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1. MI5s propaganda initiatives details cannot be made public because of sensitivities, Pat
Finucane was included in these projects though so must address the issue:
2.
15.9 It is clear that by the 1980s there was a widespread feeling across the
security forces and the UK Government that such propaganda needed to be
countered. My Review has had access to a range of internal Government
documents outlining the discussions of the need for what was described as
'Counter-Action'. Counter-Action appears to have been described as the
use of either overt or covert means to provide truthful rebuttals of terrorist
propaganda or to expose the damaging effects of terrorism. A Northern
Ireland Office (NIO) Information Strategy Group was tasked with coordinating the Government's presentational strategy. This group considered
the Government's strategy in responding to specific controversial security
incidents and the presentation of its wider political and economic message.
3.
to my Review were taken forward by the Service of their own volition and
without reference to the NIO Information Strategy Group.
15.13 The Security Service used a variety of methods and conduits through
which to disseminate the propaganda. The nature of the propaganda being
disseminated varied. Some of the propaganda involved, for example,
highlighted the damaging effect of PIRA murders and attacks. In other
instances, the propaganda was targeted more directly at discrediting
specific PIRA figures.
15.14 Security Service officers later referred to the dissemination of
information within the loyalist community, in such a way that it would be
likely to become known by PIRA figures, as having the potential to make
"an impact on the republican target." However, whilst the focus of the
propaganda was aimed at PIRA, it is also clear that the initiatives were not
particularly focused or controlled. The initiatives certainly came to include
within their scope individuals who were not members of terrorist
organisations but prominent figures in the broader nationalist and
republican communities.
4.
Aim was to expose IRA members and to disrupt them; targets were individuals who had
resisted efforts to recruit them as agents or who were regarded as unrecruitable (presumably
didnt have anything on them); no evidence that motive was to incite attacks:
Undated documents cited by de Silva record reservations within upper reaches of MI5 at the
strategy:
15.22 The documents I have reviewed suggest that there was considerable
unease amongst some Security Service officers with regard to the nature of
the propaganda and the proposals for expanding the initiatives. At one
stage, the Head of the Security Service's operational section had cautioned
that the Service should be careful that the initiatives should not involve
"anything which might be taken as incitement".[9]
15.23 The Head of G8, the Service's Irish agent-running section based in
London, provided the first internal critique of the propaganda initiatives.
He advised that the Government had an:
"... obligation to do nothing that intentionally or deliberately exacerbates
religious sectarian tensions." [10]
15.24 However, despite these reservations the officer also referred in the
same telegram to the initiatives as having been "talented and clearly
successful ".
6.
Initiative wound up towards end of 1989 (after Finucane killing) amid reservations
expressed by new Chief Constable, Hugh Annesley; MI5 Operational Section wanted it to
continue so that republican players can experience same fear of assassination as security
forces (We should interview Annesley):
Although not the focus of the initiative, Pat Finucane became a target by virtue of
representing IRA clients and the propaganda linked him to the activities of his clients. Aim
was to unnerve him rather than incite attack but de Silva says he has to consider whether
effect was to legitimise him as a target:
15.31 I should note that Patrick Finucane was not the focus of the
propaganda initiatives in the late 1980s. The thrust of the propaganda
rumours and innuendo was aimed at the republican movement and specific
PIRA players, including individuals who would have been represented by
Patrick Finucane. However, as a result of his work in defending these
individuals, it is clear that Mr Finucane came to be included within the
scope of the propaganda.
15.32 The information relating to Patrick Finucane that was being
circulated effectively involved fanning the rumours and speculation
linking him to the IRA. The effect of the propaganda would certainly have
been, in my view, to associate Patrick Finucane with the activities of his
clients.
15.33 I have found no evidence that the Security Service circulated Patrick
Finucane's personal details, nor that they proposed that any individual or
group attack him. In line with the broader objectives of the initiatives, the
propaganda against Patrick Finucane appears to have been designed to
discredit and 'unnerve' him rather than to incite loyalists or anyone else to
target him. However, even if the propaganda was not intended to incite
loyalists in that respect, I must consider the question as to whether it could
have legitimised him as a target for loyalist paramilitaries.
8.
MI5 denied there was a direct link between propaganda and Finucanes murder:
De Silva does believe the effect was to help make Finucane a target for Loyalists:
Both RUC Special Branch and the FRU knew and approved of the targeting of Pat
Finucane:
Targeting of Finucane undermined his ability to do his job as a lawyer as the British
government was bound by international agreement to protect and served to legitimise
Finucane as a target although the intent was to unnerve him rather than incite attacks:
15.53 I am entirely satisfied that, although he was not the focus of the
initiatives, Patrick Finucane came to be included within their scope. In my
view, his inclusion in this manner breached the obligations that should
have been upheld by the State to ensure that lawyers could operate free
from intimidation and not be identified with the causes of their clients.
15.54 I am satisfied that the dissemination of this propaganda could have
served to further legitimise Patrick Finucane as a target for loyalist
paramilitaries. Whilst the aim of these initiatives was to 'unnerve' people
such as Mr Finucane (rather than to incite loyalists to attack them), the fact
that the propaganda could have such an effect was, in my view, a
consequence that should have been foreseeable to the Security Service at
the time.