How does Kants concept of liberty as developed in On the common

saying: This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice
relate to his moral theory of freedom?

Introduction

This paper seeks to investigate the relationship between Kants moral

theory of freedom and his political concept of liberty as developed in On the
common saying: This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice
(henceforth TP). In chapter 1, we shall reconstruct Kants metaphysical account
of moral freedom, arguing that it is a positive and inner notion of freedom,
leading to a kingdom of ends that prepares the context for political society. With
this established, Chapter 2 discusses the Kantian doctrine of political liberty, a
negative and external notion of freedom which involves the right of coercion of
others, and then offers a critical analysis of the similarities and differences
between moral freedom and political liberty in terms of their formal normative
structure. Chapter 3 analyses the relationship of these two concepts together by
defending Kants denouncement of the right of revolution from Lockean counters,
ultimately recognising that his political understanding of coercion is inexorably
related to his metaphysics of morals through the concept of freedom, both of
which can be ultimately understood as consistently justified within Kants
philosophical investigations of political occurrences in humanity as morally
progressive.

Chapter 1: Moral Theory of Freedom

At the foundation of Kants moral philosophy lies the claim that humans,
endowed with faculties of reason, are self-determining beings with autonomous
will (GR 4:446). Strongly opposed to the Humean doctrine that reason is merely
slave of the passions (Taylor 1984: 103), Kant believes that what sets humanity
apart from the nature of the world of sense is that we are able to employ our
faculties of reason to transcend the natural necessity which governs objects
existing in the empirical world (GR 4: 447, 452). Through this faculty of reason,
we are able to function independently of alien causes, such as inclinations
towards passions, instincts and desires, thereby allowing our will to achieve
freedom (GR 4:446). While this transcendental freedom appears to take on a
negative form at first ie. freedom from determinate natural laws, Kant asserts
that this freedom of the will actually finds its genesis within a positive notion of
freedom as self-determination, presented as the quality of the will of being a law
to itself (GR 4:447). Simply, the will as autonomous or free must self-legislate by
imposing a universal law, independent of alien causes, upon itself in order to
govern its actions; this is essentially Kants formula for the categorical imperative
(henceforth CI). Here, where rational self-determination and transcendental
freedom entail one another in a form known as the reciprocity thesis (Kosch
2006: 24), Kant therefore concludes that the resultant categorical imperative
simply proves that a free will and a will under moral laws are the same.
Having established the fundamental link between freedom and morality,
the crux of the matter turns to this: since we now know that we ought to act in
accordance to the universal moral law ie. from duty, instead of merely by our

natural inclinations, how are we to practically accomplish this? Kant claims that
reason has been imparted to us as a practical faculty ie. one that ought to have
an influence on the will (GR 4: 396). Although we are susceptible to following our
own desires, Kant believes that it is through reason that we can distinguish
actions we do out of duty from actions out of mere inclinations (Taylor 1984:
104). This is elucidated in the first formulation of the CI, whereby we ought to
act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it become a universal law (GR 4:421) However, since we are unable to
tell whether a moral act is done out of duty or inclination just by looking at its
outcome, Kant believes that we instead have to look at the quality of ones
motivation (Taylor 1984: 110). This autonomy to act morally by individual
motivations is known as inner freedom (Williams 2010: 365). By focusing on
inner freedom, Kant provides a sphere in which an individual is free to perform a
duty in accordance to the universal moral law based on his own motivations and
not by external consequences or constraints.
Not only then is the function of rationality to set our ends (Taylor 1984:
103) as autonomous individuals pursuing inner freedom, but also, by extension
of the moral law being universally applicable for all rational beings, the
autonomy to pursue reason sets the ends for humanity itself as well. This is clear
through the second formulation of the CI: Act so that you use humanity, as much
in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as
end and never merely as means (GR 4:429). By recognising not only that we as
rational individuals are ends in ourselves, but also that every other human are
rational autonomous beings, it necessarily follows that we ought to treat them,
and by extension, all of humanity, as ends in themselves as well. Understood as
a whole of all ends of rational beings as ends in themselves, as well as of
their own ends, which each may set for himself in systematic connection (GR

4:433), Kant terms this ideal moral order the kingdom of ends. This is a perfect
society where common life amongst individuals is wholly governed by the a
priori moral principles conceived through the rational autonomous will, with its
people freely acting as legislating members of this moral order, subject to the
will of no other but only the universal moral laws (GR 4:434).

Chapter 2: Political Liberty

Having now established the context of Kants moral freedom by situating

the autonomous individual within a society of rational others via the kingdom of
ends, we can proceed to discuss Kants political liberty and his concept of rights.
While it may appear as though this moral kingdom of ends could then possibly
provide the formula for the perfect political society, it is noteworthy that Kant
urgently draws sharp distinction between moral and political spheres: for Kant,
the political is a realm not only of law, but of law coercively applied [italics
mine] (Taylor 1984:109). As discussed in chapter 1, a moral act is synonymous
to a free act which is judged by the quality of its motivation, but in the political
sphere it is only our act, not our motivations, which can be judged and forced
into compliance. Thus the political society cannot have its ends of coercing men
into moral beings, for that would constitute a contradiction. In fact, to have
politics even attempt to govern the morality of men by coercive means of
suppressing freedom, would not only bring about the exact opposite of his
ethical goals, but also undermine his political goals and render them insecure
(Kant 1792:96). To speak of imposing a moral law in the political arena is then
not as straightforward as simply superimposing the kingdom of ends formula as
the ideal political state; by the very nature of politics as coercive, we cannot
have a political constitution directed with a moral end.

Presented with the supposed incompatibility between politics and

morality, the question then turns to their difference: why must law applied in the
political realm involve coercion? According to Kant, by virtue of us as rational
individuals in possession of autonomous will, we have a political right which is
derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external
relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with the end which all men
have by nature (ie. the aim of achieving happiness) (TP 73) it is this freedom
concerning our external interactions with other human beings that we term outer
freedom. Inasmuch as Kant does believe that we ought to be free to pursue our
own individual conceptions of happiness, he immediately recognises that
empirically contingent conceptions of how to be happy cannot function as the
basis for which we have rights to pursue them; rather, considering that everyone
conceives of happiness differently, the basis of this right of freedom must be
founded upon the nature of humans as rational autonomous beings capable of
conceiving how to be worthy of happiness (TP 68), that is, how to be free to
pursue whatever happiness that makes me happy. Using Kants own example
that a despotic regime may infringe upon others freedom by prescribing how its
people ought to pursue happiness (TP 75), Kant is strongly against subjective
conceptions of happiness as ends, and therefore believes that an external right
based on coercion, that is, a restriction imposed through the arbitrary will of
another (TP 73), is necessary to serve as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom
(Kant 1996: 25), such that the freedom of everyone in the political society can be
harmonised.
While restricted freedom as non-interference from the conceptions of
happiness from others then seems negatively articulated in this realm of politics,
this concept of coercive right nonetheless remains logically consistent with
Kants positive concept of moral freedom constructed in chapter 1. Similar to the

universal moral laws, these laws are derived not by empirically subjective
notions of happiness or passions, but by a universal law brought forth by reason
alone, in adherence to which we as rational autonomous beings are to act from
duty if we are to act freely. Rephrased loosely, one could almost say that while
political freedom is restrained by rights, moral freedom is similarly restrained by
duties. Kant believes that freedom can only be found within a civil condition
because such legal restraints that are imposed on us in society are to be seen as
constraints we put on ourselves and so intrinsic to our political freedom
(Williams 2003:82). This strongly echoes the form of employing rationality as
self-legislation as constructed in chapter 1 and our duties to adhere to the
objective a priori principles conceived thus. In both moral and political realms,
we see that freedom constructed share a structural similitude in terms of legal
form, but differ regarding legal content. Nonetheless, as Bielefeldt puts it,
although they are never identical, they are essentially interconnected as
different normative orders of freedom, the difference of which [referring to the
inability to use morality for political ends] must always be upheld (Bielefeldt
1997:543) because these two different orders ultimately belong together with
regard to () every person as a morally autonomous subject.

Chapter 3: Against the Right of Revolution

Having elucidated that while Kants moral and political freedoms appear
contrarian in that we are not to use morality to organise political ends, and even
dichotomous in their respective scopes with the former focusing on an inner
freedom positively defined as rational self-determination and the latter an outer
freedom negatively defined as non-interference, we have argued nonetheless
that they are not mutually exclusive, since we have identified Kants formal
consistency in the construction of both laws conceived solely by reason, differing

only in normative content. Moreover, with the main difference being law
coercively applied, we need to analyse his legal system of coercive rights, most
controversial of which is his denial of the right of revolution. In a commonwealth
where no-one can coerce anyone else other than through the public law and its
executor, the head of state (TP 75), the question is whether there are coercive
rights against the sovereign. Kant firmly believes that there are no such
unalienable rights of coercion towards the sovereign, thereby absolutely
prohibiting revolution (TP 84). This is at once problematic as it appears to
impinge not only on Kants liberal commitment to freedom as self-determination
according to moral laws as developed in chapter 1, but also possibly freedom as
non-interference in chapter 2, should we consider the circumstance where the
constitution of an incumbent despotic regime evades all possibility of resistance
from its people. Hence, if we discover a sufficiently justified resolution behind
Kants denouncement of the right of revolution based on philosophical
consistency throughout his own system of liberal thought, it follows then that this
resolution will also serve to provide us with a final understanding on the
relationship between both moral and political freedoms.
Kants basic defence of this, at first glance, is tautological: if the people
are authorised to resist, then the constitution as highest legislation would contain
a provision that it is not the highest legislation, requiring another head above
the head of state, thus ultimately self-contradictory (TP 81; Kant 1996:320). Yet,
as a mere logical tautology this defence proves thoroughly inadequate in
justifying the basis of his denial of the right of revolution from a liberal
perspective. Against this framework, two main Lockean arguments (Flikschuh
2008:381) can be made whilst acknowledging the logical validity of Kants
defence: firstly, the Kants interpretation of the constitution is excessively
legalistic and does not recognise that such a founding document, as a public

declaration, can actually contain this suprapositive right to rebellion as this

provision has the function as a moral foundation to all positive law-making. As
an extension of the first, the second argument subverts Kants hierarchy,
suggesting instead from the basis of the constitution as moral founding
principles of the legal system, that the people are the ones originally
constitutionally sovereign over the state. By answering Kants tautological logic
of juridical expediency with the logic of suprapositive moral principles that
precedes the positive laws from a Lockean perspective of constitution, the critics
believe that Kant is in moral error because the people as sovereign over the
state have a moral right of rebellion that supersedes the legal right.
This is highly misrepresentative of Kantian thought. Kant, following rather
from Hobbes and Rousseau, does not believe that the people exists prior to the
state; it is only when people leave their state of nature and enters society that
man becomes human and acquires a moral dimension (Taylor 1984:112).
Hence, for Kant there is no such people to even speak of before laws are
legislated and this attack is categorically invalid. Even if we parsimoniously
concede that the people are originally sovereign over the state, without head of
state there is no possible representation of the general will (Flikschuh 2008:382),
and without such a representation of the general will which dictates the laws of
the state, such laws can neither be gleaned by its people nor be employed to
govern them, rendering this Lockean argument ineffectual. Far from being in
moral error, it is remiss to speak of Kants argument against the right of
revolution as merely juridical, for it functions as a moral argument as well. His
moral assertion that freedom unrestrained in the most terrible of all things
(Kant 1997:122), lies not only in legal terms, but in the very act of violently
employing freedom to destroy freedom (Guyer 2000:158). This does not mean
that the people are not allowed to employ freedom; in fact, Kant advocates for

the freedom of the pen (TP 85) as a tool for the people against the sovereign
that allows the people to safeguard their rights through critical obedience
(Bielefelt 1997:551) but obedience nonetheless. However, by exploiting freedom
to defy laws that have been set in place by freedom itself, Kant sees this outright
disobedience as a form of violence against civil institutions, therefore argues on
grounds that it is non-institutionalised coercion exercised by man as immoral or
more accurately amoral creatures who have yet to enter into civil society, in
order to condemn such rebellion (Murphy 1970:138).
Not only is this a moral argument on a political level consistent with his
original metaphysics in chapter 1, it is also consistent with his entire
philosophical system when we look at his historical thought: in another essay in
his political writings, Is the Human Race Continually Improving? Kant sees the
French Revolution as occurrence in our own times which proves the moral
tendency of the human race (Kant 1991:182), a position seemingly contradictory
at first but entirely consistent when we recognise that the principal undercurrent
throughout his comprehensive philosophical system cannot be judged myopically
by moral scrutiny of the right to rebellion or not, for ultimately Kants
investigations of morality is concerned not only with an individual metaphysics of
morals, but manifests on a grander scale as investigations into Mankinds innate
nature as a progressive being reaching towards a moral end of existence
(Nicholson 1992:261-3). It is precisely with this final understanding of historically
seeking humanitys moral end that we can now coalesce both doctrines of Kants
metaphysical moral account of freedom and concept of political liberty.

Conclusion

In this paper we have argued by developing the Kantian account of

freedom through relating his metaphysics of morals to his concept of political
rights. The principal consistency in both is the formal structure where in the
moral sphere the rational being is the ground of the categorical imperative, not
through its being an end of moral (or nonmoral) value, but through its
autonomously producing the moral law (Mulholland 1990: 110), also holds in the
political sphere where Kant denies despotism or the imposition of how one
ought to live any place in society, despite both spheres being normatively
independent (Willaschek 2009: 53) in terms of differing normative content,
especially when we consider the introduction of the political concept of coercion.
Yet it is by examining issue of coercion, specifically with regard to Kants view on
revolutions which denouncing it not only from a tautologically juridical but moral
perspective, where a revolutionary is accused of misusing individual freedom to
violate laws of freedom, this further proves the moral and political relationship
through his consistent focus on liberty. Nonetheless, in his grander scheme of
historical thought, it would be myopic to solely concern ourselves with the case
of whether Kants denial of the right to rebellion is valid or not, for one must
ultimately acknowledge that his philosophical investigations are at the end of the
day fundamentally most concerned with the historico-political occurrences as
moving toward the moral ends of humanitys very existence, for the sake and
hope of Mankind as a progressive being.

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