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Coercion, Control, and Cooperation in a Prostitution Ring

Carlo Morselli and Isa Savoie-Gargiso
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2014 653: 247
DOI: 10.1177/0002716214521995
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521995ANN
research-article2014

The Annals of the American AcademyCoercion, Control, and Cooperation in a Prostitution Ring

Coercion,
Control, and
Cooperation in
a Prostitution
Ring

Coercion and control are key components of the dominant narrative on sex trafficking, but the power and
exchange relations between some of the key players in
trafficking have not been carefully examined. This
study is based on electronic surveillance data from a
two-year police investigation of a prostitution network
in Montreal. All of the prostitutes in the network had
initially been recruited when they were minors.
Whereas most of the writing on sex trafficking portrays
pimps as being involved in highly exploitative and coercive relationships with prostitutes, we found that control was not always the sole purview of the pimps, that
prostitutes often held key positions and privileged roles
within the network, and that pimps and prostitutes
relationships involved complex exchanges of network
resources.
Keywords: pimp; prostitution; social network analysis; conversation analysis

H
By
Carlo Morselli
and
Isa Savoie-Gargiso

uman trafficking, which involves labor

exploitation through coercion and deception or the involvement of minors, has been
studied mostly within the context of commercial sex. Writings on sex trafficking often
focus on the harm that is experienced by

Carlo Morselli is a professor at the cole de criminologie, Universit de Montral and deputy director of the
Centre international de criminologie compare. His
research focuses primarily on the areas of organized
crime, criminal networks, and crime markets. He is the
author or editor of three recent books: Contacts,
Opportunities, and Criminal Enterprise (UTP Press
2005); Inside Criminal Networks (Springer 2009); and
Crime and Networks (Routledge 2014) and is the editor
in chief of Global Crime.
Isa Savoie-Gargiso has research expertise primarily in
the areas of prostitution markets and social networks
analysis. She is a research analyst with the Quebec City
Police.
Note: We thank Pierre Tremblay, Martin Bouchard,
and Chlo Leclerc for their suggestions in the preparation of this article.
DOI: 10.1177/0002716214521995

ANNALS, AAPSS, 653, May 2014 247

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

prostitutesharms that include physical violence, sexual trauma, and dissociative

disorders (Kramer 2003; Ross, Farley, and Schwartz 2003). Some writers define
prostitution as inherently involving violence, whether or not coercion is actually
involved. From such a perspective, the notion of consent is dismissed, as a lack
of options translates into an invisible form of coercion: To assume that there is
consent in the case of prostitution is to disappear its harm. . . . The line between
coercion and consent is deliberately blurred in prostitution (Farley 2003, 248
49). Instead, prostitution and sex trafficking are thought to be ways for men to
exercise power over women (Barry 1995; Norton-Hawk 2004). Advocates of this
particular paradigm argue that most or all prostitution involves sex trafficking
(Weitzer 2007). This applies not only to minors, who are deemed trafficking victims under American and Canadian law, but also to adult sex workers who are
claimed as trafficking victims because of the exploitation that is presumed to be
involved in their work.
Recognizing that prostitution and sex trafficking are often marked by coercion
and exploitation, this article presents empirical data to respond to key criticisms
that have been made against the sex industry, which is heavily targeted by the
antitrafficking movementclaims based on anecdotes or questionable data and
that often fail to reveal sources and methods (see Weitzer 2007; Zhang 2009). Sex
workers rights organizations have also emerged to contest the claim that victimization of prostitutes is rampant and to argue that offering sexual services is a job
like any other (Aral et al. 2003). For these organizations, the root of the problem
is not the service offered but the working conditions related to prostitution.
There are numerous problems that prostitutes can encounter, such as abuse by
clients or by police and the precarious conditions under which sex work occurs,
but these risks are not considered inherent in prostitution (Bell 1987; Lacasse
2003). Overall, this work-context approach focuses more on the agency of the
prostitutes in managing these risks and attempting to improve their lifestyles,
which distinguishes this paradigm from one that moralizes or erases the agency
of those engaged in prostitution.
Sex trafficking studies are consistent with many of the assumptions and
debates that underlie research on men and women in pimp/prostitution relationships. Research in this area falls between two extremes: studies portraying pimps
as exploiters and controllers and the fewer studies depicting pimps and other
facilitators as service providers or protectors. There is basic consensus, however,
on the definition of a pimp: an individual who lives off the earnings of and exercises at least some control over a prostitute. It is on the element of control that
debate often centers.
The current antitrafficking discourse highlights the exploitation of sex workers
by traffickers as well as pimps (generally, men) who exercise control over these
womens lives. Trafficking here takes the form of deceptive recruitment, manipulation, pressure, and physical violence (Dalla, Xia, and Kennedy 2003; Hodgson
1997; Williamson and Cluse-Tolar 2002). Several studies have documented
pimps use of violence against prostitutes. For example, Raphael and Shapiro
(2004) found that half of the prostitutes in their Chicago study had been subjected to violence from their pimps and 35 percent had been raped by them.
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Hodgson (1997) reported that 85 percent of his respondents had experienced

some kind of abuse by their pimps. Because these studies were not based on
random samples, it is not known whether the findings are generalizable, but
there is no doubt that many street prostitutes experience abuse either occasionally or routinely.
Much of this domination can be traced back to the initial recruitment process.
According to May, Harocopos, and Hough (2000), pimps follow a recruitment
model that later facilitates their control of prostitutes. They start by targeting
vulnerable and socially isolated adolescents who often come from dysfunctional
families (McLeod 2003; Norton-Hawk 2004). Then, using their charm, they try
to establish a relationship based on dependency, which thrives on the emotional
support that the girl or woman was missing in her relationships with others. Once
the pimp establishes a certain level of control over the girl/woman, he begins to
encourage prostitution. Prostitutes often state that their relationships with their
pimps are based on love, and have difficulty recognizing that the pimps are dominating or exploiting them (Williamson and Cluse-Tolar 2002).
Other studies, however, have shown that the relationship between prostitutes
and pimps can be more complicated: (1) prostitutes can benefit from their relationships with pimps and (2) the relationship between the parties can be collaborative or evenly balanced (Marcus et al., this volume; May, Harocopos, and
Hough 2000; Shelby 2002). One of the most extensive studies documenting such
nuanced relationships was conducted by Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus
et al. 2012; Marcus et al., this volume), who conducted ethnographic observations and examined a respondent-driven sample of teens and young adults
involved in commercial sexual exchanges in Atlantic City and New York City.
Pimping in the conventional sense was rare in that 86 percent of respondents
reported having no pimp, but 40 percent of the young prostitutes did associate
with a facilitator: someone who helped them find clients, played a protective role,
or otherwise assisted them. Most described these individuals as friends, partners,
or family members. For those cases in which a pimp (as traditionally defined) was
present, most of these individuals did not hold a monopoly of power over the
prostitutes whom they worked with, and force and coercion rarely occurred.
The findings of this ground-level research suggest a clear break with the
assumption that all or most pimps have inherent power and control over prostitutes. Their relationship can instead take the form of colleagues or manageremployee. In the latter, pimps manage, in a collaborative way, the routine aspects
of prostitution: daily quota, work schedule, working location, rates, how the earnings will be spent, and perhaps the workers living conditions. Other pimps, what
Marcus et al. (this volume) call spot pimps, are involved solely in procuring
clients and exercise no control over the sex workers. They provide a service but
do not manage the worker. Some other research supports at least some of these
findings. Pheterson (1996) focuses on the voluntary decision-making that is
involved in sex work, and other studies indicate that some women take the initiative to hire a pimp to meet certain management needs (Aral et al. 2003; Caplan
1984; Enablers 1978; Hogdson 1997; May, Harocopos, and Hough 2000; Milner
and Milner 1972; Weisberg 1985).
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In sum, studies document the existence of both coercive/exploitative and voluntary/collegial relationships between prostitutes and pimps. Trafficking occurs,
according to Canadian and American law, when the relationship is forged under
coercion, deception, or physical force or when it involves minors. In other circumstances, however, sex workers display considerable agency in initiating and
building a relationship with a manager to facilitate the operation of their
business.
We therefore propose an alternative perspective to analyze relationships
between pimps and sex workers. Our conceptual model places the need for
resource sharing, on the part of both actors, as the main factor for assessing
whether control and domination exist. This resource-sharing model does not
presume a relational power disparity between prostitutes and pimps; instead it
focuses on the requisites necessary for optimal transactions within an illicit
enterprise.

The Resource-Sharing Model

The resource-sharing model allows us to merge distinct and opposing assessments of pimp/prostitute relationships that have been documented in past
research. This model is rooted in general illegal enterprise research (Haller
1990). It has been applied consistently in drug trafficking research (Adler 1985;
Eck and Gersh 2000; Jacobs 1999; Morselli 2009), as well as in Zhangs (2008)
study of human smuggling between China and the United States. The resourcesharing framework highlights the exchange process that underlies criminal enterprises, with participants combining the necessary resources and skills to
accomplish and maintain a shared objective.
These studies generally reject popular images of hierarchical criminal organizations that exercise monopolistic control. Instead, control is viewed as a diffuse
phenomenon that follows the transiency and volatility that often emerge from
shifts in leadership and the ongoing restructuring of criminal groups. Control
over others is typically short term and interchangeable. The focus is therefore not
on how one person comes to dominate others but on how participants form partnerships in competitive settings.
Resource sharing has been demonstrated at all levels of criminal markets.
Block (1979) found various forms of partnerships in importation activities, retail
sales, and franchises in New York City during the 1920s. Adler (1985) observed
flexible collaboration between competing businesses in Southern Californias
drug trade during the 1970s. Pearson and Hobbs (2001) conducted interviews
with law enforcement agents and offenders involved in drug trafficking in Great
Britain and found a multitude of partnerships among various independent merchants. And in a Canadian study of seventy drug traffickers at different market
levels, almost a third described their involvement in partnerships, some of which
were simply a collaboration of independent entrepreneurs, joining together to
make use of one anothers resources (Desroches 2005).

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Pimp-prostitution relationships share many commonalities with illegal drug

contexts, including a resource-sharing framework:
This relationship was actually a triad, where one man was the pimp for two young
women, one under and one over 18 years old. . . . He appeared to be providing some
protection and directing customers to them, but it seemed that his primary role was
running errands, buying groceries, and maintaining their housing with its attendant payments. In exchange, they supported him in the house and the older one provided him
with sex. (Marcus et al. 2012, 161)

Extending this resource-sharing model, three points are important for this
study. First, the illegality of both activities forces participants to resolve conflicts
and manage problems apart from the civil and criminal legal apparatus. Such
extralegal problem solving includes a need for private protectiona resource
that pimps can provide to prostitutes. Second, while power and dominance is
often attributed to those who provide protection in both prostitution and drug
settings, research in both areas has exaggerated this hierarchy considerably.
Whether in the form of a pimp, mafioso, or drug lord, the notion that protectors
dominate their domains has been eroded by systematic studies that have shown
that such illegal trades are generally organized more informally and flexibly
(Morselli 2009). Third, participants in such illegal activities may operate with a
strong degree of agency. While it is often believed that drug dealers and pimps
and prostitutes operate in closed, loyal groups, research suggests that participation in such activities is more opportunistic, with each actor taking care of his or
her own stake in the enterprise while operating in conjunction with others (Adler
1985; Block 1979; Desroches 2005; Haller 1990; Morselli 2005).
In such networks, what may appear as straightforward power relations can
instead be give-and-take processes of mobilizing resources to pursue the activity
at hand. In other words, the person who is typically perceived as the exploited
party may have more autonomy and control than is presumed. The following
example illustrates this dynamic:
While all three referred to him as the pimp and showed him the respect typically due
pimps from their girls, the conditions under which they brought him into their relationship and his role in the situation suggested he was as much of a Boy Friday as the
type of gangster one normally thinks of when the term pimp is invoked. . . . The continuation of his role and the maintenance of his housing depended on his keeping the
women pleased rather than vice versa, and that being the pimp did not entitle him to
sexual access to the younger woman. (Marcus et al. 2012, 162)

This reversal of roles is at the core of the current study as well: the findings
challenge the domination motif associated with the pimp-prostitute relationship.
Applying network analysis to electronic surveillance data collected during a twoyear police investigation, we describe the positioning of participants in a pimpprostitute network and the resource exchange process within that network.
Analysis of this material focused on the overall structure of the network, identification of its key participants and their roles, the flow of resources within the

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network, and the changing roles of some participants over time. The final section
of the article considers the implications of our findings for future research on
pimping and sex trafficking.

Data and Methods

This study is based on data from a two-year police investigation that targeted a
network of pimps and prostitutes in Montreal, beginning in 2003. Through our
long-standing contacts and previous research collaboration with the Montreal
police, we were able to obtain a complete copy of transcripts from the electronic
surveillance (i.e., wiretap recordings) gathered during this investigation. Such
police records provide a rare opportunity for researchers to carefully examine
criminal activities in real time. Such data are also free from distortion and bias
that may be present in traditional data-collection activities, such as self-report
surveys or face-to-face interviews.
The majority of prostitutes in this network also worked as dancers in strip
clubs in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick. All of the prostitutes were recruited when they were minorsthus rendering them trafficking
victims under Canadian lawbut the majority of them were adults at the time of
the police surveillance. The investigation gathered information about the womens involvement in prostitution as an extension of their dancing, but pimps were
the main target of the investigation, as they were suspected of forcing the dancers
into prostitution and seizing the proceeds.
Electronic surveillance was the main evidence-gathering method in the investigation, resulting in fifty-five thousand pages of documentation on the activities
and communications among the pimps, prostitutes, their friends, and family
members. These transcripts made it possible to build a communication matrix of
the individuals targeted during the investigation. Social network analysis was
employed to examine these interactions and the specific positions of the participants. This analytical framework is consistent with the resource-sharing model in
that it allows us to trace exchange processes and the various levels of resource
allocation within the network.
The network matrix was made up of 142 participants that represented the
pimps, prostitutes, new recruits, chauffeurs, and clients who were monitored
during the police investigation. Network relationships were coded as binary (i.e.,
the presence or absence of a relationship) and symmetric (no indication of who
directed or initiated the relationship). Three measures were used to describe key
participants and their functions and roles in the network: (1) degree centrality,
(2) betweenness centrality, and (3) clustering coefficient. These measures
account for both individual positions within a network and for a wider assessment
of an overall networks structure. Degree centrality measures an individuals position with regard to her/his volume of direct contacts within the network. At the
whole network level, degree centrality informs us about the extent to which the
network is centered on a small set of individuals that dominates the direct

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253

relationships with others in the network. Betweenness centrality measures an

individuals position as an intermediary between two or more individuals in the
network who are not connected. Such a measure is indicative of broker-like
positioning in the network and is typically associated with a participants capacity
to control the flow of information between others. At the whole network level,
the measure informs us about how centralized the network is on a small set of
brokers. The clustering coefficient builds on the more conventional density
measure, which accounts for overall connectivity in the network. Whereas density measures the connections in the network as a proportion of all possible connections, the clustering coefficient provides an indication of density at a more
localized level by measuring the extent to which each nodes contacts in the
network are connected to each other. Thus, it would be possible to have an overall network that is low in density, but high in clustering: this would suggest that
within the dispersed network, there is an abundance of clique-like formations
that revolve around certain participants.
These network measures serve to reveal the varied forms and levels of control
within the network by assessing who are the most hands-on participants (degree
centrality), the most efficient brokers (betweenness centrality), and the general
formation of subgroups and cliques (clustering coefficient). If the network was
dominated and controlled by the pimps, we would expect them to be the most
central and pivotal. While this is often the obvious assumption in research on
pimps and prostitutes, our goal was to examine the structure of the network with
as few guiding assumptions as possible.
To examine the explicit exchange and possession of resources, we conducted a
detailed content analysis of conversations recorded during the electronic surveillance. This approach was based on Vareses (2012) method to identify the main
tasks performed by members in a mafia-like network in Rome. Conversations
between the 142 nodes were coded and categorized into different themes. The
content analysis was conducted for each week of the 11-week recording period.
Once a theme was discussed in a conversation, it was registered for the week for
all of the involved individuals. In all, our analysis revealed six themes that were
reflected in the resource sharing and business transactions within the network:
money and employee management; task management; maintaining internal
order; satisfying prostitute needs; protection; and acquiring material goods and
information.

Results
Network structure and individual positioning
The network consisted of 142 participants who were active in the prostitution
activities that were targeted during the investigation. The overall networks
degree centralization was 36 percent; its betweenness centralization was 45 percent. These findings suggest that the network was not highly centralized, but that
a small group of participants seemed to maintain a more prominent place. The
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clustering coefficient for the entire network was high at 73 percent, indicating
that, despite the low overall density (3 percent), many subgroups formed around
a few individuals. The key participants were Pimps 1 and 2brothers who managed different sets of prostitutesand Prostitute 4. These three participants had
the most direct contacts and the highest degree centrality scores (39, 38, and 36
percent, respectively). Pimps 1 and 2 and Prostitute 4 also emerged with the
highest betweenness centrality scores (37, 32, and 46 percent, respectively). This
was largely explained by their many connections with other actors in the prostitution trade: chauffeurs, clients, and strip club managers and staffing agencies.
Prostitute 4 had the most connections with others in the network. Pimps 1 and 2
were connected primarily with recruits and strip club staff, connections that were
essential for finding work for their prostitutes as well as for recruiting new sex
workers.
Pimp 1s segment of the network. Participants 3, 4, 9, and 10 were prostitutes
who worked with Pimp 1. Prostitute 4 was recruited when she was a minor and
worked with him for about three years. Over this period, she developed contacts
with chauffeurs, strip club owners, and clients. Prostitute 3 was associated with
Pimp 1 for about a year, also recruited while she was a minor.
Whether it had to do with the financial profits they generated or the special
place they sought to hold in their pimps life, Prostitutes 3 and 4 were in constant
competition. Throughout the recorded conversations, Prostitute 4 talked about
how Pimp 1 told her that within a year she could stop working and they could
begin their life as an exclusive couple. She believed that she was his number 1
girl and considered him to be her boyfriend. During this same period, Prostitute
3 repeatedly told others that she was her pimps best prostitute. She boasted
about how she made the most money and that she was the only one the pimp
really liked. She described herself regularly as Pimp 1s partner in both business
and love.
Prostitute 3 generated most of the earnings in the network, with a minimum
of $1,000 per night, whereas Prostitute 4 made $300$450 a night. At the end of
the fifth week of electronic surveillance, Prostitute 3 left Pimp 1 for another
pimp. But she returned the following week. Pimp 1 made Prostitutes 3 and 4
work together so that the latter could monitor the former. It was during this
period that Prostitute 4 gained a greater reputation, more responsibilities, and a
prominent position in the overall network than her main competitor (Prostitute
3) and, to some extent, Pimp 1.
Prostitutes 9 and 10 began their careers with Pimp 1. At first, they were
employed primarily as escorts and made a maximum of $200 per night, charging
$60 on average per client. Such earnings were not as much as they would be
working in a strip club and, during their first week, Pimp 1 encouraged them to
make more money. Both prostitutes continued as escorts and were able to double
their earnings to $400 on some nights, but Pimp 1 continued to push for more
money and, by the end of the investigation period, Prostitutes 9 and 10 started
working in strip clubs.

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Pimp 1 generally had strict rules. His prostitutes had to call him every night,
whether they worked or not. On work nights, they had to keep him updated on
how things were going, with whom they had spoken, and how much money they
had made. At the end of their shifts, they had to inform him that they were leaving work and report their total earnings for the night. Lying about this was unacceptable. On a nightly basis, Pimp 1 would go to each prostitutes home and
collect the earnings for the night, leaving them with about $80 to pay their chauffeur and the dance fee charged by the strip clubs. In turn, Pimp 1 would pay each
prostitutes work and living expenses: private cars to chauffer them to various
clubs and clients, apartment rentals, furniture, credit card accounts, food, alcohol, drugs, clothing, condoms, tanning salons, and gym membership. When a
prostitute needed something, she would call him and make a request. In most
cases, Pimp 1 provided what the women needed and would often make the purchases and payments himself.
Pimp 1 had other rules. His prostitutes were not permitted to talk with other
black men, thus reducing the risk of his prostitutes leaving him for another pimp.
There was no indication in the transcripts why the rule applied strictly to black
men, but, being of Haitian origin, Pimp 1 was seemingly wary of other Haitian
pimps who were active in the same circles. To prevent his current team of prostitutes from hearing negative things about him and to discourage them from
being recruited by his former prostitutes to join these prostitutes new pimps,
Pimp 1 also prohibited his prostitutes from speaking with his former
prostitutes.
Pimp 1s rules were an attempt to ensure that his prostitutes worked with him
as long as possible. If a woman did not follow the rules, she would immediately
be subjected to physical or verbal abuse or, in some cases, termination of the
partnership. He sometimes fired new recruits after only a few days of work
because he did not believe that they were serious enough and that they would
ever earn enough money.
Pimp 2s segment of the network. Prostitutes 17, 43, 87, and 97 worked with
Pimp 2, who also had a personal approach to managing his team of prostitutes.
Every week, one of the prostitutes stayed home to take time off. The others
stayed in motels and worked out of town, sometimes even beyond their province
(Quebec). This scheduling permitted Pimp 2 to devote all of his time to the prostitute who was off work for the week and allowed him to cultivate a good relationship with each of them in turn. Unlike Pimp 1, he avoided creating competition
between the women and ensured that his prostitutes never worked together, so
as to avoid conflict among them.
While this pimp was trying to avoid competition, this was not the case within
his team of prostitutes. Prostitute 43 had been with Pimp 2 the longest (five
years). She was close to and talked daily with Prostitute 4, who worked with Pimp
1. Prostitute 4 also knew Pimp 2s other prostitutes and obtained regular information about them from Pimp 1, who shared experiences about their respective
businesses with his brother on a regular basis. Most of the conversations between

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Prostitutes 4 and 43 dealt with information regarding the other prostitutes, and
such information was at the core of most of the jealously that persisted within
Pimp 2s team.
Overall, the earnings made by the prostitutes who worked with Pimp 2 were
more difficult to track than those generated in Pimp 1s team. This was largely
because Pimp 2 was not as thorough and strict as Pimp 1. He did not call his
prostitutes every day to ask them how much they made. The few times this subject was discussed, the amounts stated were around $200 to $300 per night per
prostitute. Although not as organized as his brother, Pimp 2 did have rules against
drug and alcohol consumption. He did not want his prostitutes to overconsume,
especially while they were working, as the following excerpt (reacting to a recruit
who had a hangover) demonstrates: Your habits are going to change because I
dont want to see you drinking like that anymore. Do you understand? Youre
going to have to change. As their principal drug and alcohol supplier, he was able
to control their intoxication, and he often inquired about what they had been
consuming and informed them how long their drug supply should last.
Pimp 2 was well aware of the distinctions between his and Pimp 1s management style but had little worry regarding his capacity to get the most out of the
women who were working with him. In one discussion with Prostitute 87, he was
quite clear on this: Are you able to be like me? My game is real. Its not fake. I
know my responsibilities. Are you able to handle your responsibilities? The others . . . dont play around with me. This game is part of my life. . . . I have my
way of playing the game and my brother has his.
Other pimps and prostitutes.The remaining pimps and prostitutes in this
network had marginal roles, at least within the scope of actions that the lawenforcement investigation was able to tap into during this time period. Pimp 25
was more involved in drug trafficking than in prostitution. One of his workers,
Prostitute 120, had been in his life for two years and worked regularly without
needing any encouragement or direction from him. The only rule he maintained
for all his prostitutes was that they call him every day to inform him of their earnings. Because Pimp 25 was largely reliant on this one prostitutes earnings, he
became increasingly involved in drug distribution for additional income. Pimps
29 and 112 were the other pimps in the network. Pimp 29 was incarcerated for
the majority of the surveillance period and was thus not at that time associated
with many of the participants in the network. Pimp 112 had pimping convictions
prior to the surveillance period, and no prostitutes were working for him during
the period analyzed for this study.
The mother. Two other key actors in the network were the parents of Pimps 1
and 2 (Participant 40 was their mother; Participant 41 was their father). While
the father was largely involved in his own drug dealing activities and appeared on
occasion in the telephone transcripts, the pimps mother played an important
role in maintaining relationships with her sons prostitutes and monitoring the
prostitutes feelings toward their work and her sons. The mother was also instrumental in the development of her sons careers as pimps.
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As a hairdresser in the neighborhood where all the participants resided, the

mother regularly styled the prostitutes hair (34 times a week). It was during
such encounters that she would reassure each woman how much her sons cared
about them. She often talked about the benefits of staying with her sons and the
need to continue giving money to them. The mother helped the prostitutes
believe that they were investing in a secure and bright future, as demonstrated in
a conversation where she convinces Prostitute 4 to accept that she cannot be the
only woman in Pimp 1s life:
You cant work alone. You need other girls so that you can have more luxuries. Help him
[Pimp 1] find other women, so that he could make more money and take care of you.
She [Prostitute 43] listened to me and found many new girls for my other son [Pimp 2].
Even if he would have 50 women, she would accept that. You have to understand that
you will end up with him in the end. . . . You have to trust him and let him continue.

Such discussions seemed to bring the prostitutes closer to their respective pimps.
The mother told her sons on several occasions, I brainwashed her for you, to
reassure them that their prostitutes would remain loyal.
The mother took other steps to keep the network intact. She sometimes
instructed her sons on how to treat their prostitutes when they were unhappy or
appeared to want to leave. She also encouraged her sons to have moments of
intimacy with each prostitute. Fearing that some of the girls might leave her sons,
she warned the sons about problems with some of the prostitutes, such as
Prostitutes 3 and 87, who left for short periods during the electronic surveillance
period. The mother also showed her sons the importance of observing a prostitutes faithfulness and desire to stay with her pimp, as well as what prostitutes
should do to prove their loyalty to their pimp. Such advice proved most useful
when the pimps became too outcome-focused in their activities:
Pimp 2: In two months, Ill have so much cash that therell be no place to
store it.
Mother: Be thankful. God gave you three great girls. The only one that I dont
know well is [Prostitute 87]. The best one is [Prostitute 97] because she
never complains and thats why I like her so much. You should too.
Pimp 2:Ok, I will. But the smartest one is [Prostitute 87].

Conversation Analysis
While the analysis of the overall network offers a general overview of the key and
peripheral participants, analysis of the conversations provides insights into the
nature of their exchanges and transactions. This approach follows previous
research into other types of organized crime (Natarajan 2000; Varese 2012).
While the overall network contained 142 participants, this analysis focuses exclusively on the thirteen who were at the core of the network and particularly

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

Figure 1
The Core of the Network
Pimps mother
40
Pimp
1

Pimp
2

Prostitute
43

Prostitute
4

Prostitute
3

Prostitute
9

Prostitute
10

Prostitute
17

Prostitute
87
Prostitute
97

Pimp
25

Prostitute
120

involved in the activities surrounding Pimps 1 and 2 (see Figure 1). When a
conversation between members of this network core revealed one or more
themes, the theme was attributed to the participant(s) involved in the conversation. The analysis focused on the resources needed to carry out the primary tasks
that were executed by these actors. This core links 84 percent of all conversations
intercepted during the investigation.
Six themes were identified in this analysis. They were partly consistent with
those identified in Vareses (2012) study of Russian mobsters working in Rome,
with some adaptations for the prostitution market: money and employee management, task management, maintaining internal order, satisfying prostitute needs,
protecting prostitutes, and acquiring material goods and information. Table 1
presents the frequency of the thirteen subjects discussions relating to each
resource. The subtotals display the conversation segments covering each resource
for each participant. The results are divided into three sections: resources used
only by pimps; resources shared by both pimps and prostitutes; and resources
used only by prostitutes.

Resources used only by pimps

Protection refers to all actions or promises to take action related to protecting prostitutes. Such resources were minimally required and discussed during
the investigation period. Only discussions involving Pimps 1 and 2 were related
to protection during the intercepted conversations (ten and eight times,
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744

1,710

138

24
66

48

25

12
526
754

70
210 1,362

142
63

40

39
179

1
97
42

2
8
6
47
63

6
2
26
34

10

13
55

34
8

43

24
45

19
2

87

10
32

5
17

97

1
51

3
47

17

27
64

25
12

120

257
4,687

18
964
851
745
1,852

Total

NOTE: Numbers in the top row represent participants in the network who were discussed in the text and shown in Figure 1. The three pimps are
represented by numbers 1, 2, and 25; the pimps mother is number 40; and the remainder of numbers in the top row of the table refer to prostitutes.

8
176
208
9
343

10
622
499
13
566

Providing protection
Maintaining internal order
Managing money and employees
Task management
Material goods and information
acquisition
Fulfilling needs
Total

Theme

Table 1
Resources Shared within the Networks Core

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

respectively). The lack of protection is likely due to the rarity of such actions in
this particular prostitution ring rather than to the irrelevance of this theme for
analytical purposes. Discussions surrounding protection emerged particularly
when new prostitutes were recruited and Pimps 1 or 2 presented the main advantages of creating a stable working relationship. At times, the prostitute initiated
conversations with this theme, as when a new recruit asked Pimp 2 to protect her
from her previous boyfriend/pimp who had just beaten her up.
Maintaining internal order was inherent in all actions the pimps took to maintain control over their prostitutes. Manipulation, violence, promising a good
future, and making threats are examples of how this resource was enacted. In the
network, each pimp had his own methods for maintaining order. Pimp 2 frequently resorted to guilt as a form of manipulation. He often told his girls that he
was considering suicide or that he was miserable and needed them to follow his
advice so that he could count on them and be happy. He would use this method
when he felt that one of his prostitutes was distancing herself from him: Baby,
dont leave me again. I love you more than anything.
Pimp 1, on the other hand, threatened his women and employed violence to
ensure order. This was most evident in his conflicts with Prostitutes 3, 4, and 9.
At one point, for example, he told Prostitute 3: You better not leave. Im going
to come over there and slap you around. . . . If I have to come over there, its
going to be fucked up! Im the mafia. Im the lion that has awakened. Im going
to beat you so hard that you wont be able to work for three days! Your face will
be screwed up so badly that you wont recognize yourself!

Resources shared by pimps and prostitutes

The first shared resource among pimps and prostitutes concerned money and
employee management. This resource covers the management of all earnings,
prostitutes, and their responsibilities. The pimps typically encouraged prostitutes
to work and earn as much as possible. They also determined where the prostitutes would work each night and established the nightly earnings that were
expected of them. Pimps 1 and 2 were active in the management side of the business and made great use of this resource. Pimp 25, on the other hand, did very
little in this regardone of his prostitutes (Prostitute 120) appeared to be able
to take care of her work tasks on her own, without any encouragement or motivation from Pimp 25. Most, however, relied on their pimps to motivate them, as
Prostitute 43 stated in one of the intercepted conversations: I stay with him
because he motivates me. Without my boyfriend, I would not work as much or
make as much money. You can make a lot of money when you dont have a
choice.
Some prostitutes performed a few of these tasks, albeit on a smaller scale than
the pimps. For example, Pimp 1 delegated some of these responsibilities to
Prostitute 4, who managed Prostitute 3s schedule for a short period during the
investigation. Prostitute 43 also had a strong role in managing prostitutes, particularly when it came to resolving conflicts in clubs that were marked by regular
competition between prostitutes who worked with other pimps. At one point,
Prostitute 43 described tensions between prostitutes in the strip club scene:
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The price you ask clients to pay is important because of the competition between girls.
If you charge less, youll get beat up by the other girls. You also have to clean up after
yourself and pick up your used condoms. If you dont, the bar will fine you $100. Some
girls would throw used condoms into other girls cabins to anger them and make them
pay the fine. Some of the girls were bitches and would do anything to upset you.

The second shared resource was task management, which comprised all
actions aimed at orchestrating the various operations and shifts (e.g., calling a
chauffeur to reserve a place in their car or calling a stripper staffing agency to
reserve a shift in a club). Pimps 1 and 2 displayed only minimal investment in
such tasks, preferring instead to delegate such responsibilities to the prostitutes
who worked with them. Prostitute 4, who had excellent interpersonal skills, was
the most involved in such tasks, active in coordinating nightly routines for herself
and the other prostitutes. Prostitute 4 was also the participant in the network who
proved to have the closest and widest range of contacts with chauffeurs and stripper staffing agencies.
A third shared resource involved the acquisition of material goods and information, which covered goods and advice exchanged between participants in the
network. This could be information shared between pimps on how to maintain
internal order among prostitutes or the transfer of knowledge on how certain
strip clubs worked to maximize their management. In one conversation, Pimp 1
shared some basic strategies with Pimp 2 on how to cope with increasing competition among the prostitutes: The girls know whats going on in the game. If they
start getting jealous and start arguing with each other, we have to beat them. No
women can ruin this business. In their attempts to maintain control over their
respective businesses, they consistently shared information they obtained regarding the others team of prostitutes.
While this third resource would appear to work in favor of the pimps in the
network, the participant who benefitted the most from the exchange of goods and
information was Prostitute 4. This was mainly due to all the potential and established clients with whom she was in contact and the information she shared with
the other prostitutes. Since she knew almost all of the prostitutes who worked
with Pimp 2, she was able to acquire information on the overall business activities
with ease. Other prostitutes were more involved in the handling of material
goods and services. For example, because of her good credit and reputation,
Prostitute 17 often helped the pimps and other prostitutes by renting apartments
and luxury cars. Few others were able to effectively manage these affairs with
such consistency, and she essentially became the liaison between the pimps and
those network participants who rented such services and goods.

Resources used only by prostitutes

The needs category covered all requests and demands that prostitutes made
on a regular basis of their pimp. This included requests to be chauffeured to and
from locations; requests for money, new clothes, or jewelry; and demands to have
exclusive time socializing with the pimp. Prostitutes would often accept a pimps

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request in exchange for a favor or service. Many of the conflicts between pimps
and their prostitutes were initiated by prostitutes constant demands. Pimps compromised regularly by giving the prostitutes what they wanted to assure that they
respected the pimps desire to run the business as they saw fit. This needsdemand resource was clearly the prostitutes main source of leverage, and for the
pimps, accommodating prostitutes needs was the norm andaccording to the
conversation analysisproved more effective than acts of violence.

Conclusion
Concerns about sex trafficking generally deal with fraud and coercion under
which individuals are compelled to work. In this study, we examined a sex trade
network that comprised prostitutes who were recruited as minors and adults.
Both fraud and coercion were observed in the network, but we also paid particular attention to the nature of the exchange relations between prostitutes and their
pimps. Two general findings have emerged from our analysis of this network and
the sharing of tasks and resources within it. They reflect two essential aspects that
must be considered when studying and assessing this trade: (1) the paradoxes
involved in the relations between and among prostitutes and pimps and (2) the
overall misrepresentations of pimping in the current, dominant antitrafficking
narrative.

Collaboration and competition

There was a noticeable difference in the relationships that pimps maintained
with one another and those that were in place among the prostitutes in the network. While much human trafficking literature portrays pimps as possessive and
brutal, we found that the relationships in this prostitution network were based
much more on collaboration. The fact that Pimps 1 and 2 were brothers may have
much to do with this observation, but strong signs of collaboration characterized
the other pimps in the network as well.
While there was a strong incentive to keep order in their business activities,
the pimps did not express possession over the prostitutes who worked with them.
Instead, they handled the prostitutes as investments that could have long-term
benefits and contributions to the team or as short-term failures that could simply
be replaced by new recruits. Probably the most salient scene to represent this
lack of possession occurred when Prostitute 3 left Pimp 1 for another pimp. The
two pimps spoke with each other and agreed to leave each others prostitutes
alone. Neither pimp threatened the other. Prostitute 3s new pimp indicated that
he had little to do with her decision since his prostitutes took care of the recruitment of new women. However, he did mention that if such recruitment was taking place on another pimps territory and would result in any conflict, the
prostitute would be punished for bringing such problems into the business.
If there were any competition in the network, it was primarily between prostitutes. Conversations consistently revealed jealousy among them and the desire
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of each to be the pimps number one woman, which pitted prostitutes against
each other. The two prostitutes who avoided competition and cooperated on a
regular basis were Prostitutes 4 and 43. They shared information with each other
about the other prostitutes in the network and offered support when they felt
abandoned or mistreated by their pimp. Both prostitutes, however, were highly
competitive with the other prostitutes in the network. The other prostitutes typically fought with each other to gain more prominence with their respective pimps
and to gain an overall edge in the business side of these activities.

Agency among prostitutes

Because some of the prostitutes were recruited as minors, the prostitution
network described here falls into the sex trafficking arena. Some of the data in
the recordings are consistent with the general claim that prostitution and sex trafficking are often marked by coercion and exploitation, but it would be a mistake
to conclude that these two elements fully characterize such an enterprise.
One of the most striking findings was the role that some prostitutes had outside the sex-service side of the enterprise. The prominence of some prostitutes
in this competitive setting was evident in the network analysis, with Prostitute 4
emerging with as much (or more) centrality as Pimps 1 and 2. Thus, while it may
be true that many prostitutes, and particularly new recruits, are easily manipulated and exploited at the early stages of the pimp-prostitute partnership, past
research has overlooked the possibility that some prostitutes become indispensable to the pimps who manage them. The relationship between Prostitute 4 and
Pimp 1 is a clear example of such a scenario. Pimp 1s desire to earn more and
work less by making the women around him take on his responsibilities can be
interpreted as exploitation. However, some of the exploited were able to transform their added responsibilities into an advantage. While Pimp 1 continued to
tend to his protection services when needed and to make his nightly visits to collect earnings from and meet the various needs of each prostitute, he increasingly
delegated recruitment and management tasks to Prostitute 4. Some may interpret Prostitute 4s place as a mere middle management position, but, in the long
term, such capitalization led to Prostitute 4s elevation as a dominant participant
in Pimp 1s team and in the overall network. Like Prostitute 4, Prostitute 43, and,
to some extent, Prostitute 3, also took on tasks that were previously the responsibility of their respective pimps.
Over time, these increasingly dominant participants in the network also
pooled their own resources to execute their recruitment and management roles
more effectively. This was clearly not the case with any new women who found
themselves in any of the teams. However, for the experienced prostitutes who
spent a number of years working with their pimps and who obtained increasing
responsibilities while their pimps tended to fewer tasks, it was clear that they
were no longer in a position to be capitalized upon and, in many ways, their place
of power in the network and in the lives of the prostitutes they managed surpassed that of the pimps themselves.

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Examining the phenomenon in a way that brings us closer to the individuals

involved, the relationships among them, and the development of such interactions shows that coercion and control are not as salient in these relationships as
is often believed, and that the notion of inherent exploitation must be qualified.
Indeed, the network examined here demonstrates that the pimps were not in
complete control and that, over time and with experience, the prostitutes were
quite able to control how other network actors related to them. Such exchange
and power relationships should be examined in future trafficking and pimping
studies.

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