EILEEN F.

SERENE

R O B E R T G R O S S E T E S T E ON I N D U C T I O N AND
D E M O N S T R A T I V E SCIENCE

Robert Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics is the

earliest complete medieval Latin commentary on this work known today, t Its
date of composition remains somewhat uncertain, but the best-supported
estimates place it around 1220. 2 The commentary, which is based on the
vulgate translation made by James of Venice in the second quarter of the
twelfth century, appears in at least twenty-two extant manuscripts and in
eight Renaissance editions) This commentary interests students of medieval
philosophy and science for a variety of reasons. Although it was only the first
of many medieval commentaries on the difficult work whose ideal of scientific demonstration apparently enchanted natural philosophers for centuries,
Grosseteste's was also one of the most widely circulated commentaries on the
Posterior Analytics. 4 So it is natural to assume that it may have exercised
both an early and an enduring influence on the reception and understanding
of this text. Since Grosseteste was the first teacher of the Oxford Franciscans
at Merton College, it is possible that his views on Aristotelian science
exercised a particular influence on the school which was to include such
leading natural philosophers as Roger Bacon, Walter Burley, William Heytesbury, and Thomas Bradwardine. 5 Finally, Grosseteste's commentary contains
acute critical discussions of Aristotle's text. While Grosseteste primarily engages in literal exposition, he does more than paraphrase and implicitly
endorse Aristotle's views; I believe that at several points he revises the
Stagirite's theory of scientific demonstration. Indeed, it Would be surprising
for Grosseteste not to revise the theory from the point of view of his own
Neoplatonic, Augustinian commitments in epistemology and metaphysics.
Current appreciation of the significance of Grosseteste's commentary is
due to the work of A. C. Crombie, whose captivating book entitled Robert
Grosseteste and the Origins o f Experimental Science 1100-1700
(Oxford: 1953) accords credit to Grosseteste for influential advances in the
methodology of science and in experimental practice. Crombie's case for the
originality and importance of Grosseteste's methodology of science hinges
largely on an interpretation of his view of induction which ascribes to our
Synthese 40 (1979) 97-115. 0039-7857/79/0401-0097 $01.90.
Copyright 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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EILEEN F. SERENE

thirteenth century author the following rather modern line of reasoning. 6

Scientific reasoning depends for its premises on universal causal principles
which we grasp only through intuitive induction; but since intuitive induction
of universal causal principles rests on a 'logical leap', no scientific explanation
can ever be fuUy confirmed. The scientist's function, then, is to attempt to
falsify at least some of the plausible possible explanations of phenomena.
Since more than one hypothesis might survive attempts at falsification, and
since intuitive induction is epistemologically problematic, the scientist should
regard his reasoning as a source of sufficient explanations of phenomena
rather than as unique accounts of their necessary causes. This interpretation
depicts Grosseteste as a skeptic regarding the certainty available to the natural
philosopher. While Crombie notes that this skepticism applies properly only
to the realm of reason alone, that is, to reason unaided by divine illtunination,
he thinks that it led to a shift from the Aristotelian goal of demonstrative certainty to a new goal of 'probable' explanations. Thus, in the alchemy
of Crombie's interpretation, Grosseteste [s transmuted from the modified
Aristotelian he appears to be, into a medieval Popperian. 7
Unfortunately, my reading of the text calls into question much of the
evidence which Crombie adduces to support his intriguing interpretation of
Grosseteste's ideas about induction, and it suggests an interpretation which is
rather different in emphasis. In my judgment, the role divine illumination
plays in Grosseteste's account of demonstrative reasoning actually undermines skepticism with respect to scientific certainty. A full discussion of the
philosophical issues and historical questions connected with Crombie's study
of Grosseteste and his influence far exceeds the scope of a single paper; here I
shall concentrate on epistemological issues arising in Crombie's account of the
nature and significance of the view of induction which Grosseteste takes in
his commentary. In Section I, I shall summarize what I understand to
comprise the main evidence for Crombie's conclusions regarding Grosseteste's
view of induction. In Section II, I shall discuss my doubts concerning the
adequacy of this evidence. In the final section, I shall introduce some features
of an alternative interpretation of Grosseteste's view of induction and demonstrative science.
I
I believe that it will be helpful to preface our examination of Crombie's
conclusions and the reasoning which supports them with a brief review of

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99

som~ salient features of the theory of demonstrative science presented in the

Posterior Analytics. Since this theory is notorious for its obscurity, I shall
simply identify the features of the theory which are directly relevant to
understanding and assessing Crombie's claims, without discussing their interpretation and rationale in detail, s According to Aristotle, the aim of
natural philosophy is the acquisition of scientific or demonstrative knowledge
(episteme in Greek, scientia in Latin) of phenomena. 9 This knowledge is
expressed in, or produced by, an axiomatized deductive system of syllogisms
which meet a number of special requirements. 1 o Full-scale scientia has as its
object a 'reasoned fact' which is the conclusion of a first figure syllogism in
barbara form whose premises are true, necessary, universal, immediate, and
appropriate to the genus and species under consideration, i t The major
premise must be universal with respect to the appropriate genus or species,
and the middle term must be a proximate cause of what is explained in the
conclusion.~ 2 In addition, in a paradigmatic demonstrative syllogism the
cause must be simultaneous with its effect. 13 A syllogism which meets these
requirements will be capable of showing the existence of, or reason for, a
certain fact, or capable of elucidating what a certain kind of thing is; in other
words, the syllogism will display why the phenomenon contained or 'saved' in
the conclusion is necessarily so, by specifying its uniquely necessitating
causes.14 Aristotle also specifies an intensional requirement for such a syllogism to produce scientia in a knower: that person must realize that the
syllogism meets all these special requirements, and thus realize that it explains
why the conclusion is so, not just that it is so. ~s So while the logical
structure of a demonstrative syllogism is simple, the additional requirements
seem to limit severely the number of barbara syllogisms which will count as
genuinely demonstrative. 16 In fact, it is far from clear that any of Aristotle's
own examples fully satisfy these requirements. 1?
While Aristotle sees demonstrative syllogisms as at least the most perspicuous way to present explanations of some sorts of phenomena, he argues
in detail that the primary premises of demonstrations are not themselves
demonstrable, is Thus successful demonstrative reasoning requires correct
apprehension of indemonstrable premises. Unfortunately, Aristotle's account
of the correct apprehension of indemonstrable premises is laconic; what he
says is that experience (empeiria), induction (epagoge), and intuition (nous)
contribute to the grasp of primary premises. 19 And he recommends the
method of division as an algorithm for formulating the definition of a genus

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EILEEN F. SERENE

and its species once one has a rough idea of what belongs to the genus. 2
That is, one constructs definitions per genus et differentiam by organizing the
members of a genus according to their similarities and differences. Aristotle
thinks that the middle terms o f demonstrative syllogisms are definitions, that
these definitions are often discovered simultaneously with the phenomena to
be 'saved', and that the major premises o f syllogisms and first principles of
sciences must be discerned by further reflection on the subject. 21 It is
traditional to note at this point that Aristotle's interest here lies not in
developing an account o f the art of discovery of premises for demonstrative
syllogisms, but rather in specifying the appropriate way to present the
structure of a science once its primary premises and middle terms have been
recognized.
It is far from obvious what a full Aristotelian account of the correct
apprehension of primary premises would contain, and there is scant consensus
regarding the appropriate reconstruction o f the few remarks Aristotle makes
on induction and its relationship to nous. Interpretations of Aristotle's view
o f the nature and limitations of induction rest primarily on alternative
readings o f Book II, chapter 19 o f the Posterior Analytics. The orthodox
interpretation holds that induction is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for apprehension o f first principles, while the empiricist interpretation
holds that induction is a sufficient condition. According to the orthodox
reading o f the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle believes that
nous is an additional necessary condition for the apprehension of first
principles; Jonathan Barnes summarizes this view vividly:
.. in B 19 Aristotle recognized, at least tacitly, the notorious frailty of induction:
[simple or enumerativeT induction, according to B 19, cannot by itself get us to the
principles; there is a chasm which induction will not leap - we must fly over it on the
back of intuition. The principles, in short, are apprehended by induction plus intuition,
or by 'intuitive induction'. 22
But Barnes himself advocates the alternative, empiricist view which holds that
in this chapter Aristotle introduces nous to characterize the dispositional
state of the person who has successfully completed an induction, not to posit
an additional means of acquiring knowledge. A telling point in favour of this
interpretation is the characterization o f nous as a state (hexis) at 10065-14.
According to this view, then, Aristotle does not envision a chasm over which
induction cannot leap, and so his account need not posit a philosophical

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problem of induction which can be met only by positing a mysterious act of

nous. Barnes thinks that "nous, the state or disposition, stands to induction
as understanding (episteme) stands to demonstration. Understanding is not a
means o f acquiring knowledge. Nor, then, is nous.'23
The second interpretation tends to exonerate Aristotle from the charge
that he fails to explain how one discovers primary premises. But it still leaves
open the question how one recognizes that an apprehension of a primary
premise is correct. What are the criteria for being certain that one is in a state
o f nous with respect to a concept or principle? To my knowledg_e, Aristotle
does not raise this skeptical question. He assumes that we do have demonstrative knowledge, and so must be in a state of nous with respect to some
primary premises. While he recognizes that there may sometimes be difficulty
in deciding whether a syllogism is truly demonstrative, he does not treat this
objection as a serious eplstemologlcal problem.Does Grosseteste's treatment of induction and nous align itself with either
the orthodox or the empiricist view, or does he take another line of interpretation? I think that Crombie's reading of Grosseteste rests on the assumption that Grosseteste accepts the orthodox view, since he writes:

"

"~4

But Grosseteste knew that there was a logical hiatus between asserting a formal
definition, or generalization stating the regularity actually observed, and asserting a
theory stating a universal and causal connexion. To leap this gap in the logical process of
induction he envisaged an act of intuition or scientific imagination, corresponding to
Aristotle's nous, by which the mind reflecting on the classification of facts produced by
induction suddenly grasped a universal or principle or theory explaining the connexion
between them. 2 s
In a footnote, Crombie emphasizes that this remark applies only to the
problem o f intuitive induction, that is, the induction of universal causal
principles, and not to the problem of enumerative induction. 2 6 In enumerative or simple induction, one formulates a generalization about a genus or
species on the basis of a sample which is less than exhaustive; for example, by
enumerative induction one asserts universally that humans are rational, without observing each member o f the species. In Crombie's view, Grosseteste
recognizes this distinction between intuitive and emunerative induction, believes that each involves at least a prima facie leap over a logical gap, and
proposes separate justifications for each sort of induction.
The justification of enumerative induction rests on acceptance o f a
principle o f the uniformity of nature which holds that causes, including the

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EILEEN F. SERENE

formal cause of each species, always have the same effect unless there is some
external impediment to their normal operation. If a classification based on
observations 1 through n suggests that rationality belongs to being human, if
nature is uniform, all humans are rational. Of course, the principle of
uniformity cannot contribute to the justification of enumerative induction
unless it has a basis apart from observed regularity alone. Crombie supposes
that Grosseteste considers this principle to be a fundamental, self-evident
truth;27 but he also supposes that the principle of uniformity alone cannot
justify, or even explain, the assertion o f universal causal connections, z8 The
reason Crombie suggests for this, in the passage I quote, seems to be that
causal connections are in principle not directly observable. Thus Crombie
concludes that the apprehension of a causal principle requires a special act of
intuition, corresponding to Aristotle's nous, in addition to observation and
classification of data, and in addition to whatever generalizations can be made
the help o f the principle of uniformity.
Crombie ascribes this diagnosis o f the problem of induction to Grosseteste,
then reconstructs what he takes to be Grosseteste's response to the problem
of intuitive induction. It seems to me that this reconstruction involves making
a firm distinction between Grosseteste's theoretical response and his practical
response. On the theoretical side, Grosseteste recognizes that all certainty
with respect to necessary truths depends on divine illumination; 29 hence the
ultimate justification for the reliability of causal explanations would be divine
illumination. But on the practical side, Crombie suggests that Grosseteste
provides a treatment of causal explanations which in effect ignores any role
played by divine illumination. It is his practical response to the problem of
intuitive induction which Crombie identifies as Grosseteste's leading contribution to scientific methodology and the rise of experimentation in science.
And it is this part of the interpretation which Crombie supports in detail.
In Crombie's interpretation, Grosseteste's practical response to the problem of intuitive induction rests on the recognition that for any phenomenon
to be explained, there will be a plurality of possible causes. To support this
claim, Crombie quotes from Book II, chapter 5 of the commentary:
Can the cause be reached from knowledge of the effect with the same certainty as the
effect can be shown to follow from its cause? Is it possible for one effect to have many
causes*. If one determinate cause cannot be reached from the effect, since there is no
effect which has not some cause, it follows that an effect, when it has one cause, may
have another, and so that there may be several causes of it. 30

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In the light of this recognition, the interpretation continues, Grosseteste

advocates the following procedure for selecting the best causal explanation
from the plurality of possible ones. First the scientist should attempt to
falsify each principle by seeing if it entails impossible or absurd consequences.
A theory which survives this falsification procedure constitutes a sufficient
explanation of the phenomenon under consideration; but since typically
more than one hypothesis will remain unscathed, none can claim to be the
unique cause which necessitates the phenomenon. At that stage the scientist
should rely on the assumption that nature operates simply and efficiently,
and on that basis select the most appropriate hypothesis. 3
Grosseteste's use of an example drawn from Avicenna's Canon o f Medicine
illustrates his practical procedure for establishing scientific hypotheses and his
concern for experimental falsification, in Crombie's opinion. The example
occurs in the context of Grosseteste's discussion in Book I, chapter 18 of the
relationship between knowledge and sense perception. While Grosseteste
agrees with Aristotle that we typically abstract universal concepts from
repeated perception of singulars, he denies that this is the only way in which
knowledge can be obtained; his reason for this denial is that angels and other
incorporeal intellects can know without sense perception. After making this
general point, Grosseteste introduces Avicenna's example of how one grasps
the universal principle that ingestion of the plant scammony causes the
discharge of the humour red bile from the body. Grosseteste says that when
we repeatedly observe that the eating of scammony is conjoined with the
discharge of red bile, we form an aestimatio that the scammony causes the
discharge. 32 Next our reason questions whether this aestimatio corresponds
with reality. To answer this question, Grosseteste and Avicemaa say, we
should make more observations under controlled conditions where we have
tried to exclude other factors, besides the ingestion of scammony, which
could be responsible for the effect. According to Crombie, G r o s s e t ~ ' s use
of this example shows that he makes a special place for causal hypotheses,'~
and requires that they be tested under controlled conditions before they are
accepted as causal principles. 33
As I understand Crombie's suggestions, they include four controversial
claims about Grosseteste's view of the nature and limits of induction.
(1) Grosseteste's understanding of nous corresponds to the orthodox
interpretation of the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics, but somehow
divine illumination plays the role of nous.

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(2) Grosseteste distinguishes between the problem of enumerative induction and the problem of intuitive induction.
(3) Grosseteste's response to the problem of intuitive induction is to
recognize that, given the plurality of possible causes of any effect, and given
the unavailability of certainty in the absence of divine illumination, the
natural philosopher can hope to find only good sufficient reasons for phenomena, and not their uniquely necessitating causes.
(4) Grosseteste's rejection of the Aristotelian quest for necessary reasons
and his emphasis on experimental falsification were significant for the rise of
experimental science.
If these claims are all tree, they constitute a strong case for thinking that
Grosseteste both endorses and transforms Aristotle's theory of science. In a
sense he endorses it by accepting what the orthodox opinion takes to be the
explanation of how induction enables us to grasp true first premises, that is
with the additional help of an act of nous, or its counterpart, divine illumination. And Grosseteste transforms the theory by rejecting day-to-day reliance
on divine illumination, and thereby rejecting Aristotle's official goal of
achieving certain knowledge of a unique explanation for each phenomenon. 34 Hence for all practical purposes the scientist's job was to observe
phenomena carefully and repeatedly, to construct possible hypotheses, and to
attempt to disconfirm the worst of them.

II
It strikes me as thoroughly plausible that Grosseteste's life-work and even the
material in his commentary in fact contributed to the rise of what we now
take to be scientific reflection and experimentation. Grosseteste seems to
have been the first person in the Latin West to have made much sense out o f
the theory of demonstrative science in the Posterior Analytics, and his
commentary elucidates the structure of the theory in a clever and clear
fashion.3 s However, I have doubts about Crombie's account of the possible
epistemological grounds for this influence, and accordingly I must question
each of the four theses I have just formulated. I believe that these theses
incorporate Crombie's views; but in any case it is their claims which I will
discuss.
The first thesis asserts that Grosseteste follows the orthodox interpretation

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of n o u s , but somehow substitutes divine illumination for n o u s . This thesis

raises a question which I consider central to a correct interpretation of
Grosseteste's version of Aristotle's theory of science, the question of his view
of the nature and role of divine illumination. It is hard to settle this
question on the basis of the text of the commentary alone, however, since
Grosseteste seems to append the doctrine to Aristotle's epistemology without
fully explaining its ramifications, Since divine illumination sometimes serves
as a poetic image or Christian talisman in medieval texts, rather than as a
general account of human knowledge, it is easy to see how Crombie could
suppose that Grosseteste introduces this idea only to relegate it to the realm
of irrelevance. But I think that one should be skeptical of such a surmise, for
reasons which I will discuss in the next section. But regardless of whether the
interpretation of divine illumination I shall suggest is persuasive, it is clear
that this first thesis requires revision. Since the orthodox interpretation of
n o u s and its relationship to induction strikes me as less plausible than the
empiricist interpretation, I am happy to point out that Grosseteste could not
have accepted it. In the orthodox interpretation, n o u s is characterized as part
of the knower's evidential basis for induction, rather than as the state he
achieves when he completes an inductive inference. But if Crombie is correct
in thinking that divine illumination is a counterpart to n o u s , as I believe he is,
then Grosseteste cannot follow the orthodox line. He describes complete
knowledge as an irradiation of the knower by the superior light; 36 this
irradiation can hardly be an activity or leap of the knower, but must be a
state of the knower.
The second thesis asserts that Grosseteste distinguishes between intuitive
and enumerative induction; the point of this distinction is to suggest that the
former problem raises more serious epistemological issues than the latter. It
seems to me that if Grosseteste does make this modern distinction, and denies
that enumerative induction is as problematic as intuitive induction, that his
view differs markedly fom Aristotle's. It is true that Aristotle and Grosseteste
portray the process of grasping the formal cause or definition of a genus or
species as relatively straightforward. 37 Grosseteste explicitly mentions that
the method of division presupposes that we can accurately discriminate
between essential and accidental properties of substances, but he does not
question our ability to do so. 3 s So it is reasonable to conclude that Grosseteste has no deep epistemological qualms about enumerative induction. How-

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EILEEN F. SERENE

ever, I fail to see that either Aristotle or Grosseteste distinguishes in principle

between enumerative and intuitive induction. 39 Commentators have puzzled
over the fact that the examples in Aristotle's discussion of induction and nous
in the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics appear to deal with conceptformation rather than the apprehension of propositional principles. The most
direct explanation of this difficulty I can see is to admit that Aristotle does
not see a sharp or epistemologicaUy significant distinction between induction
of a formal cause and induction of other explanatory causal principles. Perhaps
this is a mistake or oversight on Aristotle's part; but any less direct explanation requires strong support.
There is ample reason to doubt that Grosseteste diverges dramatically from
Aristotle in distinguishing a separate and severe problem connected with
so-called intuitive induction of causal principles. I have found no texts which
clearly require this interpretation. And there are many texts which show
that Grosseteste follows Aristotle in considering definitions as the paradigm
for the explanatory principles of science. He even enhances this special regard
for definitions in two ways. He suggests, for reasons which I will not
expound here, that a demonstrative syllogism be regarded as a composite
definition of a phenomenon, one which accounts for both its formal and
other causes. 40 Elsewhere, Grosseteste indicates that complete knowledge of
the formal cause of a thing is identical to knowledge of the exemplar cause of
that thing in the mind of God. 41 I do not see that Grosseteste's reliance on
definitions as the paradigm for explanatory principles of phenomena rests on
skepticism regarding the apprehension of correct causal principles apart from
formal causes. Nor do I see why Grosseteste should suppose that divine
illumination is more crucial in intuitive induction than in enumerative induction, since his characterization of complete knowledge involves direct acquaintance with an exemplar cause, not a grasp of the principles of efficient
causation; and complete knowledge requires full divine illumination.
The third thesis asserts that Grosseteste's response to the problem of
intuitive induction amounts to a skeptical abandonment of the search for
uniquely necessitating reasons for phenomena. Since this thesis rests on a
distinction which I find dubious, I ought to reiterate my understanding of it.
I shall continue to assume that the 'problem of intuitive induction' refers
primarily to the fact that efficient causes which might constitute necessary
connections between events are in principle not directly observable. Regardless of whether this assumption corresponds to Crombie's intentions, and

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regardless o f whether Grosseteste considers induction o f principles o f efficient causation distinct from other instances o f induction, the question o f how
Grosseteste views the formulation o f premises specifying efficient causes is
one of considerable interest. But since I am not convinced that Grosseteste's
views on the matter o f discerning efficient causes differ markedly from his
ideas on how to discern formal causes or definitions in general, I shall
concentrate here on some negative points.
Against the background o f various other assumptions, Crombie thinks that
Grosseteste's recognition o f the plurality o f possible causes o f an effect leads
him to reject the Aristotelian goal o f finding the uniquely necessitating causes
o f phenomena. Aristotle himself has difficulty settling on a full account o f
conjoint causal explanation, and so it is possible that Grosseteste inherits
some of his troubles. 42 But I do not think that one is forced to this
concession on the basis o f the evidence Crombie adduces. The relevant
passage is this:
Can the cause be reached from knowledge of the effect with the same certainty as the
effect can be shown to follow from its cause? Is it possible for one effect to have many
causes? If one determinate cause cannot be reached from the effect, since there is no
effect which has not some cause, it follows that an effect, when it has one cause, may
have another, and so that there may be several causes of itJ 3
I do not fully understand Grosseteste's position on the general question o f
conjoint explanations, but I think that this passage cannot be construed as a
metaphysical commitment on his part to the existence of a plurality o f
possible causes of a particular effect. The quoted passage occurs where
Grosseteste is only paraphrasing Aristotle; the words preceding it are, " F o r in
the first place he inquires . . . . ,,44 And at this point Aristotle is raising an
aporia, and pointing out the line o f reasoning which would lead to an
affirmation o f some sort o f doctrine o f a plurality o f possible causes. But
Aristotle himself shortly gives a negative answer to the question he raises,
when he asserts that for explanations of the properties of the same sort o f
individuals, there can be only one cause. 4s We can be confident that
Grosseteste does accept this p o i n t - that if a particular kind of effect is
demonstratively known, the middle term and the effect must reciprocate because in his discussion o f it he raises and resolves several dubitanda.
Grosseteste points out, for example, that this assertion involves an assumption about the organization and regularity of nature; it is not merely a point
about demonstrative science. 46

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EILEEN F. SERENE

But perhaps what Crombie means to assert is that there is a plurality of

possible causes in the sense that the investigator has numerous epistemic
alternatives available as he seeks to explain a phenomenon. He then would
test his hypotheses to see which were untenable. Grosseteste surely would
accept, as would Aristotle, the likelihood that a scientist would posit causal
principles which later required revision. But Grosseteste does not always
emphasize the importance of falsification through controlled experimentation, as he does in the scammony example. Grosseteste's amplification of
Aristotle's explanation why some animals have horns typifies his approach
toward revising causal principles in the light of counter-evidence, a 7 First he
considers the following principles:

(1)
(2)

Having horns is not having teeth in the upper jaw.

The cause of having horns is not having teeth in both jaws.

Apparently Grosseteste thinks of (1) as a statement of a formal cause, i.e. of

what it is to have horns, and thinks of (2) as a statement of a material and an
efficient cause, since the hard matter which would have become teeth
becomes horns instead. But then he reflects that camels and female deer
might be counterexamples, since he believes that they have only one row of
teeth and yet have no horns. Grosseteste meets this problem by recognizing
that these animals have other means of protection, and so he builds this
proviso into his initial definition of 'having horns'. Thus he can argue:

(1)
(2)

All animals which lack one row of teeth and also lack other
means of protection have horns.
Goats lack one row of teeth and also lack other means of
protection. Therefore, goats have horns.

While Grosseteste' advocacy of the revision of defective premises may be

reassuring to anyone who thinks of the Middle Ages as a blot in the history of
experimental science, it is not clear that it bears any special epistemological
significance. In the light of reflection on or observation of the animal
kingdom, Grosseteste revises the middle term of his syllogism. Since this
involves a change in the statement of the formal cause as well as that of the
material and efficient cause, I do not see that it pertains uniquely to what I
assume Crombie means by the problem of intuitive induction. It certainly

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109

does not illustrate Crombie's supposition that there may be a plurality of

epistemic alternatives for the investigator which all survive falsification.
Since the sense in which Grosseteste recognizes a plurality of possible
causes of phenomena, i.e. in the sense of epistemic alternatives, does not in
and of itself lead to skepticism with respect to the attainment of truly
demonstrative syllogisms, the weight of the third thesis must depend on the
assumption that divine illumination is not forthcoming, or cannot be expected to be forthcoming. I shall simply note here that if, contrary to
Crombie's assumption, Grosseteste believes that divine illumination is available and reliable, there is no reason to infer that he abandons the quest for
locating uniquely necessitating reasons for phenomena. Indeed, if complete
knowledge is associated with the notion of divine illumination and direct
acquaintance with the exemplar causes in the divine mind, Grosseteste has
reason to advocate the pursuit of scientia with religious fervor.
Thus, part of the fourth thesis, that Grosseteste's work~was historically
conducive to the rise of experimental science, may well be true, even if we do
not follow Crombie's analysis of the epistemological grounds for this effect.
But it seems to me that Grosseteste's use of Avicenna's scammony example
does not necessarily show that he was aware of its special experimental
implications. Since in the context its main point is to show how knowledge
comes from sense perception, and since the example is not original to
Grosseteste, we must at least question how seriously he takes its interesting
features. I have found no evidence elsewhere in his commentary to suggest
that Grosseteste takes controlled experimentation to be a necessary condition
for the formulation of a universal causal principle, as distinct from an
aestimatio or hypothesis. 48 Grosseteste simply uses Aristotle's elusive vocabulary of seeing or grasping what the middle term is. And Grosseteste himself
defends Aristotle's elusiveness on the subject of how one apprehends premises
of demonstrative syllogisms by commenting that the Posterior Analytics
concerns scientific judgment, not scientific discovery. 49

III
Broadly speaking, Grosseteste's treatment of induction and demonstrative
science represents a qualified acceptance and extension of Aristotle's doctrine
in the Posterior Analytics, rather than a dramatic departure from it. Grosse-

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EILEEN F. SERENE

teste follows Aristotle in holding that demonstrative science is expressed in

syllogisms which meet the various extensional and intensional requirements
which Aristotle specifies. Thus the activity of the natural philosopher should
consist largely in discovering the appropriate premises for demonstrative
syllogisms. The most important qualifications I have noted in Grosseteste's
acceptanc e of Aristotle's theory of induction and demonstrative science are
his points that the theory depends critically on the assumptions that nature is
uniform and that we can discriminate accurately between essential and
accidental properties of substances, s 0 These are assumptions which Aristotle
makes, but whose importance Grosseteste underscores. However, Grosseteste's attachment to the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination constitutes at least a variation on Aristotle's theory. But it is not immediately
obvious whether this variation amounts to an extension of Aristotle's theory,
an undermining of it, or a dramatic departure from it. Although I have not
found enough evidence in the commentary to substantiate a definite determination of this questiort, what I have found suggests that Grosseteste's illumination theory amounts to an extension of the theory ot induction and
demonstrative science, and does not undermine it.
One might suppose that Grosseteste's introduction of the notion of divine
illumination is a religiously motivated but theoretically insignificant shift in
terminology. If we follow the empiricist interpretation of n o u s , and note
that n o u s characterizes the intellectual state of Aristotle's knower, while
divine illumination characterizes the intellectual state of Grosseteste's
knower, it is tempting to conclude that the concepts of n o u s and divine
illumination are equivalent. But I think that there are significant differences
to be discerned between n o u s and divine illumination. Aristotle's claims
about n o u s in the last chapter of the P o s t e r i o r A n a l y t i c s strike me as rather
modest. He says first that the potentiality by which we grasp first principles is
our ability to form settled, general concepts through a process of induction
based on repeated experiences, s 1 He names the state we are in when we have
grasped a concept or first principle n o u s , explaining that n o u s is related to
induction as e p i s t e m e is related to demonstration, s 2 As I understand them,
Aristotle's claims commit him only to the conditional proposition that if we
have a genuine grasp of a first principle, we are in a state of n o u s with respect
to it. But he does not commit himself to the proposition that every general
impression which seems settled and self-evident constitutes having n o u s , t h e

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most certain and highest form of knowledge. One initial difference between
n o u s and divine illumination is that divine illumination clearly admits of
degree, while this does not seem tree of n o u s . According to Grosseteste, all
intelligibles are known by some degree or other of divine illumination. 5 3
Complete knowledge is direct acquaintance with the examplars in the divine
mind; ordinary human knowledge of intelligibles comprises a better or worse
approximation to complete knowledge, s4 As I understand the doctrine of
divine illumination, increments of illumination enhance knowledge intentionally; that is, the knower typically accepts the same proposition as he did
before the incremental illumination, but now he sees its truth more clearly, or
clearly and distinctly.
I think that the difference between n o u s and divine illumination has
several significant effects on Grosseteste's theory of demonstrative science.
Paradoxically, the doctrine of divine illumination yields an account of both
the corrigibility and validation of knowledge which I believe to constitute an
extension of Aristotle's theory. Aristotle's account of n o u s does not clearly
specify how one knows that one is in a state of n o u s ; it assumes that we
sometimes attain n o u s , since science is possible, but that we can be mistaken
in our grasp of principles. While Aristotle holds that our grasp of principles is
corrigible when they are mistaken, Grosseteste's theory suggests that our
apprehension of principles is corrigible when they are correct. That is, his
view seems to make a special place for the development of a clearer understanding of the exact import of true principles, since it contains an explicit
notion of ideal knowledge, of which our knowledge is only an approximation.
Since the process of improving one's understanding involves divine illumina.
tion, religious or even mystical motivations in principle can support such
endeavors.
The doctrine of divine illumination can also serve as a means of validating
the reliability of our demonstrative science. Grosseteste points out explicitly
that demonstrative science depends on the uniformity of nature and On our
ability to discriminate between essential and accidental causes, and thus use
the method of division perspicuously. While Grosseteste isJfar from a fullblown Cartesian skeptic, his concern over these assumptions suggests that he
has gone beyound Aristotle in raising skeptical questions about the criteria
for and reliability of the principles which we consider correct and the
syllogisms which we consider genuinely demonstrative. If Grosseteste believes

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that God is benevolent and does provide illumination, as I think he does, then
he has a special basis for certifying the fundamental reliability of our
demonstrative science, even ff it does not constitute the most direct apprehension of exemplars.
Of course Grosseteste's validation of our efforts at demonstrative reasoning by reference to divine illumination may not have direct practical significance for the natural philosopher, if it is as difficult to recognize when one has
divine illumination as it is to tell when one has n o u s . It is hard to imagine that
Grosseteste could deny the possibility that we are sometimes simply mistaken
in supposing that a certain proposition is divinely validated. But like most
divine illumination theorists, Grosseteste emphasizes the positive aspects of
his view; his remarks suggest that at least some divine illumination is selfvalidating. That is, divine illumination carries with it a characteristic and
reliably recognizable clarity and subjective certainty by which one cannot fail
to recognize oneself as the recipient of divine illumination, s5 But such
introspective criteria cannot stand alone in an epistemological theory; Grosseteste must also rely on the general view that in his benevolence God provides
for the reliability and corrigibility of our apprehension of principles.
Do Grosseteste's views on induction and demonstrative science have any
clear significance for the rise o f experimentation in science? It seems to me
that the epistemology underlying Grosseteste's theory of science can have
two opposing influences on the frequency of experimentation in science.
Surely it is a mistake to say that Grosseteste was responsible for abandoning
the search for uniquely necessitating causes of phenomena, leaving natural
philosophers only the task of propounding hypotheses and disconfirming the
worst of them through experiments. I see no evidence that Grosseteste does
abandon Aristotle's goals, or even that he is much more conscientious than
Aristotle in emphasizing the importance of seeking out falsifying counterexamples to principles. And surely Grosseteste is not motivated by skepticism, Humean, Popperian, or otherwise, about the justification of intuitive
induction in particular. If anything, Grosseteste attributes more power and
reliability to our apprehensions of principles than Aristotle does, since they
can be certified by divine illumination. Of course this point relies on the
assumption that divine illumination sometimes occurs, and that in general it is
recognizable and reliable. But Grosseteste would have been a strange illumin.
ation theorist indeed, had he not accepted these assumptions. But given these

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113

assumptions, Grosseteste's theory has all the utility of Aristotle's theory, with
the added allure that divine aid is available to the natural philosopher, and
that scientific reflection may bring him into a closer relation with God.
Perhaps these additional features help explain why so many medievals dedicated themselves, at least in principle, to the search for uniquely necessitating
causes of phenomena.
But possible unguarded assumptions about the sometimes self-validating
character of divine illumination can have an opposing influence on the
frequency of experimentation in science. Grosseteste's endorsement of careful observation is consistent with his view that certainty only arises as a result
of divine illumination, since typically divine illumination only clarifies the
existing contents of the mind. Hence it is indispensable for the scientist to
make his observations, and to formulate principles and concepts to the best
of his ability. This as a matter of course involves looking for instances which
disconfirm the proposed principles. But if and when these principles and their
connections acquire an ineluctable subjective clarity and force, one might
mistakenly consider them to be divinely verified. Should subjective certainty
arise prior to careful attempts at experimental falsification, the certain
scientist might accept his principles prematurely. Thus Grosseteste's divine
illumination theory might not clearly oppose the abrogation of experimentation in those unfortunate cases where subjective certainty arises prematurely and mistakenly. A" recognition of this tendency of Grosseteste's
theory might mitigate the shock of learning that the one quantitative law
which Grosseteste himself proposed is false, and it would have been disconfirmed by the simplest of experimental procedures, s 6

Yale University

NOTES
1 I would like to thank Marilyn Adams, Simo Knuuttila, John Longeway, J o h n
Murdoch, and Merrilee Salmon for their suggestions; and I would like to thank the
Academy of Finland and the American Council of Learned Societies for their support.
2 Robert Grosseteste, In Aristotelis Posteriorum Analytieorm Libros and Walter
Burleigh, Super Libros Posteriorura Analytieorum Aristotelis (Venice: 1514; reprint ed.,
Frankfurt/Main: Minerva G.m.b.H., 1966). For a discussion of the dating of the
commentary, see B. G. Dod, The Study of Aristotle's Posterior Analyties in the twelfth

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and thirteenth centuries: the translation, glossators, and commentators, and their
methods (B. Litt. Dissertation, Oxford University, 1971) p. 46 ff.
3 C . H . Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle commentaries', Traditio 28 (1972), 2 8 1 - 3 9 6 .
4 For full reports o f the medieval latin commentaries, see C. H. Lohr, op. cit.: Traditio
23 (1967), 3 1 3 - 4 1 3 ; 24 (1968), 1 4 9 - 2 4 5 ; 26 (1970), 1 3 5 - 2 1 6 ; 2 7 (1971), 2 5 1 - 3 5 1 ;
28 (1972), 2 8 1 - 3 9 6 ; 29 (1973), 9 3 - 1 9 7 ; 3 0 (1974), 1 1 9 - 1 4 4 .
s For a general survey, see D . E . Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the
Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1930).
6 Crombie, pp. 1 3 2 - 1 3 4 .
7 K. R. Popper, The Logic o f Scientific Discovery (London, 1959), pp. 2 7 - 3 0 .
8 For a s t u d y of issues in this text, see J. Baxnes, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics
(Oxford, 1975) and K. J. J. Hintikka, ' O n the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Science',
Nous 6 (1972), 5 5 - 6 9 .
9 For an account o f what Aristotle m e a n s by ' p h e n o m e n a ' , see G. E. L. Owen,
' "Tithenai ta P h a i n o m e n a " ' in J. Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle: I. Science
(London, 1975), 1 1 3 - 1 2 6 .
1 o Here I rely on J. Barnes, 'Aristotle's Theory of D e m o n s t r a t i o n ' , ibid. 6 5 - 8 7 .
~ Posterior Analytics I, 2; I, 9.
12 ibid. I, 2; I, 6.
13 ibid. II, 12.
4 ibid. II, 8; II, 11; II, 17.
1 s ibid. I, 13.
1~ Aristotle uses m o r e and less strict n o t i o n s o f ' d e m o n s t r a t i o n ' tbxoughout the
Posterior Analytics; b u t in its strict sense, a d e m o n s t r a t i o n has two premises which are
principles, and its middle term is the definition o f its subject.
7 An example o f what a single demonstrative syllogism m i g h t look like is this: Having
incisors belongs necessarily to every carnivore. Being carnivorous belongs necessarily to
every dog. Therefore: having incisors belongs necessarily to every dog. See Barnes,
Articles, p. 66.
8 Posterior Analytics I, 1 - 3 .
1 9 ibid. II, 19. Empeiria presupposes sense perception and m e m o r y .
20 ibid. II, 13.
2 ~ ibid. II, 1 8 - 1 9 .
22 Barnes, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, pp. 2 5 6 - 7 .
23 ibid. 257.
24 PosteriorAnalytics I, 9. In the subsequent chapter Aristotle seems to suggest that the
organization o f explananda into natural kinds might s o m e h o w mitigate this difficulty.
25 Crombie, p. 71.
26 ibid. 71n. But in another note, on p. 34, Crombie seems to recognize the anachronism
of attributing this H u m e a n distinction to medieval thinkers.
27 ibid. 85.
2 s ibid. 133.
29 ibid. 134.
3o ibid. 81.
31 ibid. 85.
32 ibid. 7 3 - 4 .
33 ibid. 8 2 - 5 .

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34 ibid. 134.
3 s As J o h n Longeway writes in his work Simon o f Faversham's Questions on the
Posterior Analytics: A Thirteenth Century View o f Science ( P h . D . Dissertation, Cornell
University, 1977): " H e uses the account of demonstrative science which h e finds in t h e
Posterior Analytics to analyze the Posterior Analytics, expecting the b o o k to provide an
a c c o u n t in demonstrative f o r m o f t h e science w h i c h h a s d e m o n s t r a t i o n as its subject.
This m e a n s that t h e essential properties o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n are to be proven o f it . . . . "
p. 126.
36 Grosseteste, I, 14.
37 For example, they both assume that one will often recognize t h e correct explanatory
definitions simultaneously with observing a p h e n o m e n o n .
38 ibid. I, 12.
9 In the light of Aristotle's view, which is shared by Grosseteste, that definitions o f
subjects give their formal cause, and so c o u n t as causally explanatory principles, it is
hard to see h o w either of t h e m could maintain this distinction.
4 o ibid. II, 2.
41 ibid. I, 7. Q u o t e d in Crombie, pp. 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 .
42 See Barnes, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, pp. 2 2 1 - 3 .
43 Crombie, p. 81.
44 Grosseteste, II, 5.
4 s PosteriorAnalytics II, 17.
46 Grosseteste, II, 5.
47 ibid. II, 4.
48 One reason w h y I question whether Grosseteste takes this example seriously is that
he fails to c o m m e n t on the fact that Avicenna's cognitive psychology includes the n o t i o n
of a distinct estimative faculty.
49 ibid. II, 6.
s o Some later c o m m e n t a t o r s on the Posterior Analytics quote and discuss this point.
s ~ PosteriorAnalytics II, 19.
52 loc. cit.
s 3 Grosseteste I, 7.
s a Like m o s t divine illumination theorists, Grosseteste dismisses t h e possibility that a
genuine intellectual vision of an intelligible might be defective. An early expression o f
this assumption is f o u n d in Book XII, 29 and 30 o f Augustine's Literal Commentary on
Genesis. J. Migne, Patrologia Latina (Rome, 1 9 0 6 - 1 9 0 8 ) Vol. 34, Cols. 4 5 3 - 4 8 6 .
s s Grosseteste says in I, 17 that certainty with respect to intelligibles increases in
proportion to their proximity to the divine.
s 6 O n this subject, see B. S. Eastwood, 'Grosseteste's Quantitative Law o f Refraction: A
Chapter in the History of Non-experimental Science', Journal o f the History o f Ideas 28
(1967), pp. 4 0 2 - 4 1 4 , and Richard C. Dales, 'Robert Grosseteste's Scientific Works', Isis
(1961), pp. 3 8 1 - 4 0 2 .