Possible Worlds

Curtis Brown
Metaphysics
Spring, 2005

Possible Worlds - Uses

1. Understanding claims about possibility and necessity
it is possible that P means there is a possible world in which P is true
it is necessary that P means every possible world is one in which P is
true
2. understanding counterfactual claims
if kangaroos had no tails, they would fall over
means
in the closest possible world in which kangaroos have no tails, they fall
over

Possible Worlds - Uses

3. understanding essential and contingent properties
I am essentially a person iff I am a person in every world in which I exist
I am contingently a philosopher iff there is a world in which I exist and
am not a philosopher
a being has necessary existence iff it exists in every possible world
4. understanding the content of belief and knowledge
the total content of my beliefs is a set of possible worlds

Possible Worlds - Uses

5. understanding semantic values
a proposition is a function from possible worlds to truth values
an intension is a function from possible worlds to extensions
6. understanding properties
a property is a set of actual and possible individuals

Modal Realism (David Lewis)

1. Concreteness. Possible worlds are concrete, maximally large spacetime regions containing concrete individuals.
2. Existence vs. Actuality. There is a difference between what there
is and what is actual. There are infinitely many possible worlds (at
least i2!), but only one of them is actual.

Modal Realism (David Lewis)

3. Worldbound Individuals. Individuals exist in only one possible

world. To say that CB might have been a famous clarinetist is to
say that there is a possible world in which a counterpart of CB is a
famous clarinetist.
4. Indexicality of Actuality. There is nothing special about the actual world. The word actual, like now and here, is an indexical
expression: when it is uttered or thought by an individual, it simply
refers to the world of which that individual is a part.

Actualism (Alvin Plantinga)

1. Abstractness. Possible worlds are abstract, not concrete. They

are representations of ways the world could be, not concrete worlds.
2. Existence = Actuality. There is no distinction between actuality
and existence, between what is actual and what is, period. Everything is actual.

Actualism (Alvin Plantinga)

3. Transworld Individuals. Individuals exist in many worlds, not

just one. (More precisely, concrete individuals exist only in the concrete physical universe not to be confused with the abstract actual world but there are many maximal possible states of affairs
in which their haecceities are exemplified.)
4. Nonindexicality of Actuality. The actual world is special: it is
the only world that represents things exactly as they actually are.
That is, it is the only abstract possible world that corresponds to a
big concrete universe.

Lewis vs. Plantinga Summary

Realism (Lewis)
possible worlds are concrete
existence 6= actuality
i.e. there are things that
are not actual
individuals exist in only
one world
actual is an indexical
expression

Actualism (Plantinga)
possible worlds are abstract
existence = actuality
i.e. there are no
nonactual things
individuals exist in
many worlds
actual is not indexical

Arguments for Realism

1. To be is to be the value of a variable. Quine: we are ontologically committed to the things we quantify over. Lewis: we quantify
over ways things might have been. But ways things might have
been are just possible worlds, so we have good reason to think that
there are possible worlds.
Reply. But Lewiss critics dont deny that there are possible worlds;
rather, they deny that possible worlds are big concrete things. (This
is essentially alternative (3) that Lewis considers to his own view.
Of course, he has objections to it!)

Arguments for Realism

2. Alternatives are incorrect or circular. Lewis calls the possible

worlds of people like Plantinga ersatz worlds, that is, poor substitutes for the real thing. He considers the idea that possible worlds
are maximal consistent sets of sentences. The problem concerns
what it is for a set of sentences to be consistent. Lewis thinks the
only satisfactory way to explain the relevant notion of consistency is
in terms of possibility.
Reply. Ersatzers can either try to take the notion of consistency
as basic, or can try to work out a noncircular account. (Plantinga
seems to take the idea of possibility as basic: A possible world is a
possible state of affairs (p. 172).)

A Test Case
There could have been an object distinct from each object that actually exists.
Lewiss view: this is straightforward. Its true if there is another
possible world that contains an object that does not exist in the
actual world. (More accurately, if there is a world that contains an
object that is not a counterpart of anything in the actual world.)
w x (ExistsIn(x, w) ExistsIn(x, a))

A Test Case
There could have been an object distinct from each object that actually exists.
Plantingas view: there are no nonactual objects. We must understand the sentence as concerning a special kind of property, namely
an individual essence or haecceity. The sentence is true if there is a
haecceity that is not exemplified in the actual world but is exemplified in some other possible world. (So there must already exist an
individual essence for everything that could possible have existed.)