Peter Tarapen y Chongoy, Petitioner, versus

People of the Philippines, Respondents.

(G.R. No. 173824, August 28, 2008, 3rd Division)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J:
TOPIC: Entries in official records (Rule 130 Sec. 44)
FACTS:
In the morning of 8 June 2000, a dump truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy
arrived at Zandueta St., Baguio City, to collect garbage. He was accompanied
by petitioner and Edmond Ferrer. The garbage truck came from lower Zandueta
St. and proceeded to upper Zandueta St. Upon reaching the Hilltop Market, the
truck turned around. During this time, vendors, including the victim James
Pangoden, Molly J. Linglingen, Silmana Linglingen and Virginia Costales were
peddling their wares along said street. Petitioner alighted from the truck and
signaled to the driver to move slowly. Despite guiding the truck, said vehicle
ran over the eggplants being sold by Virginia Costales. Petitioner picked up the
vegetables and threw them towards the place where James was. This angered
James because the flowers he was selling were soiled. An exchange of words
ensued between petitioner and James. Petitioner went to the back of the dump
truck and got a shovel. He then moved in front of the truck where James was.
While James was facing downwards, petitioner, coming from behind and
holding the shovel with two hands, struck James on the head with the same,
causing him to fall to the ground in a squatting position. As soon as James
raised his head, petitioner hit the formers head again with the
shovel. Petitioner then ran away. James was brought to the Baguio General
Hospital & Medical Center (BGHMC) in a taxi.
The wife of James, Patricia Pangoden, arrived at the BGHMC and saw
her husband in the Emergency Room. Dr. Rizal Leo Cala refused to operate on
her husband, saying that it was already hopeless. She then requested for the
transfer of her husband to the Saint Louis University (SLU) Hospital. The
request was approved, and her husband was transferred to SLU Hospital at
1:30 p.m. James was operated on, and Patricia was told that her husband had
no more chance to live. She was advised to bring home James; otherwise, they
would just be spending so much. Patricia brought her husband to his
hometown in Namatugan, Sudipen, La Union, where he expired on 10 June
2000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the medical findings made Dr. Cala be given more weight
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court has given more weight to the medical certificate
issued by. Dr. Cala because the same was issued by a government doctor. By
actual practice, only government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as civil
service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue medical
certificates which will be used by the government. As such, the medical
certificate carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his

functions and duties. Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Dr. Calas findings that the
victim sustained injuries on the right side of his head are, therefore, conclusive
in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case. The medical
certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas was not sufficient to controvert the findings
of Dr. Cala. As held by this Court, an unverified medical certificate not issued
by a government physician is unreliable.
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, Petitioner, versus
The Honorable Court of Appeals and Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation,
Respondent.
(G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998, 3rd Banc)
ROMERO, J:
TOPIC: Commercial lists and the like (Rule 130, Sec.45)
FACTS:
On September 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation, collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC), on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila. The
Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N.
Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault.
Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo
Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00 representing the value of the
fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV with
interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorneys fees and later on amended to
add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance and unrealized profits
and lost business opportunities.
During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel
The lower court ruled against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value
of the fishing boat with interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit
which the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the price quotations belongs to the category of
commercial list

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 45 of the aforesaid rule,
a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list,
register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is
published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is
generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H are not
"commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category of "other published
compilations" under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem
generis, "(w)here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons
or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."

Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc., Petitioner,

versus Court of Appeals, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007, 3rd Division)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J:

TOPIC: Testimony or deposition at a former trial (Rule 130, Sec 47)

FACTS:
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
(PRBLI). While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped the rear left side
of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan. Due to the collision, petitioner
was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit
against petitioner and PRBLI.

According to respondent, his jeep was traveling at the speed of 60 to70

kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine
Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other
words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep
was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner, explained that when the
Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the
latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of
it. Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However,
in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay
damages to respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 47 of Rule 130 is applicable
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that for Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to
testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the
same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the
present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by
the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case;
and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in
the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the
requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner
PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity
to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed
exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the
ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection
shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which
the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does
not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.

Joseph E. Estrada, Petitioner, versus

Aniano Desierto, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 1st Division)
PUNO, J:
TOPIC: Newspaper or Diary
FACTS:
Joseph Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the
Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice
President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close
friend the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as
payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a
grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of
an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House
Speaker Manny
Villar fast-tracked
the
impeachment
complaint.
The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was
formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada
pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage thus, on January 18, a
crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools
and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as
well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the
beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he
wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict
will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the

same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of
the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to
healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A pile of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he
countered by filing a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner resigned as president
HELD:
Yes. The facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January
20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or
not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on
the issue. The Supreme Court using this totality test, held that petitioner
resigned as President.
The Elements of valid resignation: (a) an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. The Supreme Court declared that the resignation of President
Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaang Palace
and in the press release which contained his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the
Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

Lintang Bedol, Petitioner, versus

Commission on Elections, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009, En Banc)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J:
TOPIC: Newspaper or Diary
FACTS:
As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of
Maguindanao, Lintang Bedol (Bedol) discharged his official functions and was
able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the
Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities
in the province.
At that time, Bedol also was charged with the burdensome and
gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial
Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators
to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to

his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for
Maguindanao. Due to certain observations on the provincial certificates of
canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance
and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct
of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30,
2007, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.
Bedol contended that the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on
May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first
time such an excuse was given by Bedol and no written report was ever filed
with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due
to failure and refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences, Bedol
was issued a contempt charge by COMELEC. He was later arrested by members
of the Philippine National Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest issued on
June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear
during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.
Petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for issuing the warrant
of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges.
Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by COMELEC. Petitioner, then, filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC in the other
assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the newspaper clippings published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer has probative value.
HELD:
There were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as
hearsay, when such articles are offered to prove their contents without any
other competent and credible evidence to corroborate them. However, in
Estrada v. Desierto, et al., the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is
inadmissible and how over time, exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged.
Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on grounds of "relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity." When certain facts are within judicial notice of
the Court, newspaper accounts "only buttressed these facts as facts."
Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does
not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the
making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself
may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence
of such a fact.
Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner
deliberately defied or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As
ratiocinated by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution of August 7, 2007,
it was not the mere content of the articles that was in issue, but petitioners
conduct when he allowed himself to be interviewed in the manner and

circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution, on a pending

controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While petitioner claimed
that he was misquoted, he denied neither the said interview nor his picture
splashed on the newspaper with a firearm holstered at his side but simply
relied on his objection to the hearsay nature of the newspaper clippings. It
should be stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or respondent. He
was under the administrative supervision of the COMELEC and it was
incumbent upon him to demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had faithfully
discharged his duties as dictated by law. His evasiveness and refusal to present
his evidence as well as his reliance on technicalities to justify such refusal in
the face of the allegations of fraud or anomalies and newspaper publication
mentioned to the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order amounted to an
implied admission of the charges leveled against him.