MARTINEZ VS.

MARTINEZ

FACTS: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. Daniel, Sr.
executed a Last Will and Testament[3] directing the subdivision of the property into
three lots. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo,
Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate.
After the Death of their parents, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by
his father on September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2
to Manolo and his wife Lucila. [6] He also discovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued
to the vendees based on the said deed of sale. [7] The spouses Manolo and Lucila
Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored
the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. The matter was referred to the barangay for
conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. They appended the certification
to file action executed by the barangay chairman to the complaint. In his Rodolfos
Answer[13] Rodolfo alleged, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a condition
precedent, namely, that earnest effort for an amicable settlement of the matter
between the parties had been exerted, but that none was reached. The spouses
Martinez filed an Amended Complaint in which they alleged that earnest efforts
toward a settlement had been made, but that the same proved futile.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION AND THE

ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH] THE
BARANGAY BUT NO SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO
PROVE THAT, INDEED, EARNEST EFFORTS WERE, IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME
HAVE FAILED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT
PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE

RULING: THE CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY AS
CONTEMPLATED BY THE CIVIL CODE.[19]
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.

Under Article 150 of the Family Code, petitioner Lucila Martinez had no familial
relations with the respondent, being a mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the
respondent; hence, there was no need for the petitioners [21] to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code.
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception
to the general rule. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the
enumeration.

The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the
Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a
proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang
Pambarangay, and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived
at, resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.
[25]
The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the certification
to file action by the barangaychairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of
the Family Code.

BLARDONY, JR. v. COSCOLLUELA, JR

FACTS: The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. Due to irreconcilable

differences, petitioner and private respondent separated. The wife filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties.
The husband, in his answer, admitted that before the filing of the petition, he and
his wife, assisted by their respective counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership but their attempt failed due to their inability
to agree upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership properties and he
prayed the court to order "a fair and equitable dissolution of their conjugal
partnership in accordance with law." The husband filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the
Lupon
Tagapamayapa
as
provided
in
P.D.
1508.
Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. The latters motion for
reconsideration of that order was denied by the court on February 20, 1985. Hence,
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction on the grounds that respondent Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction:
virtual
1aw
library

ISSUE: WON REFERRAL TO THE LUPON WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR FILING
THE CASE AT BAR; WON THE CONDITION PRECEDENT WAS JURISDICTIONAL

While the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition

precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its
non-compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired
over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Petitioner waived the
pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file
a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto
wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable partition of the conjugal
properties.
RULING:

The complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the Lupon
Tagapayapa in Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
.
.
."

BONIFACIO LAW OFFICE VS BELLOSILLO

FACTS: Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. Of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting
Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion,
and obvious partiality. Complainant assails the Order referring the said ejectment
case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was
alleged in the verified complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the
barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached [to] the
verified complaint as. The ANSWER of respondent judge denying the charges
leveled against him and alleging the following arguments:
a.
In all cases where there is failure of settlement of mediation proceedings
before the Barangay Chairman, it is necessary that the Pangkat be constituted by
the parties from the Lupon members in order that they may have a second
opportunity to amicably settle their dispute. It is a mandatory duty of the Barangay
Chairman to set the meeting of the parties for the constitution of the Pangkat upon
failure of parties to amicably settle otherwise there is no compliance with the
requirements of P.D. 1508, now Sec. 412, 1991 Local Government Code. In the case
of complainant, it appears from the records thereof that there was premature
issuance of the Certificate to File Action considering that there is no proof to show
that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the said certificate was issued.

ISSUE: WON THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF

THE LAW
RULING: NO. If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved
unsuccessful, there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410-{b}, Revised
Rule Katarungang
Pambarangay Law;
Sec.
1,c,[1],
Rule
III, Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules), or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation
proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8,a, Rule VI, Katarungang
PambarangayRules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance of this stage
of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute
the Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be
held.
CHAVEZ VS CA

FACTS: Chavez (lessor) and Trillana (lessee) entered into a contract of

lease[4] whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond. The contract provided
that lessee shall undertake all construction and preservation of improvements in the
fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense,
without reimbursement from the lessor.
A powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Lessee
did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still
high. Three (3) weeks later, he was informed by a barangay councilor that major
repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond. Lessee found out that the repairs
were at the instance of lessor who had grown impatient with his delay in
commencing the work.
Lessee filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay. He complained about the
unauthorized repairs undertaken by lessor, the ouster of his personnel from the
leased premises and its unlawful taking by lessor despite their valid and subsisting
lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached. The
Kasunduan was not complied with. Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their
lease contract and the Kasunduan, lessee filed a complaint on February 7, 1997
against petitioner before the RTC a civil action praying for award of damages in his
favor.
ISSUES: WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent
considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease
contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of
the Barangay Captain
WON respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of
the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.

RULING: The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered

mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by
the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion
of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is
judicial.[21] However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of
rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of
rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 [22] itself which provides that the
amicable settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if
beyond that period. The use of the word may clearly makes the procedure
provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory[23] or merely
optional in nature.
Although the Kasunduan executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office
of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court,
petitioners non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under
which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid
out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand.

DOMINGO VS ROSERO

FACTS: The petitioner filed an action for declaration of ownership with damages
against the private respondent, the spouses Leonilo Bercasio and Candida dela
Torre. In the complaint, the petitioner that his residence and postal address is at 660
T. Solit Street, Pateros, Metro Manila, while the respondents are residents of
Barangay Sto. Domingo, Pacasao, Camarines Sur. did.
The private respondents-defendants filed their answer (with counterclaim) 3 to the
complaint. After filing their answer, the private respondents moved for the dismissal
of the complaint against them on the sole ground that the petitioner allegedly failed
to comply with the provisions of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508
which require conciliation. The petitioner-movant arguing that the case does not
come within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508 inasmuch as the parties thereto reside in
different provinces. Alternatively, the petitioner insisted that even granting that
there was indeed a need to submit the case first before the barangay court, the
private respondents' failure to seasonably raise that ground in a motion to dismiss
before they filed their answer, or in their answer itself, constitutes a waiver of the
said ground.

ISSUE: WON THE CASE WAS DISMISSABLE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A
CONDITION PRECEDENT; WON THE CASE IS COGNIZABLE BY THE LUPON

RULING:

The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and

The Katarungang Pambarangay Law, it is crystal clear that only disputes between
parties who are actual residents of barangays located in the same city or
municipality, or residents of adjoining barangays located in two different
municipalities, are within the jurisdiction of the barangay court.
The private respondents submit that the subject dispute between them and the
petitioner is cognizable by the barangay Lupon. They premise their contention on
the allegation that at the time the petitioner filed his complaint, he was temporarily
residing in Barangay Sto. Domingo, in Pacasao, Camarines Sur. 10 Residence in a
barangay within the same municipality if only transient or temporary is not enough
to vest jurisdiction upon the barangay Lupon.
The requirement of submission or referral to the Lupong Tagapayapa under P.D.
1508 is merely a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court 12 and not
jurisdictional. 13 The failure of the private respondents to raise timely this ground in
a motion to dismiss filed before their answer to the complaint, or in their answer,
constitutes a waiver thereof. 15

HAROLD VS ALIBA

FACTS: Harold engaged the services Aliba, a geodetic engineer, to conduct a

relocation survey and to execute a consolidation-subdivision of their properties.
After completing his work, Aliba failed to return the certificates of title of the said
properties for more than one year, despite repeated demands to return them.
Harold later discovered that Aliba made it appear that she had sold the lot to
him for P80,000 and had her certificates of title cancelled and transferred to

him. Harold also found out that the alleged deed of sale was the document
that Aliba caused Harold and her husband to sign in January 1994.
Thinking that she can no longer recover her property, Harold asked for the
payment of the fair market value of her property but to no avail. The dispute
between

Harold

and Aliba was

referred

the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During

to Punong Barangay Limson Ogas and

the June

8,

1994 barangay conciliation

proceedings, the parties herein agreed that Aliba will pay an additional amount
of P75,000 to the initial P500,000 Aliba had already given to Harold. In the same
proceedings, Aliba tendered P70,000,

which

Harold

accepted.

as

agreed

upon, Aliba tendered the remaining P5,000 to Harold to complete their amicable
settlement. Unfortunately, Harold refused to accept the same, saying that P5,000 is
not enough and insisted on the elevation of the case to the court. [6] Thus, a
certification

to

file

action[7] was

issued

by

the

Office

of

the LupongTagapamayapa on June 29, 1994. Immediately thereafter, Harold filed a

Complaint[8] against Aliba before
[9]

the

Municipal

Trial

Court.

In

his

Answer,

Aliba prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, considering that he had already

been absolutely released from any obligation to Harold and that what remains to be
done is merely the completion of the amicable settlement of the parties
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ACT OF NOT ACCCEPTING THE REMAINING
BALANCE BEING PROFFERED BY RESPONDENT AND HER INSISTENCE THAT THE CASE
BE INSTEAD ELEVATED TO THE COURTS DURING THE SECOND DAY OF HEARING
SHOULD

NOT

ALSO

BE

CONSIDERED

REPUDIATION

OF

SAID

AMICABLE

SETTLEMENT OR AT THE VERY LEAST A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREOF

RULING: From the facts on record it is evident that the parties herein entered into an
amicable settlement, or more specifically, a compromise agreement, during the
said barangay conciliation proceedings. By reason of her unconditional acceptance of
the offer and the P70,000 tendered to her, Harold had already effectively waived
whatever claims she might have against Aliba regarding the subject lot. Moreover,
she is likewise barred from pursuing her case against Aliba under the principle
of estoppel now.
The issue concerning the alleged non-compliance of the amicable settlement
pursuant to the mandate of Section 411 [22] of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local

Government Code (LGC) arose because there was no formal document denominated
as Amicable Settlement signed by the parties. However, we agree with the similar
holdings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC that the requirements under Section
411 of the LGC had been substantially complied with. The minutes of the barangay
conciliation proceedings readily disclose the terms agreed upon by the parties for
the settlement of their dispute, and that the acknowledgment receipt, which was
written in a language known to the parties, signed by them, attested to by
the Lupon Chairman, and witnessed by several barangay officials, serves as an
indubitable proof of the amicable settlement and of the substantial compliance of its
terms by respondent Aliba.
Moreover, even without the minutes of the meeting and the acknowledgment
receipt, the amicable settlement, or more specifically the compromise agreement,
entered into by the parties is undeniably valid, considering that a compromise
agreement is a consensual contract, and as such, it is perfected upon the meeting of'
the minds of the parties to the contract
Harolds refusal to accept the remaining P5,000 that Aliba had tendered
cannot constitute an effective repudiation of the questioned amicable settlement,
considering that the reason for her refusal to accept the said amount or alleged
repudiation of the assailed amicable settlement is not one of the grounds for
repudiation clearly specified under Section 418 [25] of the LGC. As borne out by the
records, her refusal to accept the same was based on the alleged insufficiency of
the remaining P5,000 as settlement for the lot, without any reference to vitiation of
her consent by any fraud, violence or intimidation on Alibas part.
LUMBUAN VS RONQUILLO

FACTS: Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot she leased it to respondent

Ronquillo. The parties also agreed that there will be a 10% annual increase in rent
for the succeeding two years, and the leased premises will be used exclusively for
the respondents fastfood business, unless any other use is given, with the
petitioners prior written consent. While the respondent at the start operated a
fastfood business, he later used the premises as residence without the petitioners
prior written consent. He also failed to pay the 10% annual increase in rent
of P500/month starting 1996 and P1,000/month in 1997 to the present. Despite

repeated verbal and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears
and vacate the leased premises.
The petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairmans office but the
parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then issued
a Certificate to File Action despite not undergoing conciliation before the Pangkat
that was not constituted.[6]
The petitioner filed against the respondent an action for Unlawful Detainer.
The appellate court dismissed the complaint as it was prematurely instituted, as
when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been
complied with.

ISSUE: WON THE ACTION WAS DISMISSABLE FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE
PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY
LEVEL
RULING: Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed
the Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the
parties. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the
parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The
efforts of the BarangayChairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial
compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the
confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance
with the precondition for filing the case in court. [17] This is true notwithstanding the
mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall
constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts.
MAGNO VS JACOBA

FACTS: Complainant had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a
landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between
them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to the barangay
captain.

At

the

barangay

conciliation/confrontation

proceedings

conducted,

respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos,

appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objected

to respondents appearance but elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to
be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to
complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent
countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo
Inos.
Respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of
the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard
by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a
conciliation panel known as pangkat. Respondent submits that the prohibition
against
a
lawyer
appearing
to
assist
a
client
in katarungan
pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance
was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
ISSUE: WON A LAWYER ACTING AS AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT ALLOWED
RULING:

Section

415

of

the

LGC

of

1991[7],

on

the

subject Katarungang

Pambarangay, provides:
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all
katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in
person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except
for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin
who are not lawyers.
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the
parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel
or representative.
As to her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since
complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual
who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard,
suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of
availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed
her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter
chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10]
MONTOYA VS ESCAYO
FACTS: The private respondents were all formerly employed as salesgirls in the
petitioner's store, the "Terry's Dry Goods Store," in Bacolod City. On different dates,
they separately filed complaints for the collection of sums of money against the
petitioner for alleged unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA,
and service leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and
attorney's fees. , the petitioner-employer moved for the dismissal of the complaints,
claiming that among others, the private respondents failed to refer the dispute to

the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and to secure the certification
required from the Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the Labor
Arbiter.
ISSUE; WON THE ACTION WAS DISMISSABLE
RULING: The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes before
the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or other
government offices are not applicable to labor cases.
Article 226 thereof grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over the conciliation
and mediation of disputes, grievances, or problems in the regional offices of the
Department of Labor and Employment. It is the said Bureau and its divisions, and
not the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa, which are vested by law with original
and exclusive authority to conduct conciliation and mediation proceedings on labor
controversies before their endorsement to the appropriate Labor Arbiter for
adjudication. Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before the barangay courts
would defeat the very salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor
proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the proper court or
office to decide it finally, the position taken by the petitioner would only duplicate
the conciliation proceedings and unduly delay the disposition of the labor case.
AGBAYANI VS BELEN
FACTS: Nullification is sought by petitioners of the Order of respondent Judge
dismissing the civil action instituted by said petitioners against private respondents
and other persons for quieting of title and damages involving three (3) parcels of
land in Dayomaca (Tobuan), Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan. 2 The Court sustained the
defendants' motion to dismiss "on the ground that ... (it had) not yet acquired
jurisdiction to try the case" because of the failure of the petitioners to submit the
controversy to conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their
complaint with the Court.
ISSUE: Whether the "precondition," i.e., the prior submission of the dispute to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation, should apply to actions affecting real property
situated in one city or municipality although the parties actually reside in barangays
which are located in different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin each other.
RULING: The "precondition" had no application to cases over which the Lupon had
no authority. The Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties
are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the
barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other." 13 In such a situation,
where the Lupon is without jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are
not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of adjoining' barangays, the
nature of the controversy is of no moment-whether or not affecting real property or
interest therein, located in the same city or municipality. And the principle is not at
an altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD 1508(governing venue) that "disputes
which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay
where the real property or any part thereof is situated." The "quoted proviso should
simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the principal

clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3;" 14 but obviously, the rule on venue is
utterly in-consequential as regards a case over which the Barangay Lupon does not,
in the first place, have any jurisdiction
Since the dispute between the parties in this case was never within the authority or
jurisdiction of the Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly reside in different
cities and municipalities (and not in adjoining barangays), there was no occasion or
reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing disputes concerning real
property. Petitioners were there-fore under no obligation to comply with the
"precondition" of first referring their dispute with private respondents to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation and amicable settlement before instituting their suit
in court.
PANG-ET VS DAO-AS
FACTS: This is an Action[4] for recovery of possession of real property. During
the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective counsels, agreed to
refer the matter to the Lupon for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.[5] Consequently, the proceedings before the
MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution. [6]
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February
1995 due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for
Arbitration and their insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995,
the Certification, as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.
An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the
matter for conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration
Award thereon.
In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration
Award. Petitioner then filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the Arbitration
Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the MCTC for
the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of possession
and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued
by the Lupon.
The MCTC deniedFlorentina Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration
Award elucidating that since the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day
reglementary period provided for under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the
arbitration award has become final and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of
herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an Order remanding the records of the
case to the Lupon for the execution of the Arbitration Award. On 31 August 1995,
the then incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the
Award. Said Notice of Execution was never implemented.

ISSUE: WON ARBITRATION AWARD IS MANDATORY FOR DISPUTES THAT HAVE

UNDERGONE ARBITRATION IN THE BRGY; WON THE PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THEIR
AGREEMENT TO REFER TO ARBITRATION DURING THE PTC

RULING:
NO.
NOT
MANDATORY.The
object
of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through
conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties. [15]
Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy
during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free
to instead find recourse in the courts [16] in the event that no true compromise is
reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the
parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat,
whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court. [17] Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to
submit their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there
cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. It would
seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to
submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered by the Lupon.
What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a
confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and
that a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as
attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling within the
authority of theLupon may be instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication.
What was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was the remand of the case
to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings and not the actual
amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may only be
compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary
confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar,
to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.
PASCUAL VS. PASCUAL
FACTS: Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed
Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) To file a case for
the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Marilou M.
Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale. Respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to

Dismiss[3] on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement
under Section 412 of the Local Government Code, [4] she contending that there is no
showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was
filed in court.
Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real
party in interest, and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no
jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real property
Respondent submits, on the other hand, That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident
of the same barangay as that of hers, respondent argues in any event, brings the
matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon, being a substitute, for Sagario, becomes
the real party-in-interest.

ISSUE: WON THE LUPON HAVE THE JURISDICTION OVER THE DISPUTE

RULING: Since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an
actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the
local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for
conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
SAN MIGUEL VILLAGE VS PUNDOGAR

FACTS: Petitioner, a duly accredited private school located, entered into a contract
of services with private respondent Christina Trio. Under that contract, Christina
Trio would teach at the petitioner School during the schoolyear .The contract also
provided that any party desiring to terminate the contract before its scheduled
expiration, would give the other party at least one month notice of termination in
writing. Sometime in August 1985, while the contract was in full force and effect,
and during a final examination period, private respondent suddenly stopped
teaching at the petitioner School, without giving notice of termination. Petitioner
School immediately sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain and the
commencement of conciliation proceedings, This attempt failed because private
respondent could not be contacted. A Certificate to File Action, signed by the
Barangay Captain of Barangay. Private respondent having failed to file an answer
within the reglementary period, the petitioner School moved to declare her in
default. The trial court granted the motion, declared private respondent in default.
The judge rendered a judgment by default against the respondent.

Private respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the trial court,
alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to render its decision for failure of
petitioner to go through the mandatory conciliation procedure. Judge Pundogar
granted the relief sought, holding that the Regional Trial Court in rendering the
decision, acted without jurisdiction "over the parties and the subject matter of the
action" 1 for failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of P. D. No. 1508.
ISSUE: WON THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQ OF PD 1508 IS JURISDICTIONAL;
WON THE REQUIREMENTS OF PD 1508 OF CONFRONTATION BEFORE ISSUANCE OF
CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION HAS BEEN SATISFIED DESPITE THE LACK OF
CONFRONTATION
RULING: that failure of a plaintiff to comply with the requirements of P.D. No. 1508
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court that tried the action. Failure of a plaintiff
to go through the conciliation procedure established by P.D. No. 1508 merely affects
the sufficiency, or the maturity or ripeness of the plaintiffs cause of action and the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, but rather for want of cause of action or for prematurity.
If the defendant in an action fails for one reason or another to respond to a notice to
appear before the Lupon, the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 must be regarded as
having been satisfied by the plaintiff. A defendant cannot be allowed to frustrate the
requirements of the statute by her own refusal or failure to appear before
the Lupon and then later to assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting up
the very ground of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508.
In any event, the alleged failure on the part of a plaintiff to comply with the
procedural requirement established by P.D. No. 1508 must be raised in a timely
manner, that is, at the first available opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide
legal basis for dismissal of the complaint. Such failure must be pleaded, in other
words, in a timely motion to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set up that
defense produces the effect of waiver of such defense. In the instant case, private
respondent was declared in default and that default order was never set aside.
Accordingly, private respondent must be held to have waived whatever right she
may have had to raise the defense of failure to comply with the compulsory
conciliation procedure under P.D. No. 1508.
SANTOS VS LUMBAO
FACTS: On two separate occasions during her lifetime, the petitioners predecessor
sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her
share in the estate of her deceased mother. After acquiring the subject property,
respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a
house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As

the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made
several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein
petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a
separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao. Respondents Spouses
Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter [8] to petitioners but despite
receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the
subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed
a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages [9] before the RTC
Petitoners prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action
because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law
ISSUE: Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by
respondents spouses Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply with the
mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.
RULING: . Non-compliance with the said condition precedent could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would
not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to such
exercise of jurisdiction.[16]
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the
trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to
Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by
filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively
participated in the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by crossexamining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is
elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him
before a court is tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later
on impugning the courts jurisdiction.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA VS HEIRS OF TEVES
FACTS: Andres Abanto's heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Andres Abanto and Simultaneous Sale. [2] In this document,
Abanto's heirs adjudicated unto themselves the two lots and sold the
(a) unregistered lot of 193,789 square meters to the United Planters Sugar Milling
Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO), and (b) theregistered lot covered by TCT No. H-37 to
Angel M. Teves, for a total sum of P115,000.00. The sale was not registered.[3] Out
of respect for his uncle Ignacio Montenegro, who was UPSUMCO's founder and

president, Teves verbally allowed UPSUMCO to use the lot covered by TCT No. H-37
for pier and loading facilities, free of charge, subject to the condition that
UPSUMCO shall shoulder the payment of real property taxes and that its occupation
shall be co-terminus with its corporate existence. [4] UPSUMCO then built a
guesthouse and pier facilities on the property. [5] UPSUMCOs properties were
acquired by the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Later, PNB transferred the same
properties to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which, in turn, sold the same to the
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO). URSUMCO then took
possession of UPSUMCOs properties, including Teves' lot covered by TCT No. H-37.
Upon learning of URSUMCO's acquisition of his lot, Teves formally asked the
corporation to turn over to him possession thereof or the corresponding rentals. He
stated in his demand letters that he merely allowed UPSUMCO to use his property
until its corporate dissolution; and that it was not mortgaged by UPSUMCO with the
PNB and, therefore, not included among the foreclosed properties acquired by
URSUMCO.[6]
Teves filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dumaguete City, Branch 43, a
complaint for recovery of possession of real property with damages against
URSUMCO

ISSUE: Whether the complaint

of barangay conciliation.

should

have

been

dismissed

for

lack

RULING: NO. Being a corporation, petitioner cannot be impleaded as a party to

a barangay conciliation proceeding. Section 1, Rule VI of theKatarungang
Pambarangay Rules implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay Law[28]provides:
"Section 1. Parties. - Only individuals shall be parties to these proceedings either as
complainants or respondents. No complaint by or against corporations,
partnerships or other juridical entities shall be filed, received or acted upon."

VERCIDE VS HERNANDEZ

FACTS: This is a complaint filed against Judge Hernandez, charging her with grave
abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for her dismissal of a case which
complainant Valencides Vercide and his wife had filed against Daria Lagas Galleros
for recovery of possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro,
Tudela, Misamis Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same
municipality, while complainant and his wife are residents of Dipolog City. Because
of this fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.

In support of her order, respondent cited P.D. No. 1508, 3 of which provides:
Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all
disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
ISSUE: WON THE JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE CASE
RULING: "SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. - The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under
which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the
disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually
residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while
reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or
in "different barangays within the same city or municipality" unequivocably
declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties
who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities," except where
such barangays adjoin each other.
Recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties
do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays.
SECTION 2. Subject matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of
proceedings for amicable settlement under these rules except the following
enumerated cases:
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto to agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should
operate as such.
VIDAL VS ESCUETA

FACTS: When Abelardo Escueta died intestate on December 3, 1994, he was

survived by his widow Remedios Escueta and their six children, including Ma. Teresa
O. Escueta and her brother Herman O. Escueta. Part of his estate was a parcel of
land located at No. 14 Sierra Madre corner Kanlaon Streets, Barangay Highway
Hills, Mandaluyong City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (77083) 27568, and the house thereon. The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, who
sublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of
estate over the property. They also executed a special power of attorney authorizing
Ma. Teresa Escueta to sell the said property. [4]
Sometime in 1999, Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property, filed an
ejectment case against Llanera and the sub-lessees before the Lupon.
Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed an Amicable
Settlement,[9] where they agreed that (a) the owners of the property would no
longer collect the rentals due from the respondents therein (lessee and sub-lessees)
starting May 1999, with the concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the
property on or before December 1999; (b) time was the essence of the agreement,
and that consequently, if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the
property on or before December 1999, the barangay chairman was authorized
without any court order to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on
the property.[10] The amicable settlement was attested by Pangkat Chairman Jose
Acong. The parties did not repudiate the amicable settlement within ten days from
the execution thereof. Neither did any of the parties file any petition to repudiate
the settlement.
Five sub-lessees remained in the property, and requested Escueta for extensions to
vacate the property. Escueta agreed, but despite the lapse of the extensions
granted them, the five sub-lessees refused to vacate the property.
Escueta opted not to have the sub-lessees evicted through the Punong Barangay as
provided for in the amicable settlement. Neither did she file a motion with
the Punong Barangayfor the enforcement of the settlement. Instead, she filed
on May 12, 2000, a verified Motion for Execution against the recalcitrant sublessees with the MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and the
issuance of a writ of execution.
ISSUE: WON THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION WAS PREMATURELY AND IMPROPERLY
FILED

RULING: The Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule

VII, Section 2 provides:

SECTION 2. Modes of Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award

may be enforced by execution by the Lupon within six [6] months from date of the
settlement or date of receipt of the award or from the date the obligation stipulated
in the settlement or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and
demandable. After the lapse of such time, the settlement or award may be
enforced by the appropriate local trial court pursuant to the applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court . An amicable settlement reached in a case referred by the Court
having jurisdiction over the case to the Lupon shall be enforced by execution by the
said court. (Underlining supplied).
In this case, there is no question that the petitioners were obliged under the
settlement to vacate the premises in January 2000. The time line in Section 417
should be construed to mean that if the obligation in the settlement to be enforced
is due and demandable on the date of the settlement, the six-month period should
be counted from the date of the settlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be
enforced is due and demandable on a date other than the date of the settlement,
the six-month period should be counted from the date the obligation becomes due
and demandable.
The petitioners are estopped from assailing the amicable settlement on the ground
of deceit and fraud. First. The petitioners failed to repudiate the settlement within
the period therefor. Second. The petitioners were benefited by the amicable
settlement. They were allowed to remain in the property without any rentals
therefor until December 1998. They were even granted extensions to continue in
possession of the property. It was only when the respondent filed the motion for
execution that the petitioners alleged for the first time that the respondents
deceived them into executing the amicable settlement. [38]
ZAMORA VS HEIRS OF IZQIERDO

FACTS: Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation
whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units They agreed on
the following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased premises is only for
residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan,
representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease
wherein the rental was increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per month.
[3]
However, petitioners refused to sign it.
In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their
children (two of whom have their own families), herein petitioners, continued to

reside in the apartment unit. However, they refused to pay the increased rental and
persisted in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.
Petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks &
Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a
written consent from the owner is required for such installation, she requested
respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because
petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on the
use of the premises by using a portion thereof for photocopying business and
allowing three families to reside therein.
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of the Punong
Barangay of Barangay 16, Sona 2, District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint
against Anita Punzalan
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their
dispute amicably. Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File
Action
Respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners.
[6]
Forthwith, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss [7] the complaint on the ground that
the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. First, they
alleged that the barangay Certification to File Action is fatally defective because it
pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents attorney-in-fact to give
her written consent to petitioners request for installation of water facilities in the
premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did
not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or
arbitration proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b),
Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No.
7160[8] (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991)
ISSUE: WON THE ACTION WAS DISMISSABLE
RULING: While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled
Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig, this title must
not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings. Minutes would show
that other issues were also discussed such as the violation of the terms of the lease.
Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for
the filing of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no
new issues would be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in
the past that they cannot get to settle their differences amicably. [20]

Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9)
times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the
issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners violation of the lease
contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law
which does not require strict adherence thereto. [22]