IRAN AFTER KHAMENEI

AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK

The election of moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani surprised both external and
internal observers of the Iranian election last June. Rouhanis willingness to engage with
the West has been met with tentative optimism throughout the ongoing P5+1 talks, as
the prospect of ending thirty-four years of mutual hostility between the US and Iran
hangs tantalisingly throughout the negotiations. As the talks continue, the world is
focused on whether a successful conclusion to the nuclear negotiations will be reached,
which could in turn positively affect the role Iran plays regionally and its relationship
with the international community.
The significance of Rouhanis victory and his initiation of negotiations over Irans
nuclear programme should not be understated. However, it is important to bear in mind
that all of Irans key strategic decisions ultimately lie with Ayatollah Khameneithe
Supreme Leader, the commander-in-chief and Irans top ideologue.1 Khameneis views
ultimately shape Iranian foreign and domestic policy, and any power granted to
Rouhani during the ongoing P5+1 talks is entirely contingent on Khameneis blessing
which could be retracted at any time.
The pivotal role Khamenei plays in determining the strategic direction of the
Islamic Republic means it is important to consider how the face of the Islamic Republic
will change once Khamenei leaves office. This is especially critical to address as
1

A. Ganji, Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs, (Sep.-Oct. 2013 Issue), [Accessible at:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139643/akbar-ganji/who-is-ali-khamenei, Last Accessed: June 19,
2014].

Khamenei is now 74 years old and rumours of his ill health have abounded in recent
years.2 The next Supreme Leader (assuming there will be another Supreme Leader) will
determine both the face and the future of the Islamic Republic. It is therefore important
for the international community to assess the potential opportunities and threats which
may arise once Khamenei leaves office.
This essay outlines three plausible scenarios for post-Khamenei Iran, which are
used to examine potential threats, opportunities and implications for the UK. Before
addressing these scenarios, it is first necessary to outline some key factors which will
probably affect the process of succession based on current facts on the ground in Iran.
These assumptions are essentially an interpretation of the current socio-political and
economic dynamics in Iran, rendering them entirely subject to change. It is therefore
important to note that fluctuations in these trends will result in important changes in
the plausibility of the subsequent scenarios.

Internal Dynamics: How will the succession process be determined?

Since assuming power, Khamenei has transformed the political landscape of Iran
in order to maximise his authority over the Islamic Republic.3 His marginalisation of
constitutional institutions compounded by the elevation of groups such as the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will have a profound impact on the next succession
process.4 In theory, Irans Assembly of Experts is entrusted with supervising, dismissing

The Times of Israel, Iranian reports say Supreme Leaders health worsening, (October 13, 2013), [Accessible
at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-reports-say-supreme-leaders-health-worsening/, Last Accessed:
June 19, 2014].
3
A. Ganji, Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs.
4
A. Nader, D. Thaler, S. R. Bohandy, The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
(RAND Corporation, 2011), p 7.

and electing the Supreme Leader.5 It is unlikely, however, that this body will ever
exercise its power of dismissal over Khamenei, rendering his death the most plausible
catalyst for succession. Like the majority of institutions in Iran, the Assembly of Experts
is highly loyal to Khamenei, who has built up a powerful network of support during his
twenty-five years as Supreme Leader. This support base is comprised of various
political, military and economic institutions, which Khamenei continually pits against
one another in order to ensure that no faction becomes too strong or ultimately
challenges his authority.6
Elements of Khameneis network will seek to influence the succession process,
especially the IRGCwhich has grown exponentially under Khamenei and is now
generally regarded as the most powerful political and economic bloc in Iran.7 With such
a high stake in the future of the Islamic Republic, the IRGC will possibly be the most
important external influence on the official succession procedure. However, the
organisation faces severe internal divisions, decreasing the likelihood that it will
unanimously support one candidate for Supreme Leader and potentially reducing its
influence over the succession process.8
The dynamics between rival factions within Khameneis network are in constant
flux, and even the manner in which Khamenei dies has the potential to determine each
factions influence over the next succession process. If Khamenei believes his death is
approaching he is likely to make adequate preparations in order to preserve his legacy.
He may announce a successor (privately or publicly) in advance which would greatly
5

D. Thaler, A. Nader, S. Chubin, J. Green, C. Lynch, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian
Leadership Dynamics, (RAND Corporation, 2010), p 28.
6
A. Ganji, Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs, (Sep.-Oct. 2013 Issue).
7
R. Safshekan and F. Sabet, The Ayatollahs Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009
Election Crisis, Middle East Journal, (Vol. 64, No. 4: Autumn 2010), p 543.
8
A. Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, The Iran Primer, [Accessible at:
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014].

reduce the risk of a power vacuum in the wake of his death, as his decision is likely to be
respected by the more powerful elements of his support base, facilitating a swift
transition process.9
The consequences are a lot less certain if Khamenei dies unexpectedly, as such an
event could trigger a struggle for power between rival institutions hoping to exercise
control over the succession process. Infighting at the elite level would decrease the
prospect of a swift transition, with a potentially destabilising effect on the Islamic
Republic. A smooth transition process, however, does not necessarily guarantee the
regimes stability in the post-Khamenei era. Even if transition is swift, the power of the
new Supreme Leader will depend on his ability to consolidate his position, both by
gaining the trust of the Iranian people and building a coalition of support. Irans most
powerful actors are loyal to Khamenei as opposed to the office of the Supreme Leader,
meaning the new leader may find himself in an initially insecure position.
The following scenarios do not aim to predict the future for Iran in the postKhamenei era. Rather, they seek to outline plausible visions of reality based on an
interpretation of past trends and current socio-political dynamics, in order to
extrapolate information which can help the UK prepare for a future inevitably defined
by uncertainty.

T. Karasik, Thoughts on Irans post-Khamenei future, Al Arabiya News, (December 5, 2013), [Accessible at:
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/12/05/Thoughts-on-Iran-s-post-Khameneifuture.html, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014].

SCENARIO 1: SMOOTH TRANSITION / WEAK SUCCESSOR

The next Supreme Leader is selected swiftly, perhaps because Khamenei announces
a successor in advance which defuses rivalry between competing stakeholders and
facilitates a smooth transition process. However, Khameneis successor finds himself in an
initially weak position. He does not automatically inherit Khameneis powerful support
base, and he does not command enough popular support to ensure that his authority is not
challenged.
The way in which the new Supreme Leader decides to consolidate his position will
be based on his calculation of internal dynamics at the time. Like Khamenei, he may turn
inwards in order to entrench his position by building a coalition of support among Irans
most powerful. Depending on whether the hardliners or moderates hold more political
influence, he may instead choose to look outwardsseeking to buttress his position by
fostering relations with the international community and inviting foreign investment. This
would also depend on his assessment of the public mood, and whether the notion of
increased international engagement remains as popular at the point of succession as it
does today.

IMPLICATIONS
The weakness of the Supreme Leader in this scenario presents the UK with
certain opportunities and threats. If the hardliner camp is the most powerful voice at
the time of succession, the Supreme Leader may capitalise on this by building support
accordingly. This could result in a resurgence of political intransigence, increased
isolation from the international community and an escalation of Irans nuclear
programme. In contrast, if the moderate narrative of engagement with the West retains
its current strength, Khameneis successor may seek support via this avenue instead.
In this scenario Irans next Supreme Leader is not an ideologue, or at least he is
not in a position to act on ideology alone. His primary interest is based on preserving
power, which provides the UK with a fragile opportunity for increased engagement. If
Khameneis successor can be convinced that his interests are best preserved through

increased engagement with the international community, Iran may begin to embrace
the globalised world with positive repercussions on both its domestic affairs and the
role it plays regionally.

SCENARIO 2: POWER STRUGGLE / ENCROACHING MILITARISATION

Khamenei dies unexpectedly, resulting in a power struggle between competing
stakeholders seeking to control the succession process. As Irans most powerful institution,
the IRGC prevails and successfully propels a candidate from its own camp to power. 10
While the infrastructure of the Islamic Republic ostensibly remains intact, the regimes
traditional institutions are marginalised under the new Supreme Leader, who increasingly
consolidates power with the IRGC and its supporters.
Although the IRGC holds a vast amount of power in Iran, the organisation is highly
factionalised and does not speak with one voice.11 The new Supreme Leaders position may
therefore be insecure at first, as he is unlikely to have gained the IRGCs unanimous
support and may also face hostility from the Islamic Republics traditionalist camps
particularly the clergy. In order to bolster his authority, the new Supreme Leader may
surround himself with the powerful, hardline factions of the IRGC, allowing him to actively
suppress opposition while establishing his own position.

IMPLICATIONS
Based on Irans internal power dynamics as they stand today, IRGC intervention
in the succession process is a likely scenario. This is an immediately daunting prospect
from the UKs perspective, but it is important to note that the IRGC is not a monolithic,
solely hardline organisation. As Mehdi Khalaji argues, not all IRGC commanders are

10

Irans constitution stipulates both the process for succession and legal candidates for Irans leader. However,
the legal procedure was overlooked in the case of Khameneionly a mid-ranking cleric when elected as
Supreme Leader, which was technically illegal at the time. It is unlikely that the constitution will be strictly
adhered to in the future; especially if a body as powerful as the IRGC decides to intervene directly in the
succession process.
11
F. M. Wehrey, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, (RAND Corporation, 2009), p 15.

intransigent ideologues and in the post-Khamenei era some will even seek to open Iran
up further to the West.12 If military leaders gain increased decision-making power in the
post-Khamenei era, there is a chance that they will seek engagement with the West in
order to gain international legitimacy and internal popularity, while restoring Irans
broken economy.13 This prospect depends critically on the behaviour of the
international community today, which has the potential to delegitimise the hardline
narrative and promote the likelihood of an Iran willing to open up fully to the West in
the future.

SCENARIO 3: POWER VACUUM / REGIME CHANGE

The previous scenarios presume that another Supreme Leader will inevitably follow
the death of Khamenei; an assumption which ought to be investigated. Although
predictions of a power vacuum in the wake of Khomeinis death were overestimated, there
is evidence of popular dissatisfaction with the regime which has the potential to crystallise
into widespread protests given the right circumstances (as the world witnessed in the
aftermath of Irans controversial 2009 elections).14
In this scenario, an extended transitional period following Khameneis death results
in some social unrest. Heightened concerns about the stability of the regime during the
succession process lead the IRGC to react with disproportionate force. This crackdown
triggers public outcry and provides a catalyst for widespread protests which the IRGC
cannot ultimately quash. Protests escalate into an uprising which concludes with either
the fall or radical transformation of the Islamic Republic. Iranian youth, who tend to be
highly politicised, highly educated and comprise the bulk of the states population, will
likely be the most important bloc throughout these protests, just as they were in the postelection protests of 2009 and the student protests of 1999.15

12

M. Khalaji, Supreme Succession: Who Will Lead Post-Khamenei Iran?, The Washington Institute, (Issue 117,
February 2012), p 2.
13
Ibid., p 2.
14
C. Addis, Irans 2009 Presidential Elections, (DIANE Publishing, 2009), pp. 7-11.
15
S. Khosravi, Young and Defiant in Tehran, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p 140.

IMPLICATIONS
This is both the most transformative and the least likely scenario based on
current socio-political dynamics. The threats and opportunities for the UK which
emerge from the fall of the Islamic Republic are inevitably steeped in uncertainty.
Optimism that the Arab Spring would be a force for democratisation was short-lived,
but a future for Iran in which politics is defined by democracy and increased
engagement with the West should not be automatically discounted. Iran has a strong
civil society, a highly educated population and a generation under thirty which tend to
favour normalised relations with the West.
Perhaps these factors will not result in a revolution, but dissatisfaction rates as
they currently stand are arguably not sustainable if the Islamic Republic is to continue
as we know it today. It is therefore prudent for the international community to consider
the transformation of the Islamic Republic as a viable scenario in Irans future.

Preparing Today For An Uncertain Tomorrow: Engage, Delegitimise,

Empower.
The Foreign Offices mission statement for Iran states that the UK wishes to see
Iran reform internally, play a constructive regional role, and reach a negotiated solution
to the nuclear issue.16 Steps should be taken by the UK today in order to promote the
achievement of these policy options in the long-term, and in a future without Khamenei.
The above scenarios have emphasised the importance of supporting Irans moderate

16

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Mission Statement in Iran [Accessible at:

www.gov.uk/government/world/iran, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014].

camp today in order to facilitate the sustained delegitimisation of the hardline narrative
into the future.
There are several steps the UK can take today which may positively contribute to
Irans internal and external outlook in a future without Khamenei. As the scenarios
highlight, the initial position of the next Supreme Leader will probably be nominal,
meaning he will likely look to consolidate his position based on the influences of
powerful political players and the mood of the general population. It is important that
the moderate camp remains powerful in Iran and the Iranian population does not
become disenchanted with the notion of engagement with the West; objectives which
the UK should seek to attain.
The UK is already progressing in the right direction. The government has not
ignored the election of Rouhani, and diplomatic relations have steadily improved in the
past year. Indeed, the UK recently announced that it was set to re-open the British
embassy in Iran, which has been closed for three years.17 However, in order to
demonstrate to the Iranian people that the Rouhani administrations reformist posture
is not being ignored by Western state-actors, further steps ought to be taken. The UK
should respond to the Iranian populations receptiveness to relations with the West by
aiming to improve business, education and cultural links. For instance, the UK could
capitalise on the fact that it remains one of the prime destinations for Iranians seeking
higher education abroad, by fostering closer links with Iranian universities or
embarking on joint research ventures. If tangible measures can be offered to the Iranian
population, the UK could play a role in delegitimising the hardline camp, which
perceives the West as fundamentally distrustful.
17

UK to re-open Iran embassy says Hague, BBC News, (June 17, 2014), [Accessible at:
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27882932, Last Accessed: June 19, 2014).

The UK cannot directly impact when or how the next succession process will
play out, but it can defend against uncertainty by developing its relationship with Iran
today. Since Rouhanis election, relations between Iran and the West have sat at a
critical juncture, and actions taken now have the potential to vastly impact the future of
Iranian-Western relations. As the National Iranian American Council argues, the success
of Rouhanis counter-narrative is dependent upon the policies and behaviour of the US
and Europe.18 Any failures in current negotiations, for example, will be capitalised on by
hardliners as evidence that engagement with the West is an inevitably fruitless pursuit,
in an attempt to deflate the moderate support base. The UK should therefore focus on
making choices today which empower Irans moderate camp, delegitimise the hardline
narrative and offer tangible results to the Iranian people by engaging directly with the
population. Such actions have the potential to vastly influence the future of Irans
relationship with the international community as well as its internal postureeven into
the post-Khamenei era.

18

B. Khajehpour, R. Marashi and T. Parsi, Extending Hands & Unclenching Fists, National Iranian American
Council, (December 2013), p 16.

REFERENCES
-

Addis, C. Irans 2009 Presidential Elections, (DIANE Publishing, 2009).

Khajepour, B. Marashi, R. and Parsi, T. Extending Hands & Unclenching Fists:

Reorienting Irans Outlook Beyond the Nuclear Deal, National Iranian American
Council, (December 2013), pp. 1-28.

Khalaji, M. Supreme Succession: Who Will Lead Post-Khamenei Iran?, The

Washington Institute, (Issue 117, February 2012) pp. 1-22.

Khosravi, S. Young and Defiant in Tehran, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

Nader, A. Thaler, D. Bohandy, S. R. The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, (RAND Corporation, 2011).

Safshekan, R. and Sabet, F. The Ayatollahs Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis, Middle East Journal, (Vol. 64, No. 4:
Autumn 2010), pp. 543-558.

Thaler, D. et al, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership

Dynamics, (RAND Corporation, 2010).

Wehrey, K. M. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Irans Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, (RAND Corporation, 2009).

Websites
-

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Mission Statement in Iran [Accessible at:

www.gov.uk/government/world/iran].

Ganji, A. Who is Ali Khamenei?, Foreign Affairs, (Sep.-Oct. 2013 Issue), [Accessible at:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139643/akbar-ganji/who-is-ali-khamenei].

Karasik, T. Thoughts on Irans post-Khamenei future, Al Arabiya News, (December 5,

2013), [Accessible at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middleeast/2013/12/05/Thoughts-on-Iran-s-post-Khamenei-future.html].

Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, The Iran Primer, [Accessible at:

http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards].

The Times of Israel, Iranian reports say Supreme Leaders health worsening,
(October 13, 2013), [Accessible at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-reports-saysupreme-leaders-health-worsening/].

UK to re-open Iran embassy says Hague, BBC News, (June 17, 2014), [Accessible at:
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27882932].