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Abuan v. People, G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006, First Division, J.
Callejo
Facts: On May 5, 1998, Calasiao Police Station received information from an
informant Marissa Gorospe that Appellant Abuan was conducting illegal drug
activities in her house and is a known drug pusher. The officers searched the house
of appellant Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 and had the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing scale, aluminum foil,
and burner. Appelant claims that the search warrant was void because the
circumstances leading to its issuance were not based on probable cause but on
mere fabrications because Marissa Gorospe, the informant, is a fictitious person.
She and Gorospe were never employed by Avon Cosmetics and were not even
acquainted.
Issue: Whether or not the Search warrant issued is void because the circumstances
leading to its issuance were not based on probable cause but on mere fabrications?
Ruling: No. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
evidence seized by the police officers based on said search warrant may be
suppressed if the accused presents clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers made a deliberate falsehood. However, innocent and negligent omissions or
misrepresentation of a police officer or government informant will not invalidate a
search warrant. Even if the police officer or government informant may have
deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in his
affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish
probable cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for lack of probable cause.
People vs. Tira, GR 139615
May 28, 2004, J. CALLEJO, SR.
Facts:
At 2:35 p.m. on March 9, 1998, armed with search warrant, a team of policemen
proceeded to the Tira residence. The policemen found the prohibited and regulated
drugs under the bed in the inner room of the house of the appellants where they
also resided. They also found cash money amounting to P12, 536 inside a shoulder
bag placed on top of the television.
Issue:
Whether the appellants should have been acquitted because the prosecution failed
to prove that they owned the prohibited drugs, and that the same were in their
possession and control when found by the policemen.
Ruling:
It stressed that Connie and Amadeo Tira jointly controlled and possessed the shabu
and marijuana that the policemen found therein. This crime is mala prohibita, and,
as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive

possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.
Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.
People vs. Carlos dela Cruz, G.R. No. 182348
November 20, 2008, J. VELASCO, JR.
Facts:
In the morning of October 20, 2002, a team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once
there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-appellant. Boy Bicol
engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant was seen
holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer
pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended
accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing
scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. The RTC
acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but
convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in convicting the accused-appellant guilty
of possession of an illegal drug.
Ruling:
NO. He was not in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found inside a
room with shabu, not as the rooms owner or occupant but as a guest. There is no
question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that was subject
of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut.
Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not
disputed by the prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. The
prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu, whether in its actual or
constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant. Since accused-appellant was
not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicols nipa hut, his subsequent arrest
was also invalid. Thus, CA Decision dated November 29, 2007 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
P/Sr. Supt. Mabutas vs. Judge Perello A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817
City Prosecutor Togonon vs. Perello A.M. No. RTJ-04-1820
June 8, 2005, J. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Facts:
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817 was DISSMISSED by the Supreme Court
In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, respondent Judge explains that she did not
conduct any hearings on the motions/petitions for bail filed in the criminal cases
subject of the complaint because the crimes charged are not capital offenses as the
quantity of shabu involved therein was minimal. Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03082, and 03-288 all involve selling of less than 5 grams of shabu. Respondent Judge
believes that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a
controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable only

with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge
maintains that bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required.
Issue:
Whether or not there is ambiguity in the law as to the classification of
methamphetamine Hydrocloride?
Ruling:
NO. Supreme Court held that it can be noted that nothing in this provision indicates
the classification of the substance either as a dangerous or regulated drug. Under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride was specifically
mentioned as a dangerous drug. It is clear, therefore, that the lawmakers intended
to classify Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu as a dangerous drug.
Moreover, it would be absurd to consider methamphetamine hydrochloride a
dangerous drug under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and merely a precursor
under Section 5 of the same law.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENTAGENCY (GRs. 157870, 158633 and
161658)
November 3, 2008 J. Velasco Jr.
Facts:
Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of
Section 36 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar
as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election
in May 2004 elections, said mandatory drug testing imposes an additional
qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by the Constitution. No
provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c) (d) (f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm
as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also
violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or
employee deemed undesirable.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached. In addition
to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and
taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional.
Held:
Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not.
Ratio:
Section 36 (c) and (d) as to students and employees of private and public offices.
RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and

thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium,
among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in
the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the need for drug
testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individual's privacy interest under the premises. Just as in the case of secondary
and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec.
36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason.