Trias v.

Araneta
15 SCRA 241
DOCTRINE: Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable easements and
restrictions as conditions for contracts of sales; the same may not be
overturned by courts merely on the ground that it impacts dominical rights.
FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru
broker Araneta Inc (of Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company
sold the land to Mr Lopez with the condition that said lot should never be
used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of
the gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias. She was dismayed with the annotation that
stated 5. That no factories be permitted in this section.
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore
illegal and existed as mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations
already prevented the erection of factories in the vicinity. Worse, the
annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly
raised the issue to the court and received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the
imposition resulted from a valid sales transaction between her predecessors
in interest. He alleged that the court held no authority to overrule such valid
easement and impaired the right to contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition was valid.
HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed
under art 594 which provides that every owner of a piece of land may
establish easements he deems suitable xxx and not in contravention to the
law, public policy and public order
The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet
of neighboring residents. The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In
the absence of a clash with public policy, the easement may not be eroded.
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be
repealed anytime, allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at
the very least, the original intent to bar factories remains binding.

ORTIGAS v. FEATI BANK

Facts:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the
public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with
Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962
the vendees transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma
Chavez. The plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of
Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements
and the deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the
parcels of land subject of the deeds of sale shall be used by the Buyer
exclusively for residential purposes. The restrictions were later annotated in
the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the said lots issued in the name of
Chavez.
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building
restrictions also annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought
directly from Chavez free from all liens and encumbrances while Lot No.6
was acquired through a Deed of Exchange from Republic Flour Mills.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general
building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the
Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where
commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established.
Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from
Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and
industrial zone, per ResolutionNo.27 of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff completely sold and transferred to
third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962 or more than 2 years
after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and industrial zone.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a
building devoted to banking purposes but which it claims could also be used
exclusively for residential purposes. The following day, the plaintiff
demanded in writing that the construction of the commercial building be
stopped but the defendant refused to comply contending that the
construction was in accordance with the zoning regulations.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.

2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual

obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
Held:
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was
impliedly admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not
dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution,
plaintiff-appellant
cannot
now
change
its
position
on
appeal.
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the
said
resolution,
the
posture
is
unsustainable.
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
for the municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of the power
through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No.27 is not an
ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the
word
regulation
under
the
provision.
An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of
a municipality should be liberally construed in its favor and that any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted
in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. An
exception to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when
the exercise of its powers will conflict with vested rights arising from
contracts. The exception does not apply to the case at bar.
2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule
is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers and the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government, the exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial or commercial zone was passed
by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to
safeguard/promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare
of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions
prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution which are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the
residents in its route. The Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably
justified under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution.

Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
may be subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental
aim of the Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

CRISPIN E. LAT, respondents. francis
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are adjoining
landowners in Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat
containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly with
fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6)
hectares of which are devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is one
and a half (1) meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.
Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was
already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He
made several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14
March 1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation was already
inundated with water containing pig manure, as a result of which the trees
growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against
REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased
because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's
piggery farm.
REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative
defense that measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were
already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to
prevent any damage to the adjoining estates.
After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both
parties the Regional Trial Court found that indeed REMMANs waste disposal
lagoon overflowed with the contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of
Lat's plantation. The waste water was ankle-deep and caused death and

destruction to one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred
twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees,
bananas and vegetables. As a consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN
to indemnify Lat P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years
and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.[1] marie
The decision of the court a quo was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
[2]

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari REMMAN prays that we pass upon the
findings of the trial court as well as of the appellate court. REMMAN insists
that factual findings of lower courts may be passed upon, reviewed and
reversed: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (f) when the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are not
supported by the evidence on record; (g) when facts of substance were
overlooked which, if correctly considered, might have changed the outcome
of the case; and, (h) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are not in
accord with what reasonable men would readily accept are the correct
inferences from the evidence extant in the records.[3]
Indeed, in the abovementioned instances, the factual milieu of a particular
case may be passed upon, reversed or modified by this Court. But
examination of the record reveals that all the above instances are unavailing.
From this point of view alone the instant petition is dismissible. Nevertheless,
we shall discuss them hereunder to dispose finally of the contentions of
REMMAN.
First, REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages suffered by Lat was
not clearly established.
We disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court
where representatives of both parties were present, it was established that
the waste water containing pig manure was continuously flowing from
REMMAN's piggery farm to Lat's plantation. The water was ankle-deep and
flooded one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The overflow of the "acidic,
malodorous and polluted water" continued from June 1984 to March 1985
thus destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred

an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango

trees, bananas and vegetables.[4]
In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on
the part of REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantation of
Lat. Thus -novero
x x x Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontroverted
that the land of appellee was flooded on account of the overflow
of acidic, malodorous and polluted water coming from the
adjacent piggery farm of appellant sometime in May 1984. This
resulted in the impairment of the productivity of appellee's land
as well as the eventual destruction and death of several fruit
trees, such as coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other
plants x x x x Appellant cannot avoid liability because their
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. Appellee's
property was practically made a catch-basin of polluted water
and other noxious substances emptying from appellant's piggery
which could have been prevented had it not been for the
negligence of appellant arising from its: (a) failure to monitor the
increases in the level of water in the lagoons before, during and
after the heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy
months of 1984; (b) failure to augment the existing lagoons prior
to the incident, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the
flooding, the piggery had grown to a capacity of 11,000 heads,
and considering that it was reasonably forseeable that the
existing waste disposal facilities were no longer adequate to
accomodate the increasing volume of waste matters in such a
big farm; and more importantly, (c) the repeated failure to
comply with their promise to appellee.[5]
Second, REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals
should not have rejected its request for the production of Lat's income tax
returns. According to REMMAN had Lat's income tax returns been produced,
the issue of the alleged damages suffered by Lat would have been settled.
This argument is moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when
we affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case involving the
same parties.[6] In sustaining the trial court's quashal of the subpoena duces
tecum previously issued compelling Lat to produce his income tax returns for
the years 1982-1986, the appellate court explained that the production of
the income tax returns would not necessarily serve to prove the special and
affirmative defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's testimony regarding

the losses he sustained due to the piggery. The tax returns per se could not
reflect the total amount of damages suffered by Lat, as income losses from a
portion of the plantation could be offset by any profit derived from the rest of
the plantation or from other sources of income. Conversely, losses incurred
from other sources of income would be totally unrelated to the income from
the particular portion of the plantation flooded with waste matter coming
from REMMAN's piggery.[7]
Third, REMMAN contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have
not been satisfactorily established. nigel
We a not convinced. The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its
conclusions on this respect Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's
allegations not well-taken. Appellant contends that actual and
compensatory damages require evidentiary proof, and there
being no evidence presented as to the necessity of the award for
damages, it was erroneous for the lower court to have made
such award. It must be remembered that after the ocular
inspection, the court a quo rendered an inventory of dead and
rotten trees and plants found in appellee's property. Appellee
also testified on the approximate annual harvest and fair market
value thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting
evidence was presented by appellant on the matter. Hence,
appellant is bound thereby and cannot now be heard to
complain. As correctly held by the court a quo:
An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The
inventory of the trees damaged and the itemized valuation placed
therein by private respondent after the ocular inspection which is not
rebutted by the petitioner, is the more accurate indicator of the said
amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is indeed
unreasonable, petitioner should present controverting evidence of the
fair market value of the crops involved. The trial court held that the
private respondent himself had been subjected to extensive cross and
re-cross examination by the counsel for the petitioner on the amount of
damages.[8]
Finally, REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a
fortuitous event.

Again cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions
expressed by the lower courts Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by
reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became
humanized, rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damages.
In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649
(1993), the Supreme Court held: ella
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or
force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by
private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of
negligence. This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act
of God or force majeure; a human factor - negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may
be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation
of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the
property of appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable
law is imperative. Under the Civil Code, it is provided:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher
estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate
make works which will increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines
(P.D. No.1067), which provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally
and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as
well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of
drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which
will increase this natural flow. marinella

As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural

easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from
higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher state are those which are artificially collected in manmade lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the
owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.[9]
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is
directly accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The
negligence of REMMAN in maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons
has been satisfactorily established. The extent of damages suffered by Lat
remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.

RELOVA v. LAVAREZ- Easement and Servitude

The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the maintenance of an
irrigation aqueduct and a dam on the lands of defendant for a period of more
than 20 years confers title thereto upon the plaintiff by virtue of prescription
and burdens the lands of the defendants with a corresponding servitude.
FACTS:
The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the
aid of water brought from a river through an aqueduct which passes over the
land of the defendants. This was by virtue of an easement the use of which
had been with the plaintiff for more than thirty years. On the land of the
defendants there was a dam with a small gate or aperture in its face which
was used to control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a
greater or less quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also on the land of the
defendants.
One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water
escape by the drainage ditch, so that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff.
At the time when the dam was destroyed the plaintiff had some five cavanes
of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water
resulting from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop.

Defendants claim that the plaintiff is not the owner of any lands watered by
the aqueduct of the class known as padagat (rice lands planted in May). It
was also alleged that the plaintiff suffered no damage by the destruction of
the dam, because all the lands of plaintiff which are cultivated with the aid of
water from the aqueduct are of the class known as binanbang (rice lands
planted in August or September), and the destruction of the dam in May and
the consequent failure of water in the aqueduct at that period did not, and
could not, damage the plaintiff or interfere with the proper cultivation of his
lands.
Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not establish
the existence of the servitude in the lands of the defendants in favor of the
lands of the plaintiff landowner for the maintenance of the aqueduct and
dam in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the parties.
HELD:
Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all other allegations of
defendants were outrightly disregarded as they were clearly unmeritorious in
light of the findings of fact. However, the Court ruled that there was a valid
easement in light of the fact that the aqueduct and the dam had been in
existence for more than 30 years, during which time the plaintif had
exercised its use. It was alleged that no benefit was granted to the plaintiff
since his (plaintiff's) land is situated higher than defendants' land. Moreover,
even if defendants had the right to open the gates of the dam to prevent
destructive overflow upon their land, this does not give them the right to
stop the flow of water altogether.
In this case the servient estate was the higher one.

Valisno v. Adriano
161 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance
FACTS:

Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action for damages.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from
the defendants sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through
a canal about 70 meters long, traversing the appellee's land.
Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived
of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
Plaintiff Adriano filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case and was
granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because of urgency. He also filed a complaint for damages in the CFI
against respondent.
Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use his water
rights when she still owned the adjacent land. According to the appellant, the
water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
ISSUE:
WON the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land. -- YES
HELD:
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the
land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact
that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of
necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives
the determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been established, he is
entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to
deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Case Digest on NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its 230
KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, its lines have to pass the lands
belonging to respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule and spouses
Misericordia Gutierrez and Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations
for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained
to file eminent domain proceedings. Trial courts ordered that the defendant
spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land
in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional
value of the land to proceed their construction and for the purpose of
determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court
appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the
plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were
empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises,
and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation
to be paid to the owners of the lots. The lower court rendered judgement
ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way
easement of the affected area and P800.00 as attorney's fees'. Napocor filed
a motion for reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals committed
gross error by adjudging the petitioner liable for the payment of the full
market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines, and that it
overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easemen transmits
no rights, except that of the easement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement
fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said power
may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the
condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable
that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement
of right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC
against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed
below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is
entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent
of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the just
and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value
of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the
criteria for determining just compensation.

Costabella Corp. v. CA
193 SCRA 333
DOCTRINE:An easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot
be acquired by prescription. Convenience of the dominant estate is not a
gauge for the grant of compulsary right of way.
While a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate
is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of
the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (2) where the distance to a public
highway may be the shortest.
FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their
beach hotel. Before such construction, the private respondent, in going to
and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed
through a passageway, which traversed the petitioners property.
As a result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative
route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages.
In the same complaint the private respondents also alleged that
the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latters
property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the
residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the
beach.
The private respondent also claim that they have acquired the
right of way through prescription.
They prayed for the re-opening of the ancient road right of way (what they
called the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike.
Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interests
act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just
tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the
private respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through
prescription? -- NO
2. Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of
way in the form of a passageway, on the petitioners property? -- NO
HELD:
1. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to
acquisitive prescription.

2. One may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the:
(1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4)
the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from
their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court
confirmed that there is another outlet for the private respondents to the
main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents).
Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the
dominant estate was never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right
of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere convenience for
the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private
respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the
petitioners. The SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails over
shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt necessarily the best
choice).
EDWIN CASE, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF TUASON Y SANTIBAEZ, opponents-appellees.
Hartigan
and
Rohde,
and
Roman
Rosado, Sanz and Opisso for appellees.

Lacson

for

appellant.

TORRES, J.:
On the 7th of December, 1906, the attorneys for Edwin Case filed a petition
with the Court of Land Registration requesting that the property owned by
the applicant, described in the petition, be registered in accordance with the
provisions of Land Registration Act. After a written opposition was presented
by Felipe R. Caballero on the 6th of June, 1907, on behalf of the heirs of late
Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibaez, counsel for the applicant, Case, on
August 2, 1907, amended the original petition and set forth: that said
property, situated in Calle Escolta, district of Binondo, consists of a parcel of
land and the building erected thereon bearing Nos. 142 and 152; it is
bounded on the northwest, approximately, by the estero of Santa Cruz and
the property of Carmen de Ayala de Roxas; on the southeast by the River
Pasig; on the southwest by the property of the heirs of Tuason and
Santibaez; and on the northwest by Calle Escolta and the aforesaid property
of Carmen de Ayala de Roxas; that the total area is 3,251.84 square meters,

its description and boundaries being detailed in the plan attached to the
petition; that according to the last assessment made for the purposes of
taxation the land was valued at P170,231 and the buildings thereon at
P30,000; that the property is free from all incumbrance, and no one has any
interest therein or right thereto; that on the northeast side the property has
in its favor the right of easement over some 234.20 square meters of land
owned by the said Ayala de Roxas, and that the applicant acquired the
property by succession from Doa Clotilde Romree.
In the written opposition above alluded to, counsel for the heirs of Pablo
Tuason and Leocadia Santibaez alleged that the parties whom he represents
are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner on the
southwest; that the latter, in making the plan attached to his petition,
extended his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs
of Tuason and Santibaez in the form indicated by the red line in the
annexed plan; that the true dividing line between the property of the
petitioner and that of the said heirs is the walls indicated in black ink on the
accompanying plan; that said walls belong to the opponents, and that about
two years ago, when the applicant made alterations in the buildings erected
on his land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall
owned by the parties whom he represents, at point 12, 13, and 14 of said
plan; for which reason the opponent prayed the court to direct the applicant
to amend the line marked in his plan with the letters Y, X, U, T, S, and R, so
that it may agree with the wall indicated by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 on the plan which accompanies the written
opposition, reducing the area to whatever it may be after the amendment
has been made; that the applicant be compelled to remove the supports that
he placed for his buildings on the wall of the representatives of the
petitioner, and that he be sentenced to pay the costs.
The case was brought to trial, both parties adduced evidence, and their
exhibits were made of record. The court, assisted by the interested parties
and their respective experts, made an inspection of the two properties, in
view of which it entered judgment on the 31st of July, 1908, sustaining the
opposition offered by the representative of the heirs of Pablo Tuason
Leocadia Santibaez, and after declaring a general default granted the
registration of the property described in the application filed by Edwin Case,
with the exclusion of the wall claimed by the opponents and shown on their
plan by the lines numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14;
and in view of the fact that the lines drawn on the plan offered in evidence
by the applicant under letter G are not correctly drawn, once this decision
shall have become final, let the dividing line of both properties be fixed by
common accord between the two parties and their experts, taking as a base

for the same the amended line of walls drawn on the plan of the opponents,
but should they not reach an agreement a surveyor of the Court of Land
Registration shall be detailed to fix the same at the expense of the parties;
the court also ordered the cancellation of the registration entries of the
property entered in the name of Clotilde Romree, principal of the petitioner,
at page 142 and those following of volume 15, section of Binondo and 52 of
the register, property No. 828, first entry.
On the 12th of August, 1908, the petitioner moved for a new trial on the
ground that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the decision of the
court in excluding the wall claimed by the opponents; that said decision was
contrary to the law, in so far as it excludes the said wall, and that the
conclusions of fact therein are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight
of the evidence in so far as they referred to the exclusion of said wall. The
said motion was overruled on the 15th of same month, to which overruling
the applicant excepted and announced his intention to perfect the
corresponding bill of exceptions which was filed, approved, and submitted to
this court together with the proper assignment of errors.
In the appeal interposed by the applicant against the decision of the Court of
Land Registration, now before this court, the questions set up are merely of
fact.
The question is whether the wall that with slight interruption runs from Calle
Escolta to the River Pasig, and which divides the adjoining properties of the
applicant, Edwin Case, and of the opponents, belongs to the former, as he
claimed in the first instance, or is a dividing wall as affirmed in his brief in
this second instance, or is the property of the said opponents, the heirs of
the late Tuason and Santibaez. lawphi1.net
The trial court after considering the evidence adduced by both parties to the
suit, found that the wall in controversy belongs to the opponents for the
reason, among others, that in the public document by which one of their
original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now
possessed by them, it appears that property was then already inclosed by a
stone wall. This document, which was offered in evidence by the opponents,
has not been impugned by the applicant. On the contrary, it was
acknowledge as the title deed of the property adjoining that of the applicant
by the witness Juan B. Tuason, who knows the one and the other.
It is fully proven that two walls extend from Calle Escolta to the interior of
both properties, the one backing the other, and which respectively support
the edifices of the petitioner and of the opponents from points 36, 35, 34, 33,

32, 31, and 30 on the plan of the petitioner corresponding to points 1 to 6 on

that of the opponents.
This section of the wall of the opponents embraced within the points
mentioned in the plans offered in evidence by the parties, for very reason
that it supports only the property of the opponents and not that of the
petitioner, can not be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length
would belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr. Case. There is not
sufficient proof to sustain such claim, and besides, the building erected
thereon disproves the pretension of the petitioner.
It should, however, be noted that the portion of the wall between the
numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 on the plan of the opponents, which corresponds to
numbers 33, 32, 31, and 30 of that of the petitioner, and which constitutes
the cesspool on the property of the latter, belongs to him, and it has so been
admitted by counsel for the opponents, for the reason that the petitioner had
acquired it by prescription, the opponents having lost control over the area of
land covered by the said cesspool together with the walls that inclose it.
Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed,
unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others,
in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.
The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt
with in the said article of the code, and is that of juris tantum unless the
contrary appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining properties, that
is to say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property
owners, or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and
support a presumption against the party wall.lawphi1.net (Art. 573, Civil
Code.)
The intermediate portion of the walls in question, lying between numbers 6
and 13 on the defendants' plan, equivalent to a little more than numbers 30
to 25 on the plan of the petitioner, is the portion against which no other wall
appears to have been erected on the land owned by Mr. Case. In spite of this
it can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that
it was not exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as the latter have
proven by means of a good title that has not been impugned by the
petitioner, that when one of their ancestors and principals acquired the
property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building was
erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property
the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included.

The above documentary evidence has not been overcome by any other
presented by the petitioner, but apart from that record discloses the
existence of certain unquestionable signs. These consist of constructions
made by the petitioner himself on his own property which entirely destroy
any presumption that it is a party wall, and indeed gives rise to a
presumption against it.
Three openings have been made in the wall , undoubtedly to allow the
passage of air and light. Two of them are beveled on the side toward the land
of the objectors, and the third has recently been beveled on the other. A
rafter or lintel was found imbedded in the wall on the side of the property of
the opponents. These things constitute exterior signs and were recorded as
the result of personal inspection by the trial court in company with the
experts of both parties. These signs positively and conclusively prove that
the said wall is not a party wall, but the exclusive property of the defendant.
This is further confirmed by the testimony of the witnesses at the trial.
The fact that the petitioner built a wall and backed it against the one in
question to support the edifice he had constructed between points 21 and 13
of the corrected plan is a further indication that the neighboring wall is not a
party one. He knew perfectly well that he had no right to rest his building on
the latter. That he built a terrace about four years previously over the wall
between points 30, 29, 28, and 27 does not prove that the whole of the wall,
from the Escolta to the River Pasig, is a party wall, but it does show that he
usurped a portion thereof to the prejudice of the real owner.
Neither can it be presumed that that part of the wall bordering on the River
Pasig comprised between points 13 and 14 is a party wall. It was shown in
the proceedings as resulting from the above-mentioned ocular inspection
that the side of the said wall, which is rather a low one, there is another, a
higher one erected on the petitioner's land and backed against the one in
question. The first one, as has been said, forms part of that which has
surrounded the property from the date of its acquisition, more than a century
ago, until the present date. It is absolutely independent of that built by the
petitioner, and that it is the exclusive property of the objectors and is not a
party wall can not be denied.
It therefore appears from the proceedings that, with the exception of the
small portion of the wall in question occupied by the latrine on the property
of the petitioner, and which the opponents admit that he has acquired by
prescription, the whole of said wall from the Escolta to the River Pasig can
not be presumed to be a party wall; the evidence to the contrary
conclusively proves that it belonged exclusively to the defendants, and it has

been further shown in the case that at one time an old building belonging to
the opponents used to rest on a portion of the wall near the river.lawphi1.net
In view of the foregoing, and considering that the judgment appealed from is
in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, it is our opinion that
the same should be affirmed in full, as we do hereby affirm it, with the costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.

VALENZUELA VS UNSON
32 PHIL 19 OCTOBER 20, 1915
PONENTE: Johnson, J.:
FACTS: On December 11, 1912, the plaintiffs presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of 34 parcels of land in
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna. With such, respondents Pedro Unson and
Felix Unson presented their opposition to the registration of a portion of lot
No. 1 which portion is known as lot No. 1-A, representing a stone wall,
simply, constructed between lot No. 1 and the lot belonging to the said
objectors. This wall extends from the street running in front of the lots owned
by the plaintiffs and defendants, between said lots, for a distance of about
thirty meters. It is about 38 centimeters wide and separates the lots claimed
by the parties. At intervals along the wall, there are buttresses, which are
constructed on both sides of the wall. About midway between the street and
the rear end of the lots, resting on the wall, there is a kitchen belonging to
the defendants which is about forty years old. About 8 meters from the street
there is a cross wall, on the property of the plaintiff, which is joined to the
wall in question. Along the street and in front of the lots, there is a sidewalk
which is in front of the properties wherein it divides on the plaintiffs side of
the wall. The wall appears to have been built as one wall. The plaintiffs
attempt to show, in support of their claim of ownership of the wall that the
kitchen referred to above was built so as to rest upon the wall, by the
express permission given by them to the objectors, or their predecessors.
That fact is strongly denied by the objectors. They claim that the kitchen was
built without permission and without the objection on the part of the
plaintiffs. Later a motion for a rehearing was made by the petitioners. Upon a
consideration of said motion, the lower court, on the 15th day of December,
1913, modified that part of its first decision relating to lot No. 1-A, and
declared that the same was a party wall. The lower court did not decree the
registration of the wall. From the decision the objectors appealed to this
court. The petitioners did not appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said wall belongs to the petitioners and registrable
in their name.

HELD: No. Article 572 of the civil code states that When there is no title or
exterior marks or proofs to the contrary, there is a presumption that a
dividing wall between two adjoining properties is a party wall. Considering
the fact that both parties have used the wall for the purpose of supporting
the structures on their respective lots, that the plaintiffs have a wall joined to
the wall in question and that they and the defendants have used as a partial
support for the kitchen, and considering the conflicting character of the
testimony with respect to ownership of the wall, we are of opinion that the
said wall is a party wall that it belongs to the petitioners and objectors
jointly. One of two or more joint owners of land cannot have the same
registered against the opposition of the other joint owners.
DECISION: The judgment of lower court be affirmed without any finding as to
costs, so ordered.

Cortes v. Yu-Tibo
2 Phil. 24
DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative easement. When
easement is negative, there should be a formal act of opposition for
prescription to run.
FACTS:
Cortes wife owns a house (No. 65) in which certain windows open on the
adjacent property (No. 63), a neighboring house on the same street. This
setting has been in existent since 1843. The tenant of the adjacent property
raised the roof of house No. 63 in such a manner that half of the windows of
house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a large part of air and
light.
Plaintiff contends that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows
for 59 years, he acquired from prescription an easement of light in favor of
house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63. Consequently, he has
acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvement in the latter
house which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. Further,
he contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the
period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title
is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced,
or, in other words, from the time that said windows were opened with the
knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this
part.
Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and therefore the time

for the prescriptive acquisition must begin from the date on which the owner
of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of
the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the
existence of the easement.
Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed the case.
ISSUE:
WON the easement is positive/negative
HELD:
Easement is negative.
The easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative
character, and therefore pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by
prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting
the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant
estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to
do an act which would be lawful were it not for the easement.
In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of
opposition to the right of the owner of house No. 63 to make improvements
which might obstruct the light of house No. 65, at any time prior to the
complaint, has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such
easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed. Because the
period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not
have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence
not having been performed.
Ruling 2 -GENERAL RULE
: No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a party wall a
window or opening of any kind (Art. 580) The very fact of making such
opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a prescriptive title
without the necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes
the express or implied consent of the owner of the wall, which in time,
implies a voluntary waiver of the right to oppose.
EXCEPTION
: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a
prohibition from exercising that neighbor's right to build on his land or cover
the closed window on the party wall. The period of prescription starts to run
from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it. Note: The law refers to
all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article 528,
windows with "similar projections" include sheds. The exception applies in
this case because1) what is concerned is a party wall;2) there was no

prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes' window
(Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover 1/2 of the
window).

AMOR v. FLORENTINO- Easement

FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she
transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria
Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then demolished the old
warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will
shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent
house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a
negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any
height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no
easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code
took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said
construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied
RULING:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title.
Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the
estate is subsequently owned by two different persons and the service (it
cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor
removed,
an
easement
is
established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition
by prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition by title.
2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the
effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the
effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is already applicable. In
any case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the law on easement was
already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by
Jurisprudence.

Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the

level of the window.
DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.
1) The Majority opinio committed a travesty on justice when it ignored the
evidence produced by Amor that the testators death occurred before the
effectivity of the Code.
2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply. Moreover, the Spanish Law and
the Partidas provided for only three ways of acquiring easements: 1) contract
2) testament 3) prescription. There was no provision similar to the doctrine of
apparent sign.
3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish Tribunal regarding the
doctrine.
4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air conditioning devices, the
easement of light and view would be obsolete and deterrent to economic
progress especially when in the cities, buildings are side to side with each
other.

Gargantos v. Tan Yanon

108 Phil. 888
Doctrine: Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly
owned by one person who introduced improvements on both such that the
wall of the house constructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the
warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first
estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors,
windows which serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision
in the deed of sale that the easement of light and view will not be
established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is
established as a title.
FACTS:
The late Francisco Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he
subdivided into several lots. One lot was sold to Guillermo Tengtio, who sold
to Vicente Uy Veza. Another lot with a house constituted thereon was sold to
Tan Yanon. A third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The
problem arose when Gargantos asked from the Municipality for a permit to
demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher one. Tan Yanon

opposed the application for it would block his window and impair his right of
light and view. Both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon
recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos. Tan Yanon then
filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building
that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view
through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a
distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the
lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of Municipal
Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit to
defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and
view against the property of petitioner Gargantos. -- YES
HELD:
Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by
one person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the
house constructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the warehouse
on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first estate, there
existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which
serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of
sale that the easement of light and view will not be established, the apparent
sign of easement between the two estates is established as a title.

RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of Way

Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is

not a continuous easement.

FACTS:
Petitioners parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and
Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of the
Respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On May
1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the road,
blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by means of
force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where

the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed
wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and
Naga public market.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by
prescription?

HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements
may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be
considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on
the acts of man.
Minority
Opinion
(including
the
ponente):
Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least
since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription
through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly,
Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are
subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at
least to the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road
or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more,
not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of
it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through
prescription.
The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to
constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for
the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less
frequently according to the nature of the use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)
"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be
acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was
actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other
right and adverse to all other claimants'.

Valisno v. Adriano
161 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for
irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance
FACTS:
Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action for damages.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from
the defendants sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through
a canal about 70 meters long, traversing the appellee's land.
Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived
of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
Plaintiff Adriano filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case and was
granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because of urgency. He also filed a complaint for damages in the CFI
against respondent.
Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use his water
rights when she still owned the adjacent land. According to the appellant, the
water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
ISSUE:
WON the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land. -- YES
HELD:
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the
land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact
that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of
necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives
the determination of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been established, he is

entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to
deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Benedicto v. CA
25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: The easement is perpetual in character and was annotated on
all the transfer certificates of title issued to Heras and to Benedicto. Absence
of anything that would show mutual agreement to extinguish the easement,
the easement persists.
FACTS:
Heras filed an action with the Court of First Instance to recover a portion of
land enclosed and walled by Benedicto and to demand the reopening of an
easement of way between his and Benedictos real property. Hendrick sold
portions of her property to several personalities including Recto and Heras.
When portion of the property was sold to Herras, he closed and walled the
part of land serving as easement of way.
Trial court found that the easement of way was found entirely within
Benedictos property contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale between
Hedrick and Recto that it should be between their properties with each
contributing an equal portion of his property. Thus, trial court directed the
parties to equally contribute to the maintenance of the passageway between
Herras and Benedicto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benedicto may enclose his property.
HELD:
In this case, the easement is perpetual in character and was annotated on all
the transfer certificates of title issued to Heras and to Benedicto. Absence of
anything that would show mutual agreement to extinguish the easement, the
easement persists.

TKDC
Benedicto v. CA
25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: Under Art. 624, an easement may continue by operation of law.

Alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not a

ground for the extinguishment of easements, absent a statement
extinguishing it.
FACTS:
Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of 2 parcels of land
situated in Cebu City. An apartment building was constructed on Lot A, while
on Lot B stands a 4-door apartment, a 2-storey house, a bodega, and a septic
tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots A and B. A small portion of
the apartment building on Lot A also stands on Lot B.
Cardenas sold Lot A to petitioner Eduardo C. Taedo. On the same day,
Cardenas also mortgaged Lot B to Taedo as a security for the payment of a
loan. Cardenas agreed that he would sell Lot B only to Taedo in case he
should decide to sell it. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to the respondent
spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim.
Upon learning of the sale, Taedo offered to redeem the property from
Romeo Sim, but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe
connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built on Lot A, to the septic tank
in Lot B. He also asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building
enroaching on Lot B.
As a result, Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against
Spouses Sim and Antonio Cardenas, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of
the Civil Code. Respondent judge, Juanito A. Bernad, dismissed the complaint
for legal redemption, as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the alienation of Lots A and B is a ground for the extinguishment of the
easement of drainage. -- NO
HELD:
The finding of the trial court that Taedo's right to continue to use the septic
tank on Lot B ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent
sale to different owners who do not have the same interest, also appears to
be contrary to law.
Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment
of an easement. From its provisions, the alienation of the dominant and
servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the
extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is
continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two
estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered,

should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two
estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance
of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division
of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement
of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Taedo. Nor did
Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of
Lot A before he sold said lot. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued
by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new
owners of the servient estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any manner
whatsoever, the use of the servitude.