, as well as the
scalability and interoperability required to operate in more complex environments.

4. Conclusions
Protecting LTE networks during growth and evolution
Security and, more generally, network protection from unexpected high-traffic events has gained a higher priority status in LTE as
mobile networks become easier and more attractive targets for malicious attacks, and more vulnerable to signaling and data traffic
overload that can disrupt or completely block network access. Within the context of LTE security, the radio-to-core link has to be
protected to ensure end-to-end network security. IPsec has emerged as the de facto standard to secure the radio-to-core link. The
SeGW is a crucial enabler to provide the scalability, processing and aggregation capabilities, the performance, and the functionality to
support IPsec.
IPsec with the support of a SeGW at the mobile core edge is the solution that 3GPP strongly recommends and that operators
worldwide have started to deploy in most of their new LTE networks. But they face multiple choices on how to deploy IPsec and

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

SeGWs in terms of topology, performance, cost and functionality as they move through the three phases launch, growth, advanced
services from their initial LTE launches to more mature and heavily used networks.
At launch, what matters most to operators is the basic functionality of the SeGW in terminating the IPsec tunnel and providing mutual
authentication with the eNB. As traffic grows and new services are introduced, the functionality of the SeGW is slated to evolve and
expand. The position of the SeGW between the RAN and the EPC is ideal to support functions that go beyond protection from
malicious attacks, to include management of control-plane and user-plane traffic overload, coordination of RAN mobility, and traffic
flow optimization.
A scalable solution that allows mobile operators to smoothly evolve to meet their anticipated and unanticipated radio-to-core
requirements is crucial to maintaining performance and cost and keeping the risks (and costs) of disruption to a minimum, without
compromising the safety and integrity of their networks.

5. Glossary
2G
3G
3GPP
COMP

Second generation
Third generation
Third Generation Partnership Project
Coordinated multipoint

eICIC

Enhanced inter-cell interference

coordination
eNodeB
Evolved packet core
Interface between the PCRF and the PGW
Interface between the PGW and the OCS
Home subscriber server
Internet protocol
IP security
Long term evolution
Interface between the UE and the eNB
Machine to machine
Mobility management entity
Mobile network operator
Mobile virtual network operator
Next Generation Mobile Networks [Alliance]
Online charging system
Operating system

eNB
EPC
Gx
Gy
HSS
IP
IPsec
LTE
LTE-Uu
M2M
MME
MNO
MVNO
NGMN
OCS
OS

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PCRF
PGW
QoE
QoS
RAN
RCS
S1

S11
S5/8
S6a
SeGW
SGi
SGW
Sp
UE
VoLTE
X2

Policy and charging rules function

Packet gateway
Quality of experience
Quality of service
Radio access network
Rich communication services
LTE interface between an eNB, and an MME
(S1-MME, control plane) or an SGW (S1-U,
user plane)
Interface between the MME and the SGW
Interface between the SGW and the PGW
Interface between the MME and the HSS
Security gateway
LTE interface between the PGW and the
internet
Serving gateway
Interface between the HSS and PCRF
User equipment
Voice over LTE
LTE interface between two eNBs, including
X2-C (control plane) and X2-U (user plane)

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White paper Radio-to-core protection in LTE

About Stoke
Stoke provides market-proven mobile gateway solutions to the broadband network industry. Stoke
products have been chosen by Tier 1 mobile network operators for technical excellence and high quality
manufacturing and partners with leading industry equipment providers and systems integrators to
provide key elements of their solutions. Stoke is the industry leader in deployed LTE security gateways
and offers extensive commercial experience developing, deploying and maintaining LTE security gateway
equipment in a top tier LTE network. Stoke products and solutions, based on the innovative SSX platform,
provide a strong business value to network operators. For more information, visit www.stoke.com.

About Senza Fili

SENZA
CONSULTING

Senza Fili provides advisory support on wireless data technologies and services. At Senza Fili we have indepth expertise in financial modeling, market forecasts and research, white paper preparation, business
plan support, RFP preparation and management, due diligence, and training. Our client base is
international and spans the entire value chain: clients include wireline, fixed wireless and mobile
operators, enterprises and other vertical players, vendors, system integrators, investors, regulators, and
industry associations.
We provide a bridge between technologies and services, helping our clients assess established and
emerging technologies, leverage these technologies to support new or existing services, and build solid,
profitable business models. Independent advice, a strong quantitative orientation, and an international
perspective are the hallmarks of our work. For additional information, visit www.senzafiliconsulting.com
or contact us at info@senzafiliconsulting.com or +1 425 657 4991.

About the author

Monica Paolini is the founder and president of Senza Fili. Monica writes extensively on the trends,
technological innovation, and financial drivers in the wireless industry in reports, white papers, blogs, and
articles. At Senza Fili, she assists vendors in gaining a better understanding of the service provider and
end user markets. She works alongside service providers in developing wireless data strategies, and in
assessing the demand for wireless services. Independent advice, a strong quantitative approach, and an
international perspective are the hallmarks of her work.
Monica has a PhD in Cognitive Science from the University of California, San Diego, an MBA from the
University of Oxford, and a BA/MA in Philosophy from the University of Bologna (Italy). She can be
contacted at monica.paolini@senzafiliconsulting.com.
2013 Senza Fili Consulting, LLC. All rights reserved. This white paper was prepared on behalf of Stoke Inc. The views and statements
expressed in this document are those of Senza Fili Consulting LLC, and they should not be inferred to reflect the position of Stoke Inc. The
document can be distributed only in its integral form and acknowledging the source. No selection of this material may be copied, photocopied,
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information. Trademarks mentioned in this document are property of their respective owners. Cover page photo by Gui Jun Peng/Shutterstock.