Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11724

November 23, 1959

WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PETRONILO ARCANGEL and
ANTONIO D. BERNARDO, respondents.
Juan T. Chuidian Law Office for petitioner.
Amado A. Yatco for respondent Petronilo Arcangel.
Deogracias T. Reyes, Benjamin C. Yatco and Ernesto Pangalangan for respondent Antonino B.
Bernardo.
BARRERA, J.:

Ads By softonicThese petitions were filed by the Golf and Country Club, Inc., to review the decisions of
the Court of Appeals in two cases involving the same corporation. (CA-G. R. No. 15910-R and CAG. R. No. 15902-R). As the issues raised in said cases relate to the same principle of law, we shall
take them up jointly and resolve the questions assigned therein in a single decision. G. R. No. L11724, (CA-G. R. No. 15910).
Petronilo Arcangel, a former employee of the Golf and Country Club, Inc., filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila a money claim for overtime services rendered to said employer, for
unenjoyed vacation leave, moral damages and attorney's fees. The employer having filed its answer
to the complaint, the case was accordingly set for trial. At the hearing of May 6, 1955, however,
neither the defendant (employer) nor its counsel, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz appeared
notwithstanding the fact that they were duly notified of the hearing since March 22, 1955; hence, the
plaintiff was allowed to continue presenting his evidence without the presence of defendant.
On May 10, 1955, the lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff employee, awarding him a total
of P7,702.78.
On May 14, 1955, the law firm of Chuidian, on behalf of the defendant employer, filed a petition to
set aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding, mistake and excusable neglect, which
petition was denied by the lower court in its order of May 31.
The employer appealed from this order not from the decision on the merits to the Court of
Appeals claiming that the court a quo committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its petition
for relief. The Court of Appeals, finding no justification for the employer's failure to appear at the
hearing, upheld the order appealed from.

There is no disagreement as to the facts allegedly constituting the mistake, accident, or excusable
negligence upon which the employer's petition for relief was based. As put down in petitionerappellant's brief filed in theCourt of Appeals, and adopted by said court, they are:
The records of this case show that defendant-appellant (employer) was represented by the
law office ofBalcoff and Poblador and Cruz from the inception of this case up to May 14,
1955, when law Office Juan T. Chuidian filed its appearance upon being referred by law
office of Balcoff and Poblador on May 12, 1955 the copy of the decision dated May 10,
1955 of the trial Court.
"Sometime before May 5, 1955 the defendant-appellant Wack Wack Golf and Country Club
Inc., had manifested its desire to replace their counsel Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff
and Poblador in this case with Law Office Juan Chuidian. On May 5, 1955 Atty. Jesus
Sayoc of the undersigned law firm conferred with Atty. Angel Cruz of Messrs. Paredes,
Balcoff and Poblador for the purpose of securing the court file in this case and effect the
substitution of attorney. Unfortunately, Mr. Balcoff was not in the office at the moment and
attorney Cruz declared he had no authority to turn over to Law office of Juan T. Chuidian
the court papers and file in this case; besides, there were unpaid bill due Messrs. Paredes,
Balcoff and Poblador. Arriving at the office, Mr. Jesus Sayoc advised Mr. Juan Chuidian of
the reluctance of Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff andPoblador to turn over the court file of the
case to the former. In view of this development, Atty. Chuidian called up Atty. Balcoff by
telephone and it was agreed between the two gentlemen that inasmuch as Attys. Paredes,
Balcoff and Poblador were still the attorneys of record in the case, Atty. Balcoff would
sent a representative of his law office to appear at the hearing of the case of the following
day, May 6, 1955 in order to ask for postponement of the case. Consequently, nobody in
Law Office Juan Chuidian appeared in behalf of defendant-appellant on May 6, 1955 before
the Court. As a matter of fact, the records of the case were turned over to Law Office Juan
T. Chuidian only on May 13, 1955 after Law Office Juan T. Chuidian had received on May
12, 1955 through Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador a copy of the decision dated May
10, 1955 of the Court. On the other hand, Atty. Angel Cruz or any associate lawyer
of Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador did not appear for defendant-appellant on May
6, 1955.
We are with the Court of Appeals in the observation that as of May 6, 1955, the law firm of Balcoff
and Poblador and Angel Cruz were still the employer's counsel of record, the law office of Juan
Chuidian having entered its appearance in the case only on May 14, 1955. As such counsel of
record, said law firm must have known that, its impending relief as counsel for the defendant
notwithstanding, it is under obligation to protect the client's interest (which includes appearance at
the hearing) until its final release from the professional relationship with such client. For its part, the
court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record
until a formal substitution of attorney is effected. Thus, any agreement or arrangement such counsel
of record and its client may reach regarding the presentation of the client' case in the court is purely
their private concern. Proceedings in the court cannot be made to depend on them. The lack of
coordination or understanding between the two law firms in the instant case cannot be considered as
a legal excuse or falling within the ambit of excusable negligence to justify the granting of relief from
the order declaring the client in default, or as in the case, from a decision entered after presentation
of evidence in his absence.
Where the defendants were given every reasonable opportunity to try their case and no legal
excuse was presented for a further adjournment, and order denying defendant's motion to

set aside their default and vacate the judgment against them entered upon such default, was
proper. (Centerville Creamy Co. vs. Waxler, 30 N.T.S. 2d. 232, 262 App. Div. 1055.)
G.R. No. L-11724 (CA-G.R. No. 15902-R):.

Ads By softonicOn February 18, 1953, Antonino Bernardo, former official of appellant, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a claim against the Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. for overtime
pay, unenjoyed vacation and sick leaves from 1946 to 1951 and attorney's fees. As the employer
denied the claim, the case was set for trial.
At the hearing of May 12, 1955, after about 8 previous postponements, nobody appeared for the
employer although said defendant was represented from the commencement of the proceeding by
Atty. Angel Cruz and was duly notified of the hearing since March 26, 1955. Consequently, the
plaintiff-employee was permitted to continue presenting his evidence before the Deputy Clerk of
Court who was delegated for this purpose.
On May 14, 1955, the lower court adjudged the plaintiff entitled to the claim, and sentenced
defendant-employer to pay the total sum of P26,422.78.
On the same day, May 14, 1955, the employer represented by the law office of Juan Chuidian, filed
a petition for relief from the order authorizing the Deputy Clerk of Court to receive plaintiff's evidence
and for the re-opening of the case. The petition was later supplemented by another similarly praying
for the setting aside of the decision rendered therein, on the ground of accident or excusable
negligence. Upon plaintiff's opposition, these petitions were denied by the court in its order of May
31, 1955. From this order of denial, defendant employer appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
October 30, 1956, the Court of Appeals affirmed the disputed order, for the reason that under the
circumstances, there was no justification for defendant's counsel to anticipate that the justification for
defendant's counsel to anticipate that the Court would grant a motion for postponement of the
hearing of May 12, 1955.
The accident or excusable negligence referred to by the new counsel for defendant employer is
stated in the petition for relief filed in the lower court, thus:
1. That defendant heretofore had been represented by attorney Angel Cruz; that for certain
reasons the defendant recently contracted the services of law office of Juan T. Chuidian to
handle this case; in substitution of Atty. Angel Cruz, the appearance of the undersigned law
office has been filed with this Honorable Court on May 12, 1955;
2. That it was only in the afternoon of May 11, 1955, that the records of this case were sent
to the undersigned Law Office, and that Atty. Juan T. Chuidian was then out of town and,
consequently, nobody knew what action to take in this case;
3. That in the morning of May 12, 1955, Atty. Juan T. Chuidian telephoned the undersigned
law office and requested that one of the assistant attorneys appear at the sala in connection
with the scheduled hearing of the above-entitled case, and to move for the postponement
thereof on the obvious reason that the undersigned law firm was not prepared right then and
there to proceed with the trial of the case inasmuch as the facts of the case were not then
sufficiently known to any of the associate attorneys;
4. That when Attorney Suntay of the undersigned law office arrived at the sala of this
Honorable Court, he was informed that the case had been called earlier in the calendar and

in view of the failure of any person to appear in behalf of defendant, the Deputy Clerk of
Court was authorized to receive the evidence for the plaintiff;
5. The subsequent efforts of Attorney Suntay to suspend the reception of plaintiff's evidence
and postpone the hearing and proved fruitless; ...
From the foregoing facts, it is evident that Atty. Suntay's appearance (late by some 35 minutes) at
the hearing of the case was solely for the purpose of securing another postponement of the trial; that
his delay was brought about by the absence of the principal counsel in town, and by want of
instructions from the latter as to what action his assistants should take on the matter; that the
records of the case were only turned over to the new counsel on May 11, and that there was no time
to prepare for the trial. Under these circumstances, the employer's charge that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying its petition for relief from the order authorizing the reception of plaintiff's
evidence in the absence of the defendant and the judgment rendered in the case, is premised on the
ground (1) that counsel's tardiness or delay as well as his unpreparedness to go to trial are
accidental or may be considered as excusable negligence, and (2) that the trial court should have
allowed the motion for postponement.
Both points find adequate answer in the Court of Appeals ruling which we quote with approval:
The hearing on May 12, 1955 had been fixed, with the conformity of both parties, as early as
March 18, 1955. Not only that, but the verbal order issued in open court was supplemented
by a written order, copy of which was received by defendant's counsel on March 26, 1955.
On the date of the trial defendant was still represented by Atty. Angel Cruz as counsel of
record. Up to then there had been no substitution of attorneys, nor had Attorney Cruz
withdrawn his appearance in the case. Indeed the record does not show that he ever did
withdraw his appearance or filed a motion for substitution. The responsibility for representing
defendant at the trial on May 12, 1955 was therefore still his. On the other hand if it is true,
as alleged by appellant, that the services of Attorney Juan Chuidian had been engaged
sometime prior to May 11, 1955 then it was the latter's duty to file his appearance
opportunely and prepare for the trial on May 12, 1955. It is to be presumed that in accepting
the case Attorney Chuidian knew that the trial was to be held on that date; and he certainly
was not justified in accepting the case unless he was prepared to go to trial as scheduled.
He had no right to take for granted the liberality of the court or generosity of the plaintiff by
appearing, through an assistant of his, after the case had been actually called on the
calendar and while the evidence of the plaintiff was already being received, and then only to
ask (verbally) for another postponement.
All motions for postponement should be presented at such time as is practicable to prevent
the adverse party from incurring unnecessary expenses by coming to trial, otherwise
postponement shall be denied. And a party moving for the postponement should be in court
on the day for trial if the motion was not acted upon favorably before that day. He has no
right to rely either on the liberality of the court, or on the generosity of the adverse party."
(Moran on Rules of Court, 1952 edition, pp. 651-653, citing Linus vs. Robira, 61 Phil., 907;
Macondray & Co. vs. Paredes, G. R. No. 38255, Sept. 5 1933; Sunico vs. Villapando, 14
Phil., 352.)
In addition, the records of these two cases reveal that even prior to May 5, 1955, defendantappellant had manifested its desire to replace its former counsel Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and
Poblador with the law office of Atty. Juan Chuidian. If this were so, it was the bounden duty of both
law firms to have made the necessary arrangement for the protection of the interest of their client.
Their failure to do so cannot certainly be considered excusable neglect to the extent of making the

action of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals in denying relief based thereon, an abuse of
discretion constituting reversible error.
Although no longer necessary in view of the conclusions already reached and expressed, attention
may be drawn to the lack of the required affidavits of merit to support the petitions for relief. While
there are sworn statements on the alleged mistake, accident, and/or excusable negligence, there is
in G.R. No. L-11724, total absence of, and in G.R. No. L-11725, insufficient affidavit showing the
facts constituting the valid defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted. Even
in the latter case, the only reference made in the affidavit of the assistant lawyer in the law firm of
Atty. Chuidian, who as admitted in the pleadings submitted by them, did not know the facts of the
case, was the statement "that the defendant has genuine and bona fide defenses to the claims
interposed by plaintiff, more particularly set out in its Amended Answer dated August 4, 1954." This
amended answer is not under oath. Consequently, the mere incorporation thereof by reference
made by one who had no knowledge of the said defenses does not comply with the requirements of
the rules and decisions on the matter. The affidavits of merit must state facts, and not mere
conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. 1
Anent the question raised by petitioner in both instances regarding the legality of the lower court's
order authorizing the Deputy Clerk of Court to receive plaintiff's evidence, we again make our own
the Court of Appeals ruling, thus:
Defendant next contends that the trial court acted contrary to law and gravely abused its
discretion when it delegated the Deputy Clerk of Court to receive plaintiff's evidence. It
should be borne in mind that the delegation was made in view of the absence of defendant
and his counsel and that the function thus delegated was merely ministerial, namely, the
taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking down of whatever
documentary evidence would be presented. There could be no occasion for the exercise of
judicial discretion such as might have been called for if the other party had been present to
object to questions that were propounded or to the admission of exhibits. It cannot therefore
be seriously maintained that any prejudice was caused to defendant by the action taken by
the Court.
Wherefore, finding no error in the decisions of the Court of Appeals sought to be nullified, the
petitions filed in these two cases are hereby dismissed, with costs. It is so ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia,
and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Estrella vs. Zamora, 5 Phil., 415; Philippine Engineering Co. vs. Argosino, 49 Phil., 983;
Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A. C. No. 7421

October 10, 2007

ELISA V. VENTEREZ, GENARO DE VERA, INOCENCIA V.

RAMIREZ, PACITA V. MILLS, ANTONINA V. PALMA and
RAMON DE VERA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Ads By softonicBefore Us is a Complaint filed by complainants Eliza V. Venterez, Genaro de Vera,

Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon de Vera against
respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross Negligence
and Dereliction of Duty.
Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981 entitled, "Sps.
Daniel and Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al.," for Declaration of Ownership
with Damagesfiled before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Respondent
represented the complainants, who were defendants in said case, until a Decision thereon was
rendered by the MTC on 25 February 2004. The MTC ruled against the complainants. Respondent
received a copy of the said Decision on 3 March 2004.
Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion
for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. The 15day period within which to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration of the MTC Decision expired
on 18 March 2004. Complainant Elisa V. Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to
prepare the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed on 19 March 2004. It must be stressed
that the said motion was signed by complainant Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer did not
enter his appearance.
On 23 March 2004, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied1 by the MTC. Respondent
was not furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a Certification 2 issued by Clerk of Court II
Zenaida C. de Vera. On 31 March 2004, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution3 was filed by
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any
comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted 4 by the MTC
on 23 April 2004. On 28 April 2004, a Writ of Execution5 was issued and on 26 April 2004,
an Entry of Judgment6 was made in the said case.
Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his Notice of
Retirement ofCounsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.
Feeling aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant administrative
complaint against him.7

In his Answer,8 respondent denied the claim of complainants that soon after the Decision was
rendered by the MTC, they (complainants) directed him to file an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration thereof. For his defense, respondent averred that Salvador Ramirez (the son of one
of the complainants, Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed him that "he [was] withdrawing the case from
the respondent because he already engaged another lawyer to take over the case, so respondent
gave the records of the case to him." Respondent explained that "after Salvador Ramirez withdrew
the case from the respondent, and engaged another lawyer, the respondent turned over the records
of the case to him and the respondent ceased as the counsel of the complainants." Respondent
further alleged that the said Motion for Reconsideration was already prepared by another lawyer.
He denied being furnished a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration allegedly prepared and filed
by another lawyer engaged by complainant Elisa V. Venterez and that he was served with a copy of
the denial of the said Motion by the MTC. Respondent also clarified that the "last day of the 15-day
period for the perfection of the appeal is 19 March 2004 since a copy of the decision was served on
the respondent on 4 March 2004." Finally, respondent argued that "when the respondent was served
a copy of the Motion for Writ of Execution, he immediately notified Ramirezabout said Motion
but Ramirez came to see the respondent only on 3 May 2005, when the respondent asked him to
sign a Notice of Retirement of Counsel signed by Ramirez which respondent immediately filed in
court."
Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 15
February 2006.
On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,9finding respondent liable for gross negligence and recommending the imposition
upon him of the penalty of three months suspension, to wit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY of Gross Negligence and
should be given the penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution10 No. XVII-2006-457 dated 8 September
2006, approving and adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

Ads By softonicRESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of
gross negligence, Atty. Rodrigo Cosme is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.11
We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants
case, as would warrant disciplinary action.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.12Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle
that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is,
until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and
withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the

circumstances.13 Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client.14 This means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.15
The Decision in Civil Case No. 981 was rendered by the MTC of Calasaio, Pangasinan, on 25
February 2004. Respondent admitted16 that he was served a copy of the said Decision on 4 March
2004. After having received a copy of the MTC Decision, respondent did not bother to file a Motion
for Reconsideration or a notice of appeal with the proper courts. Thus, complainants were compelled
to engage the services of a new counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the MTC who did
not, however, enter his appearance as new counsel. It bears stressing that during this time,
respondent had not yet filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel for the complainants in Civil Case
No. 981. Respondent only formally withdrew as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 981 when
he filed with the MTC his Notice17 of Retirement as Counsel on 5 May 2004, on the ground that "he
was also retired as Counsel for the [complainants] two days after he received copy of the decision
rendered in this case when SALVADOR RAMIREZ, a representative of the [complainants], withdrew
all the records of the case from [respondent] to be given to his new counsel."
We cannot accept respondents defense that he had already withdrawn from the case two days after
his receipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly communicated this withdrawal to Salvador
Ramirez, son of one of the herein complainants, Inocencia Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the
part of respondent to wash his hands of any liability for failing to pursue any of the available
remedies to complainants from the adverse MTC Decision.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at any time with or without cause.18 The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. 19 Among the fundamental
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.20 He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause.21 A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the
client's written consent or from a good cause.22
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the
client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of
substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in
place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his
client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to
give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client
and adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application
for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.23
What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are identified under Rule
22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the
matter he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out
the employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.
The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither can the
circumstances of this case be considered analogous to the grounds thus explicitly enumerated.
Contrary to respondents contention, his professional relations as a lawyer with his clients are not
terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case to his clients. Respondents defense
completely crumbles in face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No.
981 and, hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to
terminate the latters services.
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however,
cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to
presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. 24 Until his withdrawal shall have
been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by
the court, to do what the interests of his clients require.25 He must still appear before the court to
protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client
relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.
Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel
of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw
from the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave his clients without representation. An attorney
may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the court
after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that the name of the new
attorney is recorded in the case.26 Respondent did not comply with these obligations. Therefore, he
remains the counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the duty to protect
complainants interest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the status of the case, he would
have known that he was still the counsel of record as no entry of appearance was ever made by
another counsel. It would have been easily discernible on his part that there was no change in his
status as complainants lawyer. As of that time, their client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting.
Therefore, he would have known that the Motion for Reconsideration was denied; and a writ of
execution had been issued under the circumstances.
All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest of
complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Respondent is reminded that the practice
of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the
Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.
1wphi1

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.27 In cases of similar nature, the
penalty imposed by the Court consisted of reprimand,28 fine of five hundred pesos with
warning,29 suspension of three months,30 six months31and even disbarment32 in an aggravated case.
The facts of the case show that respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer pursuant to the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a 3-month suspension from the practice of
law is a just penalty under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY.
RODRIGO R. COSME is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes

Rollo, p. 19.
Id. at 43.
3
Id. at 20.
4
Id. at 21.
5
Id. at 23-24.
6
Id. at 22.
7
Id. at 1-6.
2

Id. at 86.
Id. at 149-155.
10
Id. at 86.
11
Id. at .
12
Tan v. Lupak, G.R. No. 93707, 23 January 2001, 350 SCRA 74, 84.
13
Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.C. No. 4215, 21 May 2001, 358 SCRA 1, 9.
14
Philhouse Developmwnt Corporation v. Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 135287, 4 April
2001, 356 SCRA 281, 285.
15
Santiago v. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103, 7 September 1995, 248 SCRA 68, 73-74.
16
Rollo, p. 28.
17
Id. at 31.
18
Franciso v. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, 14 March 2006, 484 SCRA 571, 580.
19
Lim, Jr. v. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303, 15 June 2006, 490 SCRA 494, 514.
20
Orcino v. Gaspar, 344 Phil. 792, 798 (1997).
21
De Juan v. Baria III, A.C. No. 5817, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 187, 191.
22
Orcino v. Gaspar, supra note 20.
23
Id.
24
Orcino v. Gaspar, supra note 20 at 800.
25
Id. at 800-801.
26
De Juan v. Baria III, supra note 21 at 193.
27
Endaya v. Atty. Oca, 457 Phil. 314, 329 (2003).
28
Santiago v. Fojas, A.M. No. 4103, 7 September 1995, 248 SCRA 68, 75-76.
29
Basas v. Icawat, 393 Phil. 304, 310 (2000).
30
Ford v. Daitol, 320 Phil. 53, 59 (1995).
31
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Atty. Saquilabon, 337 Phil. 555, 559 (1997).
32
Mariveles v. Mallari, A.C. No. 3294, 17 February 1993, 219 SCRA 44, 46.
9

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 5834

February 22, 2011
(formerly CBD-01-861)
TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Ads By softonicThe case originated from an administrative complaint1 filed by Teresita D. Santeco against
respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a
deed of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
In an En Banc Decision2 dated December 11, 2003, the Courtfound respondent guilty of gross
misconduct for, among others, abandoning her clients cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to
comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed to return to
complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the amount of P3,900.00 which complainant paid her
for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which she never filed.

Respondent moved to reconsider3 the decision but her motion was denied in a Resolution4 dated
February 24, 2004.
Subsequently, while respondents five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect,
Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a
letter-report5 dated November 12, 2007 to then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock informing
the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein she
misrepresented herself as "Atty. Liezl Tanglao." When her opposing counsels confronted her and
showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded
that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three years and
that her suspension has already been lifted. Judge Amog-Bocar further stated that respondent
nonetheless withdrew her appearance from all the cases. Attached to the letter-report were copies of
several pertinent orders from her court confirming the report.
Acting on Judge Amog-Bocars letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution6 dated April 9, 2008,
required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file
the required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive to comment; otherwise
the case would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available records on file with
the Court. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court issued a
Resolution7 on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Resolution, and be it duly recorded in the
personal file of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance.8
A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondents address of record at "26-B
Korea Ave., Ph. 4, Greenheights Subd., Nangka, Marikina City" by registered mail. The same was
delivered by Postman Hermoso Mesa, Jr. and duly received by one Cadete on October 29, 2009,
per certification9 dated February 3, 2011 by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of the Marikina Central
Post Office.
Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29, 2009
Resolution based on a certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of
the Collection and Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Office. The said certification
reads:
This is to certify that as per records of the Division, there is no record of payment made by one
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment for
COURT FINE imposed in the resolution dated 29 Sept. 2009 Re: Adm. Case No. 5834. 10
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar.

Ads By softonicAs an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court
orders and processes.11

Here, respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as
she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Courts orders. She willfully disobeyed
this Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her
and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter,
when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended,
nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutionsfrom this Court. Neither did she pay
the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution.
We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment. 12 Sebastian v.
Bajar13 teaches
Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes
utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with
the Courts orders not "only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof." 14
1avvphi1

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in
the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit
to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct
and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

(On official leave)

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

(On official leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

On official leave.
Rollo, pp. 2-3.
Id. at 179-189.
3
Id. at 193-213.
4
Id. at 269.
5
Id. at 277.
6
Id. at 283.
7
Id. at 285-288.
8
Id. at 287.
9
Id. at 291.
10
Id. at 289. Dated December 28, 2010.
11
Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 479, 484, citing Villaflor v. Sarita, A.C.-CBD No. 471, June
10, 1999, 308 SCRA 129, 136.
12
Sebastian v. Bajar, A.C. No. 3731, September 7, 2007, 532 SCRA 435 and Cuizon v. Macalino, supra.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 449. Citations omitted.
1
2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6155

March 14, 2006

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS

M. JOAQUIN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Ads By softonicComplainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on 15 August 2003

against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross
misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23
entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of
the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed thePetition for Review on Certiorari (Ad
Cautelam) in the case.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned
petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners
therein.
The facts are as follows:
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin
(eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were
involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of
another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder
and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the
Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted
homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in
a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Motion for Leave
to Motion for Reconsideration, with the attachedMotion for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution
by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls
they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to
respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding
address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the
status of thead cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor
knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a
Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.

Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of
arrest5 had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts
remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from
lapsing.
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was
not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of
the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of
attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the
accused, and be present at the promulgation of theSandiganbayan decision.

Ads By softonicRespondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But
only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for
Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but
urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who
promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case
of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done
without proper and adequate remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the
last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file
the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the
corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused
for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that
it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on
his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for
handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional
opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to
PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and
complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to
Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter
through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and
endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately,
PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel
who would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have
been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
1 awph!l .net

The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner
Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant
Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were
declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8

The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner
Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility9 and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from
reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. 10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the
IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent
guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
1aw ph!l.n et

The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether
respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which
eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended
by the IBP proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher
duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which
stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v.
Sandiganbayan:11
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
profession in society. x x x12
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time.
Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion
for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known
that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading 13 and it rests on the sound
discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the
reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to
appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say
he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that
the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February
2002. This respondent does not dispute.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of
the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his
clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his
dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to
the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings 14 he
filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to
complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the Courts
Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least
inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to
check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he
opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about
the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case.

However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so,
he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is
presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal
himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the
appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to
go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so
doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to
Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave
them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It
should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of
his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case.
Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt
of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend
credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their
stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He
could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of
the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A
lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written
consent or from a good cause.16
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily
due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil17 that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.18
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without
adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim
when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the
amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account

number 7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited
amount.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties
and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words
of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:20
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. 21
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x 22
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation
embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains
unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor
cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting
incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police
officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M.
Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato." 23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the
latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the
culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is
unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the
most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such penalty
was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to
the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring
lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension.25The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the
case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Asscociate Justice

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 1-13.

In a decision dated 30 April 2001, penned by Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and concurred in by Associate
Justices Narciso S. Nario and Rodolfo G. Palattao. Id. at 26-54.
3
Dated 11 September 2001, id. at 80-87.
4
Id. at 123.
5
Id. at 124-126
6
Id. at 132-137.
7
Id. at 138-141.
8
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 12-14.
9
Particularly:
Canon 17A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
10
Report and Recommendation, p. 11.
11
330 Phil. 678 (1996).
12
Id. at 699.
13
The Rules of Court, which suppletorily applies to the rules of procedure of the Sandiganbayan, prohibits the filing of a
second motion for reconsideration as embodied in Section 2 of Rule 52 which states:
"Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
14
Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 56-74, Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration and the
Second Motion for Reconsideration, id. at 80-87, Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, supra note 7,
Petition for Review on Certiorari Ad Cautelam, rollo, pp. 103-122.
15
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys.An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written
consent of his client filed in court. x x x
16
Orcino v. Gaspar, 344 Phil. 792, 798 (1997).
17
373 Phil. 612 (1999).
18
Id. at 618, citing Santiago v. Fojas, 248 SCRA 68, 73-74.
19
Annex "J" of complainants Position Paper, rollo, vol. 2, p. 110.
20
432 Phil. 840 (2002).
21
432 Phil. 840, 843 (2002).
22
Spouses Rabanal v. Atty. Tugade, 432 Phil. 1064, 1068 (2002), citing Dee v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 651 (1989).
23
Rollo, p. 136 and Vol. 2, id. at 120.
24
Rule 14.01A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latters race, sex, creed or status
of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
25
Edquibal v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 5687, 3 February 2005, 450 SCRA 406.
2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO
ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for petitioner.
Arturo A. Alafriz & Associates for and in their own behalf.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos.
08265-08268 1affirming the order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's fees and directing herein petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil cases, to pay its
attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates, movant therein, the amount of
P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.
The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private respondent handled the
above-mentioned civil cases before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X,
XIII, XIX, XX AND XXIV) in behalf of petitioner. 2 The civil cases were all for the declaration of nullity of
certain deeds of sale, with damages.
The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are undisputed and are hereinunder
set forth as found by the trial court and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court. A
certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a
total area of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the
petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation.
The obligors having defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates of sale were
issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser thereof Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit,
fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the parcels of land, brought
suits against Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.

Ads By softonicIt was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner
to its sister corporation,Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. On
the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Commercial and Construction
Corporation for the purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June 7, 1983, Herby
mortgaged the same properties with Bancode Oro for P9,200,000.00. The lower court found that
private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land toCorporation, petitioner filed an urgent
motion for substitution of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on August 16,
1983 a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant
to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual
and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice,
petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the

same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the
certificates of title of the parcels of land.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases, which had been consolidated
and were pending before the Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints therein,
which motion the lower court granted with prejudice in its order dated September 5, 1983. On
December 29, 1983, the same court ordered theRegister of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens
of private respondent on the derivative titles which cancelledCertificates of Title Nos. 453093 to
453099 of the original seven (7) parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.
On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum
meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984,
petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the
amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash
advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears
that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit,
offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order assailed on appeal before respondent
court, granting payment of attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive
portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby granted and the Bank and Trust
Company (METROBANK) and Commercial and Construction Corporation 4 are
hereby ordered to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz and Associates the amount of
P936,000.00 as its proper, just and reasonable attorney's fees in these cases. 5
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its decision promulgated on
February 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the
same was denied in a resolution promulgated on November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.
The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present petition may be formulated thus: (1)
whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its
attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien
and (3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current
market values of the litigated properties on aquantum meruit basis.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging
lien in the civil cases before the court below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were
not, in the words of Section 37, Rule 138, judgments for the payment of money or executions issued
in pursuance of such judgments. 6
We agree with petitioner.
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused
a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court
rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written

notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have
the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would
have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of
attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in
pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A
lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action
in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the
fee is to be paid. 7
In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of
the frill satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor
made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein.
This being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is
flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an
ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.
In point is Morente vs. Firmalino, 9 cited by petitioner in support of its position. In that case, movantappellant attorney sought the payment of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint for
injunction which was dismissed by the trial court after the approval of an agreement entered into by the
litigants. This Court held:
. . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage by virtue of the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, it follows that no sum can be awarded the defendant for
damages. It becomes apparent, too, that no amount having been awarded the
defendant, herein appellant's lien could not be enforced. The appellant, could, by
appropriate action, collect his fees as attorney.
Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to the "proceeds of a judgment of
whatever nature," 10 relying on the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares 11 and some
American cases holding that the lien attaches to the judgment recovered by an attorney and the proceeds
in whatever form they may be. 12

Ads By softonicThe contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is true that there are
some American cases holding that the lien attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the
statutory rules on which they are based and the factual situations involved therein are neither
explained nor may it be said that they are of continuing validity as to be applicable in this jurisdiction.
It cannot be gainsaid that legal concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of variegations or
nuances upon adoption by other jurisdictions, especially those with variant legal systems.
In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the American cases it cited
expressly declares that "in the absence of a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise,
the general rule is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his client, notwithstanding such
attorney has, with respect to the land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the title
of his client thereto, recovered title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended
successfully such client's right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack," 13 as is the
situation in the case at bar. This is an inescapable recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other
jurisdictions thereby resulting in doctrinal rulings of converse or modulated import.
To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging lien attaches only to
judgments for money and executions in pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec

verba. The language of the law is clear and unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says, barring any necessity for elaborate interpretation. 14
Notably, the interpretation, literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case
law despite the dearth of cases on all fours with the present case. In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et
al., 15 the Court had the occasion to rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to
the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution." In Ampil
vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al., 16 the Court once again declared that a charging lien "presupposes that the
attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands
vs. Ababa, et al., 17 we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for
delivery of real property as in the instant case."
Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private respondent,
there was an express declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in
litigation."
Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client from the
adverse party in any action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not
extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. 18 More specifically, an attorney merely
defeating recovery against his client as a defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in
litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client's title to
property already in the client's
possession. 19
While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case,
terminating the services of his counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or
compromising his action, 20this rule cannot find application here as the termination of the cases below
was not at the instance of private respondent's client but of the opposing party.
The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion which
amply demonstrates that private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien.
Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is
within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is
settled. 21 There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition to determine
attorney's fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated. 22 These decisional rules, however,
apply only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the rules.
On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or interfere with
the authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a
proper proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main
action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The
persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the
question of their propriety or amount. 23Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject
matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of
the lawyer. 24 These are aside from the several other considerations laid down by this Court in a number

of decisions as pointed out by respondent court. 25 A determination of all these factors would
indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce evidence
to establish its right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.

Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as imposing an unnecessary burden on

private respondent in collecting the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise
of any other right conferred by law, the proper legal remedy should be availed of and the procedural
rules duly observed to forestall and obviate the possibility of abuse or prejudice, or what may be
misunderstood to be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the legal profession.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy
a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which
it is subject to State regulation. 26
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private
respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, with Justices Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Bonifacio A.
Cacdac, Jr., concurring.
2 Rollo, 27.
3 Ibid., 27-28.
4 The present petition is concerned only with one-half (1/2) of the disputed judgment of P936.000.00 of
P468,000.00, rendered against petitioner. The one-half (1/2) part of said judgment rendered against Herby
Commercial and Construction Corporation became final and executory after it failed to appeal seasonably.
5 Rollo. 28-29.
6 Petition, 10; Rollo, 16.
7 Quirante vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73886, January 31, 1989, citing Lichauco vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 123 (1975') and Otto Gmur, Inc. vs, Revilla, 55 Phil 627 (1936).
8 Original Record, Volume II. 770-771.
9 71 Phil. 49 (1940).
10 Comment, 7; Rollo, 72.
11 107 Phil. 560 (1960).
12 7A C.J.S. 752.
13 7A C.J.S., 756.
14 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, et al., 24 SCRA 708 (1968).
15 105 Phil. 194 (1959).
16 34 SCRA 370 (1970).
17 88 SCRA 513 (1979).
18 Holmes vs. Waymire 84 P 558 (1906).
19 Wessinger vs. Sturkie, 77 F (2d) 751 (1935).
20 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., 371-372.
21 Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. Henares, supra.
22 Palanca vs. Pecson, 94 Phil. 419 (1954).
23 Agpalo, op. sit., 846.
24 Section 24 Rule 138, Rules of Court.
25 Respondent Court admits in its decision that, in line with our decisions, the following factors have to be
considered, to wit: the amount and character of services rendered, the labor, time and trouble involved, the
nature and importance of the litigation, the responsibility involved, the amount of money or value of property

affected, the skill and experience called for in the legal services, the professional and social standing of
counsel, the results secured, and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent (Rollo, 36).
26 Canlas vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 SCRA 160 (1988), per Sarmiento, J.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 120634 December 3, 1999

FLORA DORONILA-TIOSECO, BENJAMIN DORONILA, JR.,

SALVADOR DORONILLA, and SOLEDAD DUNGCADORONILA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE WILLIAM M. BAYHON, and
RAMON A. GONZALES, respondents.

PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 2
As a result of dispute among the heirs of the late Doronila and their counsel, Gonzales, over his
claim for attorney's fees, on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila 3 denied the
heirs' Motion to Cancel Attorney's Lien and declared Ramon Gonzales entitled to ten per cent (10%) of
the shares of the heirs of the late Alfonso J. Doronila, including Salvador Doronila, who did not hire the
services of Ramon Gonzales.
In due time, petitioners and respondent Gonzales both appealed the trial court's ruling to
the Court of Appeals. 4
After the appeals of both petitioners and respondent Gonzales had been perfected, on November
29, 1993, respondent Gonzales filed with the trial court a motion to annotate attorney's lien,
praying that his attorney's lien be annotated on the title of parcels of land of the estate which the
heirs of the late Alfonso J. Doronila had inherited.

On December 3, 1993, the administrator of the estate filed with the trial court an opposition to the
motion pointing out that an attorney's lien does not extend to land and that the proper remedy for the
misgivings of Atty. Ramon Gonzales that the heirs of the late Alfonso J. Doronila might dispose of
their property was to ask for preliminary attachment. 5
On April 22, 1994, the trial court granted respondent's motion to annotate attorney's lien.
On May 20, 1994, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that
the opposition of petitioners had also adopted the arguments of the estate administrator. 6
On June 15, 1994, respondent Gonzales filed with the trial court an opposition to the motion.
On July 4, 1994, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

On August 29, 1994, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing
the Orders of April 22, 1994 and July 4, 1994 in Special Proceedings No. 144406 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila, granting the motion to annotate in the titles of land belonging to the
estate the attorney's lien of respondent Gonzales. 9
On March 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision denying the petition for certiorari, as
set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.
Hence, this petition. 10
On July 26, 1999, we gave due course to the petition. 11
The issues raised are:
1. Whether or not the trial court retained jurisdiction to grant respondent Ramon
Gonzales' Motion to Annotate Attorney's Lien on the title of parcels of land of the
estate after the perfection of the appeal of both petitioners and respondent from the
order declaring Gonzales entitled to attorney's fees of ten (10%) percent of the
shares of the heirs in the estate, and
2. Whether or not an attorney's lien extends to land.
Resolving the issues:
First Issue.
At the time the trial court issued on April 22, 1994 the order granting respondent's motion to annotate
attorney's lien, both petitioners and respondent Gonzales had perfected their appeal from the
orders of July 3, 1991 and December 14, 1992, which denied petitioner's motion to cancel attorney's
lien and ruled that respondentGonzales was entitled to ten per cent (10%) of the shares of the
heirs who were his clients. Thus, the trial court had no more jurisdiction over the case and had no
authority to act on the motion to annotate attorney's lien. 12
The order of April 22, 1994 cannot be justified on the ground that it was for the protection and the
preservation of the rights of parties not involved in the appeal. The order practically executed the

claim of respondent Gonzalesthat he is entitled to attorney's fees. In effect, the trial court granted
execution pending appeal, without any special reason to do so.
Second Issue.
We have ruled that an attorney's "lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the
litigation." 13
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35003. In lieu thereof, the Court ANNULS the orders dated April 22,
1994 and July 4, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila, in Special Proceedings No.
144406.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Footnotes
1 In CA-G.R. SP No. 35003, promulgated on March 23, 1995, Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., ponente, and Justices Corona
Ibay-Somera and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring.
2 Petition, Annex "P", Rollo, pp. 115-121.
3 Then presided over by Judge William M. Bayhon, now retired.
4 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 42773.
5 Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 24-27.
6 Petition, Annex "I", Rollo. pp. 52-54.
7 Petition, Annex "J", Rollo, pp. 55-58.
8 Petition, Annex "K", Rollo, p. 59.
9 Petition, Annex "L", Rollo, pp. 60-67.
10 Petition filed on July 4, 1995, Rollo, pp. 2-17.
11 Rollo, pp. 199-200.
12 Rule 41, Section 9, 1964 Revised Rules of Court; Riego vs. Leachon, Jr., 268 SCRA 777, 784 [1997].
13 Metropolitan Bank and Company vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 367, 375 [1990], citing Holmes vs. Waymire, 84 P
558 [1906].

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 117438 June 8, 1995

RAUL SESBREO, petitioner,

vs.
HON, COURT OF APPEALS, and PATRICIA GIAN, SOTERO BRANZUELA,

ANDRES C. YPIL, SANTIAGO BACAYO, BRIGIDO COHITMINGAO, VICTORINO DINOY,

GUILLERMO MONTEJO and EMILIO RETUBADO,respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Of interest to all law practitioners is the issue at bench, namely, whether the Court of Appeals had
the authority to reduce the amount of attorney's fees awarded to petitioner Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo,
notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by private respondents.
The antecedent facts of the case follow.
Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and then Espina for reinstatement and
backwages. 1 Herein petitioner, Raul H. Sesbreo, replaced the employees' former counsel Atty. Catalino
Pacquiao.
Thirty-two of the fifty-two employees signed two documents whereby the former agreed to pay
petitioner 30% as attorney's fees and 20% as expenses to be taken from their back salaries.
On September 12, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the Province of Cebu to
reinstate the petitioning employees and pay them back salaries. Said decision became final and
executory after it was affirmedin toto by the Court of Appeals and the petition to review the
appellate decision, denied by this Court in 1978. 2
A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties below in April 1979 whereby the former
employees waived their right to reinstatement among others. Likewise, pursuant to said compromise
agreement, theProvince of Cebu released P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through
petitioner as "Partial Satisfaction of Judgment." The amount represented back salaries, terminal
leave pay and gratuity pay due to the employees.
Sometime November and December 1979, ten employees, herein private respondents, 3 filed
manifestations before the trial court asserting that they agreed to pay petitioner 40% to be taken only from
their back salaries.
The lower court issued two orders, with which petitioner complied, requiring him to release
P10,000.00 to each of the ten private respondents and to retain 40% of the back salaries pertaining
to the latter out of the P2,300,000.00 released to him.
On March 28, 1980, the trial court fixed petitioner's attorney's fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal
leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies
paid to the employees.
Private respondents' motion for reconsideration was granted and on June 10, 1980, the trial court
modified the award after noting that petitioner's attorney's lien was inadvertently placed as 60%
when it should have been only 50%. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the order of this Court fixing 60% as
attorney's fee[s] ofAtty. Sesbreo should be 50% of all monies which the
petitioners (Suico, et al.) may receive from the Provincial Government.

Obviously not satisfied with the attorney's fees fixed by the trial court, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services before the Court, reimbursement
for expenses and a clear statement that the fee be likewise taken from retirement pay awarded to his
clients. Unfortunately, the respondent appellate court did not agree with him as the generous award
was further reduced. 4
The appellate court noted that in this jurisdiction, attorney 's fees are always subject to judicial
control and deemed the award of 20% of the back salaries awarded to private respondents as a fair,
equitable and reasonable amount of attorney's fee. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order is MODIFIED. The attorney's fees due Atty.
Raul Sesbreo is fixed at an amount equivalent to 20% of all back salaries which
the Province of Cebu has awarded to herein 10 petitioners. 5
Hence this petition for review where he claims that attorney's fees amounting to 50% of all monies
awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with prevailing case
law and the contract of professional services between the parties. He adds that since private
respondents did not appeal, they are not entitled to affirmative relief other than that granted in the
regional trial court.
We find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals and vote to deny the petition.
Respondent court found that the contract of professional services entered into by the
parties 6 authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the employees' back salaries only. The trial
court, however, fixed the lawyer's fee on the basis of all monies to be awarded to private respondents.
Fifty per cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the provincial government,
according to the Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to the
contract of professional services. 7 After considering the facts and the nature of the case, as well as the
length of time and effort exerted by petitioner, respondent court reduced the amount of attorney's fees
due him.
It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney's fees is always subject to
judicial control. 8 A lawyer is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in
administering impartial justice between the parties. When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the
authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control. 9
As stated by the Court in the case of Sumaong v. Judge: 10
A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client's cause and a trustee of his client in
respect of the client's cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost,
an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of administering
justice in society. It follows that a lawyer's compensation for professional services
rendered are subject to the supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the
fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the
services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney 's oath as an officer of the
court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to
professional fees. 11
In the case at bench, the parties entered into a contingent fee contract. The Agreement provides:

WE, the undersigned petitioners in the case of POLICRONIO BELACHO, ET AL.,

VS. RENE ESPINA ET AL., hereby agree to pay Atty. Sesbreo, our lawyer, the
following to be taken from our back salaries:
30% as attorney's fees
20% as expenses
That we enter into agreement in order to be paid our back salaries as early as
possible and so that we may be reinstated as early as possible.
A stipulation on a lawyer's compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily
controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such
stipulated amount unreasonable unconscionable. 12
A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction 13 and is generally recognized as valid and
binding but must be laid down in an express contract. 14 The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by
the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or
litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees in consideration of the risk
that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.
Contingent fee contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that
clients may be protected from unjust charges. 15 Its validity depends in large measure on the
reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the circumstances of each case. 16
When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is unreasonable or
unconscionable, or found to have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence or suppression of
facts on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said contract be disregarded to protect
the client from unreasonable exaction. 17
Stipulated attorney's fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate
compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client.
This means to say that the amount of the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would
be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had
been perpetrated on him. 18
The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee
contract, will not however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the court's fixing a reasonable
amount for the lawyer's services.
Courts may always ascertain, if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable
under the circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as the basis
for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract. Factors such as the time
spent and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of
the subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance
of the proffered case; customary charges for similar services; amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of employment; and
professional standing of the lawyer, are considered in determining his fees. 19
There is nothing irregular about the respondent court's finding that the 50% fee of petitioner is
unconscionable As aptly put by the court:

It effectively deprives the appellees of a meaningful victory of the suit they have
passionately pursued. Balancing the allocation of the monetary award, 50% of all
monies to the lawyer and the other 50% to be allocated among all his 52 clients, is
too lop-sided in favor of the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a commercial
venture, rather than a noble profession.
. . . Also, the 52 employees who are the plaintiffs in the aforementioned civil case
were dismissed from employment, their means of livelihood. All 52 hired claimantappellant as counsel so that they could be reinstated and their source of income
restored. It would, verily be ironic if the counsel whom they had hired to help would
appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of the total amount collectible by these
employees. Here is an instance where the courts should intervene. 20
Considering the nature of the case, which is a labor case, the amount recovered and petitioner's
participation in the case, an award of 50% of back salaries of his 52 clients indeed strikes us as
excessive. Under the circumstances, a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement in this
case. In any event, this award pertains only to the ten private respondents herein. Petitioner has
already been compensated in the amount of 50% of all monies received, by the rest of his clients in
the case below.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 Policronio Belacho, et al. v. Gov. Rene Espina, et al., Civil Case No. R-11204, Court of First Instance, Branch
VI, Cebu City.
2 G.R. No. L-49076, November 22, 1978 cited in Province of Cebu v. Torres, G.R. No. L-76950, December
15, 1988, 168 SCRA 493.
3 Jose Suico, Emilio Retubado, Patricio Gian, Sotero Branzuela, Andres Ypil, Santiago Bacayo, Brigido
Cohitmingao, Victorino Dinoy, Guillermo Montejo and Timoteo Montejo.
4 Decision dated January 31, 1994, in CA G.R. CV No. 26226, penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero
and concurred in by Justices Cezar D. Francisco and Manuel C. Herrerra; Rollo, p. 34.
5 Rollo, p. 40.
6 Rollo, p. 38, citing Exhibits "F" and "G".
7 Rollo, pp. 38-39.
8 Roldan v. CA, G.R. No. 97006, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 713; Ramos v. Bidin, G.R. No. L-53650 &
55460, May 28, 1988, 161 SCRA 561; Mambulao Lumber v. PNB, G.R. No. 22973, January 30, 1968; Gorospe
v. Gochangco, 106 Phil. 425.
9 Cruz v. CIR, G.R. No. L-18277, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 826.
10 G.R. No. 78173, October 26, 1993, 215 SCRA 136 citing Ramos v. Bidin, supra and Gorospe v.
Gochangco, supra.
11 Ibid., at pp. 143-144.
12 Rule 138, Section 24, Revised Rules of Court; Francisco v. Matias, G.R. No. 16349, January 31, 1964, 10
SCRA 89; Lopez v. Pan American Airways, G.R. No. L-22415, March 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 431.
13 Armovit v. CA, G.R. No. 90983, September 27, 1991, 202 SCRA 16.
14 Corpus v. CA, G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980, 98 SCRA 424.
15 Canons of Professional Ethics, Section 13, adopted by the Association in 1917 and in 1946; Dir. of Lands
v. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26092, February 27, 1979, 88 SCRA 513; Integrated Construction Services v. Relova,
G.R. No. L-36424, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 638; Ulanday v. MRR, 45 Phil. 540.
16 Amalgamated Laborers Association v. CIR, G.R. No. L-23467, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1266; Recto v.
Harden, 100 Phil. 427.

17 Ulanday v. MRR, supra; Felices v. Madrilejos, 51 Phil. 24; Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Gorospe v.
Gochangco, supra.
18 High Point Casket Co. v. Wheelers, 19 A.L.R. 391, cited in ANNOTATIONS ON LEGAL ETHICS 244 (1st
ed., 1983).
19 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 20, Rule 20.1 promulgated June 21, 1988.
20 Rollo, pp. 38-39.