Philosophy of History as the History

of Philosophy in Schellings System of

Transcendental Idealism
JEFFREY BERNSTEIN
College of the Holy Cross

ABSTRACT: Schellings System of Transcendental Idealism is usually considered to be either

(1) an early Fichtean-influenced work that gives little insight into Schellings philosophy
or (2) a text focusing on self-consciousness and aesthetics. I argue that Schellings
System develops a subtle conception of history which originates in a dialogue with
Kant and Hegel (concerning the question of teleology) and concludes in proximity to
an Idealist version of Spinoza. In this way, Schelling develops a philosophy of history
which is, simultaneously, a dialectical engagement with the history of philosophy.

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

he Schelling resurgence of the past decade has been beneficial in a number

of ways. First, Schelling is no longer unequivocally viewed as a mere precursor to Hegel (as was the view for the past half century). Second, important new
translations of Schelling have emerged (in particular die Weltalter and Clara1)
which provide greater visibility for Schelling both in journals and in the classroom.
Finally, a reassessment of Schellings overall career is in its germinal stagesi.e.,
a discussion has begun as to which phase of Schellings thought provides the
greatest philosophical insight, or at least speaks most directly to twentieth- and
twenty-first century philosophical concerns. Indeed, this raises the important
question as to whether or not chronology is an adequate criterion for the project
of philosophical assessment.
To the extent that this type of assessment has been occurringwith respect
to Schellings thoughtwe would do well to locate its historical beginnings in

2004. Epoch, Volume 8, Issue 2 (Spring 2004). ISSN 1085-1968.

pp. 233254

234

Jeffrey Bernstein

certain remarks made by Heine, Fichte, and Schelling himself in a similar nineteenth-century discussion concerning Schellings work. In Heines On the History of
Religion and Philosophy in Germany (published first in 1834 and again in 1852),2
we find an ambivalent judgment with respect to the progression of Schellings
philosophical career. On the one hand, Heine tells us, the early Schelling of the
1800 System of Transcendental Idealism3 is the truly philosophical Schelling insofar
as he proceeds conceptually.4 On the other hand, the Schelling of the System is a
mere imitator of his mentor Fichte (Schellings original work, according to Heine,
being contained in the Naturphilosophie). This view is, by and large, shared by
the late Schelling in his 18331834 Munich Lectures on Modern Philosophy: I
was in so little hurry to put up my own system that I contented myself for the
time being . . . with making the Fichtean system comprehensible.5 As Schelling
goes on to note, Fichte clearly notices the difference between the substance of the
System and that of Fichtes Grundlage. In a letter to Schelling (dated 15 November
1800), Fichte writes, I still do not agree with your opposition of transcendental
philosophy and philosophy of nature. . . . Nature appears in transcendental philosophy as fully found (gefunden), that is, finished and complete, and furthermore
it is discovered not according to its own laws but according to the immanent laws
of the intellect.6 This certainly amounts to a rejection of Schellings departure
from Fichtes monism of self-consciousness. However, insofar as Fichte also recognizes Schellings innovation, his statement can additionally be understood as a
challenge to the chronologically-based assessment to which Heine and Schelling
both fall victim.7 Moreover, ironically enough, the greatest opponent of Schellings
System turns out to be a strong voice in support of treating the System as a serious
philosophical work.
Given this interpretation of Fichtes comments, I would like to suggest that the
discussion of history, in Schellings System, is one place particularly worthy of attention. Schellings text is, after all, a history of self-consciousness; it is by virtue of
this historical movement that one comes to recognize both (1) the absolute identity
which constitutes the primordial and indifferent ground of self-consciousness
and (2) the aesthetic intuition which discloses this identity. Therefore, although
attention has been paid to the issues of self-consciousness and aesthetics in the
System, I believe that focusing on the history discussion is of crucial importance
for understanding this text.8
At this point, however, Heines remark about the early Schelling can serve as
another type of provocation for considering the System: it often seems to me
necessary . . . to distinguish where his [Schellings] thinking ends and his poetry
begins.9 This strange separation between thinking and poetry leads Heine to
the conclusion that Herr Schelling is now leaving the path of philosophy and
seeking to attain to the contemplation of the absolute itself by a kind of mystical
intuition.10 The problem with this statement is that Heine places Schelling in a

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

235

narrative bound for failure. Heine here utilizes the chronological method of assessment in order to discount the developments which were in fact apprehended
only through the imposition of chronology.
This problem can be additionally illustrated by a brief comparison of
Schellings treatment of history in the System as opposed to subsequent texts
such as the Freiheitschrift and die Weltalter. One might suggest that the difference
between the Systems history-discussion and those of subsequent texts is one of
form. The System provides a fully conceptual articulation of history as having its
teleological moment in the radical futurity gestured to in the aesthetic intuition.
This intuition ultimately discloses the unity of nature and consciousness in the
indifferent ground of absolute identity.11 In contrast to this fully discursive presentation, the Freiheitschrift and Weltalter texts present this insight aesthetically. In
other words, whereas the System speaks conceptually about the movement of history (with reference to the Absolute), the subsequent texts poeticize (and therefore
give an immediately historical articulation of) this very historical movement. This
is, admittedly, no small difference. For Heine, it suggests that the System (despite
its merely marching along in Fichtes footsteps12) remains philosophical while
the subsequent works indicate where Schellings philosophy ends and his poetry,
or rather folly, begins.13 Yet for thinkers who seriously consider the aesthetic as
an authentic mode of making life manifest (e.g., Hlderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger), poetic illumination would be precisely the improvement over conceptual
articulations like the Systems; it would disclose history historically.
Although I will defend the historico-philosophical significance and interest of the Systems history-discussion, I will do so in a manner different from
Heines (and, in fact, Schellings) chronologically-based opposition between the
philosophical and the poetic. Viewed from a different standpoint, Schellings
presentation of history (in the System) assumes an entirely historical form; while
the System does not conceive of history by means of an historical poeticization, it
does conceive of it through an intense engagement with the history of philosophy
concerning the issue of teleology. In this paper, I claim that the account of history which Schelling gives in the System effects an interesting and provocative
oscillation between Kants pseudo-teleological conception of history and Hegels
ultra-teleological conception (as he will come to formulate it in the Introduction
to his Lectures on History).14 Through a careful reading of the history section in
the System, I track this oscillation in order to illuminate how Schellings philosophy of history (particularly in his concern with the issue of historical teleology)
is presented as an engagement with the history of philosophy (particularly with
Kant and Hegel). Insofar as Hegel develops his conception of historical teleology
during and subsequent to the System, Schellings engagement with the history
of philosophy cannot merely be reducible to a chronological investigation. This
departure from chronology is further elaborated in my subsequent claim that the

236

Jeffrey Bernstein

oscillation between Kant and Hegel ultimately leads Schelling to a new conceptual place marked by yet another philosophical figurei.e., an Idealist version
of Spinoza.

II. THE HISTORY DISCUSSION IN SCHELLINGS SYSTEM

In the overall context of Schellings System, a philosophy of history would be for
the practical part of philosophy precisely what nature is for the theoretical part
(STI: 201). That is, it would be the penultimate moment of expressing how humans
come to attain self-understanding within the sphere of action (the final moment
being through aesthetic intuition). We need to realize that self-consciousness is
(for Schelling) not the self-consciousness of a discrete individual I, but rather a
common and temporally unfolding intuition amounting to the foundation and,
as it were, the solid earth upon which all interaction between intelligences takes
place (STI: 164). We might, from the outset, anticipate that history would be
the common stage upon which practical human events continuously occur. We
might, in further anticipation, raise the following series of questions concerning
history: How is it possible that a necessary purpose for history can preserve the
free character of history? Further, what would be the status of such a purpose?
Would it assume a critical character (as it does in Kant), thus remaining wholly
determined by (and, in fact, be inseparable from15) human reason? Or would it,
instead, have the character of an ontological and/or theological force (as it does
in Hegel16)? Though stated provisionally, it is the case that these questionsformulated as the general concern with historical teleologyare the organizing
moments of Schellings entire inquiry.

1. The Concern with Historical Teleology and the Concept of History

Schellings history discussion emerges from explicitly political concerns.17 Were
one not concerned about overwhelming and displacing Kants own philosophy of
history, one could locate the beginnings of Schellings history discussion within
the first third of the Seventh Proposition in Kants 1784 essay Idea for a Universal
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose. For Kant, progress in universal history
ultimately requires abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples (Vlkerbund) in which every state, even the smallest, could expect
to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgment,
but solely from this great federation (Fdus Amphictyonum) from a united power
and the law-governed decisions of a united will.18 For Schelling, such a federation of all states (Fderation alles Staten) (STI: 198) would require a universal
constitution which, in providing unifying first principles, would be able to bring
about universal allegiance to a state of states (STI: 198) rather than merely
preserve the individual constitutions of participating states. However, even such

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

237

a constitution would not itself be sufficient to compel states to adhere; compliance

with a universal allegiance could only come through the free participation of the
states themselves. Schelling is therefore led to the question as to how freedom
can serve as the necessary determining basis of a historical occurrence such as
political allegiance? This question, the inaugural question for the Systems history
discussion, is articulated by Schelling in the following manner:
The emergence of the universal constitution cannot be consigned to mere
chance, and is accordingly to be anticipated only from the free play of forces
that we discern in history. The question arises, therefore, as to whether a
series of circumstances without plan or purpose can deserve the name of
history at all, and whether in the mere concept of history there is not already
contained also the concept of a necessity which choice itself is compelled to
serve. (STI: 199)

One sees another Kantian text, alongside the Universal History essay, at work in
this passagei.e., the Third Antinomy from Kants First Critique. For purposes
of the present context, we might paraphrase this Antinomy as follows: historical
events have, as their causes, freely chosen decisions. But freedom cannot, itself,
provide the unity and determination needed for the creation and causality of
a historical continuum. It would appear, then, that there must ultimately be a
plan or purpose which provides the necessity, determination, and organization
which will unify these freely chosen events into a coherent series.19 But, according
to Schelling, we can only truly arrive at the resolution to this antinomy by first
ascertaining the concept of history (STI: 199). Given this, we can understand
the problem of teleology as motivating his next question, which focuses on what
it means to be historical.
Another way of articulating the need for a coherent series of historical events is
to put the issue concretely in terms of successive generations. If the term history
refers to anything at all, it refers to the delivering-over (literally ber-lieferung)
in time of certain ideas, practices, attitudes, and cultures from one individual/
society to another: if that which is to be realized in the progress of history is
something attainable only through reason and freedom, . . . there should also be
the possibility of tradition or transmission (Tradition oder berlieferung) (STI:
200). But such delivering-over can only happen if there is a requisite spatial and
temporal unity allowing for the transmissive process. This unity would have to be
in some sense ontologically (though by no means temporally) prior to the resulting
specific transmissive actions. Schelling calls this prior unity an ursprnglichen
Original (STI: 199). This two-foldedness of the inceptive moment suggests that,
according to Schelling, such unity cannot simply serve as a clearly delineated
foundation or origin with respect to historical representation or action; no space
between the unity and the multiplicity would exist. Instead, this unity would be
the actual totality of history.

238

Jeffrey Bernstein

It stands to reason that no one individual could actualize the entirety of this
historical unityonly the entire species or, in Schellings language,genus could
fulfill this ideal of history (STI: 200). Stated in Kantian terms, no conditioned
element can ever, by itself, attain the unconditioned. Schelling thus comes to the
realization of a new feature of history, namely that there can only be a history of
such beings as have an ideal before them, which can never be carried out by the
individual, but only by the genus (Gattung) (STI: 200). The unfolding of historical
unity would thus be an ideal for the individual, but a goal of the species/genus. It
is this ideal which furnishes Schellings philosophy of history with its teleology
insofar as Schelling conceives of such unfolding as progress (STI: 200).
But this generic conception of history has another side to it; not only can
historical unity (as an ideal) only be realized by the entire genus but it necessarily shows itself already in/as the original. We can now see that, for Schelling,
unity is not simply the totality of historical events (just as it is not simply a separated foundational origin), but the very occurrence of events in their necessary
temporal upsurge; the ground of history would be the emergence of history
(understood from a particular standpoint). The emergent unity of the original
would also, therefore, find fulfillment in/as the ideal. Put differently, Schelling is
thinking unity neither as static totality nor as stable foundation but, instead, as
manifestation.20
This conception of the generic leads Schelling to make the immediate association of history with naturean association which lifts our perception of
nature out of the realm of the merely natural:
If we wanted to speak of a history of nature in the true sense of the word, we
should have to picture nature as though, apparently, free in its productions, it
had gradually brought forth the whole multiplicity thereof through constant
departures from a primordial original (einem ursprnglichen Original); which
would then be a history, not of natural objects (which is properly the description
of nature), but of generative (hervorbringenden) nature itself. (STI: 199)

The locale of objectified life (i.e., the genus or individual considered as an object of
theoretical cognition) is, for Schelling, nature. And in good Kantian fashion, history
would be that same locale understood from the standpoint of free, temporally productive (i.e., human) activity. But Schelling now faces a more specified version of
the problem which confronted him in his discussion of the universal constitution
for all states: how can we conceive of nature as both productive activity and the
emergent manifestation of (i.e., the constant departures from) an original/ideal?
Differently stated, how can there be both freedom and necessity?

2. The Unity of Freedom and Necessity and the Dialectic with Kant and Hegel
In the Forward to the 1809 Freiheitschrift, Schelling announces that [t]he time
has come for the higher, or rather the proper (eigentlich) opposition to come to

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

239

the fore: the opposition of necessity and freedom, in which the innermost center
of philosophy first comes to view.21 Viewed from a non-chronological perspective, this statement could just as easily have occurred (and, in some sense, does
occur) in the Systems deduction of history. For the problem which Schelling now
faces has to do with the negotiation between empirical freedom and necessity
with respect to historical unfolding. This problem does not necessarily demand
a complete solution; it does, however, need to be posed in such a manner that it
will help rather than hinder the Systems deduction. The way Schelling poses the
problem would appear to overcome Kants Third Antinomyfor the purposes of
history, there can never be full freedom (i.e., lawlessness) or full necessity (i.e.,
lawfulness); the two must function dialectically: it is self-evident that an absolutely lawless series of events is no more entitled to the name of history than an
absolutely law-abiding one (STI: 200). Schelling continues this undertaking:
whence it is apparent:
a. that the idea of progress implicit in all history permits no conformity to
law such as would limit free activity to a determinate and constantly recursive
succession of acts;
b. that nothing whatever can be an object of history which proceeds according
to a determinate mechanism, or whose theory is a priori. Theory and history
are totally opposed. Man has a history only because what he will do is incapable
of being calculated in advance according to any theory. Choice is to that extent
the goddess of history. (STI: 200)

To say that the idea of progress permits no conformity to law is to say that empirical freedom is the sine qua non of history. To say that nothing theoretical or
a priori can limit history is to say that there can be no moment of application
from the transcendentalwe can interpolate teleologically unifyingrealm to
the empirical. And, in fact, Schelling says precisely this regarding the teleological explanation of history: So far as concerns the basic principles of teleology,
the reader will doubtless recognize for himself that they point to the only way
of explaining the coexistence of mechanism with purposiveness in nature in an
intelligible manner (STI: 4) but that the merely teleological application of them
[i.e., of proofs for the existence of empirical objects] would not in fact advance
true knowledge a single step, since notoriously the teleological explanation of an
object can teach me nothing whatever as to its real origin(wirklichen Ursprung)
(STI: 34). Put slightly differently, although there must be unity (or, for Schelling,
progress) in history, such unity can in no way direct, influence, or attempt to
fully explain historical events. From the standpoint of the empirical (i.e., for
Schelling, real) world, there is freedom all the way down. That this freedom occurs
within the context of unity merely means that (as stated earlier) the constitutive
transmissive moment of history needs a spatio-temporal structure as the very

240

Jeffrey Bernstein

condition for historys possibility; history would admit of no continuity if there

were pure heteronomy.
We can at this point, hear the influence of Proposition One of Kants Universal
History essay: if we abandon this basic principle [i.e., the teleological theory of
nature] we are faced not with a law-governed nature, but with an aimless, random
process, and the dismal reign of chance replaces the guiding principle of reason
(PW: 42). For Schelling, as for Kant, teleology/historical unity is a necessary
presupposition in order to think or speak about history; it would be irrational
to inquire into history without presupposing this moment. In other words, this
presupposition appears to be normative; and for Kant, it is normative. The teleological principle is inseparable from our reason; purposiveness in nature thus
necessarily assumes an as if character. Is this the case for Schelling? By the time
we move to the third self-evident proposition issuing from the deduction of history, we find that Schelling makes a surprising turn: neither absolute lawlessness,
nor a series of events without aim or purpose, deserve the name of history, and . .
. its peculiarity (Eigentmliche) is constituted only by freedom and lawfulness in
conjunction, or by the gradual realization of a never fully lost Ideal on the part of
a whole genus of beings (STI: 200). That this ideal was never fully lost suggests
that it bears some (if not total) relation to the original unity of history. And to
speak of an original/ideal which is not simply reducible to human reason is to
move the inquiry from a critical to an ontological register.22 It is now no longer a
matter of affirming a teleological principle in order to preserve human reason,
but because such a principle is both connected to the original unity of life and held
out as the emerging goal of life.
Hegel serves as the example par excellence for this type of historical ontologization through his extension of reason from that which primarily constitutes the
human being (as is the case for Kant) to that which also constitutes the being of
Spirit. In doing so (to paraphrase one of his more celebrated remarks), he bestows
upon reason a substantiality in addition to a subjectivity. Reason now functions
as an objective, not merely normative, ground for world history:
Reason is the infinite content, the very stuff of all essence and truth, which gives
to its own activity to be worked up. For, unlike finite activity, it does not need
such conditions as an external material, or given means from which to get its
nourishment and the objects of its activity. It lives on itself, and it is itself the
material upon which it works. Just as Reason is its own presupposition and
absolute goal, so it is the activation of that goal in world historybringing it
forth from the inner source to external manifestation. (IPH: 12)

For Hegel, reason is indeed the origin and ideal of history insofar asqua Spirits
beingit constitutes the very activity of life. This ontological character of Hegels
rational-historical origin and ideal finds an analogue in Schellings ursprnglichen
Original (which is, simultaneously, an Ideal) with the important difference being

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

241

that Schelling will refrain from the predication of reason. As we shall see (according to Schelling), historys original unity, while not irrational, is arational (insofar
as it originally manifests indifference).
As we suggested before (and as we have been anticipating), the second moment
of Schellings dialectical presentation of history deals with the necessity/lawfulness ascribed to the ursprnglichen Original. This moment amounts to nothing less
than an inquiry into the transcendental possibility of history (STI: 200)which,
for Schelling, would lead directly to a philosophy of history (properly speaking)
(STI: 201). In other words, a philosophy of history depends upon an interpretation
of historys groundi.e., that standpoint which provides the necessary unity for
history. Regarding the question as to our access to the transcendental possibility of history, Schelling has this to say: so far as the transcendental necessity of
history is concerned, it has already been deduced in the foregoing from the fact
that the universal reign of law has been set before rational beings as a problem,
realizable only by the genus as a whole, that is, only by way of history (STI: 202).
That a universal constitution determining a Fderation alles Staten is a real possibility for humanity means, for Schelling, that humanity has the access (i.e., the
provocation) for inquiry into the transcendental necessity of history. Phrased in
very different (but not inappropriate) language, Schelling (like Kant) sees events
such as the French Revolution as providing an indication or sign of the fact that
there can be progress in history; that an ultimate unifying operation may be in
a process of temporal unfolding. Schelling views his philosophy of history as
an exercise in explication and illumination of this play between free historical
action and necessary spatio-temporal unity without trying to (as stated above)
apply this dialectic to the actual unfolding of a specific world order: We content
ourselves here . . . with merely drawing the conclusion, that the sole true object of
the historian can only be the gradual emergence of a political world order, for this,
indeed, is the sole ground for a history (STI: 202). Order and freedom in their
two-fold emergence within the realm of politicsthis, according to Schelling,
constitutes the actuality of history.
Raised to the conceptual level, however, Schellings philosophy of history will
only deal with how there can be necessary unity and free heteronomy at the same
time: We now pass on . . . to the primary characteristic of history, namely that it
should exhibit a unity (Vereinigung) of freedom and necessity, and be possible
through this unity alone (STI: 203). Just as the question concerning freedom
and necessity had become more specified for Schelling during the course of the
inquiry, now the contradictory character of such a unity becomes intensified:
on the one hand, freedom cannot be merely something either bestowed upon
people or wrested by them illegally (STI: 203). It needs to be essentially theirs; it
needs to emerge from the unity of the very political organization of which they
are a part. On the other hand, this political order only exists due to its realization

242

Jeffrey Bernstein

by free individuals and communities (STI: 203). A contradiction ensues insofar

as the goal of politics presupposes that goal as its very condition of possibility:
That which is the first condition of outward freedom is, for that very reason, no
less necessary than freedom itself. And it is likewise to be realized only through
freedom, that is, its emergence is consigned to chance (STI: 203204). How can
necessity, if it is to have any historical significance, operate as the transitional moment in the emergence and realization of freedom? Schellings answer attempts
to survive Kants Third Antinomy by simultaneously appropriating its dualistic
character and doubling it; in a manner reminiscent of Hegel, Schelling holds that:
The only way of resolving it [this contradiction] is that in freedom itself there
should again be necessity . . . freedom is to be necessity, and necessity freedom
(STI: 204). How, exactly, will this resolve the contradiction? In a statement similar
to his pronouncement of 1809about philosophys innermost center being the
opposition of necessity and freedomSchelling here claims this issue to be the
highest problem of transcendental philosophy (STI: 204).

3. Unconscious, Absolute, and Art

If freedom amounts to the capacity for humans to consciously make choices
thereby initiating series of eventsthen necessity amounts to something which
exceeds this capacity (i.e., the involuntary aspect of human being [STI: 204]).
Necessity, on Schellings account is that force or drive which (in the purest sense)
acts on, in, and through each individual. Schelling names this force the unconscious (das Bewutlose); he explains this integral relationship between freedom
and necessity as follows:
[O]ut of the most uninhibited expression of freedom there arises unawares
something wholly involuntary (unwillkrlichthis also carries the senses of
spontaneous and instinctive), and perhaps even contrary to the agents will,
which he himself could never have realized through his willing. This statement,
however paradoxical it may seem, is yet nothing other than a mere transcendental expression of the generally accepted and assumed relationship between
freedom and a hidden necessity, at times called fate and at times providence . . .
a relationship whereby men through their own free action, and yet against their
will, must become cause of something which they never wanted, or by which,
conversely, something must go astray or come to naught which they have sought
for freely and with the exertion of all their powers. (STI: 204)

In Kantian terminology, we might describe this unconscious necessity as that force

which unifies the manifold of human action into a historical whole.Fate or Providence would thus be the very unfolding of history itself without the possibility of any
theoretically applicable teleology; as in the Kantian model,progress would only be
possible in a practical sense (insofar as historical events and occurrences could only
occur through the free actions of humans). However, insofar as this unconscious

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

243

force is ontological, Schellings conception shifts closer to the Hegelian model; such
unity would (as stated above) not merely be the by-product of human reason, but
instead would be organically related to historys unfolding movement.
The question of how humans can actualize the unity of history now returns:
how, Schelling asks, when we act quite freely, that is, with consciousness, can
something arise for us unconsciously, which we never intended, and which freedom, left to itself, could never have brought about? (STI: 205). In other words,
how can there be a reconciliation between freedom and necessity when necessity
runs counter to every individuals free actions? How can there be a unity to history
at all? The answer, for Schelling, is the same one given in his initial discussion
concerning the need for unity in history: such a reconciliation between conscious
freedom and unconscious necessity can only take place in the context of the entire
species/genusit can only happen generically: we are here of course talking,
not of the individuals action, but of the action of the entire genus (STI: 206).23 As
stated earlier, this is, in effect, the practical analogue to Schellings discussion of
the pre-established harmony of intelligences (STI: 164) given in the theoretical
section of the System. And, again, we see the oscillation between Kant and Hegel
take place: this reconciliation between unconscious necessity and human freedominsofar as it amounts to a play of contrary impulsesresembles Kants
conception of unsociable sociability in the Fourth Proposition of his Universal
History essay (PW: 4445). However, insofar as this reconciliation is not merely
a function of human reasonbut maintains, instead, an ontological statusit
resembles Hegels conception of the cunning of Reason (where Reason is understood as an integral moment of Spirit) (IPH: 35).
What specifically would (or could) be the condition for the possibility of this
reconciliation? What would be the character of this unconscious necessary unity?
Unifying necessity, Schelling holds,
is inconceivable unless the objective factor in all acting is something communal, whereby all the acts of men are guided to one harmonious goal and are
so guided, that however they may set about things, and however unbridled the
exercise of their choice, they yet must go where they did not want to, without,
and even against, their own will . . . this necessity can itself be thought of only
through an absolute synthesis of all actions, from which there develops everything that happens, and hence also the whole of history; and in which, because
it is absolute, everything is so far weighed and calculated that everything that
may happen, however contradictory and discordant it may seem, still has and
discovers its ground of unity (Vereinigungsgrund) therein. (STI: 207)

As stated earlier, unity in history does not occur via a static and discrete foundation which is ontologically separate from the subsequent unified contents. Rather,
this unity is nothing other than an absolute synthesis of all actionsi.e., it is
the emergent movement of historical occurrence in its unconditioned totality. As

244

Jeffrey Bernstein

Schelling states, this movement discovers its unity from within; history grounds
itself. To say that this unity is absolute is to say that it becomes manifest as
unconditioned. To say that such a unity is a synthesis is to say that it is not understood from any particular perspective but rather, from the perspective of all
actionsi.e., as unconditioned.
Insofar as this unity is a synthesis of actions, it occurs as a result of acting
humans. But insofar as this unity is unconditioned, it occurs through the actions
of the entire genus (not the individual). How are we to think this generic unity?
For Schelling, necessity (i.e., lawfulness) cannot come merely from consciousness
insofar as consciousness is correlated with freedom. This means that the necessary
unity of/in history cannot be understood by means of concepts (which are instruments of consciousness). Instead, this unity can only be accessed by means of an
intuitionbut one which cannot occur merely on the individual level. Schelling
explains the apprehending of this unity in the following way: history, objectively
regarded, is nothing else but a series of data which appears subjectively as a series
of free actions. The objective factor in history is thus an intuition indeed, but not
an intuition of the individual, for it is not the individual who acts in history, but
rather the genus; hence the intuitant, or the objective factor in history, will have
to be one for the entire genus (STI: 206207). Phrased slightly differently, it is
not merely the singularity of free individuals who constitute history but, instead,
the necessary generic unity of the individuals actions. Similarly, the intuition of
such unity cannot occur individually but only generically. We might say (in quasiHegelian fashion) that history is the progressive coming to intuition of unity in/as
self-differentiating emergence.
The unification occurring as the absolute synthesis of historical action does
not, as yet, provide any insight into the way in which freedom and necessity are
reconciled: This unity does not explain . . . the coexistence of lawlessness, i.e.,
of freedom, with conformity to law. In other words, it leaves us none the wiser as
to how that harmony is effected between this objective element, which through
its own lawfulness, generates what it generates, in complete independence of
freedom, and the freely determining element (STI: 208). It is one thing to assert
that freedom and necessity are to be dialectically related to one another. It is
quite another thing to show how this relation/reconciliation would occur. It is
at this point that the two-foldedness of Schellings conception of unitythe
ursprnglichen Original again gains significance. Recall that this conception
simultaneously signals both emergent unity and the ground of this emergent
unity (the two not being distinct from one another). When viewed from the
standpoint of history, this primordial Original is the emergent totality of historical action. When viewed from an originating standpoint, this primordial
Original is the absolute identity of freedom and necessity. Schelling gives the
following explanation:

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

245

[I]f this higher thing [i.e., common source of the intelligent and the free] be
nothing else but the ground of identity between the absolutely subjective and
the absolutely objective, the conscious and the unconscious, which part company precisely in order to appear in the free act, then this higher thing itself can
be neither subject nor object, nor both at once, but only the absolute identity, in
which is no duality at all, and which, precisely because duality is the condition
of all consciousness, can never attain thereto. This eternal unknown . . . [is]
the eternal mediator between the self-determining subjective within us and,
and the objective or intuitant; at once the ground of lawfulness in freedom,
and of freedom in the lawfulness of the object. (STI: 208209)

When understood as ground, the necessary unity is seen not merely as the
absolute synthesis of all actions, but the absolute identity of actions and forces
whichas unconditionedexceeds the dualities which arise in the conscious
movement of historical occurrences. While this absolute identity is merely
perspectivally distinct from the standpoint of absolute synthesis, it can be understood (in Schellings account) to provide a derivation for that other standpoint
and everything which issues from it (i.e., the unity of history). Put differently,
this identity is the standpoint of unity understood as simple indivisibility which
grounds the standpoint of unity understood as totality. The unconscious unity
of historythe ursprnglichen Originalhas two simultaneous moments: (1) a
monistic moment where there are no oppositions but mere indifference and (2)
a totalistic moment where all oppositions emerge synthetically in the movement
of history.24 We shall return to this two-fold conception of the ursprnglichen
Original in the penultimate section as we discuss Schellings philosophy of history as approximating an Idealist version of Spinoza.
Insofar as absolute identity, for Schelling, can not admit of any predication (due
to its simplicity), it can never be an object of knowledge. Predication (as is the case
with all forms of distinction) is a by-product of consciousness; therefore, it cannot exist with respect to the standpoint of absolute identity (STI: 209). Schellings
discussion of this point again moves in an explicitly Kantian direction: it [absolute
identity] is the absolutely simple, and thus can have no predicates drawn either
from intelligence or free agency, and hence, too, can never be an object of knowledge, being an object only that is eternally presupposed in action, that is, an object
of belief (STI: 209). This recalls Kants discussion of God as a regulative (rather
than constitutive) principle of reason in the First Critique (A685686/B714); it
also recalls Kants conception of natural purposiveness (in his Perpetual Peace
essay) as holding practical, rather than theoretical, value (PW: 108109). Like
Kant, Schelling holds that we are obliged to believe in such identity in the service
of practical aims. Similarly, since this identity cannot be given in consciousness
without the moment of necessity becoming empirical (thus doing away with
the moment of freedom and, likewise, history), Schelling holds that, [w]e can

246

Jeffrey Bernstein

. . . conceive of no point in time at which the absolute synthesisor to put it in

empirical terms, the design of providenceshould have brought its development
to completion (STI: 210). This is, perhaps, the moment of greatest resistance
between Schellings philosophy of history and more conventionally teleological
conceptions: absolute identity/synthesis (qua absolute) can never be brought to
consciousness; therefore, it can never be taken as fully actualizedi.e., there can
never be any specific legitimate claim made about the end of history. Even given
the ontological character of Schellings conception of historical teleology, it can
never provide any particular justification for attempts to bring about the end of
history because such an end (i.e., absolute unity) is constitutively unavailable to
any particular human or group of humans. This end (or rather, unity) can only
be accessed via an intuition apprehended generically.
What kind of intuition could possibly be available to the entire genus? [We]
shall be likeliest, Schelling holds, to find traces (die Spur) of this eternal and
unalterable identity in the lawfulness which runs, like the weaving of an unknown hand, through the free play of choice in history (STI: 209). Fair enough,
but which aspect of history shall we investigate? Which mode of human activity would best be able to yield such traces? It cannot be simply history which
yields the intuition, as Schelling notes: since it [identity] is the ground for the
explanation of history, it cannot, conversely, be demonstrated from history (STI:
213). There must be a particularly appropriate access for the generic intuition of
absolute synthesis/identity.
Schelling begins this search by noting that such a productive activity would
have to yield (in analogous conception to that contained in Kants Third Critique)
a product that is purposive (zweckmig) without being purposively generated
(zweckmig hervorgebracht) (STI: 214). Necessary purposive unity must emerge
as an intuition for the free self. This purposiveness without a purpose Schelling
understands to be the principle of all teleology (STI: 214). Schelling holds that
the access to the generic intuition of (purposive) identity would have to provide
insight as to how the ultimate ground of harmony between the subjective [i.e.,
freedom, consciousness] and the objective [i.e., necessity, intuition] becomes an
object [i.e., intuition] to the self itself (STI: 217).
In other words, the harmony between freedom and necessity must not only
be the content of the intuition, it must be its form25 as well: Every organism is a
monogram of that original (ursprnglichen) identity, but in order to recognize
itself in that reflected image, the self must already have recognized itself directly
in the identity in question . . . it [the intuition] can be no other than the intuition
of art (STI: 218). In the intuition, therefore, there must be a harmony between
freedom and necessity and between the self and the original identitya
two-fold harmony which is present in aesthetic intuition. Our access for this

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

247

intuition, according to Schelling, is the art-product or rather, the product of

genius (STI: 222).
Because of this, Schelling claims that art is paramount to the philosopher
(STI: 231) insofar as the philosophers task must end where arts task begins (i.e.,
at the limit of particularizing conceptuality and the intuition of identity). What
might this insight suggest to humanity at this particular historical juncture?
Schelling now provides a brief genealogy of (and desire for) the return to mythology as a privileged mode of discourse and learning:
Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge,
and with it all the sciences it has guided toward perfection; we may thus expect them, on completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into
the universal ocean of poetry from which they took their source. Nor is it in
general difficult to say what the medium for this return of science to poetry
will be; for in mythology such a medium existed, before the occurrence of a
breach now seemingly beyond repair. But how a new mythology is itself to
arise, which shall be the creation, not of some individual author, but of a new
race (Geschlects26), personifying, as it were, one single poetthat is a problem
whose solution can be looked for only in the future destinies of the world, and
in the course of history to come. (STI: 232233)27

Although history finds the trace of its telos in aesthetic intuition, the full actualization of history (via the apprehensionand mythologizationof such an
intuition by the entire genus) remains radically futural; as stated earlier, an indefinite postponement of this telos is manifest in Schellings conception of history.
We cannot apply the Schellingian conception of teleology in order to make claims
about the end of history simply because we can never have a full conception of the
presenthistorical unity, manifest only in the aesthetic intuition, disrupts our
capacities for attaining such a complete conception (hence, the totality of history exists merely at the formal level). The most we can do, from the standpoint
of the genus, is to attempt attainment of aesthetic intuition (and help as many
others as possible to attain it as well) while we remain unwitting participants in
historys unfolding.

4. The Three Periods of History and Spinoza

History as a whole, Schelling tells us,is a progressive, gradually self-disclosing
revelation of the absolute (STI: 211). This holds for both the epochs of self-consciousness and for the periods of world history. It comes, then, as no surprise that
both historical movements runs parallel courses with each other (concerning
their respective triadic structures28) in Schellings System.
Just as the first epoch of self-consciousness begins with original sensation
(STI: 51), we find that the first period of history is ruled by a wholly blind force
which rules over humans as an impersonal destiny (STI: 211). For Schelling, this

248

Jeffrey Bernstein

tragic period gains its concrete expression in the downfall of the glory and the
wonder of the ancient world (STI: 211). Just as the second epoch of self-consciousness begins with productive intuition (STI: 94), we find that the second
period of history begins at the moment where blind destiny becomes manifest
as nature (STI: 211). This period, characterized by the rule of natural law (STI:
211), finds its concrete expression in the expansion of the mighty republic of
Rome (STI: 212). Since all events are understood, at this point, as outcomes of
nature, Schelling tells us that even Romes demise has neither a tragic or moral
aspect, being a necessary outcome of natures laws (STI: 212). Finally, as the
third epoch of self-consciousness begins with reflection and progresses to an
absolute act of will (STI: 134)thereby effecting the transition from the theoretical to the practical section of Schellings System (STI: 151)the third period
of history marks the moment where destiny and nature can retrospectively be
understood as the beginning of a providence imperfectly revealing itself (STI:
212). Schelling ends his brief historical periodization with a remarkable claim:
When this period will begin, we are unable to say. But whenever this period will
be (sein wird) God also will then be (wird . . . sein) (STI: 212).
We need to remember that, for Schelling, the absolute and unconditioned unity
of history can never emerge as fully present at any point in history because such
unity is the totality of history. We might here understand Schelling to be suggesting
that this third period of history would remain (as stated above) radically futural,
unable to be accessed except through aesthetic intuition (i.e., as a moment of the
future occurring in the present). The naming of the absolute as God, however, now
places Schellings conception of history in the proximity of Spinoza; for if the unity
of history is the absolute, and the absolute is God, then we exist as moments (in
Spinozas language, modes) of Gods historical self-revelation. How, one might
ask, does this differ from Hegels conception of history where history is the selfunfolding and self-understanding of Absolute Spirit? The difference lies in the
fact that, for Hegel, such unfolding happens primarily along rational/discursive
(i.e., conceptual) lines. Insofar as Schelling privileges intuition as the moment
of absolute understanding, he more closely resembles Spinoza (recall Spinozas
discussion of the third [and highest] kind of knowing as intuitive29).
It is, ultimately, Schellings conception of historical monism (or, in a more
precise Schellingian sense,30 monistic duality) which leads him beyond the dialectic of Kant and Hegel toward an Idealist version of Spinoza. Schelling holds
that while God never is (ist), if being is (sein . . . ist) that which presents itself
in the objective world (STI: 211), God still continually reveals Himself. Man
through his history, provides a continuous demonstration of Gods presence, a
demonstration, however, which only the whole of history can render complete
(STI: 211). Insofar as history is absolute unity, our continuous demonstration of
Gods self-revelation is nothing other than that very self-revelation. This is a ver-

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

249

sion of Spinozas discussions concerning God as the one substance within which
all finite modes (e.g., human beings and their actions) occur.31
One can understand Schellings summing-up of history in a similar manner:
history itself is a never wholly completed revelation of that absolute which, for
the sake of consciousness, and thus merely for the sake of appearance, separates
itself into conscious and unconscious, the free and the intuitant; but which itself,
however, . . . is eternal identity and the everlasting ground of harmony between
the two (STI: 211). History is the unfolding of the absolute both as a synthetic
totality of diverse actions and as the indivisibly unified ground of such totality. This parallels Spinozas distinction between God/Nature as natura naturata
(i.e., nature in its manifold expressions) and natura naturans (i.e., nature in its
indivisible singularity/absolute infinity). For both Schelling and Spinoza, these
distinctions are merely perspectival; there is no ontological split occurring between synthesis and identity for Schelling, just as there is none between manifold
nature and simple nature for Spinoza. Hence, Schelling can here be understood to
appropriate the familiar Spinozistic dictum Deus sive Natura in order to transform
it into Deus sive Historia.
Finally, this monism finds expression in Schellings conception of generic
intuition and the hope for a single generic poet. In Schellings references to both a
genus-wide intuition and a genus which acts together as one poet, one can discern
an appropriation of Spinozas definition of singular things (Ethics 2D7):by singular
things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if
a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the cause
of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.32 If many act
together in a certain way, they attain the possibility of becoming one individual.
Therefore, if the entire genus can acquire aesthetic intuition and poeticize out of
that intuition, they would bring the unity of history (i.e., the absolute, God) to full
revelation. Schellings hope for the full revelation of historical unity ultimately takes
its point of departure from Spinozas monistic insight.

III. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In his 1936 Freiburg Lectures on the Freiheitschrift, Martin Heidegger says this
about Schelling, Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole
age of German philosophy. He is that to such an extent that he drives German
Idealism from within right past its own fundamental position.33 In the present
context, we can interpret Heideggers statement in the following manner: Schelling,
via a dialectical engagement with Kant and Hegel concerning the question of
historical teleology, finds his own Idealism ultimately in the process of moving
past that very dialectic. For Schelling, teleology amounts to the ontological unity
of historical manifestation in both its expressive and grounding capacitiesthis

250

Jeffrey Bernstein

is Schellings Hegelian moment. Such unity, however, can neither (1) achieve full
actualization during any particular point in history, nor (2) serve as the content
of application with respect to positing a historical telos; insofar as it remains
accessible only via generic intuition, it cannot serve as the object of knowledge
but only beliefthis is Schellings Kantian moment. In the light of Schellings
philosophy of history, we are given an ontologically unifying conception of history
which resists the application of a teloswe are left with a conception of teleology
which imposes on events nothing other than an intuition of historical unity. It is
this moment where Schellings thinking exceeds the Kantian-Hegelian dialectic
and moves in the direction of Spinoza.
However, the version of Spinoza which Schelling affirms still remains within
an Idealist trajectory. Schelling, in the end, remains tied to a divinized monism.
Schelling can only think this historical unity of forces as a living and revealing
God even when this God amounts to nothing more than intelligibility at the ontological level: Every individual intelligence can be regarded as a constitutive part
of God, or of the moral world order (STI: 206).34 God cannot, for Schelling, be
nature pure and simple (as it is for Spinoza). There must, for Schelling, ultimately
be something like an intelligible or meaningful order to life (however removed
from individual cognition it may be).35 Because of this, teleologyeven when
it amounts solely to the intuition of historically monistic unityalways already
amounts to a departure from Spinoza. Given his complete and utter rejection
of final causality,36 the belief in absolute identity (insofar as it admits of a real,
ontological character) would remain uncompelling to Spinoza. This being the
case, however, Schellings dialectical presentation of philosophy of history as the
history of philosophy still amounts to both (1) a genuinely historical engagement
with history and (2) a fascinating and unique conceptualization of a Spinozistic
Idealism which proceeds beyond the limits of Kant and Hegel.37

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

251

NOTES
1.

Strong translations now exist of both the 1813 and 1815 versions of die Weltalter.
For the 1813 version, see Judith Normans translation in Slavoj iek and F. W. J. Von
Schelling, The Abyss of Freedom/The Ages of the World (Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press, 1997). For the 1815 version, see F. W. J. Schelling, The Ages of the
World, trans. Jason M. Wirth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). For
Clara, see F. W. J. Schelling, Clara or, On Natures Connection to the Spirit World, trans.
Fiona Steinkamp (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).
2. Heinrich Heine, Selected Prose, trans. Ritchie Robertson (New York: Penguin Books,
1993), pp. 199294.
3. F. W. J. Schelling, System der transzendentalen Idealismus, ed. Horst D. Brandt and Peter
Mller (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992). In order to assist the reader, I will refer
to the English translation (F. W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism [1800],
trans. Peter Heath [Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993]) and will modify
the translation as needed. Cited as STI: page number. All bracketed interpolations are
mine.
4. Heine, pp. 283286.
5. F. W. J. Schellings 183334 Munich Lectures, Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,
have appeared in translation as F. W. J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy,
trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 110.
6. For Fichtes correspondence with Schelling on this issue, see Theory as Practice: A
Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings, ed. and trans. Jochen SchulteSasse, Haynes Horne, Andreas Michel, Elizabeth Mittman, Assenka Oksiloff, Lisa C.
Roetzel, and Mary R. Strand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp.
7374; translation slightly modified.
7. Heine even goes so far as to state that, one must read [Schellings] books in chronological order, pursuing the gradual development of his thought, and holding firmly
to his basic idea (p. 283).
8. It strikes me as rather strange that the role of history in Schellings System is usually presented in a truncated manner. The most surprising example of this trend is
Werner Marxs Schelling, Geschichte, System, Freiheit (Mnchen: Verlag Karl Alber
Freiburg, 1977), where history is treated merely as the vehicle for (and unfolding of)
the prstabilierten Harmonie (p. 80) of Schellings Identity-system. For additional
otherwise fine discussions of the System where the role of history is dealt with in a
sparse manner, cf. Richard Velkleys, Realizing Nature in the Self: Schelling on Art
and Intellectual Intuition in the System of Transcendental Idealism, in Velkleys Being
after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002), pp. 110122, Jacques Taminiaux,The Critique of Judgement and German
Philosophy, in Jacques Taminiaux, Poetics, Speculation, and Judgement: The Shadow
of the Work of Art from Kant to Phenomenology, trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 2140, Dale Snow, Schelling and the End of
Idealism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 119140, and Terry
Pinkard, German Philosophy 17601860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 184191. This trend of de-emphasizing the role of

252

9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

17.

18.
19.

Jeffrey Bernstein

history in Schellings System can be traced (at least in the English-speaking world)
back to Coleridges appropriation of Schelling in the Biographia Literaria.
Heine, p. 283.
Heine, p. 286.
Were one to stay, for the moment, with the chronology-based type of assessment, one
could make a case that the history section of the System anticipates (or, to use the
language of Schellings Munich Lectures, contains in embryonic form) the entirety
of Schellings concerns with respect to the historical unfolding of the absolute as
evidenced in the Freiheit and Weltalter texts. One should note that this particular
languagei.e., the relation of the seed/embryo to later developments (or, in the
Leibnizian language of the Freiheitschrift, the relation of subject to predicate) is a
philosophical articulation of a certain theological conception concerning the relation
of the Old Testament to the New. Schelling is explicitly aware of this in his discussion
of Spinoza in the Munich lectures (History of Modern Philosophy, p. 69).
Heine, p. 245.
Heine, p. 286.
Limitations of time and space prevent me from being able to provide a full discussion
with respect to these interpretations of Kant and Hegel. Nevertheless, during my reading of the System, I shall substantiate these interpretations as a way of dialectically
confronting Schellings own philosophy of history.
Such inseparability from human reason is literally how Kant describes the unifying
aspect of this purposive/teleological movement in both the First Critique (unzertrennlich, A695/B723) and the Third (untrennbaren, 5:481, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften,
ed. Royal German Academy of Sciences [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900]).
Put differently (and taking my cue from a phrase present in both the First and Third
Critiques), we might refer to Kantian teleology as an as-if teleology.
Concerning the stark contrast between Hegels conception of the ontological/theological character of historical purposiveness and Kants critical conception, the following
passage from Hegels Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of History may
suffice as an initial provocation: In our knowledge, we aim for the insight that whatever was intended by the Eternal Wisdom has come to fulfillmentas in the realm of
nature, so in the realm of spirit that is active and actual in the world. To that extent, our
approach is a theodicy, a justification of the ways of God (G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction
to the Philosophy of History, trans. Leo Rauch [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1988], p. 18. Cited as IPH: page number).
I believe that Schellings System maintains a complex relation to the political. This
relation does not always appear as evident in other texts of his. For a similarly complex
treatment of the political, the reader should consult Schellings 1802 Jena Lectures, On
University Studies (trans. E. S. Morgan [Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966]).
Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed., H. S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), p. 47. Cited as PW: page number.
Although this passage does not make it explicit, the question concerning freedom and
necessity will develop into the question as to how there can be a necessary basis which

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schellings System

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.
29.

253

can both preserve the unity of history and preserve the freely chosen acts/events of
history as free.
This is similar to a materialist interpretation of Hegels philosophy of historyi.e.,
that absolute Spirit is nothing other than objective Spirit. However, this reading
would have to occur through an over-emphasis of the antithetic moment. On the other
hand, Schellings conception of generic history can be viewed as similar to the Eighth
Proposition of Kants Universal History essay (PW: 50).
F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom
and Related Matters, trans. Priscilla Hayden-Roy, in Philosophy of German Idealism,
ed., Ernst Behler (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1987), p. 217.
Cf. Fredrick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism17811801
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 522, Paul Redding, The Logic
of Affect (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 113, Terry Pinkard, German
Philosophy 17601860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), p. 189, and Vronique Zanetti, Teleology and the Freedom of the Self,
in The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy, ed.
Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995),
p. 60.
Because Schelling is, in part, concerned with the construction of systema crucial
feature of which is that the whole becomes manifest in each individual parthe is
sometimes interpreted (with respect to natural history/biology) as a precursor to
Ernst Haeckels conception of evolutionary recapitulation (i.e., ontogenesis directly
recapitulates phylogenesis). However his articulation of the generic reconciliation
between conscious freedom and unconscious necessity suggests that, for Schelling, no
such simple and direct recapitulation between the individual and the species/genus
is possible.
Here one can clearly discern the Neo-Platonic influence in Schellings System. This
influence re-occurs in the Freiheitschrift insofar as Schelling re-articulates the moment of absolute identity in his discussion of the Ungrund.
In fact, this conception of identity as embodying both content and form is put forth
by Schelling earlier on in the System: There is absolutely no explaining how presentation and object can coincide, unless in knowledge itself there exists a point at which
both are originally oneor at which being and presentation are in the most perfect
identity (STI: 24).
We should note that Schelling is not here referring to any particular race/generation
but rather, solely to a possible genus which could actualize aesthetic intuition in the
form of mythology.
For a similar account of mythologys unifying role with respect to poetry and science,
see the The Earliest System-Program of German Idealism, a text widely attributed
to Schelling.
The reader should note that this triadic structure of historical periods is preserved
in Schellings Weltalter texts.
See Spinozas Ethics, 2P40S2.

254

Jeffrey Bernstein

30. Cf. Schellings footnote, in the Freiheitschrift, concerning the relation of duality and
unity (Philosophy of German Idealism, p. 238).
31. Ethics, IP8, 14, & 18.
32. Baruch Spinoza, The Collected Works Of Spinoza, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 447.
33. Martin Heidegger, Schellings Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan
Stambaugh (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985), p. 4.
34. Recall that, in the Freiheitschrift, Schelling explains that God is the living unity of
forces (Philosophy of German Idealism, p. 267).
35. While Spinoza is surely interested in the order of nature, this order isstrictly speakingnot an intelligent or meaningful order but one based solely on formal, material,
and efficient causal necessity.
36. Ethics I Appendix.
37. I should like to thank Joseph Lawrence and Peter Warnek for provocative discussions
which contributed to the conception and composition of this paper.