Introduction To German Idealism - 5 (26) Slides

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.
com
Welcome to
Introduction to German
Idealism part 5
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1
Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.com
Introduction to German
Idealism (5/26)
"Self-consciousness as Principle of
Cognition"
Reading material for the lecture on

Monday February 15th,
7 PM GMT (8 PM, CET)
The text of Hegel will be read in detail

on
Friday, February 19th, at the same
time.
2
www.wiziq.com
Robbert Veen -
http://www.robbertveen.com
3
1. Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)
2. Phenomenology of Spirit: Selfconsciousness
3. Jill Vance Buroker: Kant's Critique of Pure

Reason. An introduction
4
The issue:
What does it mean to say that the synthesis of sensuous

experience and reason is grounded on the unity of self-
consciousness?
• Kantian project: transcendental synthesis of

apperception: objective basis for the unity of
perceptions = basis for objective experience
• Hegel's criticism: still remains a subjective act

without foundation in reality
Working backwards:
1. Hegel's critique of Kant's thought

2. Hegel's grounding of this critique in the
Phenomenology
3. Kant's position clarified
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Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)
1. Critique of Pure Reason
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1.1 Understanding "thinks" the object but remains

empty as such.
The understanding is active thought, I myself; it “is the

faculty of thinking the object of sensuous perception.”
Yet it has thoughts merely without real content:
“Thoughts without content are void and empty, sensuous
perceptions without Notions are blind.”
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1.2 The ground for all applied logic is the synthetic

unity of apperception
Now logic, as transcendental logic, likewise sets forth the

conceptions which the understanding has a priori in itself
and “whereby it thinks objects completely a priori.”
Thoughts have a form which signifies their being the
synthetic function which brings the manifold into a unity.
I am this unity, the transcendental apperception, the
pure apperception of self-consciousness. I=I; I must
‘accompany’ all our conceptions. This is a barbarous
exposition of the matter.
NOTE: the self-consciousness that I am is

identified with the self-consciousness of the
unifying function in Hegel
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1.3 Concepts are mere forms of unity
Now as ‘I’ is the universal transcendental unity of self-

consciousness which binds together the empirical matter
of conception generally, there are various modes in this
relationship, and here we have the transcendental
nature of the categories or universal thought
-determinations.
[…]
10
Summary:
• Though understanding thinks objects, as thinking it

remains empty of concents.
• Only the form of concepts is part of the ultimate
unity of thinking, i.e. the self-conscious mind in
action: synthetic unity of apperception
• All thought-forms are expressions of this ultimately
functional unity of apperception.
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Hegel on Kant
2. Self-consciousness in the
Phenomenology of Spirit
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2.1 General structure of self-consciousness
If we call the movement of knowledge conception, and

knowledge, qua simple unity or Ego, the object, we see
that not only for us [tracing the process], but likewise for
knowledge itself, the object corresponds to the
conception; or, if we put it in the other form and call
conception what the object is in itself, while applying the
term object to what the object is qua object or for an
other, it is clear that being "in-itself" and being "for an
other" are here the same.
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2.2 Identification of the I with itself
The distinction is not, and self-consciousness is only

motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, I am I. When for self-
consciousness the distinction does not also have the
shape of being, it is not self-consciousness. For [220]
self-consciousness, then, otherness is a fact, it does exist
as a distinct moment; but the unity of itself with this
difference is also a fact for self-consciousness, and is a
second distinct moment. With that first moment, self-
consciousness occupies the position of consciousness,
and the whole expanse of the world of sense is
conserved as its object, but at the same time only as
related to the second moment, the unity of self-
consciousness with itself.
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2.3 Self-consciousness as posited necessarily

breaks up into a relation of two self-
consciousnesses
The independent members exist for themselves. To be

thus for themselves, however, is really as much their
reflexion directly into the unity, as this unity is the
breaking asunder into independent forms. The unity is
sundered because it is absolutely negative or infinite
unity; and because it is subsistence, difference likewise
has independence only in it. This independence of the
form appears as a determinate entity, as what is for
another, for the form is something disunited; and the
cancelling of diremption takes effect to that extent
through another.
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2.4 The dialectics of this movement
Since we started from the first immediate unity, and

returned through the moments of form-determination,
and of process, to the unity of both these moments, and
thus again back to the first simple substance, we see
that this reflected unity is other than the first.
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2.5 The meaning of Desire
The simple ego is this genus, or the bare universal, for

which the differences are insubstantial, only by its being
the negative essence of the moments which have
assumed a definite and independent form. And self-
consciousness is thus only assured of itself through
sublating this other, which is presented to self-
consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness
is Desire. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it
definitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself the
truth of this other, negates the independent object, and
thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as true
certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in
objective form.
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2.6 The object as self-negating
On account of the independence of the object, therefore,

it can only attain satisfaction when this object itself [226]
effectually brings about negation within itself
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2.7 The structure of the first, immediate concept

of self-consciousness
It is in these three moments that the notion of self-

consciousness first gets completed:
(a) pure undifferentiated ego is its first immediate object.
(b) This immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing

mediation; it has its being only by cancelling the
independent object, in other words it is Desire. The
satisfaction of desire is indeed the reflexion of self-
consciousness into itself, is the certainty which has
passed into objective truth.
But (c) the truth of this certainty is really twofold

reflexion, the reduplication of self-consciousness.
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Summary:
1. Selfconsciousness is reflective knowledge:

knowledge of knowledge
2. As such it is knowledge of the "self" of knowledge.
3. The identity of the knower with hisself is infinite
and therefore exclusive
4. The original unity of knowledge and knowledge of
knowledge collapses into a relationship of mutual
exclusion between (shapes of) self-consciousness
5. This relationship is basically Desire, i.e. the
attempt to maintain and express the identity with
itself by excluding the other shape of self-
consciousness and thereby negating the
independent object of consciousness.
6. Desire cannot achieve the exclusion and negation
unless the object is self-negating.
7. Only as a self-consciousness can the object negate
itself: the ultimate object of consciousness is
(another) consciousness.
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21
3. Jill Vance Buroker:
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. An

introduction
22
The transcendental synthesis in the A-edition
1. Consciousness of conceptual unity presupposes a

unitary con-
sciousness. (A103–4)
2. The notion of an object of representation includes the
idea of a
necessary unity. (A104–6;A108–9)
3. Consciousness of objective unity requires a
transcendental self-
consciousness (as opposed to an empirical self-
consciousness).
Awareness of this identical self makes possible the
notion of a
transcendental object. (A106–7;A108)
4. A transcendental self-consciousness is consciousness
of unity of
synthesis by means of pure concepts. (A107–8)
5. Thus the pure concepts are presupposed in all
objective awareness.
(A109–11)
23
[…]
24
The ego as "I think"
“The I think must be able to accompany all my

representations; for otherwise something would be
represented in me
that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to
say that the
representation would either be impossible or else at least
would be
nothing forme” (B131–2).
25
Dual nature of self-consciousness and the "I think"
Now the act of attaching the “I think” is the act of

apperception
or self-consciousness. Insofar as I recognize a
representation as mine, I
ascribe it to myself, and thus must be conscious of
myself as the sub-
ject of the state. As in the A edition, Kant calls this self-
consciousness
the transcendental unity of apperception (t.u.a.), and he
distinguishes
it from empirical self-consciousness.
26
Objectivity as a function of unity
Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of

cognitions. These consist in the determinate relation of
given representations to an object.
• An object, however, is that in the concept of which
the manifold of a given intuition is united.
• Now, however, all unification of representations
requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of
them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is
that which alone constitutes the relation of
representations to an object, thus their objective
validity, and consequently is that which makes
them into cognitions and on which even the
possibility of the understanding rests. (B137)
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The transcendental unity of apperception in the B-

edition
1. It is necessarily true of humans as discursive intellects

that they can
attach the “I think” to any of their representations, and,
by doing
so, express the numerical identity of self-consciousness.
2. Attaching the “I think” is possible only insofar as one
connects
one’s self-ascribed representations by means of
synthetic acts.
3. Any synthetic unity of representations requires
unification under
a concept.
4. Any manifold unified under a concept counts as a
thought of an
object.
5. Therefore, thinking of an object is necessary for the
t.u.a.
28
6. Therefore, the t.u.a. is a sufficient condition for
representing an
object.
29
The differenece between the transcendental unity

of apperception and self-consciousness
“I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor

as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation
is a thinking, not an intuiting”(B157).
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The I think as secondary act with regard to my

existence
“The I think expresses the act of determining my

existence. The existence is thereby already given, but
the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold
that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet
thereby given.”
31
The Transcendental Deduction contains Kant’s central

justification
for applying the categories to objects of experience. The
A edi-
tion version argues that apprehending the data of
intuition succes-
sively requires the imagination to reproduce previously
apprehended
representations, which presupposes concepts of the
understanding.
Although this version introduces Kant’s theory of
synthesis and the
t.u.a., it does not link the categories to judgment. The
significantly
revised B edition version corrects this defect, arguing
that the cate-
gories are required to represent objects of both thought
and percep-
tion. By analyzing the notion of an object in terms of
judgment, Kant
links the categories to the logical forms of judgment
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identified earlier.
Thus he defends the application of pure concepts
expressed in syn-
thetic a priori principles to the objects of experience.
Because these
metaphysical concepts and principles have their seat in
the subject,
they apply only to appearances and not to things in
themselves. But
because they are necessary for experiencing objects,
they represent
real features of appearances, and thus ground empirical
knowledge.
Like the forms of intuition, they represent
transcendentally ideal but
empirically real features of experience.
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Summary:
1. Hegel's critique is directed against Kant's distinction

between the function of the synthetic unity of
apperception and the empirical self-consciousness
2. Self-consciousness is basically desire, i.e. is structured
as the attempt to maintain self-identity which is lost in
the consciousness of objects.
3. Only by an direct relation with other self-
consciousnesses can the self achieve this balance of
identity and otherness.
4. Such a relationship is however also a basic fracture of
this self-identity: self-consciousness is not alone, it is
universal and it is "life".
5. Kant's argument is based on a "mechanics" of
conscious acts that maintain self-identity by shaping
the material of the senses with the forms of inner
unity.
6. The sensuous material is in that mechanical
description a foreign element.
34
2010 © R.A. Veen
We will meet again on Friday February 19th on WIZIQ.com
7 PM GMT
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Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.

We will begin shortly

Please do not forget to provide

Reading material for the lecture on

The text of Hegel will be read in detail

1. Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)

2. Phenomenology of Spirit: Selfconsciousness

3. Jill Vance Buroker: Kant's Critique of Pure

What does it mean to say that the synthesis of sensuous

• Kantian project: transcendental synthesis of

• Hegel's criticism: still remains a subjective act

1. Hegel's critique of Kant's thought

Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)

1. Critique of Pure Reason

1.1 Understanding "thinks" the object but remains

The understanding is active thought, I myself; it “is the

1.2 The ground for all applied logic is the synthetic

Now logic, as transcendental logic, likewise sets forth the

NOTE: the self-consciousness that I am is

1.3 Concepts are mere forms of unity

Now as ‘I’ is the universal transcendental unity of self-

• Though understanding thinks objects, as thinking it

2.1 General structure of self-consciousness

If we call the movement of knowledge conception, and

2.2 Identification of the I with itself

The distinction is not, and self-consciousness is only

2.3 Self-consciousness as posited necessarily

The independent members exist for themselves. To be

2.4 The dialectics of this movement

Since we started from the first immediate unity, and

2.5 The meaning of Desire

The simple ego is this genus, or the bare universal, for

2.6 The object as self-negating

On account of the independence of the object, therefore,

2.7 The structure of the first, immediate concept

It is in these three moments that the notion of self-

(a) pure undifferentiated ego is its first immediate object.

(b) This immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing

But (c) the truth of this certainty is really twofold

1. Selfconsciousness is reflective knowledge:

3. Jill Vance Buroker:

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. An

The transcendental synthesis in the A-edition

1. Consciousness of conceptual unity presupposes a

The ego as "I think"

“The I think must be able to accompany all my

Dual nature of self-consciousness and the "I think"

Now the act of attaching the “I think” is the act of

Objectivity as a function of unity

Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of

The transcendental unity of apperception in the B-

1. It is necessarily true of humans as discursive intellects

The differenece between the transcendental unity

“I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor

The I think as secondary act with regard to my

“The I think expresses the act of determining my

The Transcendental Deduction contains Kant’s central

1. Hegel's critique is directed against Kant's distinction

We will meet again on Friday February 19th on WIZIQ.com

To read more texts

Please do not forget to go to the feedback page

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