REZUMATE

1. Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making :

Toward a Constructivist Approach
The logical connections to both the realist and liberal
paradigms were always strained. The insights of the original FPA
scholars were undoubtedly intended originally as a corrective to
some of the assumptions of the realist paradigm, most notably
the rational actor assumption, whose economistic assumptions
sit ill at ease with the more empirically driven, psychologically
derived insights of FPA. One can treat the classic work of Robert
Jervis and Graham Allison as amendments to realismFanomalies eating away at the realist paradigmFbut if so, the
anomalies have evidently mounted to the point where the
original edifice is imploding; FPA ar- guably runs against the
whole thrust of realism, both in its classical and structural
versions. Morgenthaus notion of an unchanging human nature,
derived from conservative political philosophyFthe animus
dominandiFsits very oddly with the more nuanced appreciation
of human beings that cognitive and social psychology bring to
the study of FPA. Moreover, the systemic-level focus of
neorealism self- consciously rejects what Kenneth Waltz calls the
kind of unit level analysis which the stock in trade of FPA.
While the similarities between CFPA and constructivism are strong
and real, there are at least two potential barriers to such a dialogue.
The fourth and final section will examine these two obstaclesFone
epistemological, the other onto- logicalFsuggesting ways in which
these might be overcome.
As already noted, constructivism is a diverse collection of approaches
whose mem- bersFwhile differing markedly over some substantive and
epistemological is- suesFshare certain core propositions in common.
Various authors have ably summarized the basic assumptions that
underlie constructivism in its various forms, although these are so
interrelated that we can have a hard time separating them from one
another.
This definition is probably unduly restrictive, for it suggests that a
theory must necessarily be incorrect or make claims that are
patently false at the outset; a theory may be logically neither correct
nor incorrect a priori, however, and yet self-fulfilling in the sense that
the actors believe in it and so render it true. But Mertons def- inition
still captures the essential nature of the self-fulfilling prophecy;

perceptions can be self-creating, and even misperceptions can be

proven correct.10 One in- teresting example applied to the field of IR
theory is suggested by the work of Thomas Risse-Kappen, whose
argument about the democratic peace illustrates the ways in which
academic ideas seep into the policy community and become widely
accepted to the point where they effectively shape reality rather than
explain it:
If actors of democratic states view each other as predisposed toward
peacefulness, the significance of the security dilemma in their
interactions is substantially reduced and, therefore, a major obstacle
toward stable security cooperation removed. Actors who trust each
other start behaving accordingly. They thereby create a peaceful and
cooperative order through their interaction processes which reinforces
the percep- tion of ones peaceful intentions. In other words, the
presumption that the other is predisposed toward peacefulness leads
to a self-fulfilling prophecy if both sides act on this assumption. The
democratic peace is socially constructed
A clear awareness of what we now call the structure/agency problem is
also present, although again it is couched in rather different language
as one might expect. We are still confronted by the empirical puzzle
of the extent to which an individual policy-maker . . . influences policy
outcomes and the extent to which impersonal forces (such as historical
movements, ideologies, and governmental systems) also determine
actions, Snyder noted back in 1962. One suspects that it is not one
or the other but both
As for the cultural dimension of foreign policy and the importance of
social identity, Snyder and his colleagues were among the first in
modern IR to argue for the necessity of studying these phenomena,
although in truth this recognition goes as far back as Harold Lasswells
World Politics and Personal Insecurity, first published in 1935, and to
Max Webers arguments in the Methodenstreit (methodological controversy) of the late nineteenth century
There is, as a number of observers have already noted, a risk that
constructivism is in the process of becoming mere fad or what Chris
Brown calls a bumper sticker, morphing into a big tent approach of
such size and diversity that it loses its distinc- tiveness. Can everything
and anything fit under the description of constructivism? Clearly not.
According to some critics, many supposedly constructivist
arguments are merely old or existing theories dressed up in the
superficial trappings of the approach. Stefano Guzzini, for instance,
suggests that much scholarship calling itself constructivist is often
either eclectic or redundant. Eclecticism shows up when constructivism

has become a general category out of which many researchers pick

and choose their particular version without necessarily looking at the
theoretical coherence of the final product.
While one can have some sympathy with these critiques, they often
betray a more constructivist than thou mentality and a desire to
close down debate, reserving the term constructivism exclusively for
what the critic happens to do. Why should constructivism have a single
epistemology, methodology, or ontology? Guzzini is surely correct that
one is hardly a constructivist simply because one studies ideas, as we
noted earlier, and it is difficult indeed to make constructivism
compatible with rationalism, as some have sought to do.
Considering a case most of us know intimatelyFthe Cuban missile crisis
of 1962Fmakes it plain how important both forms of constructivism
are, as well as the manner in which the choice of one or the other
depends on the thing we are trying to explain. If we are interested in
why Kennedy and his advisers gave little or no consideration to the
option of doing nothing in response to the discovery of missiles in
Cuba, for example, beliefs about Cold War Communism and appropriate presidential behavior in response to security threats shared by
practically all Americans (social constructivisms forte) seem so critical
that it is difficult to under- stand how any useful explanation could
conceivably leave them out. On the other hand, if we are interested in
why Kennedy chose the naval blockade over the surgical air strike,
society-wide beliefs tell us relatively little and individual con- structions
a great deal.

2. WHAT NEXT FOR THE POLISH-ROMANIAN STRATEGIC

PARTNERSHIP?
As key players in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland and Romania
have an interest in functional membership, supported by
transparent consultation within the EU, in which they can contribute
effectively to the decision making processes which affect them. As
the two manage EU and NATO external borders, they bring a
particular vision, aimed at maintaining the attractiveness of the
European project in their neighbours eyes, and address
constructively the transition processes in their proximity.
Among the political and economic issues at the top of the common
agenda, both countries are interested in keeping the European
Council as the main forum for decision-making in the Union,
including decisions regarding economic and monetary issues. At
European level, there is increasing consensus that the austerity
policies so far adopted need to be complemented by growthinducing initiatives. Romania has supported and efficiently
implemented budgetary discipline as an objective, but further policy
proposals aimed at stimulating growth are needed, in cooperation
with Poland. At the same time, it is important that Romania
coordinates with Poland in shaping the political debate on the future
of the Eurozone, and that it turns its economic stability into political
capital at EU level.
There is also major role also for the Polish and Romanian civil societies
and non-governmental organisations, in jointly promoting respect for
Copenhagen criteria. Polls conducted ahead of the 2014 European
Parliamentary elections do not bode well for European democracies,
particularly for centre parties, as more Europeans tend to slide towards
extremist groups. Particularly worrying is the continued rise of
xenophobic and anti-European attitudes in many EU Member States,
including older ones, which gives a sense of overall deterioration of
democratisation processes across the Union.
When it comes to energy policy, Poland and Romaniain common with
other countries in the region share the same concerns of security of
supply, energy efficiency and the tensions between the severe
environmental and market liberalisation expectations of the EU and
national economic interests. Even without a common geographical
border, such convergences serve as a solid foundation for cooperation.
This can be on a bilateral level, just as on multi-lateral platformsbe
that the EU or the V4 Plus format.

Since both Romania and Poland are among the countries paying the
highest prices for Russian gas imports Europe-wide (in 2012 Poland
paid an average price of $525 and Romania $440 per thousand cubic
metres), their efforts should be joined to speed up the integration of
the regional market and with this pave the way for a liberalised single
European energy market. To this end, Romania has already joined the
regional electric power market coupling, started by the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovakia.
There are multiple economic links, as well as political and security
interests, which bind the four countries. In the EU, Poland and Romania
are among the most important trade partners of Ukraine and Moldova
respectively. Economic exchanges are poised to deepen once Ukraine
and Moldova sign Association Agreements (AA) with the EU,
envisioning the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA). Integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the
European market will open new avenues for Polish and Romanian
investments. In addition to enhanced commerce, Poland and Romania
represent main entry points connecting Ukraine and Moldova with the
EUs critical infrastructure, including highways, pipelines, railways and
power grids. As limitrophe states, Poland and Romania strive to push
the EUs frontier further to the east, extending the perimeter of
security and prosperity.
As Ukraine and Moldova could soon sign AAs, Poland and Romania
could share expertise on setting up domestic inter-ministerial
mechanisms aimed at streamlining government actions towards
implementation of association agenda. Finally, Romania and Poland
cannot avoid horse trading concerning the next EU Commissioner for
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. Warsaw and
Bucharest must work together to secure nominations from like-minded
EU Member States, as the decisions of the outgoing commissioner
were almost in line with the foreign policy of his country of origin.
Energy security is a critical issue for both Ukraine and Moldova.
Ukraine is in the middle of implementing a gas sources diversification
strategy. Poland already pumps gas in reverse mode from Germany to
Ukraine. A similar option is under discussion with Romania. Although
the volume of gas which can transit Romania to Ukraine are not
significant at this stage, signing a gas transit agreement would be a
trust-building measure between Kiev and Bucharest that could
contribute to a further thaw in bilateral relations. Given Russias
obstruction of similar deal between Slovakia (which has the greatest
transit capacities among neighbours) and Ukraine, Poland might
consider expanding its gas transit network with Ukraine. As regards
Romania, the tempo of building the gas pipeline IasiUngheni and

interconnecting electricity networks must

speed up. Romania must prepare the second stage of the projecta
compressor stationin order to be able use the gas interconnector
with Moldova to its full capacity (1.5 bcm).
A DCFTA as part of an Association Agreement is the most powerful
transformation tool the EaP provides. Poland and Romania must assist
Ukraine and Moldova in the DCFTA implementation phase. Ultimately,
economic de-monopolisation, enhanced transparency, and fair
competition are in the interests of Polish and Romanian investors. Both
states already implement projects to strengthen institutional capacity
in Ukraine and Moldova. In the coming years, Poland could share with
Ukraine and Moldova its experience in reforming the agricultural
sector, helping to boost exports to the EU market. Romania could
extend positive anti-corruption experience, transferring this not only to
Moldova but also to Ukraine, when authorities in Kiev are ready to
accept such assistance. Islands of reform in Ukraine and Moldova
deserve special support. For instance, the Ministry of Education in
Moldova pushed a law on the National Agency for Quality Assurance in
High Education through parliament. A similar agency in Romania could
be a valuable partner in setting up the institution in Moldova. The
Interior Ministry in Moldova is implementing the most profound
structural reform in decades. Poland and Romania could make this
reform sustainable in the long term, by helping with expertise and
technical assistance to create the Police College which will prepare the
next generation of well-trained policemen.
Poland and Romania have, through concerted action, the potential to
contribute to rendering the European project more flexible, to open it
up towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, and to improve European
security. The Strategic Partnership offers a particular setting to
reinforce coordination between the two countries in forging common
positions on the major political and economic debates at the European
level. These include navigating the European post-crisis agenda from
austerity towards support for growth and employment, consolidating
the Economic and Monetary Union (and within this, accommodating
the positions of non-Eurozone members such as Poland and Romania),
maintenance of a European budget favourable for the net
beneficiaries, and safeguarding the principle and practice of the free
movement of labour. Given the commonalities in the energy security of
the countries, they should utilise both bilateral and multi-lateral
platforms to push forward the regional integration of the energy
market and to claim a voice in the debate on the future of shale gas in
Europe. In the case of most European issues, the V4 Plus format can
serve as a useful channel for Poland in involving Romania in shaping a

regional view and communicating common interests.

Finally, given the similar approach to the main security challenges for
Europe and to the issue of the future of NATO and the EUs security
dimension, the next step towards turning the Strategic Partnership
premises into tangible results should see Poland and Romania
coordinating and presenting common initiatives. The coming months
could create opportunities for displaying such unified positions. At EU
level, Romania and Poland should contribute to advancing the debate
at the December 2013 European Defence Council meeting, on the
factors which have so far hindered the Unions ability to define a
geopolitical vision of its own, particularly in relation to its
neighbourhood. Joint efforts should also aim to reach a common
assessment of the CSDP in terms of capabilities, EDAs role and
industry development, and striking a balance with engagement in
NATO. At NATO, the 2014 Summit is to take place in the United
Kingdom. Both Poland and Romania can contribute their joint
assessment of the agenda for a post-ISAF Alliance, including renewed
emphasis on exercises, a joint approach to acquiring key capabilities,
and a realistic agenda with Russia.

3. ABORDARI PSIHO-COGNITIVE IN ANALIZA POLITICA EXTERNA

SORIN STEFAN DENCA
Rdcinile conceptuale ale studiului politicii extern se regsesc n
Europa secolului al XVII-lea, n perioada apariiei statelor naionale
moderne. Consacrarea analizei de politic extern ca domeniu
academic s-a produs n Statele Unite ale Americii, n special dup cel
de-al doilea rzboi mondial1. Att concepiile idealiste, cu origini n
gndirea idealist, Kantian, ct i cele realiste, bazate pe concepia
Hobbesian, pesimist asupra naturii umane, inerent agresive, au stat
la baza dezvoltrii studiului academic al relaiilor internaionale i
politicii externe n Statele Unite.
Cu ncepere din anii 1950, tiina politic american, implicit studiul
relaiilor internaionale i al politicii externe, a nceput s fie dominat
1

de abordrile behavioraliste. n plan practic, acest fapt a nsemnat

nlocuirea abordrilor normative cu un program de cercetare cantitativ.
n cazul analizei de politic extern, perspectiva behavioralist a
mbrcat forma unui program de cercetare cunoscut sub numele de
studiul comparativ al politicii externe. Scopul acestuia a fost crearea
i acumularea unui corpus de informaii privind comportamentul politic,
care s poat fi generalizate empiric. Analiza de politic extern a fost
semnificativ marcat de predominana studiilor comparative n aceast
perioad, dar au existat ncercri de explicare a deciziilor de politic
extern din perspectiva rolului jucat de factorii psihologici i cognitivi
(Carlsnaes, 2003: 333), cu att mai mult cu ct importana acestora a
fost acceptat de mult vreme. Totui, conturarea unei agende de
cercetare specifice nu s-a produs dect cu dificultate. Transferul de
metode i tehnici de cercetare din portofoliul psihologiei n cel al
analizei de politic extern a fost privit cu nencredere de o serie de
specialiti, principalul argument invocat fiind faptul c metodele de
laborator i experimentele nu pot fi aplicate n domeniul studiului
comportamentului politic.
Cea de-a treia categorie, a contextului n care politica extern este
elaborat, se refer la mediul psiho-social. Cinci teme majore au
caracterizat studiile de acest tip n ultima jumtate de secol: 1.
caracterul i natura actorilor politici individuali; 2. rolul percepiilor; 3.
rolul societii si culturii n sens larg; 4. specificul comunitii politice;
5. caracteristicile sistemului internaional (Hudson & Vore, 1995: 226).
Abordrile psiho-cognitive se ncadreaz n special n primele dou arii
tematice i ntr-o anumit msura n cea de-a treia.
ntr-o prim faz, abordrile psiho-cognitive au urmrit studierea
atitudinilor actorilor politici i schimbarea atitudinal, i mai ales
problema consistenei i disonanei cognitive. Cu ncepere din anii 70
ns, studiile psiho-cognitive au schimbat complet unghiul de abordare.
n 1953, ntr-un studiu dedicat bolsevismului, Nathan Laites a introdus
pentru prima dat conceptul de coduri operaionale cu referire la
preceptele i maximele caracteriznd viziunea bolsevismului clasic
asupra politicii, regulilor de conduit i normelor de comportament
crora bunul bolevic trebuie s li se conformeze (George, 1969:
193-4). Studiul nu a produs un impact deosebit la momentul publicrii,
n schimb a fost preluat critic i reintrodus n studiile comportamentului
politic de ctre Alexander George2 n 1969. Cadrul elaborat de George
2

a fost ulterior utilizat i adaptat de ali politologi la propriile programe

de cercetare.
Ca i cartografia cognitiv, teoria atribuirii este legat de domeniul
psihologiei i de lucrrile lui Fritz Heider, care au stimulat interesul
cercettorilor din domeniul relaiilor internaionale si analizei de
politic extern (Bonham, 1993: 256). n esen, teoria atribuiri
consider c indivizii umani atribuie comportamentul uman fie
factorilor

personali

(dispoziionali),

fie

celor

exteriori

individului

(situaionali). Aceast idee a fost preluat de cercettorii din domeniul

relaiilor internaionale i analizei de politic extern i aplicat
modului n care liderii politici, acionnd ca oameni de tiin naivi
sau conform bunului sim, percep i explic propriul lor comportament
i pe cel al altor lideri (Heradstveit i Bonham, 1986: 344). Aplicaii
ulterioare ale teoriei atribuirii sunt studiile lui Heradstveit i Bonham
din 1986 cu privire la modul n care oficiali americani i norvegieni au
perceput intrarea repetat a navelor sovietice n apele teritoriale
norvegiene, sau cel publicat n 1996 cu privire la imaginea n lumea
arab a rzboiului din Irak din 1991, precum i analiza lui Stephen
Walker publicat n 1999 cu privire la stilurile de atribuire ale lui George
Buch Sr. i Bill Clinton.
Conceptul de imagine aplicat analizei relaiilor internaionale a fost
iniial utilizat de Kenneth Boulding, reputat economist cu contribuii
majore n domeniul tiinelor sociale n general. Argumentul su a fost
c realitatea uman este structurat de diferite paliere imagistice,
ncepnd cu imaginea modului de funcionare a lumii. Comportamentul
uman depinde de imaginile mentale iar semnificaia unei informaii
este legat de schimbarea pe care o produce acestor imagini.
Cunoaterea uman, argumenteaz Boulding, este conectat organic
de imaginile mentale fiind rezultat al experienelor anterioare i
susceptibil schimbrii pe msura apariiei de noi informaii.

Teoriile nvrii au fost aplicate domeniului relaiilor internaionale

ncepnd din anii '70, studii de pionierat fiind publicate de Ernest R.
May n 1973 i Robert Jervis n 1976. n primul caz, May a examinat
analogiile cu situaii din trecut pe care liderii americani le-au fcut n
scopul justificrii rzboiului din Vietnam i a rolului pe care aceste
analogii l-a jucat n formularea politicii externe americane (Warner,
1975: 462). Deja menionata lucrare a lui Jervis privind percepiile n
politica internaional a alocat un capitol consistent problemei modului
n care liderii politici nva leciile istoriei. Aceste dou studii au fost
urmate, n special de la jumtatea anilor '80, de numeroase analize
privind problema procesului de nvare, stimulate i de acceptarea tot
mai larg a faptului c teoriile structurale nu sunt echipate suficient de
bine din punct de vedere teoretic pentru a explica sfritul Rzboiului
Rece sau alte situaii de schimbare n politica internationala.
Herrmann a identificat o serie de critici care au fost aduse abordrilor
psiho- cognitive n studiul

politicii externe. Prima se refer la

caracterul teoretic i descriptiv al acestora studii, limitate la descrierea

ideografic a percepiilor pe care liderii politici le au cu privire la
existen. n al doilea rnd, pe lng faptul c sunt excesiv de
teoretice, aceste studii reuesc s fie suficient de abstracte nct,
conform lui Herrmann, s explice totul i nimic. n plus, rolul
elementelor emoionale i afective nu a fost suficient explorat, n ciuda
importanei pe care o prezint.
Analiza de politic extern, dei considerat sub-domeniu al relaiilor
internaionale, se bazeaz pe o premis diferit, i anume faptul c
deciziile de politic extern sunt rezultatul aciunii umane, individuale
sau de grup. Este aadar plasat la intersecia diferitelor tipuri de
tiine sociale n msura n care acestea sunt legate de domeniul
politicii internaionale . Caracterul inter i multi-disciplinar al analizei de

politic

extern

ofer

deschideri

promitoare

pentru

viitorul

domeniului.

4. FOREIGN

POLICY

MAKERS

AND

THEIR

NATIONAL

ROLE

CONCEPTIONS NAOMI BAILIN WISH

The correlational analysis showed strong correspondences between
some of the ational role conceptions of political leaders and the foreign
policy behavior of their nations. For example, nations whose leaders
perceived dominand roles affecting large domains were more likely to
participate in the international arena.
The MDPREF analysis showed that the two most important factors
underlying the entire set of roles and behaviors could be interpreted as
cooperative versus competitive and high status versus low status.
The first of these factors is associated with cooperative versus
competitive motivations,diplomativ versus ideological role issues,and
friendly versus hostile behavior. The role and behavior variables most
highly

associated

with

the

second

factor

were

perception

of

dominance,size or level of influence domain,and extent of involvement

or participation in the international area.
These results demonstrate some of the distinct advantages in using
perceptual data. An analysis of national attributes might have been
adequate for an international system,but this no longer appears as
effective when one

considers the current transnational system

whichincludes both state and nonstate actors. By using perceptual

data one might be able to determine which multinational corporations
and terrorist groups perceive their roles as most competitive,how much
system change they seek,how influential they perceive themselves to
be internationally,and how these perceptions are related to their
behavior.

These analyses could highlight important qualitative differences

between the public pronouncements of governamental leaders and
those of corporate spokespersons and other nonstate actors.
Role conceptions also are particularly useful in examining changes in
the international or transnational system over time. Analyzing role
conceptions which were professed in the 1970s and comparing them
with those prosessed in the early decades can give us clues to
changing relationships in the international system.

5. STUDIUL FACTORILOR CULTURALI IN ANALIZA POLITICII EXTERNE

LUCIANA ALEXANDRA GHICA.
La jumatatea secolului XX,cand stiintele sociale au capatat forma si
agenda lor clasica,au existat numeroase incercari de a define si
ierarhiza subiecte de cercetre,in special stiintele sociale. Unul dintre
cele mai influente astfel de demersuri i-a apartinut sociologului
American Talcott Parsons,care insista asupra diviziunii stricte intre
discipline pe baza distinctiei intre obiectele de cercetare.
Dintr-un astfel de punct de vedere,nu numai ca analiza politicii externe
nu

ar

fi

mai

mult

decat

eventual

minora

subdisciplina

sociologiei,dare a nu ar fi trebuit sa aiba prea multe in comun cu

problematicile culturale.
Cultura,un concept problematic acest termen a dezvoltat doar trei
sensuri majore. Acestea ar putea fi numite illuminist,romantic si
respective

classic,corespunzand

teoriilor

franceza,germana

si

respective engleza ale culturii.

Pentru iluministii francezi,cultura era echivalentul civilizatiei,al ratiunii
si al progresului stiintific,definindu-se in mod particular prin opozitie cu
superstitiile,traditiile

si

aparenta

gandire

instinctuala

specifica

Vechiului Regim. In acest sens,cultura nu putea de decat universal,o

caracteristica potential a intregii umanitati,manifestandu-se atat la

nivel material,prin progress stiintific si tehologic,cat si la nivel spiritual
prin impunerea ratiunii drept principiu ultim de cunoastere si actiune.
In schimb in spatial german,partial sub influenta protestantismului
liderilor politici,cultura capata un sens total opus celui de civilizatie.
Kultur se refera in primul rand la cultura nationala. In ciuda opozitiei
dintre ele,paradigm franceza si cea germana aveau cel putin un lucru
in

comun,si

anume

faptul

ca

termenul

manifesta

puternica

incarcatura pozitiva : cultura era dezirabila. La fel ca si in cazul

francez,the culture se refera la vaori universal,eterne. In mod similar
conceptual de Kultur este de natura spirituala.
Indiferent de traditie,insa,conceptual de cultura sugereaza faptul ca ar
exista o dimensiune colectiva a interactiunii umane,manifestata in
special la nivel symbolic al ideilor.
Succesul de care a inceput sa se bucure perspectiva culturalista a
depins insa si de reconsiderarea unor fenomene si concept politice
frecvent

studiate

in

disciplina.

In

primul

rand,amenintarile

contemporane de securitate nu mai sunt de ordin strict military si au

complexitate semnificativ mai ridicata decat in urma cu cateva decenii.
Acest lucru se poate observa,de pilda,prin faptul ca exista noi tipuri de
conflicte si crize international,majoritatea de intensitate scazuta si
latente pentru perioade indelungate,dar care implica in mod frecvent
factori de natura socioculturala.
Cultura nu este omogena sau distribuita in mod egal intre membrii
unui grup. In al doilea rand un individ poate apartine simultan mai
multor culturi.

6. CLAUDIA ARADAU ALTERITATE SI POLITICA EXTERNA

In acest capitol este vorba de trei tehnologii de putere care
functioneaza

in

sfera

international

suverana,disciplinara

si

biopolitica.Daca Foucault analizeaza acetse tehnologii de putere in

cadrul

statului

liberal,ele

sunt

tot

mai

multe

aplicate

sferei

international. Astfel, politica externa poate fi inteleasa ca o modalitate

de

guvernare

alteritatii

printr-o

combinatie

de

tehnologii

suverane,disciplinare si biopolitice. Analiza discursive a reltiei cu

alteritatea contesta imaginarul realist al sferei international. Egalitatea
suverana a statelor este un mit care se aplica unei minoritate de
subiecti.

Sfera

international

este

caracterizata

de

relatii

inegalitare,care exclude anumite state de la deplina participare in

politica internationala.
De la relatia intre lumea europeana si lumea colonial la cea intre state
suverane si state fragile sau esuate,sfera international exista prin
crearea normalitatii. In acest context,doua noi forme ale politicii
externe prezinta un interes special : politica externa ca interventie si
terapie. Aceste forme de politica externa in Lumea noua

construiesc o relatie cu alteritatea in care aceasta e reprezentata ca

aberanta,devianta si anormala.
Daca pentru realism suveranitatea in sfera international e independent
si identitatea care este atribuita unui stat,precum si populatiei
acesteia,constructivismul pune in evidenta modalitatile prin care
subiectii sunt identificati in sfera international prin practice discursive
care identifica si plaseaza state si subiecti intr-un continuum de
normalitate-anormalitate.
constituire

unor

suverane,disciplinare

Aceste

relatii
si

cu

forme

de

discriminare

alteritatea,bazate

biopolitice,depend

de

pe

si

de

tehnologii

discursurile

care

naturalizeaza si clasifica tipurile de subiecti ce populeaza sfera

international.