Dharmakrti on pratyaka -Translations

(summarized by S.S. Liu/ Oct. 1 12 )

Pramavrttika Pratyakapariched
PV 3 : 1-7, 123-133 (Singh 1984: 142-144)
PV 3 : 1-10, 194-224 (Dunne 2004: 391-411)
English translations:

The Heart of Buddhist PhilosophyDinnaga and Dharmakrti: Appendix IV

Dharmakrti on Sensation (pratyaka) (Amar Singh, 1984:142-4)

Singh, Amar. (1984) The Heart of Buddhist PhilosophyDinnaga and

Dharmakrti. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers

Japanese translations are available in:

(1979): p. 55-68, 202-214.

Tosaki, Hiromasa Bukky-ninshikiron no kenky, vol.1: p. 55-68, 202-214)

(2005) Dharmakrtis

For detail available translations check on: EAST -Epistemology and Argumentation in
South Asia and Tibet http://east.uni-hd.de/buddh/ind/7/16/

mna dvividha meyadvaividhyt aktyaaktita |

arthakriyy kedir nrtho 'narthdhimokata || (PV 3.1)
[Singh] The means of knowledge is of two kinds, because there are two
kinds of objects, as there is or is not a capacity for action towards an
object. Hair and such things are not objects, because there is no reliance
on them of the kind that occurs towards objects.
[Dunne] Instrumental cognitions are of two kinds because there are two
kinds of objects. There are two kinds of objects because some objects
are capable of telic function while others are not. [Illusions such as] the

hairs [that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with cataracts]

are not objects (arthas) because they are not considered to be objects
sadsadatvc ca viayviayatvata |
abdasynyanimittn bhve dh sadasattvata || (PV 3.2)
[S] And (also) because of similarity and non-similarity, because of
being and not being within the scope of language, and because,
when other signs (than the object) are present, intellect occurs
with respect to one but not with respect to the other.
[D] There are two objects because some are similar across instances and
others are not similar; because some are the objects of words and others
are not the objects of words; and because the cognition of some occurs
when there are causes other than the object, and the cognition of others
does not occur when there are causes other than the object.
arthakriysamartha yat tad atra paramrthasat |
anyat samvtisat prokta te svasmnyalakae || (PV 3.3)
[S] That object with respect to which (purposeful) action is possible
is called the ultimate real, whereas the other is the conventionally
real. These are respectively the unique particular and the universal.
[D] In this context, that which is capable of telic function is said to be
ultimately real. The other one is said to be conventionally real. They
are, respectively, the particular arid the universal.
aakta savam iti cet bjder akurdiu |
d akti mat s cet samvtystu yath tath || (PV 3.4)
[S] If it is argued that nothing has a causal capacity, (we point out
that) the causal capacity of seeds, etc. towards sprouts, etc.,
you may argue that the capacity is regarded to be merely conventional.
So be it.

[D] "But nothing is capable of telic function."

We observe that things such as seeds have a capacity for telic function
in the case of sprouts, and so on. "Such things are considered to have
such a capacity conventionally, not ultimately." Let it be so in the way
as you have said.
ssti sarvatra ced buddher nnvayavyatirekayo |
smnyalakae 'da cakurpdibuddhivat || (PV 3.5)
[S] If it is argued everything has causal capacity, we reply that there
is none in universals, because of the not seeing of the cognition
of logical agreement and non-agreement like the cognition of a
visible object through the eye.*
[D] "That capacity for telic function is found in all objects."
It is not found in universals, which are not observed to have either
positive concomitance [in which a universal necessarily exists when
there is a cognition of a universal] or negative concomitance [in
which such a cognition exists in the presence only and merely of a
universal] with the cognition of a universal. An example in which
these relations do occur is that of the eye faculty and the form
perceived in relation to the cognition of that form.
*Text with Prajnakaragupta reads: It is not seen of the cognition of
agreement and non-agreement in the universal characteristic like the
cognition of a visible object through the eye.
etena samaybhogdyantaragnurodhata |
ghaotkepaasmnyasakhydiu dhiyo gat || (PV 3.6)
[S] By this (absence of causal capacity in the universal, its effect
being mere knowledge) the notions of such things as a pot, upward motion, general characteristic and number are explained
due to conformity with such things of the mind as convention,
enjoyment, etc.

[D] The fact that a universal is not invariably concomitant with the
cognition of a universal explains cognitions of supposedly extra-mental
entities, such as substantial wholes-i.e., a water-jug-projections,
universals, numbers, etc. They are also not invariably concomitant with
their cognitions because, like universals, the cognition of them follows
from the presence of other factors, such as signs and mental effort.
kedayo na smnyam anarthbhiniveata |
jeyatvena grhd doo nbhveu prasajyate || (PV 3.7)
[S] Hair, etc. are not universal, because there is no desire for
them of the kind that occurs towards real objects. In the case of
absent things, there is no fault (of their having the features of
a universal), because they are grasped as knowables.
[D] Things such as the hairs [that appear to a person with cataracts] are
not universals because they are not considered to be objects [by persons
who act upon them]. This fault does not ensue for absences because
they are apprehended as knowable.
tem api tathbhve'pratiedht sphubhat |
jnarpatayrthatvt kedti mati puna || 3.8 ||
[D] The fault also does not ensue for those hair-like appearances when
they are apprehended in that fashion [i.e., as objects by some other
awareness]. This is so because there is no reason to deny that they are
apprehended as knowable objects. The clarity of the appearance of hairs
in cognition is due to the fact that they are objects [i.e., particulars] in
that they are of the nature of awareness.
smnyaviay keapratibhsam anarthaka |
jnarpatayrthatve smnye cet prasajyate || 3.9 ||

[D] However, thoughts such as "These are hairs" have universals as their
objects; but the appearance of hairs does not have any object.
[PV3.8-9ab]
tatheatvd adoa artharpatvena samnat |
sarvatra samarpatvt tadvyvttisamrayt || 3.10 ||
[D] "If a universal is also a [real] object in terms of having the nature of
awareness, then you would have to conclude that it is a particular."
Since we do indeed assert that a universal is a particular/ your statement
poses no problem for us. But in terms of having the nature of other
objects, it is a universal in that it has the same form for all [the objects
that it seems to qualify]. It has that same form because it is based upon
their exclusion [from other objects that do not have the expected causal
characteristics]. [PV3.10]

* PV3: 123-133 Singh

pratyaka kalpanpoha pratyakeaiva sidhyati |
pratytmavedya sarve vikalpo nmasaraya ||123||
123. Sensation, which is free of conceptualization (imagining), is
established only by means of sensation itself. The conceptualization
(imagining) of all (beings), which is cognized individually
(subjectively) is dependent on names.
sahtya sarvata cint stimitenntartman |
sthito 'pi caku rpam kate skaj mati ||124||
124. One who remains with a tranquil mind, having withdrawn his
thought from all (concepts), looks at a visible object with his
eye: that thought is born of sensation.

punar vikalpayan kicid sd vo kalpaned |

iti vetti na prvoktvasthym indriyd gatau ||125||
125. Then, forming a judgment he knows There was something like
my (present) imagining . There is no access of the sense-organ
to the situation just stated.
ekatra do bhedo hi kvacin nnyatra dyate |
na tasmd bhinnam asty anyat smnya buddhyabhedata ||126||
126. For a particular observed in one place is never seen elsewhere.
Therefore, it is not the case that owing to a non-difference in
cognitions there exists another, a universal which is separate
(from the particular).
tasmd vieaviay sarvaivendriyaj mati |
na vieeu abdn pravtter asti sambhava ||127||
127. Therefore, every thought born of sensation has a particular as
its object. There is no possibility of the functioning of words
with respect to particulars.
ananvayd vie saketasypravttita |
viayo ya ca abdn sayojyata sa eva tai ||128||
128. Particulars have no agreement (with words) because no convention
functions: and the object of words may be connected with
them (with words, not with particulars),
asyedam iti sambandhe yv arthau pratibhsinau |
tayor eva hi sambandho na tadendriyagocara ||129||
129 For when there is a relationship of the form this (expression)
is of that (object) , the relationship is between only those two

objects, which are imaginings; then it is not within the range of

the senses.
viadapratibhsasya tadrthasyvibhvant |
vijnbhsabhedo hi padrthn vieaka ||130||
130. Then, because there is no (longer) a discovery (as in sensation)
of an object with a clear image, a difference of form in consciousness
is what distinguishes objects.
cakuo 'rthvabhse 'pi ya paro 'syeti asati |
sa eva yojyate abdairna khalv indriyagocara ||131||
131. Even when an object appears through the eye of which one says:
It is other than that only that (conception, imagining) is connected
with words, surely not the range (object) of the senses.
avyptendriyasynyavmtrevicrat |

na cnuditasambandha svaya janaprasagata ||132||

132. Because there is no discovery, that which is not engaged with
the senses merely through the other word and an unexpressed
relationship (between word and object) itself is not connected
with cognition.
manasor* yugapadvtte savikalpavikalpayo |
vimho laghuvtterv tayor aikyamvyavasyati ||133||
133. (If) there were a simultaneous functioning of without-imagining
(sensation) and with-imagining (sensation), affecting the mind,
(then) there would be bewilderment. Or (If) their functioning
were extremely rapid their unity would tend to result (they
would appear in the mind to be the same, resulting in the same
confusion).

 PV3: 194-224 Dunne

[ka. ak gamakatvt pratyakam]
sacita samudya sa smnya tatra ckadh |
smnyabuddhi cvaya vikalpennubadhyate || 3.194 ||
"That which is aggregated (sa'f!lcita) is a conglomerate (samudaya),
and in that sense it is a universal (samanya). [According to Buddhists
such as Vasubandhu], one has perception of such things. Furthermore,
any cognition of a universal is necessarily associated with
conceptuality. [Hence, it is wrong to say that perception is free of
conceptuality]."
atrha
arthntarbhisambandhj jyante ye 'avo 'pare |
ukts te sacits te hi nimitta jnajanmana || 3.195 ||
Due to a relation with other things [i.e., other particles], infinitesimal
particles that are different than their own previous moments arise [from
their own previous moments such that they can produce an awareness].
In that sense, they are said to be "aggregated," and as such, they are
said to be a condition for the production of awareness.
an sa viea ca nntareparnan |
tadekniyamj jnam ukta smnyagocara || 3.196 ||
Moreover, the distinctive quality that particles obtain does not occur
without the other particles with which they are in proximity. Hence,
since awareness does not have any necessary relation to a single
particle, awareness is said to have a universal [in the sense of a group
of aggregated particlesP as its object.
athaikyatanatve 'pi nneka dyate sakt |
sakdgrahvabhsa ki viyukteu tildiu || 3.197 ||

"Even though they occur in the same perceptual field, if they do not form
a new, distinct substance, then those various particles are not observed
simultaneously." Then how does one experience the simultaneous
apprehension of small things such as sesame seeds that are disjunct [i.e.,
that are not forming a separate entity that is a whole]?
pratyukta lghava ctra tev eva kramaptiu |
ki nkramagrahas tulyakl sarvv ca buddhaya || 3.198 ||
The objection that awareness occurs quickly and hence one mistakenly
apprehends them as one entity has already been refuted [at PV3.I35]. And
why would sesame seeds and so on that are falling down sequentially not
be apprehended simultaneously? Moreover, all cognitions are equal in
duration, so why would some have sequential conceptual appearances
while others are simultaneous? One would be forced to conclude that the
apprehension of any object is non-sequential. [PVJ.I98-199]
kcittsvakrambhs kramavatyopar ca kim |
sarvrthagrahae tasmd akramoya prasajyate || 3.199 ||

kica (|)
naika citrapatagdi rpa v dyate katham |
citra tad ekam iti ced ida citratarantata || 3.200 ||
And how could one see a variegated form such as a multicolor (citra)
butterfly? "That multicolor is a single real color." Then that multicolor is
even more psychedelic than that multicolored butterfly!
naika-svabhva citra hi mairpa yathaiva tat |
nldipratibhsa ca tulya citrapadiu || 3.201 ||
There is no single entity, "multicolor," just as a form composed of an
arrangement of jewels is not a single entity. This case is the same as the

conceptual appearance of blue and so on in the observation of

multicolored (citra) things such as cloths [that are composed of threads of
different colors].
tatrvayavarpa cet kevala dyate tath |
nldni nirasynya citra citra yadkase || 3.202 ||
"In those cases where one sees a single color and not the multicolor, one
is just seeing the color that is a part [of the whole]."If after eliminating
the constituent colors such as blue, you can still see some multicolor that
is other than those constituent colors, then what you see is indeed
psychedelic!
tulyrthkraklatvenopalakitayor dhiyo |
nnrth kramavaty ek kim ekrthkrampar || 3.203 ||
Two [cognitions, one of a manufactured butterfly made from different
colored thread or paints and one of a natural butterfly,F are both
determined to have the same cognitive appearance of their object and to
have the same duration. So why do you say that one is a sequential
cognition of various objects and the other is a non-sequential cognition of
a single object?
vaivarpyddhiym eva bhvn vivarpat |
tac ced anaga keneya siddh bhedavyavasthiti || 3.204 ||
For we posit that things are various because cognitions are various; [and
when one sees a variegated or multicolored (citra) object, the variegation
remarked in cognition must reflect a variety of things that produce that
cognition]. "The difference remarked in cognitions does not contribute [to
establishing that things are different]." What then would establish that
things are different?
vijtnm anrambhd lekhydau na citradh |
anrpatvn na sayogacitro bhakte ca nraya || 3.205 ||
Because heterogeneous substances do not combine to form [a distinct
substance, a whole], one would have no cognition of variegated color in
the case of paintings and such. And the conjunction relation (sa'f!lyoga)

[whereby the substances of the painting are held together] cannot itself be
multicolored because it has no visible form. 8 Nor can conjunction serve
as a locus of a metaphor because there is no variegation in the individual
[parts of a painting]. It cannot serve as a metaphor also because there is
no variegation in the individual [colors].9 [PVJ.205-206a]
pratyekam avicitratvd ghteu kramea ca |
na citradhsakalanam anekasyaikay'graht || 3.206 ||
And things that have been grasped sequentially cannot be conflated by a
cognition that construes them as a singular multicolor because [on your
view] that which is non-singular cannot be grasped by a single cognition.
[PV 3.2o6b-cd]
nnrthaik bhavet tasmt siddh 'to 'py avikalpik |
vikalpayann ekam artha yato 'nyad api payati || 3.207 ||
Therefore, a single cognition that has various [simultaneous] objects
should be established to occur. Hence, [perception, even though caused
by multiple particles] is established to be non-conceptual, since when
conceptualizing one object, what one sees is another.
citrvabhsev athau yady ekatva na yujyate |
saiva tvat katha buddhir ek citrvabhsin || 3.208 ||
"If singularity is not possible in the case of objects [such as a butterfly's
wing] that have variegated appearances, then how can there be a single
cognition whose cognitive appearance is variegation?"
ida vastubalyta yad vadanti vipacita |
yath yathrth cintyante viryante tath tath || 3.209 ||
Those who analyze reality make a statement that is entailed by real things
themselves-namely, that the way in which they think of objects is the way
in which those objects disappear."Might there be variegation in a single
cognition?"
ki syt s citrataikasy na syt tasy matv api |
yadda svayam arthn rocate tatra ke vaya || 3.210 ||

There should be no variegation in the cognition as well. But if one is

contentto have this be the objects' essence, who are we to object to that?
[PV J.209-2IO]
tasmn nrtheu na jne sthlbhsas tadtmana |
ekatra pratiiddhatvd bahuv api na sambhava || 3.211 ||
Therefore, neither the objects nor the awareness has a spatially extended
appearance because, since that kind of property-svabhava [-namely,
spatial extension-] has already been disproved in the case of a singular
entity, it is also not possible in the case of what is many. [PV3.211]
[p.182]

paricchedontaranyo ya bhgo bahir iva sthita |

jnasybhedinau bhinnau pratibhso hy upaplava || 3.212 ||
This part of awareness-namely, the one that is established such that it
seems external-is different from the internal determination [which is the
part of awareness that seems to be the subjectivity that apprehends that
apparently external part]. Awareness is not differentiated, but its
appearance is differentiated into two. That being the case, that dualistic
appearance must be cognitive confusion.
tatraikasypy abhvena dvayam apy avahyate |
tasmt tad eva tasypi tattva y dvayanyat || 3.213 ||
The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence
of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness (tattva) of the
awareness.
tadbhedrayi ceya bhvn bhedasasthiti |
taduaplavabhve ca te bhedopy upaplava || 3.214 ||
The definition (sa'f[lsthiti] of things as different is based on the
difference between those [i.e., the object and the subject]. 16 If the
awareness is erroneous (upaplava), then their difference is also
erroneous.
na grhyagrhakakrabhyam asti ca lakaam |
ato lakaanyatvn nisvabhv prakit || 3.215 ||
There is no definition of things outside of the definition of them as either

objects or subjects. [Those definitions do not ultimately make sense;]

therefore, since things are empty of any definition, it is explained that
they are essenceless.vypropdhika sarva skandhdn
vieata |
lakaa sa ca tattvan na tenpy ete vilaka || 3.216 ||
All distinctive definitions of things such as the aggregates are delimited
by activity. That activity is not ultimate; therefore, those things are also
devoid of [ultimate] definition.
yathsvapratyaypekd avidyopapluttmanm
vijaptir vitathkr jyate timirdivat || 3.217 ||
& is the case with persons who have cataracts, those who are by nature
confused by ignorance have cognitive presentations (vijiiapti) with false
images that arise in dependence on their respective conditions.
asaviditatattv ca s sarvparadaranai |
asambhavd vin te grhyagrhakaviplavai || 3.218 ||
The ultimate nature of the cognitive content [in perception] is not known
by any [ordinary beings] whose vision is not supreme; they do not know
that ultimate nature because it is impossible for them to experience that
content without the error (viplava) of subject and object.
tad upekitatattvrthai ktv gajanimlana |
kevala lokabuddhyaiva bhyacint pratanyate || 3.219 ||
Therefore, [the buddhas], ignoring the ultimate (upekfitatattviirtha), close
one eye like an elephant19 and propagate theories that involve external
objects merely in accord with worldly conceptions.
nldicitravijne jnopdhir ananyabhk |
aakyadarana (3.220abc)
ta hi patatyarthe vivecayan || 3.220d
A color such as blue in a variegated or multicolored awareness is a
quality contingent on awareness (jfiiinopiidhi)0 and as such it does not
participate in any other awareness [such as the awareness of just blue].
Hence, it cannot be seen [as distinct from the variegation] because when
analyzing it [as distinct], one is focusing on the object (artha) [that
produced the awareness, not the awareness itself].
yad yath bhsate jna tat tathaiva prakate |

iti nmaikabhva syc citrkrasya cetasi || 3.221 ||

An awareness is experienced in whichever way that awareness appears.
22Therefore, indeed (niima), the variegated or multicolored image in
awareness should be simple.
padirpasyaikatve tath syd avivekit |
vivekini nirasynyad viveki ca nekate || 3.222 ||
If the colors of a cloth and such also formed a simple or single entity,
then they should not be analytically distinguishable from each other. And
when the analyzed parts are eliminated, a remaining unanalyzable whole
is not observed.
ko v virodho bahava sajttiay sakd (: pthag) |
bhaveyu kraa baddher yadi nmendriydivat (: ntma) ||
3.223 ||
And what is the contradiction if many [particles] that have the special
characteristic [of producing awareness] when aggregated are not the
cause of awareness individually, as is the case with the senses and such?
hetubhvd te nny grhyat nma kcana |
tatra buddhir yadkr tasys tad grhyam ucyate || 3.224 ||
And except for something being a cause, there is nothing else that could
constitute that thing's being the apprehended object. That is, the
apprehended object of an awareness is said to be that in the image of
which awareness arises.

i
ii

sakd (Tib. cig car, Tosaki 319): pthag (K)

nmendriydivat (Tib. dba po la sogs bin Tosaki 319): ntmendriydivat (K)