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In Eugenio Eusebio vs. Eusebio, et al., petitioner filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father
resided in Quezon City. Eugenios siblings, stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed
the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga.
The issue here is whether the venue had been properly laid in Rizal. Supreme Court said that it did not.
Don Andres Eusebio was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a
house and lot in Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided there. It is
well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health
even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such
domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his
house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. Documents
evidenced that Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga as his residence. In sum, the Court found that
Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no
authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid
improperly.
As compared to the case of Fule v. CA: here, Amado G. Garcia died. He owned a property in Calamba,
Laguna. Virginia G. Fule, the illegitimate sister of the deceased, filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters
of administration and ex parte appointment as special administratix over the estate where the motion was
granted. Preciosa Garcia, wife of deceased opposed, which was granted by CA and annulled the
appointment of Fule. Preciosa then became special administratrix.
Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at the time of his death,
therefore the venue of Laguna was improper. However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is
conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the place of
residence of the deceased. This case defines what resides means with respect to Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court as actual residence which must be more than temporary as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile which requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.
On another issue, Court said that Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment as special
administratrix. The New Rules RULE 80 SECTION 1 broadened the basis for appointment of special
administrator (temporarily) to take possession and charge of the estates of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and regular executors or administrators appointed.
The main distinction of the last two cases is that in Eusebio case, the Court defined what domicile means
which is actual presence and must also be accompanied by an intent to stay there indefinitely and it made
a point that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health even
if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
However, in Fule case, SC defined what resides means with respect to Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court as actual residence which must be more than temporary as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile which requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.
In another case of Cacho vs Udan, Silvina G. Udan, single died leaving a purported will naming her
illegitimate son and one Wencesla Cacho as her sole heirs. Cacho filed a petition to probate said will
which was opposed by his legitimate brothers on the ground that the will was not attested and executed
as required by law, that the testator was incapacitated to execute and that it was procured by fraud or
undue influence.
Having Francisco Udan as the illegitimate son of the late Silvina which fact is not denied by the oppositor
brothers. He is so acknowledged to be in the testament hence, the death of Francisco two years after his
mothers demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only
transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are the legitimate brothers
of his mother and for that reason the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate
child. The latters own opposition to the probate of the alleged will is perfectly compatible with the
intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary coheir and to claim the entire inheritance as
heir ab intestato.
Both the above cases are differentiated in the case of Sumilang vs Ramagosa, wherein Mariano
Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion
Ramagosa. Said document institutes Mariano as the sole heir of the testator. The petition was opposed
questioning the due execution of the document claiming that it was made under duress and was not really
intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also
claimed otherwise and that were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased.
With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings of oppositors filed by the
petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided
by law and therefore the oppositors are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate.
This being so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto is hereby
ordered stricken out of the record.
In cases of Nuguid vs Nuguid, Sumilang vs Ramagosa as well as Cacho vs Udan involve a question
as to the intrinsic validity of the will, the Court said that in a petition for the probate of a will, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity only. The testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented
for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or
the legality of any devise or legacy is premature (Nuguid vs. Nuguid)
Probate is one thing and the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent
and distribution.
Comparative Analysis
Eusebio vs. Eusebio vis--vis Fule vs CA
Rodelas vs Aranza vis--vis Gan vs Yap
Nuguid vs Nuguid vis--vis Cacho vs Udan vis--vis Sumilang vs Ramagosa
Rhobie S. Corbo
Special Proceedings