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Vaisheshika

Vaisheshika or Vaieika (Sanskrit: ) is one of


the six orthodox schools of Hinduism (Vedic systems)
from ancient India. In its early stages, the Vaieika
was an independent philosophy with its own metaphysics,
epistemology, logic, ethics, and soteriology.[1] Over time,
the Vaieika system became similar in its philosophical procedures, ethical conclusions and soteriology to the
Nyya school of Hinduism, but retained its dierence in
epistemology and metaphysics.

kind of dimension, called small (au). A composite is


that which is divisible into atoms. Whatever human beings perceive is composite, and even the smallest perceptible thing, namely, a eck of dust, has parts, which are
therefore invisible.[5] The Vaieikas visualized the smallest composite thing as a triad (tryauka) with three
parts, each part with a dyad (dyauka). Vaieikas believed that a dyad has two parts, each of which is an atom.
Size, form, truths and everything that human beings exThe epistemology of Vaieika school of Hinduism, like perience as a whole is a function of atoms, their number
Buddhism, accepted only two reliable means to knowl- and their spatial arrangements.
edge - perception and inference.[2][3] Vaieika school Vaisheshika postulated that what one experiences is deand Buddhism both consider their respective scriptures rived from dravya (substance: a function of atoms, their
as indisputable and valid means to knowledge, the dif- number and their spatial arrangements), guna (quality),
ference being that the scriptures held to be a valid and karma (activity), samanya (commonness), vishesha (parreliable source by Vaieikas were the Vedas.
ticularity) and samavaya (inherence, inseparable con[6][7]
Vaisheshika school is known for its insights in nectedness of everything).
naturalism,[4] and it is a form of atomism in natural philosophy.[5] It postulated that all objects in the
physical universe are reducible to paramu (atoms),
and ones experiences are derived from the interplay of
substance (a function of atoms, their number and their
spatial arrangements), quality, activity, commonness,
particularity and inherence.[6] Knowledge and liberation was achievable by complete understanding of the
world of experience, according to Vaieika school of
Hinduism.[6]

2 Epistemology

Hinduism identies six Pramas as epistemically


reliable means to accurate knowledge and to truths:[8]
Pratyaka (perception), Anumna (inference), Upamna
(comparison and analogy), Arthpatti (postulation,
derivation from circumstances), Anupalabdi (nonperception, negative/cognitive proof) and abda (word,
Vaieika darshana was founded by Kada Kashyapa testimony of past or present reliable experts).[2][3][9] Of
these Vaieika epistemology considered only pratyaka
around the 2nd century BC.[6]
(perception) and anumna (inference) as reliable
means of valid knowledge.[10] Nyaya school, related to
Vaieika, accepts four out of these six.[2]
1 Overview
Pratyaka () means perception. It is of
two types: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of ve senses and worldly objects, while internal
perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[11][12] The ancient and medieval
texts of Hinduism identify four requirements for
correct perception:[13] Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct
experience by ones sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), Avyapadesya (nonverbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where ones sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone elses perception), Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it
the result of deception because ones sensory organ

Although the Vaisheshika system developed independently from the Nyaya school of Hinduism, the two became similar and are often studied together. In its classical form, however, the Vaishesika school diered from
the Nyaya in one crucial respect: where Nyaya accepted
four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaishesika accepted
only two.[2][3]
The epistemology of Vaieika school of Hinduism accepted only two reliable means to knowledge - perception
and inference.[2]
Vaisheshika espouses a form of atomism, that the reality
is composed of four substances (earth, water, air, re).
Each of these four are of two types, explains Ganeri,[5]
atomic (paramu) and composite. An atom is that which
is indestructible (anitya), indivisible, and has a special
1

4 THE CATEGORIES OR PADRTHA


or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and Vyavasayatmaka (denite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because
of ones failure to observe all the details, or because
one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).[13] Some
ancient scholars proposed unusual perception as
prama and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specics to a universal), and
jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of
prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of
study' by observing its current state).[14] Further, the
texts considered and rened rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyaka-pranama, so as
to contrast nirnaya (denite judgment, conclusion)
from anadhyavasaya (indenite judgment).[15]
Anumna () means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from
one or more observations and previous truths by
applying reason.[16] Observing smoke and inferring
re is an example of Anumana.[11] In all except
one Hindu philosophies,[17] this is a valid and useful
means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts:
pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta
(examples).[18] The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian
scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven
or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the
sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence)
are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as
counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian
philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For
example, they demand Vyapti - the requirement that
the hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in all cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha.[18][19] A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion).[20]

2.1

Syllogism

The syllogism of the Vaieika school was similar to


that of the Nyya school of Hinduism, but the names
given by Praastapda to the 5 members of syllogism are
dierent.[21]

Literature of Vaisheshika

The earliest systematic exposition of the Vaisheshika


is found in the Vaieika Stra of Kada (or Kaab-

haksha). This treatise is divided into ten books. The


two commentaries on the Vaieika Stra, Rvaabhya
and Bhradvjavtti are no more extant. Praastapdas
Padrthadharmasagraha (c. 4th century) is the next
important work of this school. Though commonly
known as bhya of Vaieika Stra, this treatise is basically an independent work on the subject. The next
Vaisheshika treatise, Candras Daapadrthastra (648)
based on Praastapdas treatise is available only in Chinese translation. The earliest commentary available on
Praastapdas treatise is Vyomaivas Vyomavat (8th
century). The other three commentaries are ridharas
Nyyakandal (991), Udayanas Kiranvali (10th century)
and rivatsas Llvat (11th century). ivdityas Saptapadrth which also belongs to the same period, presents
the Nyya and the Vaieika principles as a part of one
whole. akara Miras Upaskra on Vaieika Stra is
also an important work.[22]

4 The Categories or Padrtha


According to the Vaisheshika school, all things which
exist, which can be cognised, and which can be named
are padrthas (literal meaning: the meaning of a word),
the objects of experience. All objects of experience
can be classied into six categories, dravya (substance),
gua (quality), karma (activity), smnya (generality),
viea (particularity) and samavya (inherence). Later
Vaieikas (rdhara and Udayana and ivditya) added
one more category abhava (non-existence). The rst
three categories are dened as artha (which can perceived) and they have real objective existence. The
last three categories are dened as budhyapekam (product of intellectual discrimination) and they are logical
categories.[23]
1.Dravya (substance): The substances are conceived as
9 in number. They are, pthv (earth), ap (water), tejas
(re), vyu (air), kaa (ether), kla (time), dik (space),
tman (self or soul) and manas (mind). The rst ve are
called bhtas, the substances having some specic qualities so that they could be perceived by one or the other
external senses.[24]
2.Gua (quality): The Vaieika Stra mentions 17
guas (qualities), to which Praastapda added another
7. While a substance is capable of existing independently by itself, a gua(quality) cannot exist so. The original 17 guas (qualities) are, rpa (colour), rasa (taste),
gandha (smell), spara (touch), sakhy (number),
parima (size/dimension/quantity), pthaktva (individuality), sayoga (conjunction/accompaniments), vibhga
(disjunction), paratva (priority), aparatva (posteriority),
buddhi (knowledge), sukha (pleasure), dukha (pain), icch (desire), dvea (aversion) and prayatna (eort). To
these Praastapda added gurutva (heaviness), dravatva
(uidity), sneha (viscosity), dharma (merit), adharma
(demerit), abda (sound) and saskra (faculty).[25]

3
3.Karma (activity): The karmas (activities) like guas 6 Later developments
(qualities) have no separate existence, they belong to the
substances. But while a quality is a permanent feature of Over the centuries, the school became closely identied
a substance, an activity is a transient one. ka (ether), with the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy, as nyyakla (time), dik (space) and tman (self), though sub- vaieika.
stances, are devoid of karma (activity).[26]
The school suered a natural decline in India after the
4.Smnya (generality): Since there are plurality of sub- 15th century.
stances, there will be relations among them. When a
property is found common to many substances, it is called
smnya.[27]

7 Views by the Vedanta School

5.Viea (particularity): By means of viea, we are able


to perceive substances as dierent from one another. As The Vaisheshikas say that the visible universe is crethe ultimate atoms are innumerable so are the vieas.[28] ated from an original stock of atoms (janim asata). As
6.Samavya (inherence): Kada dened samavya Kadas Vaieika Stra (7.1.26) states, nitya parias the relation between the cause and the eect. maalam (that which is of the smallest size, the atom,
Praastapda dened it as the relationship existing be- is eternal), he and his followers also postulate eternaltween the substances that are inseparable, standing to ity for other, nonatomic entities, including the souls who
one another in the relation of the container and the con- become embodied, and even a Supreme Soul. But in
tained. The relation of samavya is not perceivable but Vaieika cosmology the souls and the Supersoul play
only inferable from the inseparable connection of the only token roles in the atomic production of the universe.
The Brahma Sutra (2.2.12) says ubhayathpi na karmatas
substances.[29]
tad-abhava. According to this stra, one cannot claim
that, at the time of creation, atoms rst combine together
because they are impelled by some karmic impulse adhering in the atoms themselves, since atoms by themselves,
in their primeval state before combining into complex ob5 The atomic theory
jects, have no ethical responsibility that might lead them
to acquire pious and sinful reactions. Nor can the initial combination of atoms be explained as a result of the
The early Vaieika texts presented the following sylloresidual karma of the living entities who lie dormant prior
gism to prove that all objects i.e. the four bhtas, pthv
to creation, since these reactions are each jiva's own and
(earth), ap (water), tejas (re) and vyu (air) are made of
cannot be transferred from them even to other jvas, what
indivisible paramus (atoms): Assume that the matter is
to speak of inert atoms.
not made of indivisible atoms, and that it is continuous.
Take a stone. One can divide this up into innitely many
pieces (since matter is continuous). Now, the Himalayan
mountain range also has innitely many pieces, so one 8 See also
may build another Himalayan mountain range with the
Darshanas
innite number of pieces that one has. One begins with
a stone and ends up with the Himalayas, which is a para Hindu philosophy
dox - so the original assumption that matter is continuous
must be wrong, and so all objects must be made up of a
Hinduism
nite number of paramus (atoms).
Nyaya (philosophy)
According to the Vaieika school, the trasareu (dust
particles visible in the sunbeam coming through a small
Padrtha
window hole) are the smallest mahat (perceivable) parti Vaieika Stra
cles and dened as tryaukas (triads). These are made
of three parts, each of which are dened as dvyauka
Atomism
(dyad). The dvyaukas are conceived as made of two
parts, each of which are dened as paramu (atom).
Naturalism (philosophy)
The paramus (atoms) are indivisible and eternal, they
can neither be created nor destroyed.[30] Each paramu
(atom) possesses its own distinct viea (individuality).[31]

9 Notes

The measure of the partless atoms is known as parimaala parima. It is eternal and it cannot generate
the measure of any other substance. Its measure is its
own absolutely.[32]

[1] Amita Chatterjee (2011), Nyya-vaieika Philosophy, The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy,
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195328998.003.0012

12

[2] DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology


(Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, ISBN 978-1-44198109-7, page 172
[3]

Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion


: Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett),
Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245248;
John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian
Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Dened in English,
State University of New York Press, ISBN 9780791430675, page 238

EXTERNAL LINKS

[19] Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of Indias Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 81-208-0779-0
[20] Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious,
Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac
& Co, London, page 61
[21] Radhakrishnan 2006, p. 75
[22] Radhakrishnan 2006, pp. 18081
[23] Radhakrishnan 2006, pp. 18386
[24] Chattopadhyaya 1986, p. 169

[4] Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian


Thought, ISBN 978-8120812932, pages 227-246

[25] Radhakrishnan 2006, p. 204

[5] Analytical philosophy in early modern India J Ganeri,


Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

[27] Radhakrishnan 2006, p. 209

[26] Radhakrishnan 2006, pp. 20809

[28] Radhakrishnan 2006, p. 215


[6] Oliver Leaman, Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy.
Routledge, ISBN 978-0415173629, 1999, page 269.
[7] M Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy,
Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120810860, pages 228237

[29] Radhakrishnan 2006, pp. 21619


[30] Chattopadhyaya 1986, pp. 16970
[31] Radhakrishnan 2006, p. 202
[32] Dasgupta 1975, p. 314

[8] P Bilimoria (1993), Prama epistemology: Some recent


developments, in Asian philosophy - Volume 7 (Editor:
G Floistad), Springer, ISBN 978-94-010-5107-1, pages
137-154
[9] Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge
University Press, ISBN 978-0521438780, page 225

10 References

[10] Chattopadhyaya 1986, p. 170

Chattopadhyaya, D. (1986), Indian Philosophy: A


Popular Introduction, Peoples Publishing House,
New Delhi, ISBN 81-7007-023-6.

[11] MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka


Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies,
46(2): 13-16

Dasgupta, Surendranath (1975), A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi,
ISBN 978-81-208-0412-8.

[12] B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780198239765

Radhakrishnan, S. (2006), Indian Philosophy, Vol.


II, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, ISBN 0-19563820-4.

[13] Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia


of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University
Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN
81-208-0309-4, pages 160-168
[14] Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia
of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University
Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN
81-208-0309-4, pages 168-169
[15] Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia
of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University
Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN
81-208-0309-4, pages 170-172
[16] W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reection, State University of New York Press, ISBN 0-7914-0362-9, page
26-27
[17] Carvaka school is the exception
[18] James Lochtefeld, Anumana in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing.
ISBN 0-8239-2287-1, page 46-47

11 Further reading
Bimal Matilal (1977), A History of Indian Literature - Nyya-Vaieika, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag,
ISBN 978-3447018074, OCLC 489575550
Gopi Kaviraj (1961), Gleanings from the history and
bibliography of the Nyaya-Vaisesika literature, Indian Studies: Past & Present, Volume 2, Number 4,
OCLC 24469380

12 External links
A summary of Vaisheshika physics
Shastra Nethralaya - Vaisheshika
GRETIL e-text of the Vaieika Stras

13
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