Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Rev.No.: 1 Class: 1
INSTRUMENT CONTROL
AND
SAFEGUARDING PHILOSOPHY
04-Jan-2011
AFC
B. Khodabakhshi
H.Tajik
B.Yousefian
F.zanjani
H.Hoseini-Nik
B.Yousefian
F.zanjani
H.Hoseini-Nik
P.M.
P.D.
DETAIL ENGINEERING
0
06-07-2010
IFR
A.Asghari
H.Tajik
REV.
DATE
DESCRIPTION
PREP.
CHKD.
APPD.
CONTRACTOR
APPD.
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Page 1 of 47
COMPANY
APPD.
Rev. 1
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CONTENTS
1.
SCOPE ................................................................................................................................. 7
2.
3.
4.
5.
5.1.
ABBREVIATION ................................................................................................................... 8
5.2.
DEFINITION....................................................................................................................... 10
6.
6.1.
GENERAL ......................................................................................................................... 10
6.2.
OPERATING ASPECTS....................................................................................................... 10
6.2.1.2.
6.5.
7.
7.1.
CONTROL CENTERS........................................................................................................ 15
CONTROL BUILDING ......................................................................................................... 15
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Rev. 1
8.3.
8.4.
8.5.
FIELD ...............................................................................................................................19
8.6.
9.
9.1.
9.3.
9.4.
9.5.
9.6.
9.7.
10.
10.1.
10.1.1.
GENERAL ..................................................................................................................... 23
10.1.2.
10.1.3.
10.1.4.
10.1.5.
10.2.
10.3.
10.3.1.
10.3.2.
10.4.
10.5.
10.5.1.
10.5.2.
10.5.3.
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Rev. 1
10.6.1.
10.6.2.
10.6.3.
10.6.4.
10.6.5.
10.7.
11.
11.1.
GENERAL ......................................................................................................................... 31
11.2.
11.3.
11.3.1.
11.3.2.
11.3.3.
11.3.4.
11.3.5.
11.3.6.
12.
12.1.
GENERAL ......................................................................................................................... 33
12.2.
12.3.
13.
13.1.
13.2.
13.3.
13.4.
14.
FIELD INSTRUMENTATION.......................................................................................... 37
14.1.
14.2.
15.
SIGNAL TRANSMISSION.............................................................................................. 42
15.1.
GENERAL ......................................................................................................................... 42
15.2.
15.3.
15.4.
15.5.
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Rev. 1
15.6.
15.7.
15.7.1.
GENERAL ..................................................................................................................... 44
15.7.2.
16.
POWER SUPPLY........................................................................................................... 45
17.
17.1.
18.
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Page 6 of 47
Rev. 1
1. SCOPE
The SOUTH PARS Phases 22&23&24 Facilities Project is part of the development of
the South Pars gas field located offshore at about 100km from the Iranian coast. The
Project includes:
Two well-head platforms,
A Gas Treatment Plant located Onshore and two sea lines to be laid between
wellhead platforms and the Onshore plant to transport the reservoir fluid,
An Onshore 56 gas pipeline from the Onshore Plant to IGAT tie-in manifold in the
vicinity of Kangan Refinery
This specification defines the main principles to be considered for the design and the
Implementation of the control & safety systems, the instrumentation of the Onshore
facilities, and the interfaces with the Phase 22&23&24 Offshore facilities.
2. ONSHORE FACILITIES
The new phases 22, 23 and 24 onshore facilities include the following main process
units:
Receiving facilities
Gas trains 1, 2, 3, 4
NGL fractionation units 1,2
Ethane, Propane and Butane treatment and drying units 1,2
Sulfur recovery units 1, 2, 3, 4
Condensate trains 1, 2
Export gas compression unit
MEG regeneration unit
Propane and Butane storages and loading
Condensate storages and export
Sour water stripping
Condensate back up stabilisation
Refrigerant units
Caustic Regeneration
Propane treatment
Butane treatment
Ethane treatment
TGT unit (1 train for each phase)
DMC
Additionally to these process units the Plant includes the following utility units:
Drainage and Effluent treatment disposal
Process water handling
Steam generation
Fuel gas system
Instrument and Process air generation
Nitrogen generation
Electrical Generation & Distribution
Diesel and Emergency Electrical Generation & Distribution
Propane refrigerant storage
Sea lines
Onshore pipeline
See Water Intake
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4. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
This philosophy is complemented by the following documents:
RP 2224 130 1900 001:
Safety Concept
RP 2224 130 1900 002:
Active fire fighting
RP 2224 999 1900 003:
Fire and Gas detection
RP 2224 999 1530 002:
Telecommunication General Specification
RP 2224 999 1511 002:
Classification of Packages and DCS Serial
Interfaces
DW 2224 999 1581 0001:
IPCS Block Diagram
DW 2224 999 1530 0002:
Telecommunication general architecture
DB 2224 999 P312 202:
Overall process description
DB 2224 999 P312 209:
Safety Systems process description
RP 2224 999 1511 005:
Tank Gauging System General Requirements
RP-2224-999-1511-033:
Instrumentation and Control for Packages
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Rev. 1
Intrinsically Safe
Instrument Technical Room
Junction box
Local Area Network
Loading Arms System
Light Emitting Diode
Lower Flammable Limit
Local Panel for main equipment (heater, compressor)
Low Voltage
Manual Call Point
Marshalling Cabinet
Motor Control Center
Mooring Load monitoring System
Meteorological/Oceanographic System
Motor Operated Valve
Mean Time Between Failure
Marine Terminal Information System
Mean Time To Repair
Operator Control Station
Operator Control Desk
Push-Button
Personal Computer
Process Control System
Power Distribution Control System
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
Programmable Logic Controller
Pipeline Monitoring System
Random Access Memory
Ship Berthing System
System Cabinet
Wellhead Platform 1
Wellhead Platform 2
Shutdown valve
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
Ship to Shore Link
South Pars Integrated Fiber Optic Network
Electrical SubStation
Tank Gauging system
Unit Control Panel
Ultra high frequency
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Ultimate Safety System
Video Display Unit
Very high frequency
Process on/off Valve
Sequence Valve
Tail Gas Treatment Unit
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Rev. 1
5.2. DEFINITION
COMPANY:
PARS
OIL
&
GAS
COMPANY
(POGC)
or
his
nominated
representative.
Contractor: Shall be read P.S.A.
Vendor: Any person, firm or company which manufacture or supply
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Day to day plant operation of the process trains and major utility units will be controlled
from the CCR. The DCS operator consoles shall be the main operating interfaces.
Local panels shall only be used where there is a need to operate, start or test major
plant equipment in the field. As an example, rotating equipment auxiliaries (lube and
seal oil, cooling water systems) shall normally be started locally.
Start-up inhibits shall be carried out automatically as far as possible by the control
system during a start up sequence, or manually from the operator console.
In normal operation, the control system shall aim at a steady, efficient and safe
operation of the plant and should be capable of operating between the maximum and
the minimum design conditions as given in the basis of design.
Operator manipulations during normal operation shall be restricted to adjustment of set
points, change control modes (auto, manual, cascade, ...) activate remote commands
(open, close, run, stop, ....), acknowledge alarms.
Manual operation of controls shall be limited to special cases such as:
Repair of field equipment,
Start-up of rotating equipment,
Infrequent and simple operations.
Roving field operators shall perform such tasks as isolation, observation, changeover
to standby equipment under the supervision of CCR personnel.
CCTV facilities for remote monitoring of some specific areas (flares, ....) shall be
available above Operator Control desk (OCD) in CCR.
Software inhibit functions shall be available for safety systems for testing and
maintenance purposes via dedicated maintenance stations located in ITRs.
6.2.1.2.
While operating the units, the operator shall be informed on safety matters. Sufficient
means such as trend functions, indicators, and alarms shall be provided on DCS
console in the CCR to enable the detection of abnormal situation: abnormal operating
conditions, equipment failure, gas leaks, fire, and automatic shut-down
If the operating conditions approach the mechanical limits of the plant equipment, the
safety system shall automatically drive the plant to a safe condition.
Manual activation of the safety shutdown systems shall be from the OCD in CCR via
hardwired PBs and/or from the field, to initiate shutdowns or activate fire protection
systems.
After trips, return to normal operation shall not be possible unless the safety shutdown
systems have been manually reset. This is to avoid the possibility of an uncontrolled
Plant re-start when the process has returned to a safe condition.
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control and monitoring of SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms from DCS
operator consoles in the CCR.
monitoring of SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms shutdowns initiated locally
either on the local hydraulic panels or from local PBs
remote initiation of SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms shutdown via PBs on
CCR OCD
CCTV facilities located above OCD in CCR will also allow remote monitoring of SPD
22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms.
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The SPIFON Network is designed to connect all offshore platforms to their respective
onshore control building of their current phases of development by fiber optic cable
Initial existing topology of the South Pars Integrated Fiber Optic Network (SPIFON)
includes Onshore Facilities and relevant Offshore platforms ,However the design of the
SDH equipments are fully compatible with the requirement of future phases.
This integration shall be achieved by installation of a 24-cores submarine heavy double
armored single mode fiber Optic cable, and also extension of existing onshore ring
from other phases to phases 22, 23 & 24 including all configuration and
synchronization will be done by SPIFON.
The SDH nodes shall be installed in SPD22, 24A , SPD 23, 24B and phases 22, 23 &
24 onshore Telecom Building with all necessary interfacing equipment in SDH nodes of
other SPDs.
The network shall utilize SDH-STM16 ring configuration and shall be easy to upgrade.
The specification, network configuration and protection, installation, fiber optic cables
and SDH nodes, etc shall be in full compliance with the existing SPIFON.
Consequently remote operation of SPD 22, 24A and SPD 23, 24B platforms shall be
provided by onshore facilities in Assaluyeh, Through SPIFON as well as
telecommunication facilities between platforms and onshore facilities. The voice and
data transmission from each platform to counterpart SDH nodes shall include as a
minimum, the PCS/Safety data transmission (integration into the onshore
communication over high speed Ethernet in SDH nodes). Additionally some important
Production data, F&G, ESD system status/alarms, PABX Connection, CCTV,
Meteorological, and other telecommunication requirements shall be transmitted to the
nearby NIOC Phase 1 Development (SPQ1platform) just for monitoring purpose.
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Rev. 1
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Rev. 1
7. CONTROL CENTERS
7.1. CONTROL BUILDING
Appropriate facilities, air conditioning systems and lighting including essential lighting
shall be provided in Control room and technical rooms.
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Rev. 1
Fourteen separate ITRs shall serve the areas and sections of the Plant as follows:
-
ITR 7 for Condensate Trains, Reception Facilities and, except Sea water
supply intake and distribution network
ITR 8 for MEG Regeneration Units, DMC, Diesel storage, Diesel generator,
chemical storage , Propane refrigerant storage & Condensate storage
ITR10 for NGL fractionation, Ethane treatment and drying , Export Gas
Compression
ITR 13 for Propane and Butane storage & export & Flare K.O. Drum
System equipment related to Propane and Butane metering & loading (units 149
and150) will be located in jetty building.
ITRs shall have air-conditioning units to maintain suitable environmental conditions for
the installed equipment and occasional occupation.
Refer to appendix 1 for list of process and utility units connected to each ITR. The ITR
and OCD relevant to new or modified units will be defined during the FEED phase,
based on the plant layout.
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Five operator control station (OCS) for OCD 1 & 2: four for the PCS. one for ESD
and F&G function.
Four operator control stations (OCS) for OCD 3 & 4: three for the PCS. one for ESD
and F&G functions. These stations will be identical and configured in such a way that
they are operationally interchangeable.
An ESD panel with PBs hardwired to ESD systems to initiate critical ESD/EDP
actions or USS actions per fire zone.
An F&G matrix panel that shall display the status of the F&G detection and
protection systems located in the different fire zones. The F&G matrix shall also
allow manual remote activation of the deluge systems.
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Maintenance PLC consoles for ESD and F&G systems permanently installed in the
each ITR.
The permanent ESD / F&G maintenance console shall also display the ESD or F&G
system status (system fault, line monitoring faults, cycle time,...), the ESD alarm file
with time stamping (refer to 10.7) or the F&G loops status.
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ESD and F&G system software/configuration modification download and upload shall
be restricted to a portable station, password protected.
This ESD and F&G system configuration portable station shall not be permanently
installed.
For major packaged units such as compressors, dedicated operator workstations shall
be provided as part of the Unit Control Panel. Engineering workstations shall be
provided if these UCPs employ programmable logic controllers.
8.5. FIELD
Shutdown actions may be initiated locally via PBs near equipment, main process
areas,Manual call points will be installed at strategic locations to provide for manual
initiation of alarm in the control room when a fire and gas emergency situation occurs.
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Provide a DCS VDU operator interface for remote control, operation and
monitoring of the Phase 22&23&24 Onshore Plant and Offshore platforms.
Provide the display for all process and auxiliary variables with recorded traces
(Real time and historical trend)
Alarm management
Reporting; a flexible layout of the reporting system shall be available for reporting
selected process and derived variables over selective periods.
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Back up controller shall automatically take over primary controller functions and control
strategy in case of malfunction of the later, and achieve continuous automatic control
without process disturbance or control upset.
Back up communication device shall be permanently tested to ensure it is not out of
service. Transfer to back up device in case of failure of primary device shall be
automatic without disrupting the system operation.
Failure of data communication link shall have no effect on operation of the PCS
controllers or any subsystems connected to PCS through serial links.
Failure of an individual OCS shall have no effect on the operation of other OCS.
For requirements related to safety functions refer to 10.2 and 10.5.1
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Page 21 of 47
Rev. 1
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Rev. 1
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Automatic initiation
Shutdown systems shall be designed to operate automatically when the process is
outside normal operating limits and when a dangerous situation is likely to occur
before an operator could intervene.
Shutdown should be automatically initiated only as last resort and should generally
be preceded by alarms displayed on OCS, to give operators as much time as
possible for corrective actions.
Shutdown systems will also be automatically activated by the F&G logic.
Manual initiation
Shutdown may be initiated manually, either locally, or remotely from CCR.
SD3 may be activated locally by PBs hardwired to PCS/UCP, or in CCR from the OCS.
Manual activation of ESD1 and SD2 shall be completely independent from PCS so that
PCS error cannot make this activation inoperable. It shall be initiated by PBs hardwired
directly to input cards of ESD systems.
A very few number of Ultimate Safety PBs by passing the ESD logic, allow initiating
main shutdown actions in case of ESD PLC errors. Those PBs shall be directly
hardwired, in marshalling cabinets, to the electrical supply circuits of solenoid valves
that operate the essential ESDVs or BDVs.
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Page 24 of 47
Rev. 1
ESDV
SDV
BDV
Control Valve
XV
MOV
ESD1
Yes
No (3)
No
No
Yes(4)
No
ESD2
No /Yes(2)
Yes
No
No
No
No
SD3
No /Yes(2)
Yes
Yes(1)
Yes(2)
No
No
EDP
No
No
Yes
Yes(2)
No
No
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Rev. 1
Offshore valves :
Off shore ESDV's and BDV's shall be locally and manually reset at valve location.
Valve open command (close command for BDV) shall then be initiated in SPD 22,
24A or SPD 23, 24B technical room.
Start-up inhibit
In order to be able to start equipment or sections of process, it shall be necessary
to inhibit some input to the ESD/DCS systems, as sensor signal may be in an
abnormal state prior to start-up and could cause a shutdown. Such inhibits are
designated as "start-up inhibits".
Activation of start-up inhibits shall be carried out automatically, as far as possible,
by the ESD/DCS systems during a start-up sequence. However some inhibit may
have to be set manually by the operator from the operating console.
It will only defeat the shutdown function. Input status monitoring shall remain in
operation.
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Page 26 of 47
Rev. 1
Each inhibit function shall be reset automatically either by the sensor signal
reverting to the normal or healthy state, after a dedicated step of the equipment
start-up sequence, after a predetermined time delay, or by a set of process
conditions. If cancelled automatically by the sensor signal, the input circuitry will
prevent nuisance trips being caused by oscillation of the input around the reset
value.
Maintenance inhibit
Maintenance inhibit switches shall be used to inhibit trip initiators to enable
maintenance or on-line functional testing.
The following shall be adhered to:
When the trip transmitter is inhibited, the operator shall check frequently the
associated control transmitter measurement so that manual actions (remove
the inhibit or activate manually ESD) can be taken in case the process moves
out of limits. Only one trip initiator shall be inhibited per interlock at any one
time to allow the operator to monitor properly the situation.
For reasons of security, inhibit facilities are not allowed on flame, axial
displacement and vibration sensors.
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Page 27 of 47
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Data that shall be able to be transferred from FGS/ESD to PCS such as detection
alarms system common alarms, inhibition status, fire fighting systems status, reset
commands,
ESD systems (Logic Solver central parts, I/O cards and communication cards) shall be
based on fault tolerant/redundant, programmable logic controller technology and shall
have hardware architecture that complies with the requirements of SIL3 as minimum.
The proposed system shall use Supplier standard field proven product lines.
ESD system shall generally follow the principle of de-energize to trip except for some
specific devices such as ESD PBs. All input/output that are not configured to be failsafe shall be line monitored.
Redundant configuration with
communication shall be provided.
redundant
processors
and
inter-processor
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Rev. 1
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The following typical data can be transferred from PCS to ESD/EDP systems:
Start-up inhibit
Tests initiation
Reset commands
Valve commands (e.g. close BDV, open ESDV, etc...).
Note: One integrated bus could be used for both ESD & PCS system, only when it
is SIL3 certified.
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F&G system will generally follow the principle of de-energize to trip for systems. All
input or outputs, which are not configured to be fail-safe, shall be line monitored.
Interface between the different F&G systems shall be via hardwired signals.
For non-process buildings, addressable fire detection panels shall be provided. Only
common alarm per type will be connected to F&G PLCs via hardwired signals for
display on CCR OCS and F&G matrix panel.
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Page 33 of 47
Rev. 1
either via hardwired volt free contacts and 4-20 mA analogue signals when few
data only are exchanged with PCS.
or via a high speed serial link when a large quantity of data are exchanged with
PCS In all cases signals to/from the ESD systems and F&G systems shall be
hardwired.
Main alarms shall be transmitted to the PCS for display on the alarm summary table.
When discrimination time on PCS is not sufficient to allow correct sequencing of
transmitted events and alarms, information shall then be sequenced and time tagged
by the UCP (in memory). Detailed alarm annunciation shall be available on cabinet in
ITR.
A specific register called first-up register will be carried to the IPCS in order to detect
the first shutdown.
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Start/Opening
Local
Remote
Stop/Closing
Local
Remote
Shutdown
Local
Remote
Yes (1&5)
Yes(1&3)
Yes
Yes(4)
Yes
No
N/A
Yes(3)
N/A
Yes(3)
N/A
Yes
Yes (1)
Yes (1&3)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
N/A
No
N/A
No
N/A
Yes(7)
Yes (1&5)
Yes (1&6)
Yes(5)
Yes(6)
N/A
No
N/A
Yes(1&3)
N/A
Yes(3)
N/A
Yes(3)
Notes:
1) If not prevented by trip condition, ESD logic not reset,...
2) Start/stop per fan - Emergency stop per module - Analogue control
(speed/louver/pitch) per module on PCS
3) Remote operation shall be indicated on P&IDs by Contractor when required
4) Equipment started for safety/emergency reasons will only be stopped or shutdown
manually in the field (local)
5) Only in "local mode"
6) Only in "remote mode"
7) ESD1 Trip via Electrical Isolation System
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Page 35 of 47
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Duty/Stand by selection
In cases where a standby pump is provided as a back up against duty pump
failure, the first pump started by the operator will be considered as the main. No
switch "Duty/Stand by" will be provided.
Exchange of non-critical signals from UCP to PDCS will be done through PCS.
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Page 36 of 47
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Smart transmitters (2 wires) with digital signal superimposed on 4-20mA signals shall
be the rule. Remote calibration shall be performed from a pocket interface at
marshalling level (No fieldbus provided for remote maintenance) or from maintenance
station in ITR if the PCS can support digital communication with selected smart
transmitters as a standard facility.
The following general requirements have to be used as guidelines for reliability and
redundancy of field sensors and final control elements.
For monitoring of process measurement:
level and pressure data available in CCR shall be backed by a local gauge; no
similar requirement for temperature and flow,
In case of pressurized tanks, continuous level measurement as well as alarm
actuators shall be duplicated.
Page 37 of 47
Rev. 1
same initiating device shall not be used for SD3 function and for control or
monitoring function,
Process variables used for initiating the shutdown systems shall be derived, as a
general rule, from the electronic transmitter signals. The threshold function shall be
achieved within safety systems logic. All transmitters shall have line integrity
monitoring and fault reporting by the safety systems,
If control and safety transmitters are provided at the same location the ranges for
both transmitters should be the same. Discrepancy monitoring shall be provided at
the PCS by comparison of the control & safety transmitters measured variables
and an alarm generated if the difference between the transmitters exceeds a predetermined threshold. Saturated signals under normal operating conditions shall be
avoided (e.g. a small range transmitter signal for Low Low level detect ion),
Local switch shall be forbidden for temperature, pressure and flow process alarm;
local switches may only be used for mechanical equipment if required by
Vendor/Supplier standard. and will be subject to COMPANY approval,
when switches are used as sensing devices, they shall have normally closed
contact to open on trip condition,
Online testing will be possible for sensors by using maintenance inhibit (refer to
10.4).
failure of instrument or signal shall be monitored and treated in the safety loop
(freezing of signal or safety position ...),
Failure of one element shall not jeopardize the availability of more than one safety
loop. As a consequence, shared component which is common to more than one
safety loop, which may fail and which is essential to the safety, shall be supplied
fully redundant,
SD2 & SD3 final control elements do not have to be redundant except if required
by Process specific requirement and identified on P&IDs.
if a SDV is used for both SD3 & SD2 functions it shall be equipped with two
solenoids, one controlled by DCS and one controlled by ESD system
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Page 38 of 47
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if a BDV is opened further to ESD1 & SD3 initiation, it shall be equipped with two
solenoids, one controlled by PCS (or UCP) and one controlled by ESD system.
The physical principle of measurement (mainly flow) may be shared with another
loop but the electronic processing must be segregated. For example, a single
vortex meter body shall have two separate sets of electronic or one orifice plate
primary device may be utilized with two transmitters connected to separate process
tapping. This facility is not acceptable for pressure, level and temperature.
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ESDV
Yes
No
No
Yes
BDV
Yes (Note 12)
Yes (Note 11)
No (Note 12)
N/A
SDV (Note13)
No (Note 7)
Yes (Note 11)
Yes (Note 10)
Yes
XV/KV
No
Yes
No
N/A
N/A
Yes
No (Note 7)
N/A
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes (Note 3)
No
Yes (Note 3) No
As Required
(Note 6)
As Required
(Note 6)
As Required
(Note 6)
As Required
(Note 6)
No
No
No
Yes
Yes (Note 3)
No (Note 2)
No (Note 2)
Notes:
1)
Additional permissive condition when required shall be represented by Contractor
on P&IDs. Actual valve shall be operated one after the other as per the operating
manual.
2)
Partial stroking and solenoid valve test facilities have to be specified for those
SDVs which are expected to be permanently open and which cannot be tested
during planned equipment shutdown. These SDV are to be identified by
Contractor on P&IDs.
3)
Requirement for local command shall be indicated by Contractor on PIDs.
4)
Auto reset requirement to be identified on P&IDs by Contractor.
5)
Control system means ESD/PCS/UCP for ESDVs/BDVs/SDVs depending on
ESD logic. Control system means PCS/UCP for XVs.
6)
Open and close commands have to be identified on P&IDs by Contractor.
7)
Except if specifically required by Contractor on P&IDs
8)
A by-pass operated by means of a special spring return key will allow the testing
of the solenoid valve without moving the valve. Solenoid by pass will be
monitored with PSL displayed in CCR.
9)
A spring return key switch allows a partial stroking of the valve
10) When activated by SD2
11) When activated by SD3
12) When activated by ESD1
13) Facilities are described for fail close SDVs. For fail open SDVs, if any, reverse
action shall be considered.
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The marshalling cabinets related to "type C" packages will preferably be integrated in
UCP and provided by Package Vendor/Supplier.
The termination on the technical room side of the marshalling cabinets shall be
organized in system cabinet order. Cross connection between field and system order
shall be performed within the cabinet.
Marshalling cabinets shall be dedicated to PCS&SD3 systems or ESD& F&G systems.
Mixing of signals from different units in a same system input/output card shall be
avoided.
Hardwired interconnections between UCP, PCS, F&G and ESD systems shall be via
marshalling cabinets. Contacts delivered by a system to an other system shall be
generally be free of voltage and powered by input cards of this later system.
High speed Serial links will connect UCPs, ESD system, F&G system and PCS
communication interfaces within the same ITR.
Electrical power, signal and serial link cables shall be routed beneath false floor.
Page 43 of 47
Rev. 1
High Speed Serial links between ESD and F&G systems and the PCS data
communication network shall be via a redundant communication link. Exchange of
data from PCS to ESD/F&G system shall be highly secure and shall be designed to
preserve the integrity of the safety system.
High Speed Serial links between PDCS master PLC and PCS communication in
ITR12 and between PDCS slave PLCs and PCS communication interfaces in
relevant ITR shall be redundant.
High Speed Serial link between UCP and PCS will generally be redundant.
High Speed Serial link between TGS and PCS will be non-redundant.
High Speed Serial link between CMS and PCS will be non redundant
High Speed Serial link between MTIS and PCS will be non redundant
High Speed Serial link between MTU and PCS shall be redundant
High Speed Serial link between PMS and PCS will be non redundant
For a detail list of serial communication links between DCS and other systems
reference is to be made to specification RP 2224 999 1511 002.
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Page 44 of 47
Rev. 1
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Page 45 of 47
Rev. 1
Unit
100-1
100-2
101-1
101-2
101-3
101-4
102-1 to 6
103-1
103-2
104-1
104-2
104-3
104-4
105-1
105-2
105-3
105-4
106-1 to 7
ITR
7
7
1
2
3
4
8
7
7
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
10
OCD
001
002
001
001
002
002
004
001
002
001
001
002
002
001
001
002
002
004
107-1
10
001
107-2
108-1
108-2
108-5
108-3
108-4
108-6
109
110
111-1
111-2
111-3
111-4
111-5
111-6
112
113-1
113-2
114-1
114-2
115-1
115-2
116-1
116-2
121
122
123
10
5
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
1
1
1
3
3
3
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
10
10
11
7
11
002
001
001
001
002
002
002
003
001
001
001
001
002
002
002
001
001
002
001
002
001
002
001
002
003
003
003
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Rev. 1
ITR
11
11
11
11
11
12
OCD
003
003
003
003
003
003
003
8
11
13
13
13
13
13
13
8
8
6
8
8
13
13
TLC Room
TLC Room
004
003
004
004
004
004
004
004
004
004
002
004
004
004
004
004
001
171
TLC Room
002
172
Onshore pipeline
TLC Room
003
Note:
1) OCD assignment is preliminary and shall be finalized by the EPC during the detail design
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Page 47 of 47