II.May a treaty violate international law?

If your answer is in the affirmative, explain when such may happen. If your answer is in the negative,
explain why.
Yes, a treaty may violate international law when at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) or if its conclusion has been procured by the
threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations. (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 52 & 53)
III.The President alone without the concurrence of the Senate abrogated a treaty.
Assume that the other country-party to the treaty is agreeable to the abrogation provided it complies
with the Philippine Constitution. If a case involving the validity of the treaty abrogation is brought to
the Supreme Court, how should it be resolved?
The case must be resolved in affirmative. The President alone without the concurrence of the Senate
can abrogate a treaty since being the head of state, she is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. The participation of the legislative branch in the
treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President,
the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of
political maturity and growth
Pimentel vs. Office of the Executive Secretary
July 6, 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute
The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the
Philippines for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with
respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial
duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless
they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.

Respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the
Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations even without the signature of the President.
HELD:
SC rule in the negative.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members
of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the
executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of
the
Senate,
to
make
treaties
xxx.
Section
14
(1)
Article
VIII
of
the
1973
Constitution
stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of
the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system
of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.
In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean
that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.
SC disagree.
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange
of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication
under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between
the
parties.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature.
This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of

the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in
accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the
copy
which
he
will
bring
home
to
his
own
state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the
contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be
bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are
made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which
negotiated
them.
x

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the
parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the
instrument
is
deemed
effective
upon
its
signature.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties.
It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification,
on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head
of the state or of the government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its
ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the
same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall
then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for
ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit
the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the
Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective.
Friday, August 1, 2008
CASE DIGEST
ICMC vs. Calleja GR 85750, Sept. 28, 1990
FACTS:
As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's
communist
rule
confronted
the
international
community.
In response to this crisis, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese
refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan.
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing
center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a
non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II.
As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines.
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and

Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC.
The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with
the
United
Nations
and,
hence,
enjoys
diplomatic
immunity.
Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and
ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's request for
recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DEFORAF).
Subsequently, DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding
diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the
Government
and
ICMC.
ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election sustaining
the
affirmative
of
the
proposition
citing:
(1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the status of a specialized
agency, (infra);
(2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN
General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution
No. 91 on 17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30
August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra; and
(3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity
from the application of Philippine labor laws.

HELD:
The foregoing issue constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government
that ICMC enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been
held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then
the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to
the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such
cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will
not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by its international
character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference
by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor

in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or
control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.

ICMC's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are
guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987
Constitution.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17
provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency
is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the
Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to
withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case
they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is
beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification
election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events
in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which
could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international
organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions. Clauses
on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international
Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is
equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem."
Posted by nadzameril at 7:20 AM No comments:
Labels: CASE DIGEST, ICMC vs. calleja, recognation
CASE DIGEST
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS
GR 88211, Sept. 15, 1989
FACTS:
February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the
Republic under a revolutionary government.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any
person
be
denied
the
equal
protection
of
the
laws.
xxx
xxx
x
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must
be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to
return
to
the
Philippines
is
guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:
Article
12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of
movement
and
freedom
to
choose
his
residence.
2)
Everyone
shall
be
free
to
leave
any
country,
including
his
own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.

HELD:
SC well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power which justifies her act of banning
the return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and
the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights
may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public
health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in
the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President,
it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against
the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of
the people.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the
peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal
threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed

forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to
keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers
and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and
their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion
that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against the State and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the
fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the
hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the
country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover
the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the
continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the
Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread
poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common
knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
Sunday, June 29, 2008
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to RP-US extradition
treaty and Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country" which was founded upon the doctrine of incorporation under the
Constitution. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the
papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of provisions of the
United States Code.

Private respondent addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
Government, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers.
In response to private respondent, petitioner, denied the foregoing requests.
Respondent then claims his procedural right to due notice and hearing of his case which is indispensable of the right
to due process.
ISSUE: Whethet or not private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between the
due process clause in the Constitution and the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent.
Categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant
of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule of pacta sunt servanda,
one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine
of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed
to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them,
so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in
all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution.
These two components law of the land, international law and municipal or national law, are not pitted against each
other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by PD No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a
prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted,
after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent
as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. In the absence of a law or
principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice
and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective

extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right.

The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's
due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the
deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.
G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
JOSE
B.L.
REYES,
in behalf
of the ANTI-BASES
vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

COALITION

(ABC),

petitioner,

FACTS:
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates
of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program
would be held. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to
ensure a peaceful march and rally."
Respondent Mayor denied such permit. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by
ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." To be
more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people is expected to attend."
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of denying the permit is valid?
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that denying the permit to rally by the Mayor was not valid.
Supreme Court concluded that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the constitutional
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.
There is a novel aspect to this case, If the rally were confined to Luneta, no question, as noted, would
have arisen. So, too, if the march would end at another park. As previously mentioned though, there
would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the United States
Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the
resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a signatory of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by the then
Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification was signed by the President on
October 11, 1965, and was thereafter deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on
November 15. As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the
Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the

premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of
the mission or impairment of its dignity. " The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of
the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for
the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent
Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for
other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is
understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that question the confronts this
Court.
Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet
from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds support
In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no
showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet.
Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor
could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the
exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the
distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the
qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed
aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing
less.
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO
C.
AGUSTIN,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as
Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his
capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

FACTS:
The Petitioner was an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when
it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an
early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229- an order
which was issued by President Marcos as a measure to lessen the fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation because of the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or
highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their
presence- as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1
issued by the land transportation Commission,".
He questioned the validity of a letter of Instruction providing for an early seaming device for motor
vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of nondelegation of legislative power. He contended that the Letter of Instruction is infected with
arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public and unlawful and

unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society as being compulsory and
confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road
safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter of Instructions No. 229 is valid?
HELD:
Supreme Court considered the petition far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued as a valid exercise of the police power.
The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally
without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself
with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an
assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid
the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of
the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is
sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the
recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of
the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."
The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas],
the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of
Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands
in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
It is not oppressive and confiscatory because what is only required is a rectangular early seaming
device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle
which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand,

a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps
will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light
is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion
or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision. There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in
Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early
warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like
petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring
or obtaining the same from whatever source.
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO
TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS,
MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444
who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of
the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before
this Court seeking to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently
prohibit
respondents
from
proceeding
with
the
case
of
petitioners.
He alleged that Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and
regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, issued by the President, to be illgal on the
ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say
nothing of the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based
on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this
commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission
is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

Executive

Order

No.

68

is

valid.

HELD:
Supreme Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in
its section 3, that:
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including
the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential
and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68
the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of
and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention, such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory, thus Military Commission has Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention.
G.R. No. L-2855 July 30, 1949
BORIS
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

MEJOFF,

petitioner,

FACTS:
Petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as
a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he
was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. He was handed by the
government and later on ordered his release. But it was found out that he had entered the Philippines
illegally without inspection and admission by the immigration officials thus ordered his deportation on
the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then detained while arrangements for
his deportation are being made. Thereafter two boats of Russian nationality arrived but their masters
refused to take petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not too long detention of the petitioner was valid?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner.
Under section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 any alien who enters this country "without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to
deportation within five years. In a recent decision of a similar litigation (Borovsky vs. Commissioner of
Immigration) we denied the request for habeas corpus, saying:
"It must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or
expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government
has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable lenght of time.

However, under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.

"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of
obtaining a passport, the availability of transfortation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the
efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the
alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to
carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption
assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the
expulsion of this petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under
confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities
to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the
pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the Government admits that it can not deport
him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere.

Separate Opinion
"To continue keeping petitioner under confinement is a thing that shocks conscience. Under the
circumstances, petitioner is entitled to be released from confinement. He has not been convicted for
any offense for which he may be imprisoned. Government's inability to deport him no pretext to keep
him imprisoned for an indefinite length of time. The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law has been intended to protect all inhabitants or residents
who may happen to be under the shadows of Philippine flag. Our vote is to grant the petition and to
order the immediate release of petitioner, without prejudice for the government to deport him as soon
as the government could have the means to do so. In the meantime, petitioner is entitled to live a
normal life in a peaceful country, ruled by the principles of law and justice." (Perfecto, J.)