Case No.

58
Manila Herald Publishing vs. Ramos
G.R. No. L-426 January 18, 1951
88 Phil. 94
FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit, docketed as civil case No. 11531 handled by Judge Sanchez,
against Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and reporter, respectively,
of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper published in Manila.
With the filing of this suit, the plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a bond, and the
Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises
of the Daily Record.
Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed with the sheriff separate third-party claims, alleging that
they were the owners of the property attached. Whereupon, the sheriff required of Quirino a counter bond to meet
the claim of the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and another bond to meet the claim of Printers, Inc. These
amounts, upon Quirino's motion filed under Section 13, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, were reduced by the court.
October 7, 1950- upon failure to quash the attachment, the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc.
commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and Insurance Co. Inc., in which the former
sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and
(2) P45,000 damages. This suit was docketed as civil case No. 12263 which fell in the branch of Judge Pecson.
Subsequently, Judge Pecson issued a writ of preliminary injunction to the sheriff directing him to desist from
proceeding with the attachment of the said properties.
After the issuance of that preliminary injunction, Antonio Quirino filed an ex parte petition for its dissolution, and
Judge Simeon Ramos, to whom case No. 12263 had in the meanwhile been transferred, granted the petition on a
bond. However Judge Ramos soon set aside the order just mentioned on a motion for reconsideration by the
Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printer, Inc. and set the matter for hearing for October 14, then continued
to October 16.
Upon the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Ramos required the parties to submit memoranda on the question
whether "the subject matter of civil case No. 12263 should be ventilated in an independent action or by means of
a complaint in intervention in civil case No. 11531." Memoranda having been filed, His Honor declared that the
suit, in case No. 12263, was "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. He held that what
Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in Case No. 11531. Hence, the
petitioner brought a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Judge Ramos validly dismissed the case No. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of
court.
2. WON petitioners should come as intervenors into the case of libel instead of bringing an independent
action.
3. WON as in the case no. 12263, the Judges motion to discharge the preliminary attachment levied
in case no.11531 would interfere with another judges actuations.
HELD:
1. No. The court acted with grave abuse of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the
case without any formal motion to dismiss.
The question of dismissal was suggested by Judge Ramos on a ground perceived by His Honor. To all intents
and purposes, the dismissal was decreed by the court on its own initiative.
Section 1 Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it specifically ordains
that a motion to this end be filed. In the light of this express requirement we do not believe that the court had
power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly presented. The fact that the parties filed
memoranda upon the court's indication or order in which they discussed the proposition that the action was
unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and independently of the case for libel did not supply
deficiency. Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed, and the
inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the familiar maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius. The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own
motion an action is, when the "plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court."
The Rules of Court are devised as a matter of necessity, intended to be observed with diligence by the courts
as well as by the parties for the orderly conduct of litigation and judicial business. In general, it is compliance
with these rules which gives the court jurisdiction to act.

2. No. The right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not absolute but left to the sound
discretion of the court to allow. This qualification makes intervention less preferable to an independent
action from the standpoint of the claimants, at least. Because availability of intervention depends
upon the court in which Case No. 11531 is pending, there would be assurance for the herein
petitioners that they would be permitted to come into that case.
There can be no multiplicity of suits when the parties in the suit where the attachment was levied are different
from the parties in the new action, and so are the issues in the two cases entirely different. In the
circumstances, separate action might, indeed, be the more convenient of the two competing modes of
redress, in that intervention is more likely to inject confusion into the issues between the parties in the case
for debt or damages with which the third-party claimant has nothing to do and thereby retard instead of
facilitate the prompt dispatch of the controversy which is underlying objective of the rules of pleading and
practice. That is why intervention is subject to the court's discretion.
3.

No. The objection is superficial and will not bear analysis.

Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over aN interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and
deemed necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. This is selfevident.
It is true of course that property in custody of the law cannot be interfered with without the permission of the
proper court, and property legally attached is property in custodia legis. But for the reason just stated, this rule
is confined to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has
proprietary interest. When the sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the
rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference with another court's order of
attachment.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted with costs against the respondents except the respondent
Judge.

Case No. 59
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 49188, January 30, 1990
181 SCRA 557
FACTS:
Amelia Tan commenced a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) against PAL. The court
rendered a judgment in favor of the former.
PAL filed its appeal with the CA. It affirmed the judgment of the lower court with the modification that PAL is
condemned to the latter for damages and attorney's fee.
Judgment became final and executory. The trial court upon motion of Amelia Tan issued an order of execution
with the corresponding writ in favor of the respondent. The writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Reyes for
enforcement.
Four months later, Amelia Tan, moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, stating that the judgment
rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the the CA, remained unsatisfied. PAL opposed the
motion, stating that it had already paid its obligation to plaintiff through the issuance of checks payable to the
deputy sheriff who later did not appear with his return and instead absconded.
The CA denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature. After two months the CA granted her an alias
writ of execution for the full satisfaction of the judgment rendered, when she filed another motion. Deputy Sheriff
del Rosario is appointed special sheriff for enforcement thereof.
PAL filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return of the writ had as yet been
made by Deputy Sheriff Reyes and that judgment debt had already been fully satisfied by the former as
evidenced by the cash vouchers signed and received by the executing sheriff.
Deputy Sheriff del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank of PAL, through its manager
and garnished the latter's deposit. Hence, PAL brought the case to the SC and filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON an alias writ of execution can be issued without prior return of the original writ by the implementing
officer.
2. WON payment of judgment to the implementing officer as directed in the writ of execution constitutes
satisfaction of judgment.
3. WON payment made in checks to the sheriff and under his name is a valid payment to extinguish judgment of
debt.
HELD:
1. Yes. Technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit and
end of the suit and is aptly called the life of the law. A judgment cannot be rendered nugatory by unreasonable
application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested right were never intended to rest on the requirement of a return.
So long as judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to other writs of execution.
2. No. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper
person.
Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the Sheriff should be a valid
payment to extinguish judgment of debt.
3. No. Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
"The payment of debt in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such
currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines".
Unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee, a public has no authority to accept anything other
than money in payment of an obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by
the sheriff of the petitioner's checks does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.
A check whether manager's check or ordinary check, is not a legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a
debt is not a valid tender or payment and mat be refused receipt by the creditor. Hence, the obligation is not
extinguished.
Payment in cash is logical, but it was not proper. The payment in cash to the implementing officer may be deemed
absolute payment of judgment debt but the Court has never, in the least bit, suggested that judgment debtors
should settle their obligations by turning over huge amounts of cash or legal tender to the executing officers.
Payment in cash would result in damage or endless litigations each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash in
his hands decides to abscond.
As a protective measure, the courts encourage the practice of payment of check provided adequate controls are

instituted to prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal or disbursement of funds,

However, in the case at bar, it is out of the ordinary that checks intended for a particular payee are made out in
the name of another. The issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff clearly made possible the
misappropriation of the funds that were withdrawn.
The CA explained:
"Knowing as it does that the intended payment was for Amelia Tan, the petitioner corporation, utilizing the
services of its personnel who are or should be knowledgeable about the accepted procedure and resulting
consequences of the checks drawn, nevertheless, in this instance, without prudence, departed from what is
generally observed and done, and placed as payee in the checks the name errant Sheriff and not the name of the
rightful payee. Petitioner thereby created a situation which permitted the said Sheriff to personally encash said
checks and misappropriates the proceeds thereof to his exclusive benefit. For the prejudice that resulted, the
petitioner himself must bear the fault..."
Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to protect itself, the judgment debtor whose act made possible the
loss had but itself to blame.

Case No. 60
Bilag- Rivera vs. Flora
A.M. P-94-1008 July 6, 1995
FACTS:

Aug. 5, 1990- Elsie V. Tacay bought an Isuzu Jitney on installment basis from Panda Automotive
Corporation (PANDA), Dagupan City, represented by Charlie Q. Carlos.
March 17, 1992- Tacay demanded for the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale
March 23, 1992- Tacay registered the vehicle in her name with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in
Lingayen.
May 10, 1992- Tacay tendered a check to cover part of his balance still due PANDA. Upon presentment
by PANDA with the drawee bank, the check was dishonored as the same was allegedly forged.
Tacay promised to pay the balance on or before 23 June 1992 which later on, he failed to fulfill the
promise.
July 8, 1992- Tacay sold the Isuzu jitney to complainant Florentina Bilag-Rivera covered by an Absolute
Deed of Sale. Hence, possession of the vehicle and its LTO registration papers were turned over to
complainant.
PANDA later learned of the deed of sale between Tacay and complainant and obtained information that
the alleged deed of sale was not registered or even annotated on the Certificate of Registration of the
motor vehicle.
September 1992- Panda Corporation, thru its manager Charlie Carlos, filed a complaint for specific
performance, replevin, and damages with the RTC of Dagupan City with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against Elsie Tacay, with complainant (Rivera) impleaded as co-defendant.
September 18, 1992- RTC of Dagupan issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Tacay and
complainant. Since the subject motor vehicle was believed to be in the City of Baguio, the writ was
addressed to the RTC, City Sheriff, Baguio City.
Complainant alleges that being a buyer in good faith, she should not have been impleaded in the
complaint of Panda Corporation. Instead of proceeding against the principal defendant Elsie V. Tacay, the
respondent Deputy Sheriff proceeded to attach the subject motor vehicle in complainant's possession. At
that time, respondent Sheriff was accompanied by Charlie Carlos, PANDA's Manager. Respondent issued
to the complainant a handwritten receipt on the same day (18 September 1992) which indicated that he
took possession of the vehicle pursuant to the writ of attachment.
Complainant requested the City Sheriff of the RTC, Baguio City to hold the vehicle for a few days as she
would prepare the amount of P20,000.00 as counter bond to discharge the attachment. Since there was
no bonded warehouse in the City of Baguio, the office of the City Sheriff requested complainant to pay
P1,000.00 to justify their holding on to said vehicle until she could post the counter bond. Complainant
paid the amount of P1,000.00 and was duly receipted for said payment.
Dec. 23, 1992- RTC of Dagupan City issued an order for the issuance of an alias writ of attachment as
prayed for by Panda Motors. The writ was again addressed to the office of the City Sheriff, RTC of Baguio
City with an order to attach the same motor vehicle in possession of complainant.
Respondent received the alias writ on 23 February 1993.
The alias writ was not served immediately by respondent because the whereabouts of the said vehicle
could not be ascertained. It was only on 15 March 1993 when Charlie Carlos, the manager of Panda
Motors, came personally to the office of respondent and informed him; that the vehicle to be attached was
in the possession of Carlos Camiwet, a cousin of complainant.
Respondent together with Charlie Carlos, proceeded to the residence of Carlos Camiwet and served the
alias writ of attachment on the latter with an attachment bond.
Complainant avers that this time, respondent sheriff did not issue any receipt to cover for his repossession of the said vehicle. Worse, complainant maintains that at the time of the levy, various tools
which were not integral to the motor vehicle were also taken by respondent sheriff.
The following day, complainant accompanied by her lawyer, went to the office of respondent to inquire
about the motor vehicle and to request for a receipt. According to complainant, respondent told her not to
worry and that the issuance of a receipt was no longer necessary because the vehicle and its tools were
being kept in a safe place. Complainant then informed respondent that she would be posting a counter
bond as soon as she had the money.
Complainant attended the hearing to argue her Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Quash the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment. To her surprise, she was informed by the lawyer of Panda Corporation that a
certain Elsie Tacay had voluntarily surrendered the vehicle together with its documents to Panda
Corporation and that Panda's manager, Charlie Carlos, had already sold the vehicle to a person named
Leonardo Sarmiento.
Complainant manifested before the court that the subject motor vehicle was in custodia legis and that the
above-mentioned transactions were anomalous and contrary to law. Thereafter, the court directed
complainant's lawyer to investigate the matter and to report his findings to the court.
The alias writ of attachment was enforced together with the manager of Panda Corporation, Mr. Charlie
Carlos from Mrs. Florentina Rivera, but refused to acknowledge the receipt of the said motor vehicle for
the reason that she will just file the necessary counter bond.
Hence, an affidavit-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, complainant Florentina BilagRivera charged respondent Crisanto Flora, deputy sheriff, RTC of Baguio City, with grave misconduct and
dishonesty, when he released a motor vehicle subject of a writ of attachment to a representative of the
plaintiff in a civil case, without authority from the court which issued the writ, thereby enabling said plaintiff
to sell the motor vehicle to a third person, to the damage and prejudice of complainant who claims

ownership over said motor vehicle.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent sheriff adopted an irregular procedure and entered into an anomalous transaction in not
issuing a receipt to complainant.
HELD:
Yes. While the evidence may be insufficient to prove that respondent conspired with Charlie Carlos and Elsie
Tacay in eventually alienating the vehicle to a third person, his particular zeal and precipitate decision to give
possession of the vehicle to a party litigant (plaintiff) and treat the same as "in custodia legis" effectively destroys
the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties.
As deputy sheriff, respondent could not be unaware of Rule 57, section 6 of the rules of Court which provides
that:
Immediately after executing the order of the officer must make a return thereon to the clerk or judge of the court
from which the order issued, with a full statement of his proceeding under the order and a complete inventory of
the property attached, together with any counter-bond given by the party against whom attachment is issued, and
serve a copy of any such counter-bond on the applicant or his lawyer.
Time and again, the Court has reiterated the rule that the conduct of every employee of the judiciary must be at all
time characterized with propriety and decorum and above all else, it must be above and beyond suspicion. In the
case at bench, respondent cannot successfully defend his negligent omission to secure a court order before
disposing of the property by simply alleging that a party litigant had agreed to be his agent. In the same vein, a
sheriff or deputy sheriff cannot act as special deputy sheriff of any party litigant.