Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars

Author(s): David E. Cunningham

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 2 (march 2010), pp. 115-127
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journal of
Research

II

RESEARC

article

Blocking resolution: How

can prolong civil wars

Journalof Peace Research

47(2) 115-127
? The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission:

external states

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0022343309353488
jpr.sagepub.com

?>SAGE
E. Cunningham

David

Science, Iowa

ofPolitical

Department

State University

Abstract

some
explains the effectof external interventionon the duration of civilwar? The literatureon interventionhas made
an
wars
to
states
intervene
in
it
civil
in
either
has
been
hindered
that
this
but
progress addressing
assumption
help
question,
by

What
one

in civil war to pursue an

which
involved
external states become
Often,
however,
agenda
negotiations.
wars more
to
states intervene
in this fashion,
make
difficult
of the internal combatants.
When
they

or to facilitate

side win

is separate

from

the

goals
for two reasons. First, doing

resolve

so introduces

another

actor

that must

approve

any

settlement

to end

the war.

Second,

exter

nal statesgenerallyhave less incentive to negotiate than internalactors because theybear lower costs of fightingand they can
anticipate gaining less benefit from negotiation than domestic insurgents.Through Cox regressionsusing data on the goals
of all interventionsin civilwars sinceWorld War II, this article shows thatwhen states intervenewith an independent agenda,
theymake wars substantiallylonger.The effectof independent interventionsismuch largerthan thatof external interventions
a
caseswhere
generally, suggestingthat the established finding thatexternal interventionsprolong civilwar isdriven by subset of
states have

intervened

in conflicts

to pursue

independent

goals.

Keywords
civil war,

civil war

duration,

international

intervention,

veto

players

Introduction
In 1996, Rwanda and Uganda invadedZaire and, alongside a
small rebel group led by Laurent Kabila, marched all theway
to Kinshasa

and overthrew

the government

of President Mobutu.

Kabila became presidentof the renamedDemocratic Republic of

theCongo (DRC); however, relationswith his externalpatrons
quickly soured.Within a year,Rwanda and Uganda were again
atwar with theCongolese government,this timefightingalong

side differentdomestic insurgents. In 2002, fighting largely

but

stopped,

in the years

following

Rwandan

withdrawal,

ten

sions between Kigali and Kinshasa have remained high, to the

of

point

threatening

a return to full-scale war.

At the time, both of these external interventions in civil

conflictwere praised by many scholars and policymakers.3
Some

of an African

talked

to African

However,

problems'.

or of African

solutions

later it is clear

that, while

renaissance'
years

intervention in Sierra Leone contributed to

the resolution of a long-runningcivilwar, the high degree of

the ECOMOG

external involvement in theCongo led to thatconflictbecom

ing the largestwar sinceWorld War II.
What explains the effectof external interventionon the
duration

and

termination

of civil war?

Interventions

are

an

important area of study because, despite the implications of

the

term,

'civil wars'

often

states

influence.

contain

can

of external
degrees
from host
of
roles
variety
high

Foreign
play
At roughly the same time, the Economic Community of
ing and facilitatingnegotiations, offeringincentives to groups
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
dis
to
or peace
and
enforcers,
negotiate,
deploying
peacekeepers
a
over
into
Sierra
force
ECOMOG
The
forces
Leone.1
patched
or
to
economic
either
all
the
side,
military support
threw theRevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF)-led government providing
to
to
in
forces
the
conflict.4
way
participate
sendingmilitary
and

restored

and provided

two years of
support

to the
previous

government.Following the intervention,theRUF continued to

fight but its ability towage war was severelydiminished. In
1999, ECOMOG

1
ECOMOG
The
In May

withdrew and in 2000 the conflictended.2

intervened in Sierra Leone

in February 1998.
in Sierra Leone was hastened by another intervention.
British troops arrived to evacuate British nationals. They

end of war
2000,

stayed and helped the government battle the RUF,

a ceasefire agreement inNovember 2000.

leading the RUF

to sign

author:
Corresponding
dacunnin@iastate.edu
3
The clearest example of this attitude was from Connell &

Smyth (1998).
They argued that leaders such as Uganda's Museveni and Rwanda's Kagame
represented a new generation of African leaders opposed to the kind of
corrupt and dictatorial rule represented byMobutu.
4
For studies focusing on the roles that external states
play, see Gleditsch &
(2006), Salehyan (2007), and
Beardsley (2004), Salehyan & Gleditsch

Gleditsch

(2007).

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116

Scholars
tion on

of conflict

have

studies

atten

focused
increasing
'interventions'
have

the effect that these various

on

likelihood of conflict resolution. In general, this literaturehas

are

that these actions

assumed

to

intended

the resolu

expedite

tion of conflict,eitherby improving theprospects fornegotia

tion or by helping one side win a military victory. In this
article,however, I focusmore directlyon thegoals of interven
that states

tion

and

end

the conflict,

argue

but

some

to pursue

rather

in civil war

intervene

often

specific

to

not

objectives

that are additional to the goals of the internal combatants.

When states intervene in this fashion, theymake settling the
conflictmore difficultand this leads to longer civilwars.
examine
To
properly
the duration
of civil war,

the effect of external

one must

have

on

intervention

a basic

states

External

the

understanding

of the factors thatdrive the duration of civilwar. In the next

can

journal ofPeace Research 47(2)

affect all of these

In

factors.

particular,

existing approaches to external intervention can be divided

into two schools: those that focus on the ability of parties to
negotiate, and those thatfocus on the capability of combatants
to wage
A

warfare.

military

number

of scholars

have

examined

how

external

can affectthe abilityof parties to negotiate.Walter

actors

external

as

a critical

playing

actors

(2002) sees

in the termination

role

of

civilwar because she argues that it isnearly impossible forpar

ties to commit credibly to stop fightingwithout an interna
tional

to enforce

guarantee

the peace.

&

Doyle

Sambanis

(2000) argue thatcertain strategiesused by internationalactors

are more

at

effective

in a civil war

hostilities

reducing

environ

ment and helping to build peace.

examine

scholars

Other

intervention

the effect of external

on the ability of the government and rebel groups to achieve

provide
work will be used to examine how differenttypesof external military victory.Balch-Lindsay & Enterline (2000) argue that
a brief overview

section,

can

interventions

affect

of these factors. This

frame

of conflict.

the duration

interventions

one-sided

civil wars

to shorter

lead

because

they

increase theprobability that sidewill win the conflictoutright.

Balanced

intervention

External

of civil war

and the duration

Understanding theduration of civilwar inherentlyinvolvesan

of the factors

analysis

affecting

the termination

of those

con

intervene

because

they

to

create

inwhich

by contrast,

interventions,

states

each

support
a stalemate,

external
multiple
to
conflicts
longer
it harder for one side

lead

side,
making

towin. Regan (2002) similarlyfinds thatneutral interventions

civil wars, while

prolong

interventions

biased

toward

either

the

flicts.Civil wars end in a variety ofways but, in general,war

or the
shorten
them.
government
opposition
ends can be divided into two categories:military victory or
two roles together.
&
examine
these
Aydin (2006)
Regan
war is affected
interventions
theduration
show
that
decrease
negotiated settlement.5The duration of civil
They
diplomatic
both by factors thatmake military victory easier (or harder) of civil wars and that economic
interventions
and
and

These

harder).

that make

factors

by

two

strategies

negotiated
are linked,

easier

settlement
however,

because

military

(or
par

tiesuse thebattlefield to strengthentheirposition at thenego

tiating table (Wagner, 2000). Since war is costly,parties seek
constantly to find a negotiated settlement that gives them
higher expected utility than continued warfare.
At

over

every point

the course

of the conflict,

then,

each

party compares the expected utilityfrom threeoptions: ceasing

the armed

struggle,

continuing

fighting.

agreeing
If actors

or
settlement,
negotiated
are rational and risk-neutral,
they

to some

them.

lengthen
These

some

effect of

militarily.

con
Throughout the conflict, then,parties decide between
some
use
to
that
deal
violence
and
gives
accepting
tinuing
them something short of their total demands. In the absence
of

negotiated

settlement,

wars

continue

until

one

party wins

or all parties but one concede the conflict.Consequently, the

duration ofwarfare isdriven by factors thataffectthe abilityof
parties
ate, and

to win

the conflict,

the ease

of

reaching

the incentives
a

negotiated

they have

to

negoti

settlement.

but loses on many of itsdemands. However, it is theoretically useful to exam

inewar ends as fitting into these categories.

types

of

have

actors

external

are

on

interventions

approaches
can have on civil

ventions

facilitated

theo

miss

civil war

duration.

key effect that external

assume
conflict because
they
with

intervening

one

of two

goals

inter
that

in mind:

to help one sidewin militarily or to contribute to the resolu

tion of the conflict

vention.

through

negotiated

interveners with
important

However,

settlement.

independent

agendas

cases motivate

that in many
goals
there are also cases where

inter

external

states

interveneto pursue independent objectives in thewar outside

of the

goals

of the domestic

combatants.

These

states,

then,

not necessarily to help one

fight to advance those objectives,
sidewin or to help resolve the conflict.

During theCold War, for example, South Africa provided

military support to neighboring states and insurgents. It did
not do so out of some ideological affinity
with the groups that
it supported; rather, it intervenedbecause itwanted to keep
anti-apartheid

5
These are not dichotomous distinctions; there are negotiated settlements that
are cover-ups formilitary victory and cases where one side wins the conflict

and

important

both

However,

will pursue the policy that gives them the highest expected
External
utility.Once fightinghas begun, groups rarely concede the
conflictwithout receiving any benefit unless they are wiped
are
These
out

are

approaches

retical and empirical progress in our understanding of the

governments

out of the
region. Chester

Crocker

(1999), who was Assistant Secretaryof State forAfricanAffairs

from 1981-1988 and oversaw negotiations in severaldifferent
southern

African

conflicts,

argues

that

internal

conflicts

such

as the long civilwar inAngola could not be resolved until the

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117

Cunningham
externaldimensions of those civilwars (primarilythe involve
ment of South Africa and Cuba) were removed.Crocker and
team committed
to
negotiating
addressing
a
in
dimension
and
1988,
first,
peace
agreement

States

the United
the external

between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa was signed at the

United Nations. That agreementpaved theway foran internal
peace agreement in Angola in 1991, albeit one that broke
a few years

down

states

When

later.
to pursue

intervene

independent

in con

goals

flict,theyoftendo work throughdomestic combatants. In the

Congolese conflictof 1996-2002, Rwanda and Uganda both
intervened initiallyto help Kabila overthrowMobutu. There
was a year-long break in fightingwhen Kabila took power in
the summer

of

1997.

relations

However,

Kabila

between

and

the governments in Kigali and Kampala quickly soured

because Kabila proved unwilling to disarm Rwandan and
Ugandan insurgentsbased on Congolese territory.In 1998,
countries

those

went

again

to war

in the
Congo,

time

this

fighting alongside new insurgent groups. Throughout the

1998-2002 phase of thewar, the rebel groups with which
Rwanda and Uganda allied changed, those two countries
battled each other, and each countryprovedwilling to support
whatever

it saw as
advancing
or rebel
organizations

group

any government
6
way.

its
goals
it saw as

and

opposed
in the

standing

A similar example can be seen in Libya's intervention in

in the 1970s. Libya sent itsmilitary intoChad to sup

Chad
port

northern

southern

the Aouzou

possess

groups

insurgent

This

Libya
intervening,
in northern Chad
rumored

an area

Strip,

uranium.

a dominant

against

after

However,

government.

annexed
to

Arab'

led to conflict

annexation

between

Libya and some northern groupswho were unwilling to cede

control

of the Aouzou

agenda

to the conflict

Strip.

securing

then,

Libya,

control

brought
of Chadian

separate
territory.

The differencebetween interventionsto help one sidewin

and

interventions

that

in the former

group

and

theoretical

to pursue
independent
case the external
state

in the

latter

distinction

tion, the external

state

it does

not.

goals,

then,

supports

an

Rather,

is that in cases
brings

the

is not
internal

important
interven

of independent
an additional
set of demands

into

the conflict thathave to be addressed to settle thewar, shortof

all-out victoryby one side. In theDRC conflict,forexample, a
negotiated

settlement

proposing

political

solution

to

the

conflictwould have had to address both the internaldynamics

of the conflict and Libya's claims to theAouzou Strip to fully
the war.

resolve

an external

When
ences

over

state intervenes

the outcome

to pursue

separate prefer
to treat it as a

sense

itmakes

of the war,

separate combatant who must either be defeatedmilitarily or

satisfied

some

through

for the war

sort of
agreement

to end.

is true even if that external stateworks closelywith an

internalally. States interveningin thisfashionmakes resolving

This

civil wars

harder

civil wars

when

for two

they
the outcome

over

preferences

reasons.

contain

to resolve

it is harder

First,

more

combatants

with

separate

of the war. Additionally,

external

states are likely to anticipate less gain from negotiating than

internal combatants, and so inducing them to stop fighting
more

becomes

difficult.

interventions with

external

Why

agendas
When

external

independent

conflicts

prolong
states

in civil wars

intervene

to pursue

indepen

dent goals, resolving those conflicts becomes more difficult

because there is an additional actor who has to be either
defeated

militarily

or consent

to an

the war.

to end

agreement

In otherwork (Cunningham, 2006), I have shown that con

flictsare longerwhen therearemore combatants in the conflict
who

have

diverse

preferences

over

of the war

the outcome

and

the ability to block agreement. I identifyfour dynamics that

make

negotiation

in

conflicts

multi-party

more

difficult.7

I discuss them brieflyhere.

First,when a combatantwith separatepreferences joins the
civilwar, it introduces an additional set of issues thatneed to
be addressed innegotiation. The addition of these issues com

plicates the bargaining environment because it shrinks the

'bargaining

range'

of

acceptable

that all

agreements

comba

tantscould preferto continuedwarfare.8This dynamicmakes

itmore difficult to find one specificagreement that all of the
combatants
Second,
tants

to use

will

accept.
in fractionalized
battle

outcomes

conflicts,
to

update

it is harder
their beliefs

for comba
about

the

likelihood that theywill win the conflict. Informationalmod

els (Filson& Werner, 2002; Slantchev, 2003; Smith& Stam,
2004) have gained prominence in the studyof bargaining and

war.

These

models

see the onset,

duration,

and

termination

of

internaldimension of the conflict could not end thewar if it warfare as one

driven
process
asymmetries.
by information
did not also address the security concerns of Rwanda and Conflict
because
parties overestimate the likelihood
begins
In fact, an agreement was
in Lusaka,
Zambia,
Uganda.
signed
theywill win thewar, theyuse theirperformanceon thebattle
in 1999, but thewar continued for threeyears,
because
to update theirbeliefs about the
field
largely
probability of victory,
Rwanda and Uganda refused towithdraw fromCongolese ter
and when enough updating has occurred, a bargaining range
ritory. In the civil war in Chad, an agreement to end the
7

It also appears thatRwanda and

Uganda had another goal in the conflict
the exploitation of resources such as diamonds,
gold, and cobalt. It is not clear
if these resourceswere solely a means to fund participation in the conflict or a
goal themselves.

In Cunningham (2006), I discuss these theoretical arguments inmore detail

and show empirically that conflicts are much
longerwhen there are a greater
number of combatants with separate preferences over the outcome of the
conflict and the ability to block agreement.
8
This argument is similar to veto player approaches to
governmental
as Tsebelis (2002) and Cox & McCubbins
(2001).
bargaining such

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journal ?/Peace Research 47(2)

118

and

emerges

is reached.

agreement

For

these models,

then,

the

primaryfactordriving theduration ofwar is the abilityof com

batants to use the battlefield to update theirbeliefs.
wars because the
Updating is difficult inmultiparty civil
battlefield reveals information less clearly thanwhen thereare
two

only

these wars

While

participants.

are

indi

multiparty,

vidual battles continue to be primarilydyadic, as the stateusu

ally fights separate battles against individual insurgentgroups
or external

interveners.

battles

Dyadic

allow

to become

parties

more realisticabout theirchances of defeating the other actor

in the battle but do not reveal informationallowing them to
more

become

about

realistic

their chances

the con

of winning

flictoverall. It isharder, then, forcombatants in these conflicts

to use the battlefield to adjust the demands theymake or the
extent of concessions they are willing to offer to the other
parties.

Third, when there are more parties in the conflictwho

must sign an agreement, the incentives for each to hold out
in the hope of getting a better deal as the last signer increase.
Civil war negotiations are long processes, and at the end, the
can demand

last signers

to

concessions

significant

incorporate

into the existingnegotiation frameworkor threaten to scuttle

thewhole process. The ability to demand substantial conces
late in the process

sions

means

have

that all parties

an incentive

to hold out in the hope of being the last signer,and so actors

take more
are more

hard-line

positions

toward

negotiation

when

there

combatants.

Utility from negotiation because they bear lower costs from

fightingand can anticipate gaining less benefit from a negoti
settlement

ated

the domestic

than

insurgents.

The costsof
fighting

The costs of participating in a civilwar are lower for external

states

for two reasons.

First, when
insurgents
in a civil war,
intervenes
the fighting does not
costs of civil war
that state's territory. The
pri

than for internal

an external

state
on

take place

marily involvehuman costs, including the loss of lifeor health,

economic

and

trade.

local

disruption
war
certainly

as destruction

such

costs,

of

human

bear

costs;

and

of infrastructure

states

External

in civil

intervening
these costs

however,

are

lim

whereas thehighest
ited to themilitary personnel intervening,
human costs in civilwars are felt by the civilian population.
are

costs

Economic

states

for external

lower

as well.

While

theremay be regional effectsof the civilwar, the intervening

not

state does

of infrastructure

the destruction

experience

and

war state.
disruption of domestic trade feltby the civil
can

wars

Second,

be

states

for external

less costly

because

war state to offset

they can exploit local resources in the civil
some

an

In recent years,

of the costs of intervention.

increasing

number of scholars have focused on the effect of lootable

resourceson theduration of civilwar.9 They argue thatparties
to civil war
that

often

gain
this access

having

the war

to resources

access

their

lowers

during
to
incentive

and

negotiate.

are prone to
Finally, negotiations inmultiparty conflicts
A fundamental problem with these approaches is that they
breakdown because of shiftingalliances between partieswhen
do not explainwhy the government cannot just include these
different issues are introduced. Because of the difficulties resources in a settlement to end the war. If a
does not
inherent

in

multiparty

combatants

bargaining,

have

incentives

to formcoalitions thatcan reduce thenumber of actors.Often,

some umbrella
insurgent groups form
on their behalf. These
negotiating
negotiate
organization
are
because
combatants
blocs
however,
unstable,
inherently
for example,

the various

issues areas.

Shifting

alliances

on

these

issue areas

lead coa

litions to break down. This dynamic makes itharder for all

actors

to agree

issues.
tiple
External
make

wars

to one

states
harder

specific

bargain
with

intervening
to resolve because

that encompasses
a separate
they

mul

agenda,
increase the number

of actors.Additionally, inmany cases itwill actually be more

difficult to induce external states to exit the conflict short of
exter
fullyachieving theirgoals because of differencesbetween
nal

states

and

internal

combatants

in

the

attractiveness

of

resources

tionally,

Negotiations in civilwar are affectedby each party's subjective

estimation of the expected utilityof negotiation versus contin
ued warfare. If combatants anticipate higher utility from con
tinuing to fight than from negotiating, the conflictwill drag
on. External states involved in civilwar generallyperceive low

no

If the
longer

to

ismore

applicable.

statesmight be willing to cede control of lootable

to domestic
to
even

a war,

to end

groups

grant external
if states offer

states

control

are
unlikely
they
over them. Addi

interveners

external

access

to

resources, the offer is less credible because ifthe state reneges

on the deal the external intervener can do little, short of
attacking
One

again.
way

external

that

can

states

bear

costs

higher

from

intervening in civilwar is if they face internationalpressure

to

withdraw.

Sometimes,

harshly
responds
In this case, it can

actors and negotiations

resources,

the war.

it would

negotiate.
the argument
states, however,

For external

While

not

incentive

after

as credible,

this commitment

put

international

the

to an external

negotiation.

External

an

have

resources

or all of these

some

sees

to continue

then,

it controls

because

the government should be able to offer to allow it to continue

group

inmultiparty conflicts can formdifferentcoalitions on differ

to stop
fighting

incentive

to control

to

ent

group

an

have

pressure

state
on

intervening
that external

community
in a civil war.
state

in the

formof sanctions or other economic disruption thatmay lead

it to quit the conflicteitherbywithdrawing entirelyor signing
some

9
&

agreement.

In the absence

See, for example, Collier, Hoeffler &

Lujala (2002).

of this international

S?derbom

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pressure,

(2004) and Buhaug, Gates

Cunningham 119
states

external

however,

internal

than

fighting

likely

to bear

lower

costs

from

bear

lower

costs

from

insurgents.
states
generally

external

Although

are

not necessarilymean that theywill be more

fighting,thisdoes
to
achieve
military victory.The probability ofmilitary
likely
victory

of war

the costs

and

are

factors

separate

the

affecting

not necessarily correlate.

expected utility of fighting that do
In many

civil wars,

interveners

external

and

groups

operate

in areas thatare geographicallyoutside of the reach of the state,

and the ability of the state to impose costs on them is low.
costs mean

low

These

that groups

incentive

little

have

may

to negotiate, even if theirprobability of victory is quite low,

and can lead to seemingly endless conflicts in which
to have
fighting continues even though neither side appears
much chance of defeating the othermilitarily (Cunningham,
Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009).
The benefitsof negotiating
In addition to facing lower costs from fighting,external states
are likely to perceive a lower benefit from negotiation than
domestic

groups. When

tlement,

the domestic

civil wars

in some

end
can

combatants

Like any theoretical assumption, this condition will not

hold

in all cases. However,

in most

interve

external

conflicts,

ners are sufficientlystrong that theyhave a significant

military
presence in the conflict.While rebel groups are often under
trained,may be undisciplined, and may not have advanced
equipment, states thatare capable of sending theirarmies into
other states generally have militaries that are relativelywell
trained,

organized,

and

disciplined
When
brought

an

and

effective

state has

external

preferences

and often represent a more

equipped
force than the domestic
combatants.
intervened

that are separate

in a civil war

and

from those of the internal

parties and ithas themilitary capability to block a settlement

to thewar, that state is likelyto see littleincentiveto stop fight
ing shortof achieving itsoverall goals. Its participation in civil
war, then,will lead those conflicts to drag on. This theoretical
leads

argument

to one main

wars with
Hypothesis: Civil
will be longer.

set

negotiated
transform

generally

to the conflict
An assumption
ending.
precondition
are
in this theoretical
is
interveners
that
these
strong
argument
to block
settlement.
enough

necessary

into

empirical

prediction:
external

independent

interventions

political movements that pursue their agendas through non

means.

violent

Often,
which

power-sharing
in the
subsequent

peace

contain

agreements

the combatants

give

This

government.10

for

provisions

large

share of votes
can

provision

External
Domestic

states,

in government
fore, either

with

have

are
an

not

do

contrast,

by

combatants

have

hesitant

extremely
state. External
external
to

to continue

pursue

their

this

power

states,

there

by partici

pating in the conflict or withdraw and return to using

foreignpolicy.The latteroption is certainlypossible; however,
it is notoriously
difficult for states to convince
other states to
course of action, and so external states have much
their
change

less ability to continue to influence politics in the civilwar

state after
they exit the conflict
a
and
peace
agreement
signed

than domestic
joined

groups

The dataset
To test thishypothesis, I need to differentiatebetween inter

that have

the government.

duration

This

discussion

that when

external

states

to resolve

and

caveat,

however.

This

therefore

longer. There
holds
argument
only

intervene

in

is one

important
states
if external

have themilitary capacity to continue thewar ifthe other par

ties

sign

a settlement.

If external

interveners

are such

10

effect

because

See Hartzell & Hoddie

ments in civil wars.

satisfying

their

preferences

has

an

indepen

interveners.

In

this

study,

I use Version

3,

2005 of the Uppsala/International Peace Research Institute

Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD).
The ACD dataset identifiesincidentsof violence involving
state actor

is not

calendar

(Eriksson & Wallensteen, 2004; Gleditsch et al., 2002). It

includes all conflicts thatbegan between 1945 and 2004 and

divides
systemic

these
wars'

(2007) for a discussion of power-sharing arrange

into four

conflicts
such

types

as anticolonial

interstate wars,

conflicts,

intrastate

'extra
wars,

and internationalizedcivilwars. In this study,I include all con

flicts from

marginal

participants in the conflict that the internalcombatants could

reach agreement and exclude them, then theywill not have the
same

intervener

in
that generate more
than 25 casualties
over
some
as
classified
year,
given
incompatibility
or
control over the central government
groups
territory, where
or
a
seeks secession
of
autonomy
piece of territory
particular

conflicts to pursue a separate agenda, the conflictwill be

harder

of

populations

at least one

of civil war
suggests

the

dent agenda. The firststep is to determine the population of

interventionsinto civil conflict.Empirical studies of civilwar
are complicated by the fact that there are
multiple datasets
available.11These datasets use differentdefinitions of conflict
and of combatants and so can lead to substantiallydifferent

The

in terms of whether

ventions

option.

to share

goals

analysis

Empirical

alleviate

groups' fears that theywill be excluded from decisionmaking

once they exit the conflict.

the last two

categories.

The ACD identifiesa listof participants in each conflict,by

year, for every conflict,divided into 'SideA' actorswhich are
broadly on the side of the government and 'Side B' actors
11
See Sambanis (2004) for a discussion of civil war datasets and of the
different results that they can produce.

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journal of Peace Research 47(2)

120

which are broadly opposed to it.Of the700 or so participants

in the internalconflicts in theACD data, most are eithergov
or domestic

ernments

insurgent

the ACD

However,

groups.

does identifyexternal states thathave amilitary presence in the

conflicts.

In this study, it is these actors that are the set of external

interveners into conflict. The ACD
identifies 60 external
actors thathave intervenedmilitarily into civilwars in the last
60 years.12The analysishere, then, is limited to cases of direct
military intervention.Limiting in this fashion leaves out an
set

interesting

cases

of

where

states

external

are

heavily

involved in civilwar even if they are not directmilitary parti

cipants.

However,

military

is the most

intervention

observable

form of intervention,and so the analysis is limited to those

cases.

Measuring goah of intervention

To properly test the theoreticalargument in thisarticle, I need
a measure

of the

of states

goals

in conflicts.

intervening

In par

ticular, thatmeasure needs to identifywhether the external

statehas an agenda in the conflictwhich is separate from that
of the other actors involved.Three methods are used to code
interveners

whether

bring

separate

agenda.

First, one indicator of divergent preferences is external

statesand their internalallies engaging in armed conflictover
theiragenda in the conflict. In theDRC, Rwanda and Uganda
shiftedtheirsupport to differentgroups over time,most clearly
by bringingLaurent Kabila to power in 1997 and then starting
a rebellion in 1998 aimed at overthrowing him. In Chad,

Libya engaged in armed conflictwith both the government

and many rebel groups after it annexed theAouzou Strip. In
theWestern Sahara conflict involving both Morocco and
Mauritania,

when

Mauritania

reached

peace

agreement

with

in 1979,Morocco responded by
the rebelgroup POLISARIO
Western
of
the
all
Sahara,
including theMauritanian
annexing
controlled

section,

and

continued

to

fight.

In the
long-running

conflict inAfghanistan, theUnited States intervened in the

1980s

to undermine

the

Soviet-led

government,

and

then

became involved again after the 11 September 2001 attacks

to overthrow
of

the Taliban-led

its former

allies.

Direct

government
armed

conflict

that included
between

many
external

states and their internalallies is relativelyrare,however, and

so it can only be used to code a handful of cases.

12

vast majority of these external intervenes are individual states.

lists all participants of a coalition as
in some cases, the ACD
However,
in
the Kosovo conflict of 1998-99, all
For
interveners.
example,
separate
The

states of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization are listed as 'Side

is treated as one external
In this study, however, NATO
intervener into the conflict. The assumption in aggregating allies such as

member
B'

actors.

NATO

is that the alliance members either would or would not collectively

a specific war end and that separate members within
would not make separate decisions about whether or not to

be satisfied with
NATO

continue thewar.

A second method is to look at stated demands. In some

states

cases,

indicate

ismoti

intervention

that their

explicitly

vated by goals other than the internaldynamics of the conflict.

intervention

Israel's

into southern

for exam

in 1982,

Lebanon

ple,was clearlymotivated by a desire toweaken thePalestinian

a state
there. However,
Organization
indicating
states
an
is quite
because
rare,
independent
agenda
an inter
to
intentions.
have incentives
their
disguise
Declaring
on the basis of
can open a state up
vention
independent
goals
so states are
to rhet
to
of
sovereignty,
likely
violating
charges

Liberation
that

it has

orically align themselveswith one of the internal sides of the

conflict, even if in practice theyhave differentpreferences.
Because

between

conflict

states and

external

their allies

and

expresseddemands can only be used to code a handful of cases,

I need a thirdmethod to identifythe goals of the remaining
interventions.

To

sources,

two main

using

these

code

cases,

examine

I use news

types. First,

historical
around

reports

the time of the conflict/intervention,such as Lexis Nexis and

an indication of
Keesing's Record ofWorld Events, that give
reasons

the perceived

for the intervention.

case

I use

Second,

histories written by scholarswho are knowledgeable about

these conflictswhich indicatewhat theybelieve thegoals of the
external

states

to be.

sources
in combination
allowed me to come up
Using
states to
measurement
of the reasons motivating
with a
general
these

intervene in conflict.Once I had this coding of goals of the

intervention, I looked for evidence of preference divergence

between
several

allies

the internal
clear

examples

the external

and

where

this

divergence

were

state. There
was

not

present.

In theCuban invasion of 1971, for example, theUnited States

- the
and its Cuban allies clearly had one common goal
of the government
as France's
intervention

removal
such

of Fidel

Castro.

in Gabon

In other

in 1964,

cases

Iran, Jordan,

South Yemen, and theUnited Kingdom inOman in 1965

1976, Zimbabwe inMozambique from 1976-1992, Russia
and Uzbekistan inTajikistan in 1992-1998, Zaire inRwanda
in 1990, and Guinea and Senegal inGuinea-Bissau in 1998
1999 - external states deployed theirmilitaries at the direct
request

of an allied

government

to

prevent

it from

over

being

thrown. In all, therewere 29 cases of interventioninwhich the

intervenerclearlywas becoming involved directly to help one
internal

actor

win

or

to

help

hasten

the

of

resolution

the

conflict.
There

were

another

12 cases where

intervener

the external

cases of
clearly had independent goals. These include the
in
in
Chad, Israel
DRC, Libya
Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola
in southern

Lebanon,

in theWestern

Mauritania

Sahara

con

flict, and theUnited States inAfghanistan. Additionally, the

list includesTanzania inUganda in 1979 (whichwas moti
vated by tension between Nyerere and Amin, rather than by
the internaldynamics of the conflict), aswell as South Africa
inAngola (discussed inmore detail below).
Between

two extremes,

these

however,

there were

a set of

cases inwhich itwas difficult to determinewhether the inter

vention

brought

separate

set of
preferences

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that would

have

121

Cunningham
to be satisfiedfor the conflict to end. Recall from the theore
tical argument that the importantdistinction iswhether an
that satisfied

agreement

intervener

the external
if an

Even

intervener

the
and

has

internal
therefore

somewhat

also satisfy
parties would
to end.
lead the conflict
different

over

preferences

the outcome of the conflict, if it iswilling to let itsally operate

and

negotiate

it does

freely,

not

an actor with

represent

sepa

rate goals thathave to be satisfied in the conflict.

In many

cases,

the

whether

determining

least

somewhat

the war.

may

situation

similar

from

goals
because

the governments

extreme,
freely.

separate

However,

arises

them

these

over

one

why

'quasi-independent';

is
is
and another
'clearly
independent'
arises because
of the diffi
that difference

culty inmeasuring the concept empirically. If similar results

are found using the two variables, then thatwould suggest that
the analysis is robust to differentmeasurements of the same

parties

on

the outcome
were

differences

Iwill brieflydiscuss an example tomake the above coding

discussion clearer.The Angolan civilwar of 1975-2002 had a
high level of external involvement.That conflict broke out
almost immediately after independence when three groups
that had worked together to oppose the Portuguese colonial
- could not
power theMPLA, UNITA, and theFNLA
agree

not

had the ability to operate

in the current US
involvement

have

the conflict and over what

strategy for pursuing
moti
look
the question
should
like.
However,
Iraq

settlement

post-independence

and

to war.

returned

The

became the government and fought a briefwar with

the FNLA and a decades-long war with UNITA.
The ACD
identifiesfour external interventions into the
war.
civil
Cuba sent 11,000 troops to support the
Angolan

MPLA

in the civilwar in Iraq. There are clear differencesof opinion

between theUnited States and Iraqi governments, both over MPLA
the correct

intervener

concept.

internal

would be allowed to negotiate independently (in the absence

of actually observing this behavior) is difficult. Examples
include interventionssuch as those by theUnited States in the
conflicts inVietnam and Cambodia. Although it supported
these governments, there is no question that theUSA had at
of

includes a number
of question
and the second
independence,
able cases. Therefore,
there is no theoretical motivation
for

Africa

in 1975, and these troops stayed until 1989. South

intervened

several

times

across

the conflict

to

support

and to oppose theMPLA, which had taken an anti

post-war
was
is:
if
here
the
the
able
vating
Iraqi government
coding
apartheid stance.Zaire supported theFNLA in 1975. Namibia
to broker a political compromise among thevarious competing assisted the government from 1999-2002, as itwas able to
factions that theUnited States did not find ideal,would the finallydefeatUNITA.
In the analysis for this article, the only interventionthat is
United States allow the compromise to go forwardor would
it continue fighting?
coded as independent is thatof South Africa. Zaire's involve
ment was verybriefand limited to
To deal with
I have created
these cases that are in-between,
providing logistical support
a

trichotomous

are

Interventions

coding.

as

coded

UNITA

non

independent, clearly independent, or quasi-independent. The

category

quasi-independent

USA

ner had
me

includes

those

cases

as

such

the

in Iraqwhere it isnot entirelyclearwhether the interve

a

separate

to code

ventions

agenda.
three different

that

are

clearly

This

trichotomous
one

variables,
independent,

allows

coding
includes

only
the second

inter
includes

both those that are clearly independent and those that are

directly

to FNLA.

venting

a fellow Marxist

Namibia

sent

troops

to assist

the govern

ment in itsdefeat ofUNITA but had littleother involvement

in the conflict.Cuba, while ithad a substantialforce inAngola
for 14 years, had little interest in the region other than pre
government

from

overthrown.

being

South Africa, on the other hand, had a strong interest in

undermining

anti-apartheid

governments,

and

so

its involve

ment inAngola
brought a separate agenda to the conflict.
a measure
non
reason
is
and
the
third
of
The
is coded as non-independent and South
Cuba
quasi-independent,
independent interventions.Appendix A includes a listof the Africa is coded as independent is that the assumption is that
are coded.
interventions
and how
theAngolan government had greater freedom to negotiate
they
to the
I
two caveats
are in order.
Before
with UNITA than vice-versa, even though both were heavily
proceed
analysis,
meant
is by no means
First, the 'non-independent'
coding
dependent on foreign support for theirmilitary viability. If the
to
are somehow
or
that these interventions
MPLA and UNITA had reached some negotiated settlement
altruistic
suggest
not self-interested.
are a
reasons
There
that compromised on ideological issues, it is unlikely that
variety of self-interested
states enter conflicts without
a separate
that external
Cuba would have used itsmilitary power to block implemen
bringing
states may
External
intervene to support a government
tation of that agreement.However, South Africawould likely
agenda.
that shares a common
the spread of
have remained involvedmilitarily inAngola as long as thegov
ideology, prevent
refugees,
ernment
there had a strong
stance, and there
support their ethnic kin, or prevent regional instability.The
anti-apartheid
is
a
outcome
distinction
whether
the
for
the
fore
important
goals
negotiated agreement that addressed the political
of the conflict between the external states and the internal dynamics of theMPIA-UNITA
conflictbut did not address
combatants are different,and if these goals aremotivating the that issuewould not have satisfiedSouth Africa and ended the
intervention.

The second caveat is that the theoryto be testedheremakes

no prediction about the relative
impact of the two variables
The firstvariable is sim
measuring independent interventions.
ply

coded

based

on

more

restrictive

conception

of

war. The assumption

motivating the coding, then, is that any
deal that satisfiedthe government ofAngola would have satis
fied Cuba, but that South Africawould not necessarily have
allowed any agreement to go forward simplybecause UNITA
was

willing

to

accept

it.

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of'Peace Research 47(2)

122_journal

measure of clearly independent

Statistical analysis
agendas achieves significance
at the 0.1 level (one-tailed test),while the
To testthe effectof independent interventionson theduration
quasi-independent
of civilwar, I use a Cox Proportional Hazards model regres measure does not. The coefficienton each measure of inde
is quite
that interventions
sion, one of a set of hazard models that examine the effect pendence
large, however,
suggesting
of covariates on the likelihood of observing some event (in this with an independent agenda prolong conflicts substantially.
a war

case,

at any
point

end)

in time,
given

that that the con

flicthas survived to that point. The Cox model does not

assume

a baseline

hazard

but

function,

rather fits the baseline

function to the shape of the data.13Here, theduration of civil

war

ismeasured

in

days.

data are not, in theircurrentform,well suited to

duration analysis because the dataset listsconflictsby calendar
The ACD

year

and

treats all

in the same

conflicts

governmental

country

as one conflict,
regardlessof how farapart in time theyare.To
address theseproblems, I use data fromGates & Strand (2004)
which indicate the startand end date foreachwar. This precise
dating

for a duration

allows

analysis

more

with

accurate

data

on the
dependent variable. To address the problem of recur
when

ring conflicts,

is a two-year

there

break

in

fighting

a new

conflict is coded.
Table I presents the resultsof severalCox regressions that
test the effectof independent interventionson the duration
of civil war.14 Models 1, 2, and 3 include themeasures of
intervention

in a 'core model'

agenda

which

also

includes

three

variables thatcould affectboth thepresence of an independent

intervention

and

of civil war.

the duration

First,

the presence

of lootable resources in the conflict could be an inducement

states

for external

to remain

in the war,

and

resources

lootable

have been found to prolong conflict.15Second, I include an

annual

measure

formed.16

More

of

the number

costly

conflicts

of battle-deaths,
may

be

shorter

log
(because

trans
par

ties have greater incentive to end them), and they also may
intervention
because
discourage
of
the costliness
intervening

state evaluates
the intervening
before
involved.
becoming

Finally, I include a dichotomous variable of the regime type

of the civil war
to intervene

because

state.17

to pursue

External
an

of the international

states may

be more

independent
agenda
costs associated
with

hesitant

in democracies
doing

so, and

regime typecould also affect the duration ofwar.

As can be seen fromModels 1 and 2, both measures of
with negative signs,and
independent agendas have coefficients
therefore

both

are

associated

with

longer

civil wars.

The

13
See Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004) for descriptions of hazard models
and their applicability to social science.
14
Because the analyses here include time-varying covariates, the individual
row observations in the data matrix cannot be considered independent of one

another. To address this problem, I use robust standard errors based on the
Lin & Wei
(1989).
generalization of the Sandwich estimator developed by
15
This variable, obtained from Buhaug, Gates & Lujala (2002), measures
whether there are any lootable resources
including diamonds, gems, and
various drugs - in the conflict zone.
16
This variable is from Lacina & Gleditsch (2005).
17
I created this variable based on the 'Polity2' variable from the Polity IV
dataset. It is coded 1 if the civil war state had a score of 7 or greater on the
Polity scale, and 0 otherwise.

in Model

contrast,

By

agendas

the measure

3,
near

is nowhere

of

statistical

non-independent
and

significance

the

coefficient is substantially lower than for either of the other

two

measures.

cannot

We

determine

independent
confidence.

These

results

the

effect

on

the duration

of war

show

that external

states

interventions

in conflict with an independent agenda make

substantiallymore difficult to resolve.
The

lootable

resources

measure

as

performs

of
with

non
any

intervening

civil wars

expected,

with

conflicts containing resources lasting longer.The number of

battle-deaths is significantin all threemodels, but in the oppo
site direction than expected - conflicts are less likely to end
when they have more battle-deaths.Models 1-3 show that
wars

last

longer

in democracies.

counterintuitive

This

finding

confirms that identified in previous studies (Cunningham,

2006; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009), but is one
forwhich there is no clear theoretical explanation. Further
exploration of the relationship between regime type and the
duration of civilwar is needed in order to understand this
correlation.

InModels 4 through6,1 add additional control variables to

theprevious tests.The variables included are thenatural log of

the civil war

is a

conflict

a measure
of whether
the
population,18
or territorial conflict,19
the
natural
governmental
state's

log of the country's gross domestic product per capita,20 the

in the civil war state,21

level of
fractionalization
ethnolinguistic
the proportion
countries
of
that are democra
neighboring
the con
variable
cies,22 and a dichotomous
indicating whether

flictyear took place during the Cold War. These variables

for factors

control

that have

been

identified

in the

literature

as influencing the duration of civilwar. Again, as in the core

both measures

models,

of

independent

agendas

are

negative,

and this timeboth are statisticallysignificant.In thesemodels,

the measures

cients

and

statistical
between

have substantially
of independence
larger coeffi
to achieve
measure
the non-independent
fails
again
These
show that the relationship
results
significance.
is
intervention
and
civil wars
independent
longer

robust to (and actually strengthenedby) the inclusion of vari

ables controlling for additional factors which influence
duration.
The

measures

of

lootable

resources,

battle-deaths,

and

democracy have similar effectsinModels 4-6 as in the 'core'

models. Of the other variables included, only themeasure of
18
This variable is fromGleditsch (2002).
19
This variable is a measure of the 'incompatibility' from theArmed Conflict

Dataset
20
This
21
This
22
This

obtained fromGates &

Strand (2004).

variable is fromGleditsch

(2002).
variable is from Fearon (2003).
variable is fromGleditsch & Ward

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(2006).

ELF
-0.058
(0.399)
-0.103
-0.149
(0.394)
(0.392)
-0.102
(0.395)
Incompatibility

0.57**

(0.105)
(0.104)
(0.103)
-0.024
-0.025
-0.026
GDPpc
-0.027
Log
0.555**
(0.191)
Log
population
-0.045
(0.068)
(0.067)
-0.036
-0.017
(0.069)
-0.044
(0.07)

(0.192)

0.561**

(0.188)

(0.187)
(0.186)
(0.185)
(0.183)
Cold
dummy
-0.156
-0.132
War
-0.126
-0.129

0.556**

(0.192)

Proportion
of
neighboring
0.329
(0.398)
(0.399)
0.301
0.325
(0.402)
0.297
(0.402)

(0.239)
(0.234)
(0.231)
(0.171)
-0.617**
-0.59**
(0.17)
Democracy
-0.668**
-0.604**
-0.611**
-0.683**
-0.689**
6
Model
4
7
532
1
-0.302**

(0.149)
-0.179**

-0.303**

-0.413**

(0.041)

(0.188)
-0.212**

(0.149)
(0.04)
-0.189**

-0.448**
(0.052)

-0.21

-0.462**
*

(0.053)

(0.18
-0.23**

Non-independent
0.132
(0.258)
0.078
(0.288)

Subjects
256256256
Failures
224
224
202
224
202
202
202
168
168

do-likelihood

(0.187)

-1023.313

Wald
Chi-square
40.89
37.54
37.99
53.10
52.99
48.55
51.79

-1024.191

-713.391

-1024.598

(0.429)
(0.289)
Quasiindependent
-0.822**
-0.304
Observations
1465
1465
1465
1223
1223
1223

Clearly

independent

(0.531)

-2.024**

(1.035)

-0752*
Table
Cox
I.
hazards
proportional
civil
of
duration
models
war
*significant

at 0.1

level,

Reported
coefficients
with
parentheses.
robust
standard
in
are
errors
at.05
**significant

Any
intervention
-0.428*
(0.283)

interventions
interventions
interventions

democracies

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

level,

one-tailed

tests.

124 journal ?/Peace Research 47(2)

Figure 1. Survival functions for conflictswith and without interventions

conflict incompatibility is significant,showing that territorial

conflicts

last

longer

than

those over government.

The

measures

of population, GDP, ethnic fractionalization,23theproportion

of neighboring democracies, and whether the conflict took
place during theCold War do not have a statisticallysignifi
cant effecton the duration of civilwar.
InModel 7, I rerun the analysiswith a variablemeasuring
whether

there was

any

external

intervention

in the conflict.

There is an established finding in the literaturethatmilitary

interventions

prolong

civil wars,24

and

the results here

are con

sistentwith thatfinding (although only significantat the 0.1

level).Notice, however, that the coefficienton the interven
tion variable is substantially smaller than for themeasures of

independent interventions.This finding shows that while

interventions in general prolong civil wars, independent

23
The

literatureon ethnicity and civil war suggests the relationship between

fractionalization and conflictmay be u-shaped. I reranModels 4 through 6
with the measure of ELF and its squared term. The effect of the measures
of independence did not change.
24
This result has been found in Balch-Lindsay &
(2002), Elbadawi &

Sambanis

Enterline (2000), Regan

(2000), and Regan & Aydin (2006).

interventions

have

greater

substantially

on

impact

the dura

tion of conflict.
To furtherillustratethe effectof thedifferenttypesof inter
ventions, Figure 1 shows the predicted survival functions of
civil wars based on Models 4-7, comparing those conflicts
with and without intervention.The survivalfunctiongives the
percentage of civil wars survivingbeyond a certain point in
time, measured

in

days.

Figure 1 shows that independent interventionshave a sub

Wars with a clearly
stantial effecton how long civilwars last.
an
intervention
have
independent
approximately 80% chance
of surviving to 5,000 days (about 14 years), as compared to
50% forwars with a quasi-independent intervention,almost
40% of wars with any intervention, and 20% of wars
with

no

intervention.

Additionally,

the presence

of a non

independent agenda has almost no effecton the duration of

war, since the predicted survival functions forwars with and
without

non-independent

interventions

are

virtually

indistinguishable.
The analyses in Table I and Figure 1 suggest that the
finding in the literature that externalmilitary interventions
prolong conflict isprimarilydriven by the presence of a subset

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

125

Cunningham
in which

interventions

of these

the intervener

has

an

as well

indepen

dent agenda. This analysis provides strong support for the

theoreticalargument developed in this article.

shown

that external

Several

theoretical

it has

'civil war',

world

been

military

prolong
for this effect have been

explanations

our

however,

civil wars.

interventions

of the

understanding

impact

devel

of interven

tion on civil war has been limited because we have not

examined

the full range

of roles

can

states

that external

play.

In this article, I have identifiedone factor thathas a major

effect on

the duration

intervene

in civil war

of civil wars:
to pursue

whether

an

states

external

independent

or

agenda

to

help the conflict end. The empirical resultsdemonstrate that

interventionswith independent agendas lead to substantially
longer conflicts, and that in fact this subset of interventions
is a major driving factor behind the general relationship
between

interventions

military

and

civil wars.

longer

The resultsof this studyhave implicationsforpolicymakers

interestedin resolvingcivilwars. Two primary implicationsstand
out.

First, because

the resolution

of

examine

should
external

these
these
external

conflicts,

to convince

the

pres

in its absence
is important because
criti
these states to leave. International

cism

interventions
of external military
and the lack of direct pressure
muted,

in civil wars
lowers

tends

to be

the chances

that

stateswill leave shortof achieving theirfullobjectives.

if the international

Second,

sary

states

to leave civil wars

to use

dimensions

If

closely.

international

community
through

negotiations
sequenced
of these wars. Assistant

cannot

itmay

pressure,
to resolve
Secretary

exter

be neces

the

Paper

separate

of State Crocker

in recent civil wars with

high
of external
involvement
such as those in Sierra Leone,
degrees
to address
the international
has shown a reluctance
community

the externaldimension. This study shows thatfailingto address

thisdimension can significantlylower the probability of resol
ving these conflictsand lead to substantiallylongercivilwars.

Replication data
The data used in this article,aswell as a codebook and do-file
for replicating the analysis, can be found at http://www.prio.
no/jpr/datasets.The statisticalanalyseswere conducted using
10.0.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Scott Gates, T. David Mason,
Ray,

and

Barbara

F. Walter

for comments

on

this

at the Peace

Lootable

(2002)

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Appendix A.
Interventions

Non-independent

Conflict
Cuba

vs. National
and Oman

Muscat

Council
Revolutionary
vs. State of Oman

vs. Communist

Party of Malaysia
Faction

Malaysia
vs.
Gabon
Military
Sudan vs. Darfur Groups
vs.
Military
Uganda
vs. PFLOAG
Oman
Oman

vs. PFLOAG

Oman

vs. PFLOAG

Oman

vs. PFLOAG

Angola

vs. UNITA

Angola
Angola

Faction/UNLA

vs. UNITA
vs. UNITA

Ethiopia (Ogaden)

vs. Renamo
Mozambique
vs. SRLP
Gambia
Rwanda

vs. RPF

Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan
Tajikistan
Tajikistan

vs. RUF

(Nagorno-Karabakh)
vs. UTO
vs. UTO

Bosnia-Herzegovina
vs. rebels
Congo
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau

vs. Croats

vs. Military

vs. Military

Faction
Faction

Conflictdates

Intervener

Side

15-19 Apr 1961

I July-31Aug 1957
31 Aug 1957-31 July 1960
18 Feb 1964
9 Apr 2003
23Mar 1974-31 Dec 1991
9 June 1965-31 Jan 1976
9 June 1965-31 Jan 1976
9 June 1965-31 Jan 1976
9 June 1965-31 Jan 1976
II Oct 1975-22 Feb 2002
11Oct 1975-22 Feb 2002
11Oct 1975-22 Feb 2002
1 Sept 1976-20 Jan 1984
1Nov 1976-4 Oct 1992
30 July1981-6 Aug 1981
1Oct 1990
3Mar 1991-10 Nov 2000
1Dec 1991-27 July1994
10May 1992-31 Dec 1998
10May 1992-31 Dec 1998
1Apr 1993-18Mar 1994
3 Nov 1993-17Mar 2003
7 June 1998-7May 1999
7 June 1998-7May 1999

USA
UK
UK

Rebels

France

Government
Government
Government

Chad

Government

Libya

Government

Iran

Government

Jordan
South Yemen

Government
Rebels

UK

Government

Cuba

Government

Namibia

Government

Zaire

Rebels

Cuba

Government

Zimbabwe

Government

Senegal
Zaire

Government

UK

Government

Government

Armenia

Rebels

Russia

Government

Uzbekistan

Government

Croatia

Rebels

Chad

Government

Guinea
Senegal

Government
Government
(continued)

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127

Cunningham

Appendix A. (continued)

Lesotho

vs.

Lesotho

vs.

Faction

Military

Uzbekistan
Central

African Republic

Clearly

vs.

Military

vs. rebels

Laos

vs. Pathet Lao

Laos

vs. Pathet Lao

DRC

vs. rebels

DRC

vs. rebels

DRC

vs. rebels

Chad

vs. rebels
vs.

Faction/UNLA

Military
vs. UNITA

Angola
Morocco

vs. Polisario

Afghistan(Taliban)
vs. rebels

Congo

Conflict
Iran vs. Kurdistan
Iran vs. Azerbaijan
of Korea
Republic

vs. Leftists

vs.

Royalists
vs. FNL

Vietnam

vs. Rebels
Iraq
vs. Rebels
Lebanon
Laos

vs. Pathet Lao

Laos

vs. Pathet Lao

DRC

vs. Rebels

DRC

vs. Rebels

Cambodia

vs. Khmer

Rouge

Cambodia

vs. Khmer
vs. Khmer

Rouge

Cambodia
Afghanistan

vs.

Rouge

Mujahaiden
vs. Serbs
Bosnia-Herzegovina
vs. Serbs

Yugoslavia

16 Feb
IMU

1999-30

28 May

2001-15

Faction

(Kosovo)

Government

Botswana

Government
Africa

South

KyrgyzstanGovernment
Government
Libya

Sept 2004
Mar 2003

13Apr 1975-10 Dec 1990

12Nov 1959-22 Feb 1973
12Nov 1959-22 Feb 1973
17Oct 1996-31 Dec 2003
17Oct 1996-31 Dec 2003
17Oct 1996-31 Dec 2003
I Nov 1965-30 Sept 2002
23Mar 1974-31 Dec 1991
II Oct 1975-22 Feb 2002
20 Jan 1975-15 Aug 1991
27 Apr 1978
3 Nov 1993-17Mar 2003

Intervener

Side

Israel

Rebels

North

Vietnam

Rebels

USA

Government

Angola
Rwanda

Rebels

Uganda

Rebels

Rebels
Rebels

Libya

Tanzania

Rebels

South Africa
Mauritania
USA-led

Rebels
Government

coalition

Rebels,

Government

Government

Angola

Conflictdates

Intervener

Side

1 Jan 1946-17 Dec 1946

1 Jan 1946-17 Dec 1946
15Aug 1948-25 June 1950
26 Sept 1962-15Mar 1970
1Apr 1955-31 Dec 1962

USSR
USSR
USA

Rebels

1May

vs. Rebels

DRC

Croatia

1998

interventions

Quasi-independent

Yemen

1998

Oct

Conflictdates

Conflict

Uganda

vs.

Oct

Interventions

Independent

Lebanon

4 Sept-14
4 Sept-l4

Faction

Military

Side

Intervener

Conflictdates
Conflict

2003

13Apr 1975-10 Dec 1990

12Nov 1959-22 Feb 1973
12Nov 1959-22 Feb 1973
17Oct 1996-31 Dec 2002
17Oct 1996-31 Dec 2002
17Oct 1996-31 Dec 2002
2 Apr 1967-17 Apr 1975,
3 Dec 1978-27 Feb 1998
2 Apr 1967-17 Apr 1975
2 Apr 1967-17 Apr 1975
27 Apr 1978
7 Apr 1992-14 Dec 1995
1 Jan 1992-14 Dec 1995
22 Apr 1996-3 June 1999

Rebels
Government
Government

Egypt
USA
USA-led

Government
coalition

Syria
South Vietnam

Government
Rebels
Government

Thailand

Government

Chad

Government

Namibia

Government

Zimbabwe

Government

North

Rebels,

Vietnam

South Vietnam

USA
USSR

Government
Government
Government

Yugoslavia

Rebels

Yugoslavia

Rebels

NATO

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Government

Rebels