The British Journal of Sociology 2013 Volume 64 Issue 4

On the almost inconceivable misunderstandings

concerning the subject of value-free social science1
Donald Black

Abstract
A value judgment says what is good or bad, and value-free social science simply
means social science free of value judgments. Yet many sociologists regard valuefree social science as undesirable or impossible and readily make value judgments
in the name of sociology. Often they display confusion about such matters as
the meaning of value-free social science, value judgments internal and external
to social science, value judgments as a subject of social science, the relevance of
objectivity for value-free social science, and the difference between the human
significance of social science and value-free social science. But why so many
sociologists are so value-involved and generally so unscientific is sociologically
understandable: The closest and most distant subjects attract the least scientific
ideas. And during the past century sociologists have become increasingly close
to their human subject. The debate about value-free social science is also part of
an epistemological counterrevolution of humanists (including many sociologists)
against the more scientific social scientists who invaded and threatened to expropriate the human subject during the past century.
Keywords: Value-free social science; philosophy of social science; sociology of
science; history of sociology; pure sociology

Social scientists have long debated their proper involvement in values conceptions of what is good or bad. Should they be value-free? Or is value-free
social science undesirable or even impossible? Sociologists have been especially active in the debate, arguing strongly both for and against value-free
social science (e.g., Weber 1949a[1917]; Dahrendorf 1968[1961]; Gouldner
1962; Becker 1967; Seubert 1991). A century ago classical sociologist Max
Weber spoke of the almost inconceivable misunderstanding[s] offered in all

Black (Department of Sociology, University of Virginia (Corresponding author email: black@virginia.edu)

London School of Economics and Political Science 2013 ISSN 0007-1315 print/1468-4446 online.
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,
MA 02148, USA on behalf of the LSE. DOI: 10.1111/1468-4446.12034

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seriousness as objections to the possibility of value-free social science

(1949a[1917]: 11, 10).2 Misunderstandings about value-free social science
continue to be almost inconceivable, however, and the issue still deserves
attention.3
A value judgment says what is good or bad.4 But science studies facts
observable reality not what is good or bad. If the social sciences were truly
scientific, their main concerns would be matters such as the discovery of new
facts and the explanation of known facts, and social scientists would have no
more involvement in questions of value than do other scientists such as physicists and biologists (see, e.g., Homans 1967; Black 1995). Yet much social
science is value-involved if not value-laden full of value judgments.
Many American sociologists criticize social inequality of various kinds, for
example, such as the higher incomes of white Americans compared to AfricanAmericans or the higher incomes of American men compared to American
women. They say we should eliminate these differences by favouring blacks
and women over whites and men (known as affirmative action or the promotion of diversity). They side with blacks and other minorities against whites,
women against men, and anyone else with less power or other social status
against those with more. Sociologist Wendell Bell a former head of Yale
Universitys Department of Sociology even suggests that because the
number of American prison inmates who are white is smaller while the
number of blacks is larger than their proportion in the American population,
we should increase the number of whites in prison and decrease the number of
blacks in prison until they match their proportions in the population (1983; see
also Dator 2011).
Some sociologists criticize capitalism and express hostility toward business
owners and anyone else with wealth, power, or other forms of social status
(see Cushman 2012). Much of what they call sociology is little more than
the promotion of liberal or otherwise left-wing ideology.5 Sociologist Michael
Burawoy a leader of a movement in early twenty-first century sociology
known as public sociology and a president of both the American
Sociological Association and the International Sociological Association
argues that the primary concern of sociology should be to transform the
world (2005a: 31718). He not only advocates a critical turn toward openly
partisan sociology but also proposes that the central mission of the field
should be the advancement of democratic socialism which he sometimes
calls sociological socialism (Burawoy 2005b: 224; 2005a: 325). Many devote
their attention to what they regard as the shortcomings of their society and
how they should be remedied. In a resolution passed in 2003, the American
Sociological Association itself took a political position by criticizing the
American invasion of Iraq and calling for an immediate end to the Iraq War.6
Yet as a science, sociology has no politics or morality. Scientists should criticize only bad science.
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Facts and values

Social scientists sometimes evaluate various features of society as though their
value judgments were matters of fact. Perhaps some think their judgments are
matters of fact. But no value judgment is a matter of fact.
For centuries philosophers have distinguished between facts and values, and
recognized that it is logically impossible to make value judgments with facts
alone. Eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume thus famously noted that
a logical gap separates what is the case from what ought to be the case and that
we cannot deduce the latter from the former a logical principle known as
Humes Law (1961[1739]: 469).7 For example, the fact that people sometimes
steal or get drunk cannot tell us how we should judge or handle theft or
drunkenness. Facts alone cannot tell us what we should like or dislike, or what
we should or should not do about anything. If facts alone could tell us what is
politically or morally good or bad, social scientists might become the philosopher kings that the ancient philosopher Plato imagined as the rulers of an ideal
world. But no study of reality can ever tell us what reality should be, and no
social scientist can ever discover what is best for anyone (see Dahrendorf
1968[1961]: 6).
Many social scientists nevertheless dismiss or disregard the distinction
between facts and values. They say that value-free social science is impossible, and that whether it should be value-free is a moot if not foolish question. Some sociologists claim that sociology inevitably has a partisan point of
view, and that they cannot avoid taking sides in the social struggles of their
time (e.g., Gouldner 1962; Becker 1967). They reject or ignore the distinction
between facts and values as unsophisticated or untenable (e.g., Selznick
1961: 86; Smith 2010: 395) as though we cannot distinguish between something observable (such as the execution of someone for murder) and what is
good or bad (such as whether we should or should not execute someone for
murder).
Others advocate a cultural turn toward a humanistic style of sociology and
disparage as positivists those who prefer a more scientific style or who merely
stress the importance of being factual (see, e.g., Friedland and Mohr 2004a).8
I recall one colleague who smiled condescendingly and asked another with
whom she was arguing, Oh, are you one of the people who still believes in
facts? meaning that the whole notion of being factual, much less scientific,
was literally a laughing matter. Cultural sociologist Jeffrey Alexander
another former head of Yales Department of Sociology claims that social
science is incapable of establishing the truth of anything at all: From the
most specific factual statements up to the most abstract generalizations, social
science is essentially contestable. Every conclusion is open to argument (1987:
25). He also believes that social science is inherently evaluative: The ideological implications of social science redound to the very descriptions of the
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objects of investigation themselves (Alexander 1987: 21; see also Bourdieu

1993[1984]: chs 23; Friedland and Mohr 2004b).
I sometimes ask my sociology students on the first day of class to raise their
hands if they think value-free social science is possible. No one ever has
which surely at least partly reflects what students hear in other sociology
courses. But is it really impossible for sociology or other social sciences to be
as free of value judgments as the natural sciences such as physics, astronomy,
or biology? If value-free social science is impossible, then the social sciences
are not and cannot be sciences in the same sense as other sciences. Indeed,
if value-free social science is impossible, social science should have a more
honest and accurate label such as social ethics or social policy. But it is possible.
And anyone who believes otherwise is badly mistaken about the meaning of
value-free social science.

Five great misunderstandings

The degree of misunderstanding about value-free social science is staggering.
It is difficult to comprehend how highly educated people such as social scientists could continue to be so confused about this subject. Let us therefore turn
to some of the most common misunderstandings. The first is the worst.
Misunderstanding #1: Value-free social science is impossible.
Only someone who does not understand the meaning of value-free could
think that value-free social science is impossible. Value-free simply means free
of value judgment anything that says what is good or bad. Whether social
science can be free of value judgments is not a matter of opinion but a matter
of fact. Is it possible to make a statement in social science that does not contain
a value judgment? The answer is yes. And examples are widely available.
Consider one principle of legal behaviour from my own work: Law varies
directly with relational distance (Black 2010[1976]: 406).9 Does this statement
say anything about what is good or bad, such as how law should or should
not behave? Does it say what is right or wrong, just or unjust? No, it judges
nothing. It merely says that conflicts across greater relational distances (such
as between strangers rather than spouses) attract more law whether more
complaints, arrests, civil lawsuits, convictions, or punishment. For instance,
it predicts that a stranger rape or assault will more likely result in a call to the
police than a spousal rape or assault, and that a stranger killing will more likely
receive a severe punishment than a family killing. It does not say whether
such differences are good or bad. It addresses facts alone what is observable.
Among countless other possible examples, it shows that social science can be
as free of value judgment as any other science (see Black 1995).
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When lecturing at my university or elsewhere I sometimes note the widespread view that value-free social science is impossible and challenge my
audience to show me how the principle of legal behaviour above contains a
value judgment. But of course no one has ever been able to do so because the
principle is completely value-free. So let us be done forever with the claim that
value-free social science is impossible. It already exists.
Misunderstanding #2: Value-free social science is impossible because social
scientists must make value judgments about social science itself.
Value-free social science means free of external value judgments about the
world beyond social science such as judgments about whether a particular
legal decision is just or unjust, whether a particular public policy is good
or bad, or whether a particular social reform is desirable or undesirable. It
does not mean free of internal value judgments about the world of social
science itself such as judgments about what we should study, what methods
we should use, what concepts or theories we should employ, or what ideas we
should praise or criticize.
Internal value judgments are a necessary and proper feature of all science
(see Weber 1949a[1917]: 11; Dahrendorf 1968[1961]: 611; compare, e.g.,
Gouldner 1962). All scientists must thus decide what they should study: Black
holes or black bears? Race relations or international relations? If a sociologist
chooses to study capital punishment in modern America, for example, the
choice is not a value judgment about the desirability of capital punishment as
a way to handle crime.10 Although such a study might increase public interest
in capital punishment or even lead to a new public policy about capital punishment, the study itself can and should be free of judgments about capital
punishment.11
All scientists make countless judgments about various scientific matters,
including judgments about whether their colleagues have used proper research
methods in their work, whether their evidence justifies their conclusions,
whether their work is important, and whether they conform to the various
standards and ideals that sociologist Robert Merton calls the ethos of science
(1973[1942]).12 Scientists might disagree among themselves about their scientific standards and ideals, but as long as their judgments concern only matters
internal to science they have no bearing on whether their work is value-free in
the present sense.
The confusion about internal versus external value judgments reminds me
of a discussion among sociology graduate students at my university that once
came to my attention. One student found it very amusing that I had told his
class that sociology should be value-free because, he noted, whether sociology should be value-free is itself a value judgment: Ha, ha, ha! Professor Black
doesnt know he is contradicting himself when he says sociology should be
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value-free! His own statement is a value judgment! But the joke was on the
student. He had confused a value judgment internal to sociology that it
should be value-free with a value judgment external to sociology. Although
social scientists cannot and should not be value-free about the nature of social
science, they can and should be value-free about everything else.
Misunderstanding #3: Value-free social science is impossible because value
judgments are subjects of social science.
Social scientists sometimes study value judgments as a form of human behaviour, such as judgments of a political or moral nature. But the study of value
judgments does not require social scientists to make value judgments of their
own (see Weber 1949a[1917]: 11; Dahrendorf 1968[1961]: 11). They can study
value judgments just as they study any other form of human behaviour in a
value-free fashion.
Consider, for example, the scientific study of law. Value judgments pervade
law: What should be illegal? Which side should win a trial? Who should receive
what punishment? Science cannot answer these or any other value questions
about legal behaviour, and no social scientist should claim to do so in the name
of science. Yet when I first entered the field of legal sociology I found that most
sociologists and other social scientists failed to study law from an entirely
scientific point of view. They seemed unable or unwilling to study the reality of
law alone and instead often suggested how law should or should not behave
(see Black 1972). They thereby abdicated their role as observers and became
participants in law itself (for illustrations, see Skolnick 1966; Mayhew 1968;
Selznick 1969). The same is true today: Legal sociology is so value-laden that
it hardly deserves to be called a branch of sociology (see Black 1997). Sociologists can and should study legal behaviour from a scientific standpoint, such
as by seeking to explain why some people call the police or bring lawsuits when
others do not, why some cases succeed while others fail, and why the same
crimes sometimes attract different punishments (see, e.g., Black 2010[1976];
Cooney 2009). The fact that value judgments pervade law does not mean that
social scientists must make their own value judgments about law. They need
not make value judgments about anything beyond social science itself.
Misunderstanding #4: Value-free social science is impossible because
objectivity is impossible.
Many assume that value-free social science requires objectivity: a lack of
psychological bias or prejudice. And because objectivity might be difficult if
not impossible to achieve especially in the context of human behaviour
they conclude that value-free social science is difficult or impossible to achieve
(see, e.g., Wallerstein 2000: 3078). But value-free does not mean objective.
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Value-free only means free of value judgments, and even biased social science
might be value-free.
Suppose, for example, someone says that women never develop scientific
theories. Although the statement might lack objectivity about the scientific
accomplishments of women, it is not a value judgment about women or their
accomplishments. It is a factual statement that might be true or false and it
happens to be false: Some women do develop scientific theories. But a biased
statement might also be true.13
Sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf once noted that the origin of a statement does
not determine its truthfulness: The psychological origins of an idea have no
implications for its validity. Validity is a question of empirical test (1968[1961]:
4). No matter why anyone makes statement about anything, it might still be
true (compare Ciafa 1998: 63). Nor does the origin of a statement determine
whether it is value-free.14 No matter why anyone makes a statement about
anything, it is value-free if it contains no value judgments.
Misunderstanding #5: Value-free social science is impossible because social
science has so much human significance.
The subjects studied by social scientists often have more human significance
than the subjects studied by other scientists. Compare subjects such as crime,
violence, and inequality to microscopic organisms, atomic particles, or galaxies
light years away (see Black 2000a: 3501). Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu might
exaggerate when he suggests that people hardly ever talk about the social
world in order to say what it is, but almost always to say what it ought to be
(1993[1984]: 22). Yet the findings and theories of social scientists surely elicit
more value judgments than the findings and theories of other scientists.
Some also confuse the factual statements of social scientists with value
judgments. If I say that law favours the wealthy over the poor, for example,
some might think I am making a value judgment about law because they
believe wealthier people should not have a legal advantage. But the statement
itself is value-free. It is completely factual, and we can determine whether
it is true or false. Whenever I ask my students on an examination in Sociology
of Law to give an example of a value judgment about law, however, invariably
one or more answer that law favours the wealthy over the poor (instead of
saying, for instance, that law should not favour wealthier people). Apparently
some cannot understand the difference between a factual statement about
legal behaviour and their own value judgments about the statement. No
wonder they think social science cannot be value-free: They confuse social
science with their own value judgments.
My book The Behavior of Law frequently elicits value judgments about law.
For instance, some readers react negatively to the idea that downward law is
greater than upward law which means that cases brought against those with
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less wealth attract more law (such as harsher punishments) than cases in the
opposite direction (Black 2010[1976]: 214).15 Or they react negatively to the
idea mentioned earlier that law varies directly with relational distance which
means, among other things, that cases between strangers attract more law than
the same cases between intimates (Black 2010[1976]: 406). Some think the
main claim of The Behavior of Law is that law is unjust. Yet although the
book contains many ideas about legal behaviour that might disturb those who
believe in equality before the law, it does not contain a single value judgment
about legal behaviour. Even so, a colleague once told me I should have called
the book The Misbehavior of Law instead of The Behavior of Law. But his title
described his reaction to the books content not the content itself.
Some likewise confuse causal theories with value judgments since identifying the cause of a particular kind of human behaviour (such as crime or
violence) might seem to imply whom or what to blame for the behaviour,
or possibly to justify it (see Felson 1991). But what causes something is a
scientific matter, while blaming or justifying something is a value judgment.
For example, sociologists and other social scientists sometimes explain crime
with frustration resulting from inequality which might seem to blame society
instead of criminals for crime (e.g., Merton 1938; Blau and Blau 1982; see also
Felson 1991). Others explain rioting with the frustration of the rioters which
might seem to justify the rioting (see, e.g., Fogelson 1970; Baldassare 1994; see
also Senechal de la Roche 1996: 98100). For that matter, it might seem that if
we can explain all human behaviour with the social environment or anything
else beyond human control, we cannot judge any human behaviour at all.
But science cannot blame anyone or justify anything, nor can it tell us what we
should or should not judge.
Still others explain violence as a means to a goal that some might judge as
morally significant, whether blameworthy or worthy of sympathy. For instance,
social scientists sometimes explain the lynching of American blacks a century
ago as a means by which whites sought to terrorize blacks (see, e.g., Tolnay
and Beck 1995: 19). Or they explain modern terrorism as a means by which
nationalists seek to end foreign domination (see, e.g., Pape 2005). Although
such explanations might seem to condemn or defend those involved in the
violence, they do not actually include any value judgments about anyone (but
see Black 1995: 8614).16 Here again the human significance of social science
does not determine whether it is value-free. Social science is value-free as long
as it makes no value judgments.
***
Some think social science cannot be value-free because social scientists must
make judgments about what to study and how to study it, including whether
they should be value-free. Some think social science cannot be value-free
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because social scientists study value judgments. Some think social science
cannot be value-free because social scientists cannot be objective. And some
think social science cannot be value-free because it has so much human
significance. They are wrong: Value-free social science means social science
that contains no value judgments, and that is all.

Value judgment in social science

Because we cannot deduce what is good or bad from facts alone, science
cannot judge the world it studies. Judgmental science is a contradiction in
terms. We should therefore turn the alleged impossibility of value-free social
science on its head: What is impossible is not value-free social science but
judgmental social science. Social science cannot escape being value-free. And
to the degree that social science is not value-free, it is not social science at all
(see Black 2000b: 7056).
Some social scientists might not understand the logical gap between
facts and values, or they might not understand the difference between their
scientific ideas and their value judgments. Others might understand the difference between facts and values but still promote their own political or moral
preferences in the name of social science. Still others might consider it a virtue
or even an obligation to make value judgments when they teach, publish, or
engage in other professional activities (e.g., Dahrendorf 1968[1961]: 18).17 In
any case, many social scientists express their opinions about various matters
of a political or moral nature. Is this right? Should social scientists tell anyone
what is good or bad for them or anyone else?
Max Weber opposed all value judgments by social scientists, and particularly
criticized the abuse of authority by professors of social science who promote
their ideological preferences in the lecture hall: It is somewhat too convenient
to demonstrate ones courage in taking a stand where the audience and
possible opponents are condemned to silence (1946[1922]: 150). The authority
of professors and closeness to their students give their value judgments all the
more force (see Phillips and Lapuck 2014).
Weber viewed the constant confusion of the scientific discussion of
facts and their evaluation as one of the most widespread and also one of the
most damaging traits of work in our field (1949b[1904]: 60). But he could have
gone further: Any value judgment in the name of social science is arguably a
violation of scientific ethics. Judgmental social science is intellectually dishonest and harmful to anyone associated with social science. Those who make
value judgments in their role as social scientists mislead the audience of social
science, personalize and politicize social science, undermine the credibility of
social science, lower the standing of social science, and retard the progress of
social science.
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The value of value judgment

So far I have been silent about the value of value judgment beyond social
science. But nothing I have said about value-free social science should be
construed as a negative judgment of value judgment itself. I am not saying that
value judgments are meaningless, useless, unrespectable, improper, or inferior
to any other form of discourse nor did Weber (see 1949a[1917]: 14). Indeed,
I fear that some might think I am arguing that being value-free means never
judging anything which would be yet another misunderstanding about valuefree social science.
Far from being inferior to anything else, value judgment is an indispensable
element of human life. We must continually make value judgments about
virtually everything we do, from how we spend our time to what we consume,
whom we befriend, and the conduct we condemn. Without value judgments we
would be helpless and directionless unable to make choices about anything
and unable to know whether our choices are good or bad. Life without value
judgments is inconceivable.
Value judgments deserve at least as much attention, intellectual care, and
creativity as anything else. Yet most social scientists know no more than
anyone else about value judgment what is good or bad about anything and
have no right to claim otherwise. Most have no education or sophistication
about value judgment. Most have no knowledge of political, legal, or moral
philosophy, or any other subject concerned with the proper ideals, goals, and
rules for human beings and the societies they inhabit. Most have no new ideas
of a political, legal, or moral nature. Those who present their value judgments
as social science as though their personal preferences were scientific discoveries only display their incompetence and ignorance about value judgment
all the more. They abuse not merely social science, but value judgment itself.

The unscientific nature of social science

Why is a discussion of value-free social science still necessary a century after
Max Weber first tried to banish value judgments from social science? Why do
social scientists still present their own political and moral preferences in the
name of social science? Why is social science still so unscientific?
The involvement of social scientists in value judgment illustrates their lack
of involvement in science in discovery and explanation and other scientific
matters. Many do not regard themselves as true scientists, care little about
science, know little about science, and express scorn for those who take science
seriously. Others have a conception of science so broad that it includes almost
anything, from humanism to political ideology. Why is social science so unscientific or even anti-scientific?
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It is possible to explain sociologically the degree to which ideas are scientific,

known not only by their concern with facts but also by such characteristics as
their testability, generality, and simplicity (Black 2000a: 35161). Why, then, is
social science so much less scientific than sciences such as physics, astronomy,
or biology? Why did social science evolve so much later than other sciences,
and why has its progress been so much slower?
The degree to which ideas are scientific depends on the social location
of their subjects. Ideas about the closest and the most distant subjects are the
least scientific: Scienticity is a curvilinear function of social distance from the
subject (Black 2000a: 352).18 Because humans are comparatively close to
all human subjects, for example, ideas about human subjects are generally
less scientific than ideas about nonhuman subjects (such as plants or particles).
And because human subjects in ones own society and time are especially
close, ideas about these subjects are especially unscientific. Ideas about the
most distant subjects (which are largely or totally unknown) are less scientific
as well.
In earlier and simpler societies humans were mostly very close or very
distant from one another, part of everyday life or foreign and unknown, and
too close or too far away to produce scientific ideas about human behaviour.
The social sciences therefore evolved later than the natural sciences (such
as astronomy and physics) with their more distant yet observable subjects.
The social sciences emerged only with the modernization of human society, as
the closeness of traditional communities came apart and the world as a whole
came together (see Black 2011: ch. 8).19 Only then did the social location of the
human subject become both close enough and distant enough for significantly
scientific ideas to appear. So began, for example, the classical era of sociology
a century ago.
Classical European sociologists such as Max Weber and Emile Durkheim
devoted most of their attention to subjects in other societies and times (such
as ancient and other pre-modern societies), and their sociology was notably
scientific.20 But later sociologists in Germany, France, and elsewhere increasingly studied closer subjects in their own society and time. Most modern
American sociologists thus study only modern American society and possibly
only the part to which they are especially close, such as their own race,
ethnicity, gender, and personal activities. As a result, modern sociology has
become increasingly less scientific than classical sociology.
Sociologists who study the closest subjects produce particularly unscientific
sociology. They discover little or nothing and explain little or nothing. Many
also dismiss or oppose value-free social science and readily make value judgments about their subjects of study (see Black 2000b: 7078).21 But we cannot
expect sociology to become more scientific until more sociologists study
subjects farther away in social space, beyond their own society and beyond
themselves, the worst scientific subject of all (see Black 2000a: 35361; 2002).
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***
The debate about value-free social science is not merely a matter of misunderstandings mistaken meanings, muddled thinking, or bad logic. Nor is it merely
a difference of opinion. It is part of larger conflict about whether the human is
a proper subject of science.22 It is a cultural war specifically an epistemological
war over what counts as knowledge of the human and over the standards that
should apply to knowledge of the human.23 Nowhere has the struggle been
greater than in sociology, where after more than a century it still rages as much
as ever.
The scientific invasion of the human subject was a major movement of
cultural time that challenged the reign of humanism which sanctifies and
raises the human above the natural world and above the jurisdiction of science
(see Black 2011: Part III).24 Social science threatened to expropriate a subject
long owned by the humanities such as philosophy and art and by common
sense itself (see Black 1979).25
The revolutionary advance of science toward the human subject caused a
counterrevolution of conservative humanists akin to the counterrevolution of
religious authorities and other conservatives against the Copernican revolution that removed the human from the centre of the universe and against the
Darwinian revolution that reduced the human to an animal. Many humanists
regard science as an inappropriate and inadequate way to understand the
human, and say that social science is not and cannot be a real science. But they
often mean that social science should not be a real science, and that a science
of the human should not exist at all.
Everyone claims ownership of the human subject, and everyone presumes
to be an expert on the human subject.26 Many social scientists are humanists
as well, including some who explicitly call themselves humanistic sociologists, cultural sociologists, critical sociologists, and others who say that the
science of the human is not and cannot be the same as other science.27
Although most academic humanists are politically liberal and progressive,
those who oppose the science of the human are epistemologically conservative reactionary and regressive.28 And the newer and more advanced
the science of the human, the greater is their opposition (see Black 2011:
1157).29
These humanists reject every standard by which science judges ideas
about the human subject, including the standard that places ideas about
facts above value judgments, testable ideas above those that are immune to
falsification, simple and clear ideas above those that are complex and ambiguous, and general ideas above those particular to a single place and time (see
Black 1995). They reject the superiority of prediction and explanation over
interpretation. They reject the science of the human as a heresy against their
conception of the human as special, sacred, and beyond science.
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Natural scientists such as astronomers and biologists ultimately prevailed

over their religious and other conservative opponents, but social scientists
must still struggle against humanistic reactionaries both within and beyond
social science. If the forces of modernization that spawned the science of the
human continue into the future, however, social science will inevitably become
ever more scientific and successful. And its conservative enemies will finally
disappear into the dustbin of history.30
(Date accepted: August 2012)

Notes
1. For comments on an earlier draft I
thank Andrew Abbott, Earl Babbie,
Bonnie Berry, Faruk Birtek, Moish Bronet,
Bradley Campbell, Mark Cooney, Richard
Felson, Ellis Godard, James Hawdon, John
Herrmann, Janet Humston, Mark Kleiman,
Jason Manning, Calvin Morrill, Scott
Phillips, Roberta Senechal de la Roche,
Roscoe Scarborough, Timothy Snyder,
James Tucker, Jonathan Turner, Jeff
Weintraub, Richard Wright, and several
anonymous reviewers.
2. In Germany in Webers time, the passionate clash of convictions and personalities about the role of values in social
science was known as the Werturteilsstreit
value judgment dispute later simply
called the value dispute (see Dahrendorf
1968[1961]: 1; Ciafa 1998: 138). Weber
himself was the most aggressive and
controversial advocate of value-free social
science. According to his colleague Paul
Honigsheim, Of all the things Max Weber
did, said, and wrote, nothing has been so
much talked about, commented on, misunderstood, and laughed off as his doctrine
of a value-free approach in sociology
(quoted in Dahrendorf 1968[1961]: 4). A
century later, however, Webers promotion
of value-free social science receives little
or no attention from sociologists, including those who otherwise regard his work as
a model for modern sociology. A recent
description of Webers contributions and
career in an online encyclopedia does not
even mention the subject of value-free social
British Journal of Sociology 64(4)

science (Wikipedia 2012; see also Burawoy

2011: 3989).
3. Apart from sociologists, economists
and psychologists have been especially
likely to make value judgments about their
subjects of study. Historians and political scientists have been somewhat more divided
in this respect. Anthropologists were once
the least likely to make value judgments
about their primary subjects of study: tribal
societies. But as tribal societies largely
disappeared in their traditional form by
the late twentieth century, anthropologists
turned to other subjects (including modern
societies) and became increasingly judgmental. The most judgmental social scientists are those who study their own societies
and other close subjects (a matter to which I
return later in this essay).
4. By good or bad I mean what is desirable or undesirable in itself not a more or
less effective means to a goal (such as when
we say that boiling is a good way to purify
water or that smoking is bad for your
health). The effectiveness of a means to a
goal is a matter of fact rather than a value
judgment (see Durkheim 1953[1906]).
5. I do not mean to emphasize liberal
(or left-wing) sociology over conservative
(or right-wing) sociology. But while equally
indefensible, the former is considerably
more common than the latter (see de Russy
2010; Cushman 2012; Gross and Fosse
2012).
6. A similar resolution in 1968 by the
American Sociological Association against
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Donald Black

the Vietnam War failed to win the support

of a majority of the members. Although
most opposed the war, they considered it
improper for a scientific association to take
a political position on the war or any other
subject.
7. Humes strict separation of the is
from the ought has also been called
Humes Guillotine, after a bladed instrument once used in France to decapitate
criminals (see, e.g., Black 1964). Other
philosophers (including Immanuel Kant
and Ludwig Wittgenstein) have addressed
the fundamental difference between facts
and values as well (see, e.g., Wittgenstein
1961[1921]; Janik and Toulmin 1973: chs
57). Some (such as Ayn Rand and John
Searle) have sought to bridge the difference
between facts and values (e.g., Rand
1964[1961]; Searle 1964; Davydova and
Sharrock 2003; Smith 2010: 38691).
8. Critical sociologists also commonly
disparage more scientific sociologists as
positivists. The term positivism traces to
founder of sociology Auguste Comte (in the
first half of the nineteenth century), who
advocated a style of social science as factoriented and value-free as natural science
(see Lenzer 1998). But for critical, cultural,
and other more humanistic sociologists,
positivist seems to mean not merely
scientific but intellectually backward, philosophically ignorant, and possibly politically
conservative (see, e.g., Burawoy 2011, commenting on Sztompka 2011; see also Lenzer
1998: xxxiii, xlvi). I sometimes jokingly say
that I am a positivist in the sense that I am
not a negativist who believes a genuine
science of human behaviour is impossible.
9. Relational distance is a geometrical
conception of intimacy, measured by such
features of a relationship as the frequency
and scope of contact between the parties.
Law is any form of governmental social
control, such as an arrest, a lawsuit, a conviction in court, or a prison sentence. The
formulation above refers only to the behaviour of law within a society. When greater
relational distances are included, such as
between different societies or tribes, the
London School of Economics and Political Science 2013

pattern is curvilinear (Black 2010[1976]: 23,

401).
10. What we choose to study does not
occur in a social vacuum, however, and
might reflect concerns or influences beyond
science. For example, our subject might
derive from what Weber calls its value relevance its association with something we
or others judge to be an important social or
other human problem (such as a particular
kind of violence or crime that we or others
would like to prevent or reduce) (see Weber
1949a[1917]: 212; Ciafa 1998: ch. 1). What
we study might also have an impact on
how others view the subject (such as when
our scientific work identifies something that
others might regard as a social problem in
need of a solution). But regardless of why
we study a subject and regardless of its
impact, our work can still be value-free.
11. Value-free social science does not
mean social science without practical
applications. For instance, a sociological
study might identify a more or less effective
means to a goal. I myself have outlined
several practical applications of my theory
of law (Black 1989). But while science can
sometimes evaluate the effectiveness of a
particular means to a goal, it cannot tell us
what our means or goals should be (see
Weber 1949a[1917]: 12, 26; Dahrendorf
1968[1961]: 146; Ciafa 1998: 16).
12. Merton
identifies
four
major
imperatives in the ethos of modern science:
universalism (the use of pre-established
impersonal standards in the evaluation
of
scientific
matters),
communism
(common ownership of scientific findings),
disinterestedness (the exclusion of
self-interestedness from scientific matters),
and organized skepticism (a collective
unwillingness to accept any scientific claims
without adequate evidence) (1973[1942]).
13. A study might be biased as well. But
as long as the study pertains to matters of
fact, it should be possible to correct its
errors.
14. All science is a human creation or
social construction (see, e.g., Gorton 2010).
But its human nature does not mean science
British Journal of Sociology 64(4)

Misunderstandings concerning the subject of value-free social science 777

cannot be true (see Collins 1998: 8779). Nor
does its human nature mean social science
cannot be value-free.
15. The same pattern occurs in cases
spanning other social elevations, such as different levels of social integration, organization, conventionality, and respectability (see
Black 2010[1976]: chs 26).
16. On the other hand, words such as
terrorize or terrorism might seem to
condemn any behaviour to which they are
applied.
17. Dahrendorf suggests that sociologists
should make their value judgments explicit
in their writings and in the lecture hall in
order to guard against possibly undesirable
political and moral consequences of [their]
scholarly activity (1968[1961]: 18). Others
argue that a failure to make value judgments
is a form of judgment in itself. For example,
a failure to criticize capitalism might be
said to endorse and perpetuate its system
of domination and oppression (see, e.g.,
Gorton 2010).
18. Social distance refers here to relational, cultural, and functional distance.
Relational distance is a degree of intimacy;
cultural distance is a difference in culture;
and functional distance is a difference in
activity (see, e.g., Black 2000a: 348, note 13).
Subjects at higher social elevations (such
as those associated with more wealth and
power) also attract less scientific ideas:
Scienticity is an inverse function of the social
elevation of the subject (Black 2000a: 354).
Downward sociology (toward subjects of
lower status) is therefore more scientific
than upward sociology (toward subjects
of higher status). Because criminologists
mainly study the blue-collar crime of the
poor and powerless, for instance, their field
is one of the most scientific and value-free
branches of sociology. But when they study
white-collar crime (such as the wrongdoing
of corporate executives and politicians),
their work becomes less scientific and more
judgmental (Black 2000a: 354).
19. The increasing closeness of world
society (sometimes known as globalization)
results from new forms of transportation
British Journal of Sociology 64(4)

and communication as well as the growth

of knowledge about previously obscure or
unknown societies.
20. By contrast, Karl Marx focused
mainly on his own capitalist world, and his
work was more ideological and otherwise
judgmental than the work of other earlier
sociologists.
21. The least scientific and most ideological sociologists occasionally even argue that
close subjects are superior to more distant
subjects. For example, Michael Burawoy
argues in favour of indigenous sociologies
or national sociologies (limited to subjects
in the sociologists own society) and
expresses disdain for universal sociology or
sociology from nowhere (which reaches
beyond a single society) (2011: 399402;
compare Sztompka 2011: 3914).
22. I refer to the human not as an organism but as a person (see Smith 2010).
23. Epistemology is the philosophy of
knowledge, including the nature of knowledge and the standards by which we should
evaluate knowledge.
24. The scientific invasion of the human
subject also trespassed on the territory of
the humanists a movement of relational
time. And it jeopardized the social standing
of humanists and gave rise to competition
for resources such as university positions
and opportunities for publication a movement of vertical time (see generally Black
2011).
25. Max Weber and other early advocates
of value-free social science were regarded as
the radical left wing of German social
science (1968[1961]: 2).
26. Even other scientists such as physicists and biologists might claim to be experts
on the human. For instance, one physicist
commented that all of social science is
something of an oxymoron a contradiction in terms and added that any physicist
could quickly solve the problems that are so
difficult for the social scientists (quoted in
Watts 2011: ix).
27. For example, Jeffrey Alexander
rejects any pursuit of social science in the
manner of other science as misguided and
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Donald Black

utopian (1987: 223). A century ago, European scholars involved in the conservative
struggle against social science argued that
the cultural sciences (Kulturwissenschaften
or Geisteswissenschaften) are fundamentally
different from the natural sciences
(Naturwissenschaften) (see, e.g., Ringer
1997: chs 12).
28. I have similarly commented on the
conservative resistance of lawyers to the
sociology of law:
To be scientific in an unscientific field is
highly disruptive. It is deviant, a form of
rebellion epistemological rebellion. If
successful, it overturns reality . . . . For half
a millennium opponents of science have
been conservatives epistemological conservatives who usually hold political, religious, and academic power as well. They
always join forces against the scientists.
Law professors across all political and
moral persuasions likewise join forces
against the idea that law is part of the
natural world and subject to science like
anything else (Black 1997: 56).

29. In an essay on my book The Social

Structure of Right and Wrong (1998), for
instance, legal scholar David Frankford
criticizes my positivism and failure to
address the agency (free will) of the person,
and dismisses my theoretical strategy pure
sociology as uninteresting, irrelevant,
metaphysical, and meaningless (1995: 791,
793, 801). Humanistic sociologist Christian
Smith attacks pure sociology particularly
what I call the death of the person as not
only outrageous in itself but entirely inferior
to his own critical realist personalism (2010:
26576; Black 1995: 870).
30. Who now reads the humanistic
sociologists of the past? Who remembers
their value judgments or other writings?
Who even remembers their names? During
the past century the most successful sociologists those who enjoy the most fame
and glory have been the most scientific,
especially the most theoretical. Always,
therefore, the humanistic enemies of scientific sociology have been fighting a losing
battle.

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