PLA DA

Table of Contents

Contents
PLA DA.......................................................................................................................................................1
Table of Contents.................................................................................................................................1
Explanation..........................................................................................................................................1
Shell............................................................................................................................................................ 1
1NC DA GDI.......................................................................................................................................1
1NC DA...............................................................................................................................................1
Overview.................................................................................................................................................1
2NC OV...............................................................................................................................................1
Uniqueness..............................................................................................................................................1
EXT UQ...........................................................................................................................................1
A2 UQ overwhelms the Link............................................................................................................1
Link.........................................................................................................................................................1
EXT Zero Sum..................................................................................................................................1
Deep Sea Expo....................................................................................................................................1
Energy Link.........................................................................................................................................1
Renewables/ Renewable Industry........................................................................................................1
Energy Independence...........................................................................................................................1
Fishing.................................................................................................................................................1
Wind....................................................................................................................................................1
Generic................................................................................................................................................1
Arctic...................................................................................................................................................1
Aquaculture.........................................................................................................................................1
Marine Reserves/Conservation............................................................................................................1
Offshore Wind.....................................................................................................................................1
Zero Sum Renewables......................................................................................................................1
Internal Link............................................................................................................................................1
EXT Internal Link.............................................................................................................................1
A2 Reforms Dont Solve..................................................................................................................1

Explanation
This disadvantage is pretty basic. Lets go over the key points that make it distinct from other China
disadvantages. The Panda piece of evidence is really interesting because it indicates that the Peoples
Liberation Army has a lack of discipline. Specifically, the problem lies in the fact that the PLA is a
nationalist army as opposed to a nationalized army. Recent activity, not authorized by the CCP, has
created quite a sticky situation in places like India and Kashimir. Despite Xi Jinpings call for discipline,
the PLA continues to ignore the administration. As a result, Xi Jinping is implementing corruption reform
and rooting out military leaders who are not listening. Thats the uniqueness. Since the PLA is nationalist,
they will act in order to project power if they feel threatened by certain actions (especially those by the
United States). Those confrontations escalate. Extinction.
The strategic value in this file is high. Many teams will not expect the impact chain and read generic
China impact defense, which does not answer the impact that the disad sets up. This file has a 90% win
rate for Chaminade CK. Included is two pretty recent shells, a fully typed out overview, ALL
HIGHLIGHTED uniqueness blocks, a good amount of links on the ocean topic (but still effective on the
surveillance topic), and internal link explanations. If you have any questions, message me on g chat.
Jeremiahcha97@gmail.com

Shell

1NC DA GDI
Structural anti-corruption reforms are being implemented now Xi is cleaning up
the PLA
McCauley, a senior intelligence officer for the former Soviet Union Russia and China during 31 years
in the federal government and writer for Jamestown Foundation, 2/4/2015
(Kevin, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43498&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=7&cHash=3c905ec80c598bc9668e6324ed194a01#.VNzJDfnF-So, 2/13/2015, JC)
An unprecedented number of personnel moves and promotions within the PLA have occurred under
President Xi. The Chinese press suggests that the promotions and shuffling of personnel are due to
ongoing anti-corruption campaigns in the Chinese government and the military (Caixin, January 8; South
China Morning Post, January 9). Others have noted that a number of officers with backgrounds in the
Nanjing Military Region (MR), comprising Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Fujian provinces, have
been promoted to bolster President Xis support within the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). This MR is
noteworthy because President Xi served in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and in Shanghai (see China
Brief, January 9; The Diplomat, December 30, 2014). Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry spokesman, in
response to press speculation, portrayed the personnel shuffle as routine (China Daily, January 5). These
explanations for the large-scale reshuffling and promotions provide valid, but incomplete, explanations
for the large number of PLA personnel moves occurring under President Xi. An important additional
reason is to gain support as well as break ground force opposition based in the MRs to President Xis
announced military reforms, which plans to adjust the MRs creating joint commands, thus reducing
ground force dominance (see China Brief, December 5, 2014). Past opposition, mainly from entrenched
interests within the ground forces to maintain the current MR structure, derailed earlier plans by former
Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to adjust the MR structure and form joint commands, which form
an important component of President Xis military reforms.

*LINK HERE*
Plan incites rogue PLA action for power projection before reforms can stop them
PLA interventions and conflicts draw in United States military response
Panda, the Diplomat, 9/23/2014
(Ankit, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-military-may-have-gone-rogue-after-all/, China's Military
May Have Gone 'Rogue' After All, JC, 11/3)
New evidence supports the commonly held view that the Chinese military isnt entirely in line with the
party leadership. Recently, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the PLA headquarters in Beijing
with PLA chiefs of staff present. Notably he delivered this speech following his return from his South
Asia tour which featured a particularly interesting visit to India when PLA troops crossed intro Indiaadministered Kashmir as Xi arrived in the country. In his speech, Xi unusually emphasized the
importance of the PLAs absolute loyalty and firm faith in the Communist Party of China, according to
Xinhua. Further supporting the idea that there may be some commanders in the PLA who have acted
without the consent of the party leadership, Xi emphasized the need for a smooth chain of command
and called on field commanders to make sure all decisions from the central leadership are fully
implemented. In a particularly telling paraphrasal, Xinhua notes that Xi suggested that Military
commanders should have a better understanding of international and domestic security situations as well
as the latest military development. According to Xinhua, Fang Fenghui, chief of the PLA general staff,
was in attendance, along with other senior Chinese military leaders. A statement following Xis speech

noted that All PLA forces should follow the instructions of President Xi Jinping, also chairman of the
Central Military Commission (CMC), and update their operations to meet new goals and missions set by
the CMC. In light of Xis remarks, it seems highly likely that PLA leaders have at times acted without
the consent of the Communist Partys senior leadership and, more critically, against the strategic vision of
that same leadership. It is, of course, nearly impossible to ascertain the extent to which the PLA may have
drifted from the party leadership without veering dangerously close to baseless speculation. All we know
is that Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the chairman of the Central
Military Commission, felt it necessary to issue a statement to the Peoples Liberation Army that, in effect,
says Please listen to me. In light of Xis remarks, it may bear reconsidering the verity of, for example,
him telling Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he honestly did not know the details of the standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in Kashmir as the two leaders met. The fact that Xi felt it
necessary to deliver these remarks and issue a statement to the PLA immediately upon his return from
India suggests that the Chinese incursion in Chumar may not have been carefully coordinated after all.
The one oddity in all this is why were hearing about this speech at all. If Xi is truly concerned by lapses
in Chinas chain of command and fears that his leadership over the military is not absolute, why broadcast
it via a report in state media? For a state apparatus so concerned with saving face, its somewhat curious
that Beijing would choose to willingly broadcast these sorts of lapses in leadership to the outside world.
Xi, like Hu Jintao before him, has issued statements expressing displeasure with the military before, but
the frank language and the fact that the remarks were delivered following the incident in Kashmir
between Indian and Chinese troops suggest that this time things might be different. One explanation
might be that this speech and the report could be engineered specifically for consumption by the outside
world. After all, given recent incidents involving Chinese troops in India, Southeast Asia, and the East
China Sea, it may grant the leadership in Beijing some plausible deniability by suggesting that these
actions were not sanctioned by the top leadership in Beijing. Of course, by the same token, this same
admission makes Xi look weak in a way very much contrary to the image he has cultivated for himself (it
is almost cliche to refer to Xi as anything but the 21st century reincarnation of Deng Xiaoping).
Unfortunately for many of Chinas neighbors, neither explanation of Chinese military behaviorbe it topdown carefully planned strategy or rogue field commandersis particularly comforting. Leaders and
strategists in India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United States will be less interested in
cracking open the black box that is the Chinese military and more interested in responding effectively to
Chinas increasingly assertive military behavior.

Military conflicts go nuclear, causing extinction turns all impacts

Wittner professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany, 2011
[Lawrence, 11-30-2011, Is Nuclear War with China Possible, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrencewittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html, DOI 7/12014]
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries
international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The
current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another
example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear
enough. Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government
recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in
Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need
this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the
United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government

threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their
conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet
or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more
temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear
arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons
prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999,
between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost
slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its
arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for
an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though,

don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously,

NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to redspond
to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack
on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that
nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its
modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense
systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans
convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its
Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a
total inventory of roughly 300. Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States
would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An

attack with these Chinese nuclear

weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and
fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese
death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering,
radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out
the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating
worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe
would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double
its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars
"modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade

1NC DA
Structural anti-corruption reforms are coming nowXi is pushing and has enough
capital China is on a path for strong leadership
Mulvenon 7/28 (James, Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis Deputy Director and specialist
on the Chinese military, Groupthink? PLA Leading Small Groups and the Prospect for Real Reform and
Change in the Chinese Military, Hoover Institution, 7/28/14, China Leadership Monitor, Issue 44, p. 4
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44jm.pdf)
While the use of leading small groups and other ad hoc leadership organizations to manage specific tasks or oversee internal campaigns is nothing new for the CCP
and PLA, the appearance of a

significant number of new PLA entities in the midst of the implementation of the Third Plenum reforms is
hardly a coincidence. The real question is: Will these leading groups have any appreciable success in confronting and overcoming the important (and
longstanding) structural problems that they were created to address? Or will they be yet another example of the Chinese system engaging in feigned compliance
with the reform directives, while trying to maintain the status quo and protect selected malefactors? It

is tempting to see Xi Jinping as different, as

bolder and more decisive than his predecessors in breaking crockery and rooting out corruption, but from the outside it is
sometimes challenging to distinguish the reality of the situation from the full-volume propaganda depiction of the situation that we are provided by the Chinese media
apparatus. Recent

events, however, strongly suggest that we are witnessing some real change, particularly with respect to
military corruption. If senior military officials like Gu Junshan, and even more significantly Xu Caihou, are officially charged and
prosecuted for abuse of power, then we can perhaps conclude that Xi Jinping has the juice to push through
structural reform. If Xi succeeds in implementing real organizational reform of the military region system, even replacing it with an architecture better suited
to integrated joint operations, one could conclude that he enjoys more influence and power within the PLA than any CCP leader since Deng Xiaoping.

*LINK HERE*
Plan incites rogue PLA action for power projection before reforms can stop them
PLA interventions and conflicts draw in United States military response
Panda, the Diplomat, 9/23
(Ankit, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-military-may-have-gone-rogue-after-all/, China's Military
May Have Gone 'Rogue' After All, JC, 11/3)
New evidence supports the commonly held view that the Chinese military isnt entirely in line with the
party leadership. Recently, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the PLA headquarters in Beijing
with PLA chiefs of staff present. Notably he delivered this speech following his return from his South
Asia tour which featured a particularly interesting visit to India when PLA troops crossed intro Indiaadministered Kashmir as Xi arrived in the country. In his speech, Xi unusually emphasized the
importance of the PLAs absolute loyalty and firm faith in the Communist Party of China, according to
Xinhua. Further supporting the idea that there may be some commanders in the PLA who have acted
without the consent of the party leadership, Xi emphasized the need for a smooth chain of command
and called on field commanders to make sure all decisions from the central leadership are fully
implemented. In a particularly telling paraphrasal, Xinhua notes that Xi suggested that Military
commanders should have a better understanding of international and domestic security situations as well
as the latest military development. According to Xinhua, Fang Fenghui, chief of the PLA general staff,
was in attendance, along with other senior Chinese military leaders. A statement following Xis speech
noted that All PLA forces should follow the instructions of President Xi Jinping, also chairman of the
Central Military Commission (CMC), and update their operations to meet new goals and missions set by
the CMC. In light of Xis remarks, it seems highly likely that PLA leaders have at times acted without
the consent of the Communist Partys senior leadership and, more critically, against the strategic vision of
that same leadership. It is, of course, nearly impossible to ascertain the extent to which the PLA may have
drifted from the party leadership without veering dangerously close to baseless speculation. All we know

is that Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the chairman of the Central
Military Commission, felt it necessary to issue a statement to the Peoples Liberation Army that, in effect,
says Please listen to me. In light of Xis remarks, it may bear reconsidering the verity of, for example,
him telling Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he honestly did not know the details of the standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in Kashmir as the two leaders met. The fact that Xi felt it
necessary to deliver these remarks and issue a statement to the PLA immediately upon his return from
India suggests that the Chinese incursion in Chumar may not have been carefully coordinated after all.
The one oddity in all this is why were hearing about this speech at all. If Xi is truly concerned by lapses
in Chinas chain of command and fears that his leadership over the military is not absolute, why broadcast
it via a report in state media? For a state apparatus so concerned with saving face, its somewhat curious
that Beijing would choose to willingly broadcast these sorts of lapses in leadership to the outside world.
Xi, like Hu Jintao before him, has issued statements expressing displeasure with the military before, but
the frank language and the fact that the remarks were delivered following the incident in Kashmir
between Indian and Chinese troops suggest that this time things might be different. One explanation
might be that this speech and the report could be engineered specifically for consumption by the outside
world. After all, given recent incidents involving Chinese troops in India, Southeast Asia, and the East
China Sea, it may grant the leadership in Beijing some plausible deniability by suggesting that these
actions were not sanctioned by the top leadership in Beijing. Of course, by the same token, this same
admission makes Xi look weak in a way very much contrary to the image he has cultivated for himself (it
is almost cliche to refer to Xi as anything but the 21st century reincarnation of Deng Xiaoping).
Unfortunately for many of Chinas neighbors, neither explanation of Chinese military behaviorbe it topdown carefully planned strategy or rogue field commandersis particularly comforting. Leaders and
strategists in India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United States will be less interested in
cracking open the black box that is the Chinese military and more interested in responding effectively to
Chinas increasingly assertive military behavior.

Military conflicts go nuclear extinction

Wittner 11 professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany, 2011
[Lawrence, 11-30-2011, Is Nuclear War with China Possible, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrencewittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html, DOI 7/12014]
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries
international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The
current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another
example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear
enough. Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government
recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in
Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need
this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the
United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government
threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their
conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet
or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more
temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear
arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons
prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999,
between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost

slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its
arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for
an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though,

don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously,

NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to redspond
to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack
on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that
nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its
modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense
systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans
convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its
Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a
total inventory of roughly 300. Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States
would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An

attack with these Chinese nuclear

weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and
fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese
death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering,
radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out
the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating
worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe
would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double
its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars
"modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade

Overview

2NC OV
China has placed its focus on the ocean - _________ has been outlined in official
documents as KEY to Chinese interests and a priority for the government China
has status quo interest in the ocean as the place where they could take the lead from
the US PLA relies on nationalism to act, not the CCP too much corruption and
rogue leaders the plan destroys all reform efforts by inciting the PLA to lash out
hardliners and the PLA project power by taking military action in places like
Taiwan and Sentaku Islands and the US will respond Their __________
specifically pisses off Chinese PLA officials
PLA entirely ignores the CCP and takes action on its own thats Panda
Impact is immediate global nuclear war PLA nuclear stocks and first strike
capabilities are ways to project power and demonstrate Chinese dominance the
PLA enters a try or die framing where they will do anything to preserve Chinese
nationalism their lash out guarantees conflict with the US enough to cause
extinction
CCP will also use biological chemical and nuclear warfare after strike
Renxing 5
(Epoch Times , 8/3/05http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards
human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight
hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech, free of all disguises, lets the public see the
CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its
desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and
utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab
themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue
who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow,
the bloody confession affirmed the CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million
Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

Uniqueness

EXT UQ
Group the uniqueness debate actual action by Xi is the framing issue only our
evidence is in the context of what Xis agenda looks like and predicts CCP action
none of their evidence is in the context of general secretary action
Here are three reasons why corruption reform is happening
First weeding out corrupt officials is in process now thats (1NC evidence)
Second cultural justifications
Chan, South China Morning Post, 11/3
(Minnie, 2014, Xi Jinping calls on the PLA to remember the past in fight against graft,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1630043/xi-jinping-calls-pla-remember-past-fight-against-graft)
President Xi Jinping has called on the military to reflect on discipline and uphold its revolutionary
tradition in the wake of a corruption scandal involving a former top general. Xi ordered more than 400
senior military officials, including leaders of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the army's four headquarters and seven key
military commands as well as heads of military-related organisations to gather in the historically significant town of Gutian
in Fujian province for a two-day conference that ended on Friday, Xinhua reported. Xi called for serious
thought on the disciplinary and legal violations of disgraced former CMC vice-chairman Xu Caihou, telling the
gathering that the lessons learned from Xu's case deserved profound reflection while the unfavourable influence of the case had to be thoroughly
cleared away. Xu had confessed to taking bribes, military prosecutors announced last Tuesday. Political

analysts said the meeting

indicated that Xi, who is also chairman of the CMC, is facing some resistance to his ongoing anticorruption campaign and reform of the PLA. "In Communist Party history, party heads can consolidate their political status in
two ways, through ideological and military legitimacy," Beijing-based political commentator Zhang Lifan said. He said Xi had shown
his control of ideology by chairing a forum of writers and artists last month. However, Xi had yet to gain full
control over the PLA, since the party's fourth plenum did not promote his allies, Liu Yuan and Zhang Youxia, to
CMC vice-chairmen, Zhang said. The PLA Daily reported separately that Xi had taken the military leaders to
visit the venue of the historic Gutian Party Congress in 1929 and a memorial hall for Mao Zedong to reiterate the
importance of upholding the traditional spirit of the PLA's predecessor, the Red Army. At that congress, Mao
reaffirmed party leadership and proposed the principle of "the party leading the army", an important tenet in the history of the party and the PLA.
Xi adopted that principle when he became head of the PLA two years ago. Xi also visited an experimental development zone in Pingtan county.
Xi spent 17 years in official positions in Fujian.

Third Its at the top of Xis agenda

Qiang, ChinaDaily USA, 1/26
(2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-01/26/content_19408932.htm, CHINA DAILY USA,
JC)
China faces major as well as potentially minor security threats, and given the complicated international
situation, the security environment in its neighborhood cannot be said to be satisfactory. This calls for
further reform of the military, without which China cannot safeguard its national security. The reform of
China's military is also necessary to keep pace with the military buildup across the world and to cleanse
the force of bad elements, especially senior officers, that have indulged in corruption and pomposity and
thus lowered the morale of patriots. An armed force's main responsibility is to safeguard a country's
national security and defend its territorial integrity against attacks. With such a perception in mind,
China's leadership under President Xi Jinping has accorded the highest priority to military reforms. The
reforms are also expected to improve national governance. The severe crackdown on corrupt military
officers, including Xu Caihou, former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Gu

Junshan, former deputy head of the People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department, shows the
top leadership's determination to root out corruption from the military. But the ever-intensifying anticorruption campaign, which has netted "tigers" (corrupt high-ranking officials) as well as "flies" (lowerraking officials), has prompted some people to ask whether the campaign would affect the fighting spirit
of the military. Such people should be informed that the investigations into corrupt military officers will
not dent the fighting capability or spirit of the military, or soil its image. If anything, the anti-corruption
drive will further strengthen the PLA.

Fourth its slighted to continue onto this year xi has no intention of stopping
China Times 1/5
(2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150105000001&cid=1501, JC)
Beijing is set to dig deeper in its crackdown on corruption in the military as it aims to modernize its
armed forces and improve combat ability, Guangzhou's South Reviews magazine reports. The ongoing
crackdown began with the case of Lieutenant General Gu Junshan, deputy head of the General Logistics
Department of the People's Liberation Army, who was removed from his post in February 2012 and
indicted in March 2014 for taking bribes and embezzlement after a lengthy investigation, the magazine
said. Also in March, an investigation was launched into Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of China's
Central Military Commission, with an indictment against him announced in late October. President Xi
Jinping, who also served as the head of the Central Military Commission, raised Xu's case on two recent
public occasions, once during a military political work meeting in October and again during his visit to
the Nanjing Military Region in December. Xi said the armed forces need to learn the lesson from Xu's
case and purge themselves of negative influences in the PLA's thinking, political work, organization and
practices. The PLA Daily, the official newspaper of China's armed forces, reiterated Xi's determination to
fight corruption in an op-ed piece on Dec. 17, pointing out that some people have (erroneously) stated that
an end has come. In another op-ed published Dec. 23, the paper also said the armed forces might be a
group with special tasks, but they enjoys no special privilege when it comes to rooting out corruption.

A2 UQ overwhelms the Link

False - itll be closetheres doubt in the politburo about his anti-corruption
campaigncapital is the deciding factor US action makes Xi look weak
SCMP 8/5 (Keith Zhai, SCMP reporter, Xis shockingly harsh Politburo speech signals tensions over
anti-graft crackdown, South China Morning Post, 8/5/14,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1567026/xis-shockingly-harsh-politburo-speech-signalstensions-over-anti-graft)
President Xi Jinping told top officials he was

disregarding life, death and reputation to fight corruption in a terse speech

signalling a possible dispute and doubts among party elites over the campaign . An official mainland newspaper and a person familiar
with the matter confirmed the presidents statement. Xi was believed to have made the remark in a closed-door Politburo meeting on June 26, the details of which
were publicly revealed only when the city newspaper Changbaishan Daily on Monday reported that local officials received instructions from the president. [I] had
left life and death, as well as my personal reputation, out of consideration in the combat against corruption, Xi said, according to Changbaishan citys party chief, Li
Wei. Li said the top leaderships remarks emphasised a sense of crisis , and some of the words were shockingly sharp and harsh.
However, he did not provide more details. "We have to take the responsibility since the party and the country had put their fate in our hands, the president was
reported to have said. Xi said the

two armies of corruption and anti-corruption are in confrontation, and are in a

stalemate, according to Li, adding that the leadership vowed to see the anti-graft campaign to the very end. The campaign launched by Xi against tigers and
flies (high to low-ranking cadres) when he came to power has seen scores of officials, business associates and their families either jailed, investigated or sacked. The
latest victim of the campaign is former security tsar Zhou Yongkang, the highest-level official to be netted in a corruption probe so far. The Changbaishan Daily also
said that Xi urged graft busters to focus on four types of officials: those who are strongly opposed by the public; those who have not restrained themselves after the
partys 18th congress in 2012; younger cadres in key positions; and those who might potentially take on more important roles. The dailys article was soon deleted
from the website as some internet operators said they received a gag order from propaganda authorities. A person familiar with the presidents speech told the South
China Morning Post earlier that Xi

made the strongly worded speech to the Politburo to counter some critics and silence
doubts against his anti-corruption campaign. Xi warned the party elites that nothing would be off limits in his anti-graft drive, the person said.
The president also rebuked the school of thought that the relentless drive against errant officials would only plunge the country in chaos and that Xi, in the end,
would eat humble pie. According to the person, Xi retorted: What is there to be scared of? Zhang Ming, a political scientist at Renmin University in Beiing, said
the remarks showed the

anti-corruption campaign had certainly threatened some interest groups in the upper
echelons. The combat between Xi and the interest groups has been white-hot and Xi also realised that
[it] is make or break, he said.

Link

EXT Zero Sum

Ocean is zero-sum for the CCP 1NC _____ evidence cites the fact that China
believes that any increase in ocean policy by the United States that China is
pursuing must be a direct challenge even if the plan is a small dent in geopolitics,
China doesnt believe so, and the hardliners within the CCP will strategically spin
the plan and blow up its importance as being a zero-sum venture vs. China to take
power within the government
We cant control the spin, Chinese hardliners will interpret the plan in the worst
way possible
Mead 12 (Walter Russell Mead, High Noon in Beijing, American Interest Blog, April 30,
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/04/30/high-noon-in-beijing/)
America can set a policy in motion, but we cant control
or fine tune the consequences of our policies as they ripple out across the world. Many conversations with US officials in this
What we all seem to be learning in Asia is that events have a logic and a pace of their own.

and in prior administrations have left me convinced that the US is not trying to contain China the way we once contained the Soviet Union. While virtually all Americans at senior levels believe
that over time economic progress will lead to political change in China, this is because most Americans are hardwired to think in those terms and this whiggish faith in the historical process is not

Leading Americans in both parties generally hope for a peaceful and gradual reform process
rather than violent conflict in China; they do not want to dismember or impoverish China and they would
not welcome its disintegration. Nor do Americans see the evolution of a future Asian security order in zero-sum terms. The United States wants to prevent Chinese
domination of Asia but we do not want to dominate the region ourselves. Many Chinese, I have found on my visits there, have a much darker view of our
intentions, and see the US and China entangled in a zero sum battle for dominance which only one side can win. For
now, it appears that the US, surprisingly to some Chinese analysts, is winning that contest. We should not
expect Chinese hard liners to accept that situation with calm and resignation , even if their present options are limited.
a statement of policy or intent.

AND specifically ocean policies are zero sum

Dujarric, Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies Director, 11
[Robert, His work has appeared in the Asahi Shimbun, The Financial Times and Nikkei Weekly, among
other publications, The Diplomat, China's Zero-Sum Game, http://thediplomat.com/2011/07/chinaszero-sum-game/, accessed July 11, 2014, EK]
Last, but not least, there has been a series of potentially explosive incidents at sea involving Chinese vessels and US and Japanese vessels. In some cases, Chinese
ships have impeded the activities of American survey ships in international waters. Though

some have argued that Chinese opposition to

US intelligence operations outside Chinese territorial limits but within its EEZ is legitimate , the Chinese
side has clearly opted for a risky policy of confrontation. In others, Chinese helicopters have flown dangerously close to Japanese
naval ships. The cumulative effect of all these events is to reinforce the position of the hawks in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Hanoi, Canberra, and numerous
other capitals, who see China as a threatening force that wishes to overthrow the status quote with force. Moreover, without getting into theorizing about escalation,
its easy to see how a minor disturbance say a Chinese naval helicopter crashing on a foreign vessel and killing crew members could evolve into something bigger.

The other question is what is Beijings goal? Is it actually willing to use violence and thus risk war to
break the regional status quo? If so, against whom? Does it understand what the costs would be? The fact
is that Chinese policy making remains a black box. Some see a highly unified and disciplined CCP running the country the way the Soviet
Communist Party did there. Others point out to factionalism, while some note the growing role of a public opinion (fed a nasty diet of nationalistic-chauvinistic
propaganda in public schools). Arguments have been made that in the case of the sanctions against Japan, the measures were first taken by local officials and then
approved by Beijing, which felt it had no choice. Understanding the sources of Chinese conduct is essential in formulating a response. But at some point, it becomes
secondary. Regardless of who decided to embargo rare earth exports to Japan, the fact is that Japanese factories couldnt get their orders fulfilled. Maybe young
Chinese pilots find it fun to buzz the masts of foreign surface vessels, or possibly they are ordered to so by the senior leadership, but the probability of a lethal
accident remains the same. Optimists will argue that the Chinese economy is now so intertwined with the rest of the world that it diminishes the possibility of armed
conflict. They can also point to growing personal contacts in government between China and its neighbours (including the United States). But as the US Civil War (the
bloodiest war in American history), World War I in Europe, the Serbia-Croatia War, and many other conflicts indicate, in

the end human instincts to

kill can overcome the urge to make money. Even the closest of financial, academic, and personal

connections can be destroyed. The basic assumption that US and allied policymakers have made for the past two decades about China is that relations
with the Middle Kingdom are a positive-sum game. As China grows richer, everybody benefits. So far, this has proven to be the case . But in the past, it
seems that CCP policymakers whoever they are not only have a zero-sum game approach, but wish to
alter the status quo. Logically, the CCP should be particularly wary of destabilizing actions. Though winning wars can help regimes,
picking a fight with a strong set of enemies (essentially the United States and its main allies) with far
stronger domestic institutions is very risky. Maybe Beijing hopes that it can avoid military conflict, or just keep it limited to clashes with weak
neighbours. But these are dangerous calculations that resemble Russian roulette.

Deep Sea Expo

China is becoming leader in deep sea exploration US action is seen as a threat to
Chinas maritime soft power
Marlow 13 (Jeffrey, Chinas Deep Sea Ambitions, December 30)
Recently, Chinas Jiaolong manned submersible became the worlds deepest-diving state-sponsored
research vessel, with four trips to 7,000 meters depth. Around the same time, news broke of plans for a
National Deep Sea Center, a $78 million facility that will operate the sea-going fleet and serve as a central
base for oceanographic research and technology development. Months later, the centers director, Liu
Baohua, announced a nationwide search for oceanauts, men and women who will pilot Jiaolong and its
planned sister sub around the oceans depths. Its all part of Chinas rhetorical, financial, and strategic
return to the sea, a realm that it dominated several centuries ag o. Chinese maritime strength reached its
apex in the early 15th century, as admiral Zheng He crisscrossed the Indian Ocean with enormous fleets,
returning with gifts (most famously a giraffe) for the Emperor. But a few years later, as political winds shifted, the
Ming Dynasty ended the epic voyages, choosing instead to focus on other, more local, priorities. This abrupt 180 is frequently
cited as a cautionary tale highlighting the dangers of isolationism, a poor strategic move that doomed the discoverers to
become the discovered. So why the resurgence in sea-based activity? Dean Cheng is a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation
and an expert on Chinas technological ambitions. He points to the innocuously named 863 Program as an underappreciated game
changer that reconfigured the countrys relationship with technology across a number of disciplines. In
March of 1986 (hence the 863 title), four prominent engineers wrote to then-Chairman Deng Xiaoping, warning of
impending doom for civil societys scientific institutions. A long-standing focus on military might had
neglected other aims of technological development, and if China didnt redistribute its resources soon, it would be fated to watch
the new technological revolution from the outside. Xiaoping took the argument to heart, initiating research and
exploration programs focused on seven key fields: biotechnology, space, information technology, lasers,
automation, energy, and materials science. Marine Technology was added to the roster in 1996, well
coordinated with the countrys broadening regional influence and growing appetite for sea-based
resources. China has become much more dependent on the oceans and ocean-based trade for food and
commerce, notes Cheng. Theyd also like to know whats off the coast; there are vast unexplored
swaths of their seabed as well as deeper ocean reaches that could prove useful. And while Plan 863
indicates a formal commitment to oceanographic exploration, Chinas movement has been measured and
deliberate, similar to its spacefaring progress. With all the fanfare surrounding the countrys entry into manned spaceflight, its
important to maintain historical perspective. In the decade since it became the third country to put a man in space, China has completed four flights; the

It seems likely, then, that the oceanaut program will

be a slow burning initiative, the leading edge of a larger oceanic strategy. Going forward, China will
continue to consolidate its strategic interests and look to secure access to resources, whether in the form
of deep ocean minerals or coastal fish. As Cheng explains, there are relatively few sudden interests in
Chinese politics. The broader set of research areas tend to be methodical in the development process its been true for outer space and its true
bulk of the Space Race, from Gagarin to Armstrong, happened in less time.

for inner space too.

Energy Link
Competition is zero-sum PLA perceives threat and takes action - no risk of a link
turnnationalist and mercantilist access to resources is key to interests
Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research Director, 2011
[Mikkal, 6/21/11, New America Foundation, Chinas Energy Rise and the Future of U.S.-China Energy Relations,
http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china_s_energy_rise_and_the_future_of_us_china_energy_relations, 7/6/14, IC]
Therefore, much

will depend on the character of the energy relationship between China and the U.S. Nevertheless,
something resembling an E-2 seems likely to be elusive. China and the U.S.
continue to have fundamentally different world views about energy security and how to achieve it. Beijings political
leaders see energy security in distinctly national terms of establishing national control over energy resources and
transportation routes. It is a decidedly 19th Century, mercantilist agenda. Maintaining adequate, reliable, and growing
supplies of energy is viewed as indispensible for ensuring rapid economic growth, job creation, and social
and political stability; i.e. the continued claim to legitimacy to rule by the Communist Party. Beijings political
despite its desirability, establishing

leaders have little faith in global energy markets to ensure adequate, reliable, and affordable energy to China: energy is simply too important to be left to the markets.
Despite gradual market reforms, state control and intervention remain central to Chinas approach to energy security. Alternatively, the U.S. has built its conception of
energy security over the past 40 years on an international energy structure based on integrated and transparent global markets, competitive pricing, private investment,
private technological innovation, and multilateral cooperation. To paraphrase former President Bill Clinton, its the market, stupid. So each country views energy
security through very different prisms. Moreover, the

potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges

continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic level. Beijings leaders suspect that
the U.S. seeks to use its energy vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China . Criticism of the
impact of Chinas overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as a cynical ploy to weaken Chinas access to vital oil supplies. Pressure from
Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow Chinas economic
growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other hand, sees Chinas energy
expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its national oil champions to carve out
privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies.
This strategic suspicion casts a pall of a zero-sum atmosphere of national competition over energy
access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on both sides. The 2005 episode when Chinas CNOOC sought to
acquire Unocal and was forced to withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of Chinas strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic mix of bilateral energy

it
is still very unclear what role Beijing would want to take on the world energy stage . This is a corollary to the broader
lack of clarity over what role Beijing wants to play in other global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains largely inwardly focused
and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign
policy of keeping a low profile, Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy
cooperation.5 Conversely, assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent
Washington is truly ready for a shared global energy partnership . This would require accommodating
very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum producers and regions, the role of
the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing carbon emissions. Washington tends to view a partnership as China
simply joining in and becoming enmeshed and integrated into a set of U.S.-sponsored and led energy institutions and policy
agendas established by the west. This is highly unlikely to be acceptable to Beijings leadership.6
suspicions and mirror-imaging. Further, to the extent that the U.S. might encourage China to take a stronger leadership role on global energy security cooperation,

Prefer our evidence it cites how the plan would be PERCIEVED AND SPUN in
Beijing (If Mead not read)
Center for American Progress 12 (5 Myths and Reliaties About US China Solar Trade
Competition) http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/05/16/11592/5-myths-andrealities-about-u-s-china-solar-trade-competition/
But the only honest way to address trade issues with China is on a case-by-case basis, as objectively as
possible. That is exactly what the domestic trade resolution procedures at the U.S. Department of

Commerce and the international procedures at the World Trade Organization are designed to do. Those
institutions take trade complaints out of the hands of politicianswho almost always have political
incentives to overreact or underreact to trade accusations against China regardless of the factsand put
them into the hands of independent arbiters. At present, a large portion of the trade allegations levied
against China are in the clean energy sphere. The reason is clear: Chinese leadership decided that clean
energy is their countrys historic opportunity to finally surpass the United States in a major
technology sector. Chinese government institutions at all levelsnational, provincial, and localare
directing massive subsidies to green energy companies in direct support of that goal. When U.S. clean
energy companies face stiff competition from Chinese rivals and the latter appear to be benefitting from
such generous government support, that can easily trigger suspicion and trade complaints on the U.S.
side, particularly when low Chinese prices are driving U.S. companies out of the market.

Renewables/ Renewable Industry

New U.S. federal support for renewables crowds out china
Mathews 13 [John, Mathews holds the Chair of Strategy at the Macquarie Graduate School of Management at Macquarie University, Sydney. 2/1/13, The
Globalist Debate: Renewable Energy and the Clash of Civilizations http://www.theglobalist.com/the-globalist-debate-renewable-energy-and-the-clash-ofcivilizations/ //jweideman]

Samuel Huntingtons Clash of Civilizations is considered one of the foundation texts of our time, given its appearance in the decade prior to the destruction of the
World Trade Center towers in September 2001. But Huntingtons focus on the West and Islam has done little to illuminate an even more fundamental and farreaching clash the one pitching the waning fossil fuel civilization against the waxing civilization based on renewables and resource-efficiency. We

see the
evidence for this civilizational clash in terms of the struggle of the renewables industries to be born and
prosper, while the fossil fuel industries along with the companies, subsidies, regulations and laws that uphold their privileges refuse to leave the field.
China and the United States represent the polar extremes in this clash with China acting to build
renewable energy industries. It is racing ahead as fast as is physically possible in order to ensure energy
security, even as it builds a coal- and nuclear-fired thermal energy system. The United States, in contrast,
is focusing on innovation, while Congressional leaders are subject to heavy fossil fuel lobbying and act to
delay the transition to renewables. The clash is heating up in the current spat over trade in solar photovoltaic modules, where the United States
now (and potentially the European Union as well) is levelling countervailing tariffs on Chinese solar PV imports into the United States. This move is inviting tit-for-tat

The
dispute even threatens an all-out trade war. That this is actually a clash of civilizations becomes evident
when we examine the ideological support for each sides position in this dispute. China is supporting its
policies to promote its solar PV industry at home, and for companies that then export their product, on the
grounds that it is a developing industry that needs support in order to become established in the face of
incumbent intransigence. It is a market-oriented strategy that is proving to be extremely effective. The
United States, by contrast, is ideologically promoting a transition away from fossil fuels (insofar as any transition is
allowed by Congress) through support for innovation and Schumpeterian creative destruction. In its first term, the Obama Administration promoted
retaliation by China against U.S. exports of polysilicon and PV equipment, where the United States currently runs a strong trade surplus with China.

renewables against fossil fuel incumbents through tax credits and loan guarantees, sometimes at very high levels (such as the $535 million allocated to Solyndra as a
loan guarantee, which became a public liability when the company went bankrupt). This policy was aimed at offering strong support for a few chosen recipients to
help them bring new versions of existing products to market. In Solyndras case, this was CIGS thin-film PV technology, which has been falling rapidly in cost but
not as fast as first-generation c rystalline silicon cells, which have overtaken the thin-film innovators and made life very difficult for them. Where things become
interesting is on the ideology-based flanking moves undertaken by Washington-based think tanks in support of the U.S. position. Consider the example of the ITIF, the
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, which is very active on this issue. It conveniently labels the two sides in this clash as innovation on the one
hand (the U.S. approach) and green mercantilism on the other (Chinas approach). Innovation is good and green mercantilism is bad. The ITIF (and other think
tanks along with it) have taken sides in the current trade dispute, arguing that the U.S. Department of Commerce and the companies urging it forward (a coalition led
by SolarWorld) are simply trying to enforce the rules of global competition, while the green mercantilists are threatening the survival of the rest of the industry. The

problem with this position is that it ignores the reasons for Chinas success. Chinese firms are not
dumping product on the rest of the world, but are benefiting from the cost advantages they have reaped
through scaling up production. This is a time-honored approach to reducing costs and enlarging the
market, perfected in the United States ever since it was applied so effectively by Henry Ford to the (at the
time) luxury automotive market. In the solar race, U.S. firms like Solyndra and Konarka are in difficulties
not because of Chinese dumping, but because their market in the United States was not allowed to expand
fast enough thanks to Congressional hostility linked to fossil fuel lobbying. The American slowness to
diffuse renewable energies does not so much reflect a lack of innovation as a plethora of regulatory and
institutional blockages. Take the case of Google and its promotion of renewables a quest launched with much fanfare in 2007 and quietly abandoned
in November 2011. Google invested in the Atlantic Wind Connection, an ambitious project to establish wind
farms off the Northeast coast and link them to the mainland grid by a single connection. But the project
has gone nowhere, as one regulatory barrier after another has had to be negotiated. In China, by contrast,
there is strong focus on building a national smart grid as counterpart to policies promoting renewables. This
is not just a fast follower technology strategy, but one where China intends to take the lead through development of new standards and their promotion through
domestic market creation.

Energy Independence
Energy independence actions by the US cause an already tumultuous China to
perceive the US as undermining their own energy security
Sun, fellow with the East Asia program at the Stimson Center, 2014
(Yun, March 20th, US Energy Independence: Disaster or Blessing for China?,
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/201178-us-energy-independence-disaster-orblessing-for-china, accessed 7/6/14)
With revolutionary shale gas and shale oil technologies, the U.S. is , as President Obama said in his State of the Union
address in January 2014, closer to energy independence than ever. How such independence affects China has been a popular issue
for studies in China in recent years. The assessment of the impact of the U.S. energy independence on China is
characterized with a strong sense of uncertainty, vulnerability and insecurity. China states three main
goals in its energy policy: security, efficiency, and environmental protection, with energy security being
the top priority. In the Chinese lexicon, energy security first and most importantly means the secure and
uninterrupted supply and transportation of foreign energy resources back to China . According to recent studies by
the State Council, by 2030, China will import about 75 percent of the 800 million tons of its annual domestic oil consumption. How to
secure the stable and constant supplies of such a large volume, diversify the sources to mitigate vulnerability, and ensure
their safe transportation back home has become a serious challenge for China. Chinas insatiable need for energy
security is the primary motivation for its fervent global acquisitions of energy assets and development of pipelines
with Russia, Central Asia, and Myanmar in recent years. Since 2009, Chinese oil companies have spent more than $100
billion on oil and gas assets to boost imports. From the pure perspective of energy security, the Chinese perception of
U.S. energy independence is largely negative: an energy-secure United States, in the view of many
Chinese, will damage Chinas energy security through either actively manipulating or passively
fostering the instability of oil-producing regions/countries. Many Chinese analysts believe that from a
geopolitical point of view, the independence of the United States from Middle Eastern oil will translate
into reduced interests and deployment in the area, leading to regional chaos that will significantly damage
Chinas energy supply and shipment. China relies on the Middle East and Africa for the largest share of
its crude oil supplies, freeriding with the security and stability Washington currently provides . However, if
the United States is to reduce its role in the region, it would expose China to tremendous geopolitical and
security risks. Some Chinese analysts believe that an energy-secure United States will undercut Chinas energy
supplies by stirring up tension in the region because Washington will conceivably be less-constrained and potentially more
radical in imposing democratization or nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East. Conspiracy theorists argue that Washington might even
purposefully pursue such policies so as to disrupt Chinas energy supply. For the pessimists,

U.S. energy independence is bad for

Chinas economic development. In their view, after the United States becomes an exporter of energy resources, it will manipulate the
energy price on the international market to maximize its own profits while suppressing the growth of emerging markets, especially China. As long
as the United States can balance the reaction of domestic consumers, it will chase up the price of the primary commodities globally to increase
the costs of Chinas industrial development. The

hypothesis further extends into the ideological realm, that U.S. will
use its own example of energy technology innovation and independence to boost the legitimacy and
desirability of the western development model and demonize Chinas growth model.

Fishing
Increased fishing threatens Chinese resources and naval power and holds the
potential for military conflict
Goldstein 09 [Lyle, director of China Maritime Studies Institute, August 7 , 2009, Asia Times Online, originally published by the
th

Jamestown Foundation, Chinas Fishing Fleet Sets Challenge to US, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KH07Ad01.html]

With much attention focused on China's growing naval, shipbuilding and port infrastructure
developments, it is easy to forget another important dimension of China's maritime rise: China's status as
a major global fishing power. With a total haul of over 17 million tonnes in 2007, China's take is four
times that of the nearest competitor, and far exceeds the catch of Japan, the United States and other major
Pacific maritime powers. China's massive fishing fleet is concentrated in the Western Pacific, but is also
active now on all the world's oceans. This issue should foremost be evaluated in an environmental context since the world's oceans
are now under severe strain from overfishing. Yet, there are also vital foreign policy and international security aspects to
Chinese fisheries developments that cannot be neglected by US policymakers. Indeed, fisheries issues are
a significant security concern among Chinese maritime strategists, because they fit squarely into
perceived resource and sovereignty imperatives now driving current maritime development [2]. As a whole,
China's actions as the largest world fishing power can serve as an important signal for determining Beijing's willingness to conform to global
maritime norms as a "responsible maritime stakeholder". During 2009, Chinese fishing vessels and fishing policies made global headlines with
increasing frequency. Beginning in March with the so-called Impeccable incident, in which a few Chinese fishing trawlers in the company of two
other enforcement ships and at least one Chinese naval vessel surrounded and harassed a US surveillance vessel 120 kilometers south of Hainan,
one of a number of recent and similarly dangerous incidents at sea. Shortly thereafter, China's largest fishery enforcement vessel,Yuzheng 311,
was sent on a lengthy patrol in the South China Sea following legislation by the Philippines to formalize its offshore claims to several islets in the
South China Sea. In June, Chinese enforcement of fishery claims came under international scrutiny when Vietnam lodged a series of protests
concerning alleged rough treatment of their own fishing vessels by Chinese authorities. According to one report, incomes of Vietnamese
fishermen have declined because of "China's stepped up [fisheries] enforcement", in the vicinity of the Paracel Archipelago. Then in late June, a
major incident erupted between Beijing and Jakarta after Indonesian authorities seized eight Chinese fishing vessels and detained 75 Chinese
fishermen, who were allegedly fishing illegally in Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - 59 of the 75 Chinese fishermen detained were
permitted to return to China in July. Such incidents illustrate how

the activities of fishing vessels and related enforcement

authorities of the Western Pacific region represent one of the jagged edges of volatile maritime territorial
disputes. There is a real potential in China - and also among its neighbors - for fishing nationalism to take hold
because resources coupled with sovereignty disputes are at the heart of naval development in the East
Asian region. Unfortunately, fishing tensions could aggravate these disputes to the point of military
conflict.

Wind
China plans to lead the world in offshore wind turbine tech by 2015
Patton 2012 (Dominque, November 26, China correspondent at ReCharge Newspaper Chinas
government wants 10MW offshore wind prototypes in operation by 2015 under a plan for industrial
innovation. http://www.rechargenews.com/wind/article1297333.ece)
In its wind power science and technology development five-year plan under Chinas Ministry of Science
and Technology (MOST), the government urges industry to achieve a breakthrough on assembly of
10MW offshore wind turbines within the plans timeframe of 2011-2015. It also encourages equipment
makers to master the manufacturing of 3-5MW direct-drive wind turbines as well as 7MW wind turbines
and components. The turbines' functions and reliability should reach world-leading levels and they
should enter commercialisation. The plan, published on the MOST website, is part of Beijings long-term
push to raise the level of innovation in Chinese industry. It reveals the strength of high-level support for
turbine makers such as Sinovel and Goldwind, both of which have begun development of large offshore
turbines, including 10MW models. In a statement yesterday, Goldwind said it will continue development
of its direct-drive turbines and accelerate commercialisation of its 3MW hybrid machine. A 6MW directdrive prototype is scheduled for completion in the first half of this year. Goldwind's chief engineer, Cui
Xinwei, told a conference last year that large turbines will be in demand in Chinas offshore industry
especially in the South China Sea, where wind farms will be far from the shore". MOST has already
provided significant funding for R&D to wind power companies, including through the national 863
programme which supports high-tech industries. Goldwind, Sinovel and others have participated in this
programme. It is not clear whether MOST will provide funding to support the targets in the new five-year
plan for wind power. Liming Qiao from the Global Wind Energy Council says the plan is a good signal.
Policy signals come first and tend to drive funding, focus and attention to targets.

Generic
Expansion of US influence into the ocean is perceived as containment
Dingli 2013 (Shen, Fudan University Associate Dean, Managing Chinas Maritime Interests,
ChinaUS Focus, 8/20/13, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/managing-chinas-maritimeinterests/)
Second, it is natural that China needs to safeguard all its core interests, including territory, territorial water and space. With Chinas sea
baseline spreading as long as 18,000 km, it is a daunting task to assure that all its territorial water is under proper sovereign control. When foreign reconnaissance
planes and intelligence ships approach quite often, it is important to keep alert, dissuading such behavior while following relevant global codes. It is never easy to
achieve both ends at one time, with the 2001 China-US air collision off Hainan Island in mind. Over the past decade, Chinese armed forces seem to have enhanced
their capacity and skill to do so. Third, with the creation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, Chinas maritime economic
rights have been much enlarged, in a sense. China has to ensure that this area will be tapped both exclusively and sustainably. Chinas
EEZ could overlap with that of its close neighbors at sea, which requires proper bilateral talks to divide various overlapping interests. Meanwhile, it is necessary to
command UNCLOS in a sensible way. As China revealed its navys access to the US EEZ in the Shangri-La Dialogue this June in Singapore, it shall have room to
relax its interpretation of the legality of foreign navys access to its own EEZ. Fourth, assuring

free access to high sea is increasingly of Chinas

vital maritime interest. Given Chinas status as both a top exporter and importer, China is gaining wealth through trade from the ocean. In this regard, it is
not incomprehensible that China is becoming more interested in building its blue water navy so as to assure that the international code of free access to maritime
global common will remain undisrupted. This certainly has particular bearing on China-US relations. On the one hand, China and the US are sharing more common
interests so as to roll back the threat of pirating; on the other hand, Beijing strongly

perceives Washingtons maritime hegemony due

to the latters dominance in East Asia, especially in the Taiwan context, which affects the mainlands freedom of option in dealing
with the island province. It is not impossible that the Beijing-Washington security dilemma would generate their arms
competition, even unintendedly, though not at a full scale to repeat what occurred between the US and the former Soviet Union.

Arctic
China is increasing influence in the Arctic
Spears, Horseshoe Bay Marine Group Principal, 2011
(K. Joseph, 1/28/11, The Snow Dragon Moves Into the Arctic Ocean Basin, China Brief, 11:2, p.13, IC]
On March 5, 2010 the official China News Service relayed comments made by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo,
with respect to the Arctic at the Third Session of the Eleventh Chinese Peoples Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) when he advised Chinese leaders not to fall behind on Arctic Ocean exploration.
Admiral Zhin stated The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the North Pole
and surrounding area are the common wealth of the worlds people and do not belong to any one
country. He went on to say China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one
fifth of the worlds population. He went on to criticize some countries for contesting sovereignty over
the region, which impacts other nations (China News Service, March 5, 2010). Is this a new Arctic
specific statement or part of a larger strategy with respect to China approach to its foreign policy with
respect to the Arctic Ocean Basin and international law and the law of the sea? Or was this simply a
restatement of existing Chinese policy on the Arctic or ocean issues generally? Many commentators took
Admiral Zhins statement as a new direction with China taking a more aggressive stature and a potentially
increasing militarization and singular approach to the Arctic. In recent years, the expansion of China
military and especially its navy has been increasing. Chinas new approach seeks to enhance the
perceived legitimacy of Chinese operations at sea. This has led to recent incidents involving U.S. vessels
with in Chinas EEZ. The Law the Sea Convention allows foreign vessels including naval vessels the
right of innocent passage in the EEZ. International law Professor Cmdr. James Kraska in a number of
articles has coined this concept or notion of lawfare whereby China seeks to use international law to
advance its strategic interests.

[DO NOT READ AGAINST LOST] China resents United States involvement in the
Arctic- involvement supports Chinese fears of regional exclusion
Rainwater, Senior PoliSci Major @ Pepperdine U., 13
[Shiloh, Spring 2013, Naval War College Review, Race to the North: Chinas Arctic Strategy and Its
Implication, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/31708e41-a53c-45d3-a5e4-ccb5ad550815/Race-tothe-North--China-s-Arctic-Strategy-and-Its.aspx, 07/02/2014, PD]
Despite its many achievements in terms of investment and cooperation, China fears it is being shut out of
the Arctic. In 2008, for example, the "Arctic Five" Canada. Russia, the United States. Denmark, and
Norwaysigned the Ilullssat Declaration, committing themselves to peaceful resolution of territorial
sovereignty disputes in the Arctic.15 However, with its narrow definition of Arctic matters as regional
ones, the declaration perceptually attempts to exclude non-Arctic states tram them." China fears that in
this fashion the arc unipolar stales will 'gang up and 'carve up the Arctic melon' and its natural resources
among them- selves, to the exclusion of everyone else."" To secure its position in Arctic affairs, therefore.
Beijing propagates the notion that it has rights in the Arctic, engages in "lawfare" to obfuscate the legal
framework, advocates institutional reform, and cultivates hard-power measures to secure its interests.
First and foremost. China harbors a deep sense of entitlement to Arctic re- sources, sea-lanes, and
governance. This entitlement relies on various justifications. As a Northern Hemisphere country that is
affected by Arctic warming, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the worlds most
populous state. China sees its role in Arctic affairs as indispensable. Chinese rear admiral Yin Zhuo made
this point in March 2010, proclaiming that "the Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no

nation has sovereignty over It Similarly, in 2009 Hu Zhengyue. Chinas assistant minister of foreign
affairs, warned that Arctic countries should "ensure a balance of coastal countries' interests and the
common interests of the international community."'' Hu, it seems, was advising the circumpolar states not
to lock up for themselves the resources and sea-lanes of the Arctic. China further asserts its rights by
employing the language of UNCI.OS to argue that the Arctic and its resources are the "common heritage
of all humankind" and do not belong exclusively to the Arctic Five." In reality, "common heritage" in
UNCLOS refers to the high seas, designated by UNCLOS as the area that lies beyond EEZ boundaries. If
the current territorial and continental-shelf claims of the circumpolar states are ultimately accepted as
presented. 88 percent of the Arc lit seabed would likely (all under their combined sovereign EEZ
jurisdictions, with the small "doughnut hole" in the center qualifying as the common heritage. Since,
however, most of the resource wealth in the Arctic lies within these claims. China perpetuates the notion
that the entire Arctic Ocean is the common heritage of humankind so as to expand its legal rights there."
This sort of "lawfare." or misuse of the "law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an
operational objective." is an essential component of Chinas strategy, enabling the PRC to circumvent its
weaker status as a non-Arctic state through asymmetrical means." China also appears bent on reforming
the institutions governing the Arctic so as to create for itself a more favorable legal environment Chinas
national news magazine Beijing Review has boldly asserted that every treat)* and organization
constituting the Arctic legal regimeincluding UNCLOS, the International Maritime Organization, and
the Arctic Councilis riddled with flaws and must be reformed. For example, in Chinas view the laws
enacted by the Arctic Council are not legally binding and "a politically valid ... Arctic governance system
has yet to be established." Moreover. China resents the fact that Arctic affairs are dominated by the littoral
states, claiming that "it is unimaginable that non-Arctic states will remain users of Arctic shipping routes
and consumers of Arctic energy without playing a role in the decision-making process.... [A]n end to the
Arctic states' monopoly of Arctic affairs is now imperative

Aquaculture
US aquaculture expansion trades off with Chinas market share
Bondie and Wolf 2013
[Marcella and Anna U of I Chicago. Planning for Sustainable Aquaculture 2013
http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/upp/research/research/Student%20Pages/pdf/bondie_wolf_project.pdf]

As many studies assert, the United States is the largest Western importer of tilapia, China is the largest
global exporter of tilapia, and both will continue to be so into the future. This suggests that contemporary
food systems are primarily influenced by global market forces and large food distributors, such as WalMart and Costco. These distributors, though in a position to incentivize aquaculture producers to practice
sustainable methods, merely react to current unsustainable practices, rather than taking a proactive
approach to avoiding unsustainable practices at the start. To counter this trend of importing unsustainably
farmed fish, countries that have the economic means and the need to increase food security should
encourage legislation that enables municipalities and regional areas to participate in the creation and
support of local aquaculture systems. The growth of small, local aquaculture operations will allow
consumers a healthy supply of fish protein and may reduce the global market share of Chinese
aquaculture. This is likely to result in reducing the often- unavoidable unsustainable practices that stem
from large-scale production and export of fish product.

Marine Reserves/Conservation
China hates ocean protection efforts they would be angered by the plan because
they perceive it as infringing upon their development efforts empirical evidence
DSO 2012
[Der Speigel (Prominent German publication) Online. Saving the Southern Ocean: China, Russia Block Plan to Protect
Antarctic Waters 11/2/12 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-and-russia-block-plan-to-create-ocean-sanctuaries-inantarctica-a-864962.html]

Proposals to establish marine reserves in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean were stymied by
Russia, China and Ukraine at the end of a two-week international summit in Australia on Thursday.
Commercial fishing restrictions in the proposed sanctuaries proved to be the main sticking point. A
meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in
Hobart, Australia ended in deadlock on Thursday when member nations failed to reach agreement on new
protected areas across Antarctica, home to the world's most intact marine ecosystem. The two-week
CCAMLR talks, attended by representatives from 24 nations and the European Union, were geared at
establishing giant marine sanctuaries in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean. One of the most
pristine ocean regions in the world, its waters are home to penguins, seals, whales and seabirds, whose
food sources are increasingly under threat from climate change and overfishing. At stake are the region's
stocks of krill, a valuable crustacean which is the keystone species of the Antarctic ecosystem. The
growing global demand for animal feed and fish bait is causing a rapid decline in its numbers .
"Antarctica is home to unique ecosystems," said German Agricultural Minister Ilse Aigner ahead of the
talks, pledging that Germany would "actively support protection of its oceans." A US-New Zealand plan
foresaw a 1.6 million square kilometer protected area in the Ross Sea, while nations led by the EU and
Australia had proposed a series of reserves encompassing 1.9 million square kilometers -- an area bigger
than Alaska. Commercial Versus Conservation Interests But these efforts were thwarted by resistance
from China, Russia and Ukraine, which raised objections to fishing restrictions in the proposed reserve on
the grounds they would have too much impact on their annual hauls. "(Establishing marine reserves) is a
complex process involving a large amount of scientific research as well as international diplomacy," said
CCAMLR in a statement. "It was decided that further consideration of the proposals is needed." Amid
the lack of consensus, the decision on the ocean sanctuary was postponed until a special session to be held
in Germany in July 2013. Environmentalists expressed their concern at the outcome of the CCAMLR
talks. "We're deeply disappointed," Steve Campbell of the Antarctic Ocean Alliance told Reuters.
"Members failed to establish any large-scale Antarctic marine protection because a number of countries
actively blocked conservation efforts." "CCAMLR has behaved like a fisheries organization instead of
an organization dedicated to conservation of Antarctic waters," railed Farah Obaidullah of Greenpeace.
Gerry Leape from the Pew Environment Group agreed, telling AFP that "In 2011, participating countries
agreed to work together to protect and conserve the unique marine life that thrives in the ocean
surrounding Antarctica. Instead, they are heading home and leaving the door wide open to unchecked
commercial fishing in these areas."

Offshore Wind
Lack of U.S. production lets china dominate the offshore wind market US market
crowds out
Zoninsein 10 [Manuela, writer for the new York times. 9/7/10, Chinese Offshore Development Blows Past U.S.
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/09/07/07climatewire-chinese-offshore-development-blows-past-us-47150.html?pagewanted=all //jweideman]

As proposed American offshore wind-farm projects creep forward -- slowed by state legislative debates,
due diligence and environmental impact assessments -- China has leapt past the United States, installing
its first offshore wind farm. Several other farms also are already under construction, and even the Chinese
government's ambitious targets seem low compared to industry dreaming. "What the U.S. doesn't realize,"
said Peggy Liu, founder and chairwoman of the Joint U.S.-China Collaboration on Clean Energy, is that
China "is going from manufacturing hub to the clean-tech laboratory of the world." The first major offshore wind farm
outside of Europe is located in the East China Sea, near Shanghai. The 102-megawatt Donghai Bridge Wind Farm began
transmitting power to the national grid in July and signals a new direction for Chinese renewable energy
projects and the initiation of a national policy focusing not just on wind power, but increasingly on the
offshore variety. Moreover, "it serves as a showcase of what the Chinese can do offshore ... and it's quite significant," said Rachel Enslow, a wind consultant
and co-author of the report "China, Norway and Offshore Wind Development," published in March by Azure International for the World Wildlife Fund Norway.

China is ready to show the

world what its own homegrown wind technology can do. All of Donghai Bridge's 34 turbines, 3 MW
capacity each, were built by Sinovel Wind Group, China's largest wind turbine manufacturer, though designed in
cooperation with American Superconductor. The Beijing-based company began building the farm at the mouth of the
Yangtze River Delta in September 2008. CCCC Third Harbor Engineering Co. Ltd., also based in Beijing,
installed the turbines, completing construction in February 2010. Shanghai's Zhongtian Technologies
Submarine Optic Fiber Cable Co. Ltd. manufactured the 78 km of submarine cable. Powering 200,000
households while reducing CO2 In China, one key challenge will be developing foundations for the soft seabed commonly found off the coast
Planned to strategically coincide with the World Expo in Shanghai, which is being fed electricity from the offshore farm,

of the East China Sea, especially since "most offshore wind farms that will be developed in China will be intertidal," said Gerald Page, managing director of Equinox
Energy Partners, a venture capital firm in Beijing. The $337 million project, located 8 to 13 km (about 5 to 8 miles) from the coast, was erected on soft seabed
conditions using a multi-pile foundation structure. About eight to 10 legs are placed on concrete piles, on top of which are stacked a concrete tack and then the
turbines. Shanghai Investigation, Design and Research Institute conceived the foundation. During low tide, the turbine foundations are exposed; during high tide, they
become submerged in about 5 meters (16 feet) of water. Unlike in Europe, which is much more focused on developing deepwater (greater than 50 meters, or 164 feet,
deep) turbine technology, China is exploring unique foundation technology and demonstrating innovative pursuits.
The farm is expected to eventually generate an annual 267 million kilowatt-hours of electricity -- enough to power 200,000 Shanghai households. China's government
claims that annually, the wind farm will cut use of 100,000 tons of coal, reducing carbon emissions by 246,058 tons. Currently, the wind farm's capacity is equivalent
to only 1 percent of the city's total power production of about 18,200 MW, which is generated mostly from traditional fuel-based sources, according to China Daily,
the state-run English-language daily newspaper in Beijing. Construction of the Donghai project's second phase, on the west side of the bridge, has been approved by
authorities. It, too, is projected to produce about 100 MW. An additional four farms surrounding Shanghai are currently under negotiation, and the city hopes to
complete 13 wind farms by 2020, with the majority of the expected 1,000 MW capacity supplied by offshore wind farms. An industry's itch to expand The
"Development Plan on Emerging Energies" released July 20 outlines wind production goals through 2020 by the Chinese government. According to the plan, offshore
wind power is expected to reach 30 gigawatts, and coastal provinces were required to start drafting offshore wind-grid implementation plans. This includes Liaoning,
Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. In the next three to four years, according to the Azure-WWF report, in total, 514 MW
should be installed along this coastline. As of March this year, pipelines accommodating 17 MW were already installed between Donghai and a pilot wind project in
Bohai Bay near Tianjin. The expected long-term cumulative pipeline, at 13.7 GW, is nearly halfway to the estimated 2020 goal, but this doesn't necessarily mean that
the Mandarins are fully behind renewable technologies and warmly welcoming a greener future. "The top-level people are cautiously optimistic," explained Andrew
Grieve, a senior researcher at J Capital Research, an equities research company based in Beijing. "They are far more optimistic on the local and provincial level."
Behind closed doors, industry insiders hear buzz and speculation that coastal provinces' plans far exceed the existing Chinese central government's plans. Grieve
stressed that the real force for wind comes from manufacturers that are itching to expand the market. "Comparatively speaking," he said, "the central government is
the most conservative of the lot." All this is without official numbers, as the 12th Five-Year Plan (for the 2011-2015 time period) has still not been formally unveiled.
It remains in final draft form, and though the original release date was slated for March, approval keeps moving backward. Analysts expect the implementation date
should, at the latest, arrive on Jan. 1, 2011. The central government's aim was to hit 10 GW by 2010, a goal that was quickly surpassed. "Industry is either going to
take their number and beat it, or government is going to have to step in and calm down growth," Grieve said. Rumors support the latter, but given historical trends, the
former would seem more likely. The Azure-WWF report describes the offshore wind energy generation potential in China as huge -- calculated as 11,000 terawatthours, similar to that of the North Sea in western Europe. "China has the largest wind resources in the world, and three-quarters of them are offshore," Barbara
Finamore, director of the Natural Resources Defense Council's Beijing office, told Scientific American. The existing industry is nowhere near that large. As Grieve
explained, "apart from the 1 gigawatt of bids this year, there are no central government national targets for offshore wind, although possible national targets of 5
gigawatts by 2015 and 30 gigawatts by 2020 have been suggested." The provincial government-proposed provincial offshore development plans amount to 10.2 GW
by 2015 and 22.7 GW by 2020. The growth in China's wind manufacturing market remains focused on the domestic market -- for now. Dheeraj Choudhary, who runs
Parker Hannifin Corp.'s Global Renewable Energy business unit, said "60 to 70 percent of wind turbine market growth has come from domestic manufacturers, and
not the international guys." Joanna

Lewis, an assistant professor of science, technology and international affairs at

Georgetown University who works as a China program adviser to the Energy Foundation, agreed: "No

one has nearly as much capacity [as China] installed in the world." As a result, there is still "very strong demand for wind
turbines in China, and they're not at stage where supply exceeds demand." Eyeing markets abroad Talk to wind turbine and
technology experts and manufacturers, and they see a day not too far off when Chinese-produced (and in
some cases, Chinese-invented) turbines will service foreign markets. Anthony Fullelove, project manager for North Brown Hill
Wind Farm, based in Sydney, Australia, expects that his country, as well as Europe and the United States, will see a
sharp increase in turbines sourced from China -- as the technology rises to meet global standards and
prices drop -- to make wind farms viable especially in a generation sector without a carbon price. "Turbine manufacturers in China are
starting to look for markets abroad upon seeing Chinese market getting tighter and tighter , with more
companies selling in China," Lewis added. For the time being, Chinese manufacturers still work hand in hand with foreign engineers and designers.
But that is starting to shift. "Reliance is much lower," noted Choudhary. Instead, Chinese manufacturers look to foreign companies to provide subsystems and
components. All of China's top five turbine manufacturers have worked with foreign engineers yet retained the intellectual property rights on the technologies.
Meanwhile, as

China moves forward with installing water-based wind farms as well as developing its
domestic technological know-how, not a single offshore wind turbine is in use in the United States. Though
the 130-turbine Cape Wind project, in Nantucket Sound off the coast of Massachusetts, has received federal approval, several potential regulatory and judicial hurdles
lurk. Similarly, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission recently approved a power purchase agreement proposed for the Block Island farm off of Rhode Island,
which would start with an initial eight turbines as a model, yet Attorney General Patrick Lynch (D) has vowed to appeal the decision to the state Supreme Court. When
discussing the creation of an Atlantic Offshore Wind Energy Consortium in February, U.S. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said it currently takes seven to nine years for
offshore wind project to receive approval. At this point, Cape Wind is moving into its 10th year of negotiations. In comparison, China's Renewable Energy Law was
implemented in January 2006. By November 2007, the Bohai model turbine was installed. So important was the Donghai farm to the Chinese Communist Party, it
footed the bill to ensure the project would be completed in time for Expo 2010 in Shanghai, during which time China

world watching.

has the eyes of the whole

Zero Sum Renewables

Renewables competition is zero sum
Bennhold 10 [Katrin, Writes for the New York Times Business. 1/29/10, Race Is on to Develop Green, Clean Technology
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/global/30davos.html?dbk&_r=0 //jweideman]

It is shaping up to be the Great Game of the 21st century. To top officials and business executives here at
the World Economic Forum, Topic A this year was the race to develop greener, cleaner technology, which
is emerging as one of the critical factors in reshaping the world economy as emerging powers snap at the
heels of battered Western economies. With the United States and China sizing each other up across the Pacific
and Europe seeking to maintain its economic stature, it is a battle for potentially millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in
export revenues. The outcome which pits a venture capital-driven market approach relying on
government subsides against a top-down system of state capitalism has the potential to influence how economic and political
systems evolve. Concern that China may be edging ahead in potentially lucrative growth sectors like renewable
energy was palpable here, where senior officials from the United States and Europe warned that the West could not
afford to be complacent. Six months ago my biggest worry was that an emissions deal would make American business less competitive compared to
China, said Senator Lindsay Graham, a Republican from South Carolina who has been deeply involved in climate change issues in Congress. Now my concern is
that every day that we delay trying to find a price for carbon is a day that China uses to dominate the green economy. He added: China

has made a
long-term strategic decision and they are going gang-busters. Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister, agreed. Its a race and
whoever wins that race will dominate economic development , she said. The emerging markets are well-placed. The global
economic downturn, which hit the aging developed world far harder than fast-growing emerging markets, has focused attention on the job-creating potential of green
technology, seen by many here as the next industrial revolution. In the energy sector alone, the deployment of new technologies, like wind and solar power, has the
potential to support 20 million jobs by 2030 and trillions of dollars in revenue, analysts estimate. Ms. Lagarde estimated that as many as 240,000 jobs could be added
in France over the next few years, helping offset the 400,000 lost last year in the slump. While new energy sources will initially be more expensive than fossil fuels,
politicians in the West, mindful of a stagnant or shrinking manufacturing base, are hopeful that clean technology offers a way of rebuilding older industrial areas by
creating a comprehensive green supply chain. The

quest for a new comparative advantage, economists say, is all the more
urgent as the crisis has left the financial-services sector reeling a sector that was long considered one
of the last bastions of Western sophistication. From Chinas perspective, experts here said, climate change
offers the opportunity to leapfrog Western competitors. The low-carbon economy is the future, said David Li Daokui, a professor at
the Center for China in the World Economy in Beijing.

Internal Link

EXT Internal Link

Ocean is key in light of military corruption, the nations legitimacy is based on
incoming reforms the USs ocean policies are seen as an obstacle for China and the
US is pinned as the enemy that means the only scenario for PLA lashout in Taiwan
and Senkaku Island is the plan ocean is seen as Chinas last way out in supremacy
this is just uniqueness for us
*Insert Zero Sum Card*
Rogue actions are likely by the PLA in order to support nationalist interests
internal discipline is lacking now
World Review, indpt non partisan NY magazine, 7/28
(July, http://www.worldreview.info/content/why-chinas-pla-weak-dangerous-army, Why Chinas PLA is
a weak but dangerous army, JC, 11/3)

CHINA's military capability and intentions are causing significant concern among its regional neighbours
and the United States, writes guest expert Rogier Creemers. But Beijing continues to stress that its rise
will be peaceful despite growing military budgets, increased tensions across the South and East China
Seas, and seemingly calculated incidents and displays of power. And while China increasingly throws its
weight around, its neighbours are exploring cooperative coalitions to counter the perceived threat.
However, Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is not a professional fighting force when compared
with the US, South Korea and its neighbours. It is a party army an armed wing of the Chinese
Communist Party. China, which last fought an external war in 1979 in Vietnam, is strong on sophisticated
military technology, but weak in manpower. The PLA lacks military professionalism and combat
experience - which makes China potentially very dangerous. While different elements of the PLA have
been involved in peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations around the world, the main focus of the PLA
has remained limited to the interests which the government - the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) - has
traditionally designated as central. Primarily, these are its power and sovereignty within the first line of
islands off its shore - Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. China is now pursuing these interests in
a more aggressive manner than before. Beijing has sought stability in its region until very recently. But it
has become more forthright in the assertion of its naval claims, and seems less concerned with the ire its
activities may cause its neighbours. There is an element of strategic risk involved here. An important
element is the presence of the United States. The 2012 Pivot to East Asia has been understood in Beijing
as a move to counter its growing regional power, and considerable planning efforts have been spent to
deny US units area access in case of conflicts. But perceptions of goals and interests tell us little about
whether or not the Peoples Liberation Army is able to achieve the objectives outlined by the leadership,
and reach its own performance standards. The PLA suffered from poor command and crude tactics,
leading to extensive casualties and an indecisive outcome in its last external conflict which was in the
Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979. Since then, the PLA has seen structural streamlining, modernising its
material and professionalising its troops. Yet, while the technological capabilities of Chinas new weapons
systems are well known, much less is clear about the PLA's ability to use them. Perhaps the biggest
challenge for Chinas military is creating the internal discipline and esprit de corps required in a
modern military. The PLA, like other parts of the Chinese state, remains deeply involved in a culture of
bribery and corruption and patrimony. One of the most important question is: what is the relationship
between the new leadership and the PLA? Within the army itself, there are officers who claim that

ideological correctness must be restored, while there are others who propose deeper modernisation. The
PLA occupies a particular position within the Party-State apparatus. It was the PLA which powered the
CCP to victory in the wars against Japan and the Republicans. Most of the first generation leadership,
including President Xi Jinpings father, Xi Zhongxun, held military command positions. PLA support was
essential in overthrowing the political faction, the Gang of Four, and bringing the reformist Deng
Xiaoping to power. The pact between the army and the party was re-sealed in blood on the streets of
Beijing and in Tiananmen Square in student-led demonstrations in 1989. There is only one point of
interaction between the civil and military command structure - the chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party s Central Military Commission currently President Xi. There are political risks involved in
having a large, well-trained body of armed men and women, and loyalty must be maintained in order to
prevent the emergence of a Praetorian Guard of ambitious self-servers which might interfere with party
processes. This might be why political indoctrination still occupies a considerable part of military training
and also influences strategic calculations at the highest levels of power. The armed forces seem to be
treated relatively generously. President Xi Jinpings anti-corruption campaign, for instance, seems not to
have extended to the ranks of the PLA. Military budgets continue to grow at a speed vastly outstripping
GDP growth. They have been given more rein to act in the East and South China Seas. But it is unclear
whether this new hawkishness reflects a greater willingness of President Xi to act, or an inability to
restrain his commanding officers who want to give their new equipment a whirl. It is exactly this lack of
clarity, together with the risks and hazards which Chinese forces are increasingly taking, which is
concerning to foreign observers. This lack of clarity brings risks. While China may not display overt
aggression, the likelihood of unintended hostilities is growing. Equally disturbing is that it is not yet
clear whether Chinas discipline and command structures are sufficiently robust to prevent rogue actions
on its own side.

A2 Reforms Dont Solve

Panda evidence extension
No official allegiance reforms make pla loyal to the CCP leadership and root out
unloyal high ranking officials
Status quo PLA is extremely corrupt doesnt listen to CCP
Garnaut, correspondent for Foreign Policy, 2013
(John, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/xis_war_drums).
Despite the hype, however, high-ranking insiders have come forward to say the Chinese military is rotten
to the core. Formal hierarchies are trumped by personal patronage, coordination between branches is
minimal, and corruption is so pervasive that senior positions are sold to the highest bidders while
weapons funding is siphoned into private pockets. "Corruption has become extremely institutionalized
and significant," says Tai Ming Cheung, director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at
the University of California/San Diego. "It makes it much more difficult to develop, produce, and field
the weapons systems required to achieve world-class power projection." It's not just corruption. More
than three decades of peace, a booming economy, and an opaque administrative system have taken their
toll as well, not to mention that the PLA is one of the world's largest bureaucracies -- and behaves
accordingly. "Each unit has a committee with a commander, political commissar, and deputies, to the
point they have a meeting now for everything," says Nan Li, associate professor at the U.S. Naval War
College's China Maritime Studies Institute. Li told me that PLA military universities have even been
reduced to printing textbooks that instruct commanders how to transcend the tyranny of committee-style
decision-making. "That shows how much the PLA has been defeated by -- corroded by -- peace," he says.
Nor is the military necessarily 100 percent loyal to its political masters in the Communist Party -- a
terrifying prospect for a new leader trying to consolidate his power. In theory, the PLA has always been
subordinate to the civilian side of the party, but the actual command linkages are largely limited to its top
leader and sometimes his deputy. In 2012 -- in the wake of the political destruction of Xi's potential rival,
Bo Xilai, who boasted extensive informal ties within the military -- the drumbeat of official demands that
the PLA demonstrate the proper obeisance to the party and the party's outgoing general secretary, Hu,
suggested the chain of military command might be more fragile than commonly understood.