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- P 865,096.07
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6,214,737.11
8,003,180.38
6,797,814.05
4,805,166.34
2,822,620.003
xxxx
The above changes can end at this point and they need not go any
further. This, however, is entirely dependent upon you. But you have
to understand that meeting corporate objectives by everyone is
primary and will not be compromised. We are meeting tough
challenges next year and I would want everybody on board. Any
resistance or holding back by anyone will be dealt with accordingly.
Subsequently, De Dios wrote Tongko another letter dated December
18, 2001,5terminating Tongko's services, thus:
It would appear, however, that despite the series of meetings and
communications, both one-on-one meetings between yourself and
SVP Kevin O'Connor, some of them with me, as well as group
meetings with your Sales Managers, all these efforts have failed in
helping you align your directions with Management's avowed agency
growth policy.
xxxx
On account thereof, Management is exercising its prerogative under
Section 14 of your Agents Contract as we are now issuing this notice
of termination of your Agency Agreement with us effective fifteen
days from the date of this letter.
Therefrom, Tongko filed a Complaint dated November 25, 2002 with
the NLRC against Manulife for illegal dismissal. The case, docketed
as NLRC NCR Case No. 11-10330-02, was raffled to Labor Arbiter
Marita V. Padolina.
In the Complaint, Tongko, in a bid to establish an employeremployee relationship, alleged that De Dios gave him specific
directives on how to manage his area of responsibility in the latter's
letter dated November 6, 2001. He further claimed that Manulife
exercised control over him as follows:
Such control was certainly exercised by respondents over the herein
complainant. It was Manulife who hired, promoted and gave various
assignments to him. It was the company who set objectives as
regards productions, recruitment, training programs and all
activities pertaining to its business. Manulife prescribed a Code of
Conduct which would govern in minute detail all aspects of the work
Additionally, it must be pointed out that the fact that Tongko was
tasked with recruiting a certain number of agents, in addition to his
other administrative functions, leads to no other conclusion that he
was an employee of Manulife.
In his letter dated November 6, 2001, De Dios harped on the
direction of Manulife of becoming a major agency-led distribution
company whereby greater agency recruitment is required of the
managers, including Tongko. De Dios made it clear that agent
recruitment has become the primary means by which Manulife
intends to sell more policies. More importantly, it is Tongko's alleged
failure to follow this principle of recruitment that led to the
termination of his employment with Manulife. With this, it is
inescapable that Tongko was an employee of Manulife.
Tongko Was Illegally Dismissed
In its Petition for Certiorari dated January 7, 200526 filed before the
CA, Manulife argued that even if Tongko is considered as its
employee, his employment was validly terminated on the ground of
gross and habitual neglect of duties, inefficiency, as well as willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of Manulife. Manulife stated:
In the instant case, private respondent, despite the written
reminder from Mr. De Dios refused to shape up and altogether
disregarded the latter's advice resulting in his laggard performance
clearly indicative of his willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
his superior. x x x
xxxx
As private respondent has patently failed to perform a very
fundamental duty, and that is to yield obedience to all reasonable
rules, orders and instructions of the Company, as well as gross
failure to reach at least minimum quota, the termination of his
engagement from Manulife is highly warranted and therefore, there
is no illegal dismissal to speak of.
It is readily evident from the above-quoted portions of Manulife's
petition that it failed to cite a single iota of evidence to support its
claims. Manulife did not even point out which order or rule that
Tongko disobeyed. More importantly, Manulife did not point out the
specific acts that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross
and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife merely cited
Tongko's alleged "laggard performance," without substantiating such
claim, and equated the same to disobedience and neglect of duty.
We cannot, therefore, accept Manulife's position.
In Quebec, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled
that:
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of
illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause. This burden of proof
appropriately lies on the shoulders of the employer and not on the
employee because a worker's job has some of the characteristics of
property rights and is therefore withinthe constitutional mantle of
protection. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Apropos thereto, Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code mandates in
explicit terms that the burden of proving the validity of the
termination of employment rests on the employer. Failure to
discharge this evidentialburden would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was not justified, and, therefore, illegal.27
We again ruled in Times Transportation Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commissionthat:
The law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of the
termination of employment rests with the employer. Failure to
discharge this evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was not justified, and, therefore, illegal. Unsubstantiated
suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employers do not provide
for legal justification for dismissing employees. In case of doubt,
such cases should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant to the
social justice policy of our labor laws and Constitution.28
This burden of proof was clarified in Community Rural Bank of San
Isidro (N.E.), Inc. v. Paez to mean substantial evidence, to wit: