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Beck (1967, 1976) proposed that self-deprecating and negatively biased thinking styles are not only core features of adult
depression but also may play a key role in the development and
maintenance of this disorder. In addition to the overriding negative triadnegative view of self, current circumstances, and
futureand stereotypic schemas, premises, or dysfunctional
attitudes (shoulds and musts), a central theme of Beck's cognitive model is that depressed individuals characteristically make
specific dysphoria-provoking cognitive errors, collectively referred to as distortions, in response to ambiguous or negative
life experiences. Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979) described seven of these typical cognitive errors: overgeneralization (believing that if a negative outcome occurred in one case,
it will occur in any case that is even slightly similar); selective
abstraction (attending exclusively to negative features of a situation in the belief that only the negative features matter); assuming excessive responsibility or personal causality (seeing oneself
as responsible for all bad things, failures, and so on); presuming
temporal causality or predicting without sufficient evidence
(believing that if something bad happened in the past then it's
always going to be true); making self-references (believing oneself, especially one's bad performances, to be the center of everyone's attention); catastrophizing (always thinking of the
worst on the premise that it's most likely to happen to one); and
thinking dichotomously (seeing everything as one extreme or
another, black or white, good or bad). These cognitive errors
Leonard Yost is now located at the Berkshire Medical Center, Pittsfield, Massachusetts.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Harold Leitenberg, Department of Psychology, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont 05405.
528
cal experience (i.e., social vs. academic vs. athletic), (c) whether
any sex differences existed, and (d) whether any grade level
differences existed within the limited range examined. Then us-
ing the questionnaire, we conducted three further studies to determine if Beck et al.'s negative cognitive errors would be endorsed to different extents by children who scored high versus
to 3-line descriptions of hypothetical situations or events, followed by a statement about the event that reflected one of the
four revised cognitive errors (catastrophizing, overgeneralizing,
personalizing, and selective abstraction). Children were asked
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529
that children and parents would find this too intrusive and
threatening.) Examples of some of these items follow.
Your cousin calls you to ask if you would like to go on a long bike
ride. \bu think, "I probably won't be able to keep up and people
will make fun of me." (catastrophizing in the athletic area)
Last week you had a history test and forgot some of the things
you had read. Today you are having a math test and the teacher is
passing out the test. You think, "I'll probably forget what I studied
just like last week." (overgeneralizating in the academic area)
You call one of the kids in your class to talk about your math
homework. He/she says, "I can't talk to you now, my father needs
to use the phone." You think, "He/she didn't want to talk to me."
(personalizing in the social area)
You play basketball and score 5 baskets but missed two real easy
shots. After the game you think, "1 played poorly." (selective abstraction in the athletic area)
In order to consensually validate the categorization of both
the cognitive errors and the content areas of the 49 items, 10
clinical psychology graduate students were given definitions of
the four cognitive errors and the three content areas and were
asked to identify which cognitive error and which content area
was reflected in each of the 49 items. For cognitive error types,
92% agreement was reached and for content areas, 99% agreement was reached.
These 49 items were then administered to 62 students enrolled in 2 sixth- and seventh-grade classes of a local elementary
school. Responses were examined to determine which items
showed the most variation or dispersion of scores. Feedback on
ease of understanding instructions and clarity of vignettes was
also obtained from this pilot sample.
From the original 49 items, 24 were selected for the final form
of the questionnaire.1 These items had the best interrater agreement and range of scores, within the plan to have six items reflect each of the four error types and eight items reflect each of
the three content areas (i.e., two catastrophizing, two overgeneralizing, two personalizing and two selective abstraction items in
each content area).
' Copies of the questionnaire and scoring key are available from the
first author.
530
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sample, for boys and for girls separately, and for the three grades
separately. In contrast with the hypothetical midpoint of 72 for
the range of 24 to 120, the mean cognitive distortion score of
this sample was only 57. Thus one can conclude that the types
of cognitions measured by the CNCEQ are not thoughts that a
general population of children commonly endorse as being like
their thoughts. As one might hope and expect, most children do
not appear to have a negatively biased and self-defeating pattern
of interpreting events.
A four-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on Type of Error X
swers, that their answers were confidential (i.e., they would not
be shared with their teachers, parents, or friends), and that it
all like I wotild think (1) to almost exactly like I would think
(5). A total cognitive distortion score was computed by adding
the ratings on all 24 items. Thus, the minimum possible total
cognitive distortion score was 24, and the maximum possible
total cognitive distortion score was 120.
Subscale scores for each type of cognitive error (catastrophizing, overgeneralizing, personalizing, and selective abstraction)
were obtained by adding ratings on the six items included in
each of the four error types (for each error type, minimum
score = 40).
Test-retest reliability was determined by computing a Pear-
tude in absolute terms was nevertheless not substantial. In addition, there were relatively high intercorrelations among the four
types of errors (range = .49 to .56) and between the three content areas (range = .57 to .60). This caution notwithstanding,
one plausible explanation for both the higher selective abstraction score and the higher social cognitive distortion score is am-
The test-retest correlation for the total score was .65 (df= 141,
p < .001). As expected, because of the decreased number of
items involved in the calculations, the test-retest correlations
for each error type and each content area were somewhat lower
than for the total score. The range for error types was .44 to .58;
for content areas, .56 to .59. Each of these reliability coefficients
biguity: Of all the cognitive errors, the items pertaining to selective abstraction were probably the most ambiguous (after all, a
half-full glass is indeed also half-empty), and one could also ar-
was significant at the .001 level (df= 141) and can be considered
adequate for research purposes, although they are far from opti-
gue that social context is inherently more ambiguous than either academic or athletic context. The criteria for social success
quently, people usually have less of a basis for judging the quality of their past performances in social situations compared
was calculated for the total score, for each error type subscale,
and for each content area subscale. The alpha for the total score
was .89, the alphas for the four error types ranged from .60 to
with academic or athletic situations. As a result, perhaps negatively biased cognitions are more likely to be elicited in social
.71, and the alphas for the three content areas ranged from .75
to .82.
Normative Data
a product of several different results. First, there was no significant difference between scores for personalizing across the social, academic, and athletic areas, whereas there was a significant difference for each of the other error types across these
In order to obtain normative data, the CNCEQ was administered to 637 children in the fourth (n = 191), sixth (n = 210),
and eighth (n = 236) grades in two public schools near Rochester, New York. There were a total of 311 boys and 326 girls in
cantly more often in the academic area than in the athletic area
(p< .001 in each case). Selective abstraction was also endorsed
significantly more often in the social area than in either of the
531
Table 1
Normative Data for the Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire
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Measure
Total distortion
Type of error
Catastrophizing
Overgeneralizing
Personalizing
Selective abstraction
Content area
Social
Academic
Athletic
Total
sample
Boys
Girls
Fourth
grade
Sixth
grade
Eighth
grade
57.42
57.01
57.81
60.67
55.73
56.31
13.87
14.18
14.26
15.10
13.71
13.75
14.34
15.21
14.03
14.59
14.19
15.01
15.13
14.48
15.78
15.27
13.58
13.76
13.47
14.93
13.12
14.32
13.74
15.13
20.74
18.91
17.78
20.31
19.22
17.47
21.15
18.60
18.07
21.99
20.18
18.48
19.97
18.36
17.40
20.40
18.36
17.55
Note. N= 631.
other two areas but, unlike Overgeneralizing and catastrophizing, was endorsed significantly more often in the athletic area
tortion score, nor was any significant Sex X Type of Error interaction found. However, there was a significant Sex X Content
Area interaction, F(2, 1262) = 8.16, p < .001, in that girls en-
toms. In two recent similar comparisons, it was found that children with self-reported symptoms of depression were more
likely to express negative cognitions associated with Seligman's
athletic areas than did boys and vice versa in the academic area.
Despite the significant interaction, these differences were so
small that subsequent simple effects analyses failed to yield any
significant difference between boys and girls within the social,
academic, or athletic area.
In regard to grade level, a significant main effect was found
for the total distortion score, f\2,631) = 7.30, p < .001. A New-
eighth graders (p < .01, in both cases). The sixth and eighth
graders did not differ from each other. In addition, a significant
Grade Level X Type of Error interaction was found, F(6,
1893) = 7.73, p < .001. Fourth graders endorsed catastrophizing and personalizing more often than did sixth and eighth graders (p < .01) but did not differ from sixth and eighth graders on
Overgeneralizing or selective abstraction. No significant difterence occurred between sixth and eighth graders on any type of
cognitive error, and no significant interaction was found between grade level and sex or between grade level and content
area.
That the youngest children (fourth graders) endorsed catastrophizing and personalizing cognitions more strongly than did
sixth and eighth graders makes some sense. Presumably younger children have not had quite as much experience with the
types of negative events described in the CNCEQ; thus, they
might be expected to forecast more dire consequences (catasIrophize more) than would older children who have already discovered that these sorts of negative events are not really that
big of a deal. In addition, because social perception in younger
children tends to be more egocentric (Selman, 1980), it perhaps
follows that younger children should also be somewhat more
likely to blame themselves for bad outcomes (personalizing).
532
Table 2
Scores on the CNCEQfor Separate Comparisons of Depressed and Nondepressed, Low Self-Esteem and High Self-Esteem,
and High-Evaluation-A nxiety and Low-Evaluation-Anxiety Children
Self-esteem
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Vermont sample
Evaluation anxiety
Measure
Depressed
Nondepressed
Low
High
Low
High
High
Low
Total distortion
Type of error
Catastrophizing
Overgeneralizing
Personalizing
Selective abstraction
Content area
Social
Academic
Athletic
70.31
42.07
66.73
45.48
66.23
51.15
66.91
48.81
17.83
18.36
17.17
16.95
10.17
10.05
10.69
11.17
16.69
17.00
16.58
16.46
11.11
10.88
11.68
11.81
15.87
17.29
16.46
16.61
12.91
12.13
12.88
13.23
16.31
17.19
16.62
16.79
11.06
11.73
12.36
13.67
25.00
23.07
22.24
15.21
14.12
12.74
23.23
22.10
21.40
16.67
14.80
14.01
24.21
21.68
20.34
18.63
17.09
15.43
24.25
21.97
20.68
17.35
15.96
15.50
man and Butler normative sample had a depression score higher than
19, and according to Kovacs, as reported in Kaslow et al. (1984), a score
of only 11 is believed to represent mild depression. Thus, although one
cannot consider this to be a clinical sample of depressed children, they
certainly represent the high end of the spectrum of scores possible on
the CDI. The nondepressed group also consisted of 42 children (19 girls
and 23 boys), with a mean depression score of 1.4.
children to endorse negative cognitive errors. Given the correlation between self-report measures of low self-esteem and depression in children (cf. Hammen & Zupan, 1984; Moyal,
Results
1977), our expectation was that the results would be in the same
direction as those obtained in Study 2 between relatively depressed and nondepressed children.
Two different samples of children and two different measures of selfesteem were used in this comparison. The first sample consisted of 52
low self-esteem children (29 girls and 23 boys) and 75 high self-esteem
children (35 girls and 40 boys) drawn from a larger pool of 726 children
in the fourth through eighth grades in Vermont public schools who had
been administered the Piers-Harris Self Concept Scale, a widely used
self-esteem measure developed for children (see Piers, 1969; Piers &
Harris, 1964; Wylie, 1979 for a full description of this measure and its
statistical properties). The questionnaire consists of 80 self-evaluative
statements that a child endorses or rejects by circling yes or no after
each item. In addition to a total score, six empirically derived factors
constitute subscales for which scores can be calculated.
The total score of the Piers-Harris was used to create low and high
self-esteem groups. Those children who scored lower than one standard
deviation below the mean of the total sample were considered to have
low self-esteem, and those who scored higher than one standard deviation above the mean were considered to have high self-esteem. The
mean score for the 52 low self-esteem children was 35.5, and the mean
score for the 75 high self-esteem children was 73.0. Unfortunately, these
52 low and 75 high self-esteem children do not represent all of the low
and high self-esteem children we had identified from the original pool
of 726 children. Because of practical problems the Piers-Harris and the
CNCEQ could not be administered concurrently to the majority of children and so summer vacation intervened between the spring, when the
Piers-Harris was administered, and the early fall, when we were able
to administer the cognitive error questionnaire. Because some children
moved over the summer and because some parents did not give permission for their children to participate again, approximately one third of
the originally identified low and high self-esteem subjects could not be
given the cognitive error questionnaire.
In part because of this methodological problem, the comparison between low and high self-esteem children was replicated in another sam-
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Results
533
nificant interaction between self-esteem and content area occurred in either sample.
Table 2 shows the scores on the CNCEQ for the low and high
self-esteem children from each sample separately. The number
of boys and girls in the low and high self-esteem groups was
not equal. However, an initial series of two-factor (Sex X SelfEsteem) ANOVAS did not demonstrate any significant Sex X
Self-Esteem interactions for total distortion, error type, or content area. Although not enough subjects in different grades were
represented in the Vermont sample, an analysis of the possible
interactions between grade level and self-esteem level could be
conducted in the New York sample. Again no significant interactions were obtained, indicating that the effect of low versus
high self-esteem on negative cognitive errors was the same regardless of whether the children were in the fourth, sixth, or
eighth grades. Accordingly, neither sex nor grade was included
in subsequent analyses.
Instead, the data for the Vermont and New \brk samples were
analyzed, separately, first using a three-factor repeated-measures ANOVA with self-esteem, error type, and content area as
factors. Again, we were interested in examining only self-esteem main effects and possible interactions between self-esteem
and error type and between self-esteem and content areas. For
each sample a significant main effect was found for self-esteem,
indicating that the low self-esteem groups had a higher total distortion score than did the high self-esteem groups (p < .001).
Subsequent analyses also indicated that low self-esteem children had higher scores on each cognitive error type and each
content area (p < .001 in all cases).
A significant Self-Esteem X Type of Error interaction was
found for the New York sample only F(3, 480) = 3.88, p< .01.
The reason for this interaction was that overgeneralizing was the
most strongly endorsed cognitive error in the low self-esteem
group, whereas in the high self-esteem group selective abstrac-
Results
The scores of the high- and low-evaluation-anxiety subjects
on the CNCEQ are summarized in Table 2. Although there was
again a disproportionately greater number of girls in the highevaluation-anxiety group than in the low-evaluation-anxiety
group, an initial series of two-factor ANOVAS failed to demonstrate any significant Sex X Anxiety Level interaction on the
CNCEQ.
A three-factor repeated-measures ANOVA (High vs. Low
Evaluation Anxiety X Error Type X Content Area) revealed a
significant main effect for evaluation anxiety on the total distor-
534
for each error type and for each content area (p < .001 in all
cases). As was the case for the comparisons between depressed
and nondepressed children and between low and high self-es-
esteem, or pure high-evaluation-anxiety groups could be artificially created (i.e., one group of children who all score high on
depression but not also low on self-esteem or high on evaluation
Type interaction occurred, F(l, 597) = 6.71, p < .001. The basis
of this interaction, as shown in Table 2, was that low-evaluationanxiety subjects endorsed selective abstraction the most, followed by personalizing, overgeneralizing, and catastrophizing.
A simple effects analysis indicated that each of these error types
were significantly different from each other for the low-evaluation-anxiety subjects. No significant difference was found, how-
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Discussion
In Study 2, in which a self-report measure of depression of
children was used to define depressed and nondepressed
groups, depressed children were found to endorse each type of
negative cognitive error in each content area significantly more
often than did nondepressed children. Similar comparisons in
Study 3 between low self-esteem and high self-esteem children
and in Study 4 between high-evaluation-anxiety and low-evaluation-anxiety children also revealed the same finding: low selfesteem and high-evaluation-anxious children endorsed each of
these negative cognitive errors in each content area significantly
more strongly than did their high self-esteem and low-evaluation-anxiety counterparts. This was equally true for both boys
and girls, and for the evaluation anxiety comparison, in which
tively biased manner. For example, if positively phrased vignettes and thoughts had been described, perhaps the children
who scored on the high end of the self-esteem questionnaires
and the low end of the depression and evaluation anxiety inven-
self-esteem children and high-evaluation-anxiety and low-evaluation-anxiety children. This is not surprising given that low
self-esteem, depression, and evaluation anxiety are to some extent correlated with each other (cf. Hammen & Zupan. 1984;
glasses (distort in a positive direction) than depressed, low selfesteem, and high-evaluation-anxiety children are prone to look
through dark colored glasses (distort in a negative direction).
Such a hypothesis is supported by some recent findings that suggest that depressed adults may be more negative but yet more
realistic than normal controls (cf. Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
535
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