Heirs of Roman Soriano v CA

Parties:
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO
ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS, respondents.

Facts:

Adriano Soriano originally owned a 24,550 square meter land in Pangasinan. Such property was leased
to Spouses de Vera for 15 years and Adrianos son, Roman was caretaker thereof.
When Adriano died, his heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement which subdivided the land into two
lots: Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs
of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman.
In 1971, Spouses Abalos acquired Lot 60052 (sold by Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia) and
of Lot/ 8459 (sold by Elocadio, Francisca and Librada).
In 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker. Roman then filed a case with the
agrarian court for reinstatement and reliquidation; however, the agrarian court approved his ejectment.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, agrarian courts decision was reversed.
But prior to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement
wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of
the lease in 1982. The agrarian court approved such agreement.
In 1976, Spouses Abalos filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan an application for
registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459. The trial
court granted their application. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. On petition for review filed
with the Supreme Court by Roman Soriano, it was denied for lack of merit.
On July 15, 1983, Roman filed with the RTC an action for annulment of document and/or redemption,
ownership and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 159568. Spouses Abalos moved to dismiss on
the grounds of red judicata among others but was denied.
In 1984, 11 years after the approval of the post-decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the
spouses de Vera, Spouses Abalos (substituting Spouses de Vera) filed with the agrarian court a motion
for execution of said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the
property. Roman moved to suspend but was denied. Roman filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals.
Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985 and he was represented by his heirs.
Civil Case No. 159568 was amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party-defendant for having
purchased part of the property from Spouses Abalos. But the amended complaint was dismissed as
such altered the cause of action. Upon reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and Spouses
Abalos were ordered to file their Answer. Spouses filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals docketed as C.A. GR SP No. 22149.
Court of Appeals denied Romans petition for certiorari. His heirs then filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. 93401.
In 1990, the Court of Appeals also denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Spouses
Abalos, ruling the land registration court did not err to refuse the rule of res judicata. Spouses Abalos
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. 99843.
In 1991, the Supreme Court held in G.R. 93401to grant the petition filed by the Heirs of Roman.
On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the denial of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
GR SP No. 22149, and consequently, Civil Case No. 15958 for annulment of document and/or
redemption, ownership and damages, was ordered dismissed.
On October 18, 1993, Heirs of Roman filed with the Department of Agrarian Adjudication Board DARAB
cases for Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction.

The decision of the land registration court was partially executed: Lot No. 8459-A assigned to Heirs of
Roman, and Lots No. 60052 and 8459-B assigned to Spouses Abalos. Heirs of Roman appealed to
CA. CA affirmed the partition but reversed order directing the issuance of a writ of possession on the
ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15958.
On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
99843, dismissed Civil Case No. 15958. Spouses Abalos then moved for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution and/or writ of possession to place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459B. However, said motion was held in abeyance until and after DARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for security of
tenure with prayer for status quo, has been resolved.

Issue: Whether Spouses Abalos having won the land registration case can effectively eject Heirs of Roman who
are possessors thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the
possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated
differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is
being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latters occupancy was
unlawful.
While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final judgment of the land registration
court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet, controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of
tenure case filed by Heirs of Roman before the DARAB. Although private respondents have been declared titled
owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed
by law. The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and
they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. The
exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. However, the
status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In keeping with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on
whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to
exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing
or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without
right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a
holder. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the
hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be
deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for
ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
PETITION GRANTED
DBP v CA G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999
Parties:

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIEDA, respondents.
Facts:

Spouses Pieda are the registered owners of a 238,406 square meter land in Capiz. On March 7, 1972,
they mortgaged it to DBP to secure their agricultural loan in the amount of P20,000.00. They failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage.
DBP extrajudicially foreclosed on February 2, 1977, as the highest bidder, the Sheriff Certificate of Sale
was executed in its favor. Such certificate contained the following provision: This property is sold
subject to the redemption within five (5) years from the date of registration of this instrument and in the
manner provided for by law applicable to this case
On April 25, 1977, the certificate of sale was registered in the Register of Deeds of Capiz and on March
10, 1978, DBP consolidated its title over the foreclosed property by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership. A Final Deed of Sale was executed in favour of DBP and it took possession
of the foreclosed property and appropriated the produce thereof.
On July 5, 1978, the Ministry of Justice issued Opinion No. 92 which declared that lands covered by
P.D. No. 27, including present subject property, may not be the object of foreclosure proceedings.
The spouses then offered to redeem the foreclosed property by offering P10,000.00 which was
accepted by DBP.
On November 11, 1981, DBP sent the spouses a letter informing them that pursuant to P.D. 27they
cannot repurchase the property because it was tenanted. However, Ramon Buenaflor, acting for DBP
sent a letter to the Register of Deeds to cancel the title issued in the name of DCP and reissue such in
the name of the spouses. They were advised by the Registry to file a petition in court which DBP did. In
1982, the court declared the foreclosure and sale null and void and the title of the spouses was revived.
On December 21, 1981, Spouses Pieda filed complaint against DBP for cancellation of certificate of
title and/or specific performance contending that DBP, in evident bad faith, caused the consolidation of
its title to the parcel of land in question in spite of the fact that the 5-year redemption period expressly
stated in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their offer to redeem the foreclosed
property was made well within said period of redemption. The RTC ruled in favour of the spouses.
Upon DBPs appeal to CA, CA affirmed RTC decision.

having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold,
may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such
redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and
sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act.
If no redemption is made within one year, the purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to consolidate and to
possess the property. Moreover, it was in consonance with Section 4 of the mortgage contract between DBP
and the spouses where they agreed to the appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and to hold
possession of the mortgage property in case of foreclosure. DBPs acts cannot therefore be tainted with bad
faith.
The Supreme Court further held that without the act of DBP consolidating title in its name, the spouses would
not be able to assert their right to repurchase granted under the aforementioned section.
In the case of Maneclang vs. Baun, the Court held that when a contract of sale is void, the possessor is
entitled to keep the fruits during the period for which it held the property in good faith. Good faith of the
possessor ceases when an action to recover possession of the property is filed against him and he is served
summons therefore. In the present case, DBP was served summons on June 30, 1982. By that time, it was
no longer in possession of the disputed land as possession thereof was given back to the spouses after the
foreclosure of DBP was declared null and void on February 22, 1982. Therefore, any income collected by
DBP after it consolidated its title and took possession of the property on May 30, 1978 up to February 22,
1982 belongs to DBP as a possessor in good faith since its possession was never legally interrupted.
PETITION GRANTED
Somodio v CA G.R. No. 82680 August 15, 1994
Parties:
NICANOR SOMODIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EBENECER PURISIMA, and FELOMINO AYCO, respondents
Facts:

Issue: Was DBP in bad faith when it took possession of the disputed lot?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that DBP was not in bad faith. A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it. Good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. It was
therefore incumbent on the spouses to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title (i.e. the nullity of the
foreclosure). This, they failed to do.
The spouses contention that DBPs bad faith stems from the fact that DBP consolidated title over the
disputed property despite the statement in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale to the effect that said land was
subject to a five year redemption period is wrong. The period of redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed land
is provided under Section 6 of ACT No. 3135 which provides for one year.
Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to,
the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person

On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas conveyed to Wilfredo Mabugat the possession of a residential lot in
General Santos City. Nicanor Somodio paid one-half of the purchase price. Thus, Mabugat executed an
Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of petitioner over one-half undivided portion.
The land was partitioned into two portions, Somodio took the western part. Immediately after the
partition, Somodio took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and
other fruit-bearing trees.
In 1976, Somodio began constructing a structure on his lot. It was however left unfinished when he
went to North Cotabato.
In October 1977, Somodio allowed Felomino Ayco to transfer the latters hut to the lot in question. Six
years later, Somodio demanded that Ayco vacate the premises. On August 23, 1983, Somodio filed an
action for unlawful detainer against Ayco at the MTC.
On June 26, 1983, Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a house thereon. 4 days later,
Somodio, in the same court, filed against Purisima a complaint for forcible entry. These two cases were
consolidated.
Purisima contended that the lot was a portion of the land subject of his application for miscellaneous
sales patent with the Bureau of Lands. The lot was actually a gift to his father, a geodetic engineer for
having surveyed the parcel of land comprising of Lots Nos. 6427 and 6328 for the Small Farmers
Fishpond Association, Inc. Ayco anchored his right to possess on Purisimas evidence.

On April 30, 1986, the trial court ruled in favour of Somodio and ordered Ayco and Purisima to remove
their respective houses, to deliver the land.
RTC affirmed in toto decision of MTC. However, upon appeal to the CA, CA reversed RTC decision.

Issue: Who had the prior possession of the land in question and thus have better rights?

the subject premises after its lease contracts had expired from 1987 and 1989 respectively. RTC
dismissed the complaint ruling that the subject Deed of Absolute Sale having been rescinded by the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 106063, Equatorial is not the owner and does not have any right to demand
backr entals from the subject property. Such was subjected to res judicata of the previous mother
case.

Ruling:

Issue: Is Equatorial is entitled to back rentals?

The Supreme Court held that Nicanor Somodio had the better right to possess. Somodio took possession of the
property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he
started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he
left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession.

Ruling:
No. Equatorial is not entitled to back rentals.

Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a
thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.
The Supreme Court noted that priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession. Even if
the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing improvements on the land only in
1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession because respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983. Even
if Purisima's father surveyed the property of help to his cause or Lot No. 6328-X was in payment of his fee for the
services of his father and that he caused the construction of a perimeter wall in the area, these facts do not mean
that Purisima himself had prior possession.
Prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with his right of ownership over the same. Forcible
entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION REVERSED
Equatorial Realty Development v Mayfair Theater G.R. No. 133879. November 21, 2001
Parties:
EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC, petitioner, vs. MAYFAIR THEATER, INC., respondent
Facts:

Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. (Carmelo) owned a parcel of land with two 2-storey buildings constructed
thereon at Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila.
Carmelo entered into two contracts of lease with Mayfair Theater both for a period of 20 years and had
provisions regarding right of first refusal (it must be initially offered to Mayfair before other purchasers)
to purchase properties. First, on June 1, 1967with 1,610 square meters of floor area which became the
Maxim Theater and second, on March 31, 1969 with 1,064 square meters and 300 square meters which
became the Miramar Theater.
On July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. (Equatorial) for P11,300,000 without being initially offered to
Mayfair.
Mayfair filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. The RTC ruled in favour of
Carmelo and Equitorial.
Upon appeal to the CA, CA completely reversed and set aside RTC decision.
On April 25, 1997, Mayfair filed a Motion for Execution, which the trial court granted. However, Carmelo
could no longer be located.
Upon payment of P11,300,000 with the clerk of court and issuance of deeds of reconveyance and sale,
the certificate of title was issued in the name of Mayfair.
On September 18, 1997, Equatorial filed with the RTC an action for the collection of a sum of money
against Mayfair. Equatorial wanted to claim rentals or reasonable compensation for the Mayfairs use of

The Supreme Court held that no right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent
failure to deliver the property to the buyer. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it
by right of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the
sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that period.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him. And
there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. In the
present case, it is clear that petitioner never took actual control and possession of the property sold.
Also, the Court citing Vda de Sarmiento v Lesaca held that, the possession referred to in the contract evidently
refers to actual possession and not merely symbolical inferable from the mere execution of the document As
provided in Article 1462, the thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in the control and
possession thereof, which situation does not here obtain because from the execution of the sale up to the present
the vendee was never able to take possession of the lands. The execution of a public instrument gives rise,
therefore, only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the instrument itself
expresses or implies that delivery was not intended; or when by other means it is shown that such delivery was not
effected, because a third person was actually in possession of the thing. In the latter case, the sale cannot be
considered consummated. Mayfairs opposition to the transfer of the property by way of sale to Equatorial was a
legally sufficient impediment that effectively prevented the passing of the property into the latters hands.
The Supreme Court noted that it may be raised that under Article 1164 of the Civil Code, Equatorial as buyer
acquired a right to the fruits of the thing sold from the time the obligation to deliver the property to petitioner arose.
However, Article 1385 of the Civil Code provides: Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were
the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest; x x x. Not only the land and
building sold, but also the rental payments paid, if any, had to be returned by the buyer.
Also, it is to be emphasized that the fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be
interpreted to mean either actual delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorials title. They were made merely to
avoid imminent eviction since there were already two ejectment suits against Mayfair.
Even assuming arguendo that there was valid delivery, Equatorial still is not entitled to any benefits from the
rescinded Deed of Absolute Sale because of its bad faith. The contract of sale between Equatorial and Carmelo
was knowingly entered into in violation of the rights of and to the prejudice of Mayfair. Equatorial even admitted that
its lawyers had studied the contract of lease prior to the sale. Equatorials knowledge of the stipulations therein
should have cautioned it to look further into the agreement to determine if it involved stipulations that would
prejudice its own interests.
PETITION DENIED
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioner San Miguel Corporation who purchased Lot 684
from Silverio Perez, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying its application for registration
of the said land in view of its failure to show entitlement thereto.
The Solicitor General opposed and appealed the application contending that the land in question is part of public
domain and that petitioner being a private corporation is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public

domain. In this case, petitioner claims that its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed

The trial court agreed with Wong as it ruled that Wong had a better title because it was he who had prior, actual and

possession of the land in question based on documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts, and

continuous physical possession of the disputed property as opposed to Mercados only acts of going to said land

testimonial evidence of vendor Silverio Perez.

periodically.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling that petitioner
and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable right over Lot 684.

On appeal, Judge Lucas Carpio reversed the decision of the municipal trial court in the ejectment case.

HELD: No, documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or

ISSUE: Whether or not Wong has a better title over the disputed property.

right of possession over a piece of land but mere indicia of a claim of ownership. They only become strong
evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession. Also, the

HELD: No. Mercado had prior possession. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the

testimony of vendor Silverio Perez as proof of actual possession is weak and was not corroborated by other

exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities

witnesses.

for acquiring such right. The execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary.In this case, the notarized sale made by Giger in favor of Mercado
transferred the possession of said land from Giger to Mercado.
The second sale made by Giger to Wong did not transfer possession to Wong because in the first place, by that

Ignacio Wong v Carpio

time, Giger is not in possession of the land anymore. Further, possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession, which is not the case here.
203 SCRA 118 Civil Law Property Possession; cant be recognized in two persons

Anent the argument of Wong that he never acted with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth (FISTS), the
Supreme Court held that if a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of person already

Ejectment Force, Intimidation, Threat, Strategy, or Stealth

clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such
prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even

In 1972, a pacto de retro sale was executed by William Giger in favor of Manuel Mercado. Giger failed to

though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting

repurchase the land within the agreed period hence Mercado was able to consolidate the title unto himself and the

himself on the ground and excluding the other party.

sale was notarized in 1973. Since then, Mercado paid the taxes on the land and he would periodically go to the said
parcel of land and gather coconut products for his business.

The Supreme Court also noted the rules regarding questions regarding the fact of possession:

However, in July 1976, Giger again sold the same land to Ignacio Wong. Giger then delivered the title of the land to

a. Present possessor shall be preferred;

Wong. In August 1976, Wong started deploying his laborers to the said farmland; he built a farmhouse thereon; he
fenced the boundary; and he also put up a signboard which indicates that the land is his.

b. If there are two (or more) current possessors, the one longer in possession is preferred;

In September 1976, Mercado learned of the presence of Wong within the disputed land. In November 1976,

c. If possessors acquired possession at the same time; the possessor who can present a title is preferred;

Mercado filed an ejectment case (forcible entry) against Wong.

d. If all possessors present the foregoing conditions equally, then the property in question shall be placed in judicial
In his defense, Wong insists that a forcible entry case is not proper because, in possessing the land, he never acted

deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; that he entered the said land without issue after he purchased
the same from Giger.
MAGLUCOT-AW v. MAGLUCOT

G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000.

Kapunan, J.

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO

DOCTRINE: Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took

v. HONORATA BOLANTE

possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition

G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000.

allotted to another party.

Panganiban, J.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging that

DOCTRINE: For all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted is still deemed

they are the owners of lot no. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639 which was

to be the legal possessor.

covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis, Bartolome

FACTS: Before 1954, the land in question was originally declared for tax purposes under the

Maglucot, Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas and respondent's

name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930. Petitioners were

predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to subdivide the lot into six portions and was granted.

daughters of Margarito Mendoza. The tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso was cancelled,

Then in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying rentals therefore. They likewise

and subsequently placed the tax declaration under the name of Margarito. The respondent was

built houses on their corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992, they stopped paying rentals

the occupant of that land. During the cadastral survey of the land, the brother of petitioner and

claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition

Honorata had a dispute over the ownership of the property. The trial court said that petitioners

and that the respondents are stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of

are the lawful owner of the property. However, in a turn of events, the appellate court held that

their agreement in 1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by

the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with the

petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.

respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to partition.

continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Art. 538 of

HELD: YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took

the Civil Code.

possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, Honorata had a better right over the property

allotted to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with the

HELD: The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Art.

sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard

538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous

to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive

possession of the land since 1985. The petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she

possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance with the sketch plan. Also, the payment of rentals

came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Art 536 of the Civil Code. We

reveals that respondents' possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner thereof.

concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possession

One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes

because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents and purposes,

to be ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the subject lot in the concept of an

a possessor even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who

owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Petition was granted.

can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession. However,

possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by the
former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records
show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. Before 1985, the subject land was occupied
and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father
(Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso died in 1930,
Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time,
respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot. Possession cannot be acquired
through force or violence.

possessors of Lots 2 and 3, with claim of ownership in good faith from 1906-1951. Vicar was in possession as
borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for
taxation purposes. When Vicar applied for registration over the lots in 1962, it has been in possession in concept of
owner for only 11 years. While ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for 10 years, it is always with
just title extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years. The findings of the CA may no longer be altered
by presentation of evidence because those issues were resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the
principle of res judicata shall open the door to endless litigation over the same issues. Art. 555 of the NCC
provides that a possessor may lose his possession by possession of another, subject to the provisions of Art. 537, if
the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the right of real possession is not lost until after the lapse
of 10 years.
Vicar has not met the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over the lots, nor did it satisfy
the 10 year requirement for ordinary acquisitive prescription because it lacked the title. The private respondents
have Free Patent Application for those lots since 1906, and the predecessors have been in possession of the
questioned lots since then. The bailees failure to return the subject matter of the commodatum to the bailor did not
mean adverse possession, since they are holding the property in trust for the bailor. The adverse claim only arose
in 1951, when it declared the lots for taxation purposes.
Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez vs- Manuel de Guzman and Max B. Solis, GR No L-28721, Oct. 5,
1928

Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mt. Province vs- CA, Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano and Juan Valdez || G.R.
No. 80294-95, Sept. 21, 1988
Facts:
-

The documents and records presented reveal that the whole controversy started when petitioner VICAR
filed with CFI-Baguio an application for registration of title over four lots found in La Trinidad, Benguet.
The lots were the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gym and
dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The private respondents (HEIRS) filed their opposition,
asserting ownership and title thereto. The Land Registration confirmed the registration of the lots.

Heirs (ang kay Octaviano and Valdez) appealed the decision of the land registration court to CA. CA
reversed the decision, dismissed Vicars application. The Heirs filed a motion for reconsideration,
praying for the CA to order the registration of the 3 rd lot in the names of the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano;
eight days later, the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez filed their motion for consideration, praying
that lots 2 and 3 be registered under their name. This was denied by the CA, on the grounds that there
was no sufficient merit to justify the reconsideration one way or another. They also denied Octaviano
heirs reconsideration.

The SC denied both minute resolution of Vicar and Heirs for lack of merit. Upon the finality, the
Octaviano Heirs filed with CFI-Baguio a Motion For Execution of Judgment, praying that they be placed
in possession of Lot 3. The Court denied the motion.

Octaviano heirs presented their witness, Fructuoso Valdez, who testified on the alleged ownership of
the land in question by their predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio, and his written demand to Vicar for the
return of land to them. Vicar countered that the land in question was not covered by any title in
Egmidios name, and that Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3 for 75 days continuously and
peacefully.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to the ownership of the lots in question?

HELD: It was not positively declared by the CA that the private respondents were the owners of the land, neither
was it declared that they were not owners of the land, but it held that the predecessors of private respondents were

Facts:
-

Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo brought an action in the CFI-Tayabas against Mendoza for
the recovery of a certain piece of land. The Court ruled in favor of Mendoza, which was subsequently
affirmed by the SC. When the case was remanded to the lower court, the judge issued an order
requiring the provincial sheriff to immediately dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction and put Mendoza
in possession of the land. In the cadastral proceedings in Tayabas, the piece of land in question was
adjudicated in favor of petitioners in equal parts, pro indiviso, subject to the right of retention of the part
of Manuel de Guzman (respondent) until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements on the
land. The spouses and de Guzman were ejected from the land when Mendoza acquired possession of
such.

Since they were unable to agree upon the amount for the improvements, petitioners requested the court
to fix the value of the improvements and require the defendant to render an accounting of the fruits, plus
decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. Defendant filed a general denial. During the
pendency, Bernardo (known as Max B. Solis) asked leave to intervene, alleging that De Guzman has
transferred all his rights in the improvement and in the lot to him, except for two coconut trees. This
petition was granted by the Court.

ISSUES:
(1)

The amount of the indemnity to be paid by the defendant for the improvements made by him on the said
lot and the basis upon which said amount shall be fixed;

(2)

WON the defendant is obliged to render an account of the fruits received by him from June 1924 until
the improvements are delivered after same have been paid for;

(3)

Whether the value of the said fruits and products received by defendant shall be applied to the
indemnity to which he is entitled, or whether said defendant is obliged to deliver to the plaintiffs the
remainder in case of excess;

(4)

WON the defendant has the right to be paid by the plaintiffs in whole or in part for the value of the fruits
received by petitioners from the respective dates that they were in possession and enjoyment of the
land.

Evarista contends that the understanding with Lizarraga by virtue of which she continued to occupy the
house and make improvements was a contract whereby it was agreed to sell her the house, the deed of
sale to be executed as soon as the title deeds of the property were transferred to the name of the
partnership. It was by virtue of the contract that she remained in the occupation of the building, and that
in one of the stipulations of the contract of sale, Evarista assumed the liability of P14,000 on the estate
and another in favor of the Agricultural Bank and its successor, National Bank, paying the interest
thereon as well as the tax and premiums of 5 insurance, all of which payments were made through the
same firm of Lizarraga, who, as a result of the liquidation of accounts, held funds in their possession.
Evarista does not seek the execution of the proper instrument of evidence this constract of sale, nor the
performance thereof she only claims the cost of the improvements made at her expense, and that this
be recorded in the corresponding certificate of title.

Lizarraga denies that she entered into an agreement with Evarista concerning the sale of the building.
However, the Court found that the verbal contract was proven by evidences in the exhibits and oral
evidence.

HELD:
(1)

In accordance with the provisions of Art. 435 and 454 in relation with Art. 361, the value of
indemnization to be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the necessary and useful
expenses incurred by him when he introduced it to the plantation in question; [TC held that defendants
have the right to collect P2,046 as compensation from the plaintiffs. 20% to de Guzman and 80% to
Solis]

(2)

The plaintiffs (petitioners), as owners of the property, shall have the right to make their own demands
upon payment in the form indicated in number (1), the defendant having the right to retain the land until
expenditures have been refunded; [De Guzman and Solis are obliged to pay petitioners the sum of
P666.93 per annum, 1/5 for de Guzman and 4/5 by Solis]

(3)

Defendant is obliged to render a detail and just account of fruits and profits received by him from the
property for their due application;

(4)

The value of the fruits received by the defendant should first be applied to the payment of the
indemnizacion, and in that it exceeds the value of such, the excess shall be returned to the plaintiffs.
The Court did not make any pronouncement as to whether or not the plaintiffs are obliged to return to
the defendant the value of the fruits received by them before the defendant took possession of the land.

It was further deemed that indemnizacion, whether it means compensation or indemnity, the amount is the
amount of the expenditures mentioned in Art 453 and 454 of NCC, which are the necessary and useful
expenditures that was incurred by defendants. SC concurred with the decision of the RTC.

Issues: WON Evarista is the owner of aforesaid improvements and has the right to demand payment of their value;
Art. 453 of the NCC states that necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor, but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him. This applied to personal and real property
the expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would
have continued to stand just as before, but they were USEFUL, inasmuch as with them the house better serves the
purpose for which it is intended. On the question of Evaristas good faith, Lizarraga did not allege nor prove that
Evaristas possession was in bad faith, for she began to occupy by permission of the previous owner, and continued
to occupy with consent among the parties involved. The improvements were only created after the agreement of
sale.

Evarista Robles + Enrique Martin (husband) vs Lizarraga Hermanos | GR No. L-16736, Dec. 22, 1921

(Please note that the issue of the other cases is: WON Evarista has the right to retain possession of the house until
she is indemnified for such improvements the ruling of the Court was not connected to it, indi ko gets ngaa lease
ila na wakal so please read na lang kay basi wrong info pa di mabutang ko | Second, Should her payment of
improvements be cited in the TCT?)

Sociedad Lizarraga Hermanos v. Evarista Robles de Martin + Enrique Martin | GR No. L-16661 Dec. 22, 1921

Jose B. Aznar vs Rafael Yapdiangco and Teodoro Santos | GR No. L-18536, Mar. 31, 1965

Evarista Robles + Enrique Martin vs Lizarraga Hermanos & Reg. of Deeds, Iloilo | GR No L-16662 Dec 22
1921

Facts: May 1959 Santos advertised in two metropolitan papers the sale of his Ford Fairlane 500. On May 28,
1959, a certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella (who dafuq is this) went to the Santos
residence to answer the ad. Santos was out, so his son Ireneo received and talked with De Dios. The latter told the
young Santos that he had come in behalf of his uncle Marella, who was interested to buy the car.

Facts: Anastacia de la Rama died and left behind 6 children: Magdalena, Jose, Evarista, Zacarias, Felix and
Purificacion Robles. She also left some properties, among which is the house on Iznart St., Iloilo, which is the
object of the controversy of the three cases.
-

The children and heirs of Anastacia entered into a partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation
and settlement of their accounts. The Court awarded to the partnership the properties left by the
deceased, including the disputed house. Evarista, one of the heirs, has been occupying the house with
her husband Enrique by the permission of her mothers and consent of the co-heirs [after mothers
death] and lastly by agreement with the partnership.
Lizarraga notified Evarista that beginning April, the rent of the upper story of the house shall be raised
to P60, and if she did not agree with it, she will vacate the house. Evarista refused, thus Lizarraga
brought an ejectment suit against her. Evarista, in turn, sued Lizarraga to recover the value of the
improvements, and in another action, that said value be noted on the certificate of title as an
encumbrance.

When Irineo told Santos, the latter instructed his son to see Marella the following day at his given
address. Thus, Irineo met with Marella, who agreed to buy the car for P14,700 on the understanding
that the price shall be paid after it is registered in his name.

Santos and De Dios went to the office of Atty Padolina, where the deed of sale was executed in
Marellas favor. They proceeded to the Motor Vehicles Office in Quezon City to effect the registration.
Note that the price has not been paid yet.

Santos returned to his house and gave the registration papers and a copy of the deed of sale to Ireneo,
with strict instructions that he shall not part with it until Marella has paid the full price. Irineo, together
with De Dios, proceeded to Marellas residence wherein the latter lacked P2,000 and begged off to be
allowed to secure the shortage from his sister who lived nearby. Marella managed to secure the
registration papers and the deed of sale by telling Irineo that he just wanted to show it to his lawyer.
Irineo agreed, and they, as well as an unidentified third person, proceeded to Marellas sisters house.

De Dios asked Irineo to wait at the sala, and was never seen again. Irineo discovered that they all left
him, and when returned to De Dioss house, only to be told that no such man lived there. He also
returned to Marellas house, and nobody was there. He returned home to his father, who promptly told
him to go to the police authorities.

Marella was able to sell the car to Jose Aznar on the same day for P15,000. Aznar acquired the car in
good faith, for valuable consideration and without notice of the defect appertaining to vendors title.

When Aznar tried to register the car, it was seized by agents of the Philippine Constabulary on the
report of Santos. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco, the head of the
unit responsible for seizing the car in question. Teodoro Santos was allowed to intervene by lower court.

JOSE R. CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
REYNALDO PAHATI, ET AL., defendants-appellees
*Application of Article 559
*Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must undoubtedly prevail in this
jurisdiction.
Facts:
This is a case which involves a conflict of rights of two persons who claim to be the owners of the same property

TC: awarded motor vehicle to Teodoro Santos; the basis of which is Art. 559 of the NCC

Jesusito Belizo is engaged in buying and selling second hand cars

ISSUE: Between Teodoro Santos and Jose Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of the car?

Jose Cruz has purchased from Belizo the subject car, a year after, in the pretext that Belizo has a buyer
he was able to convince Cruz to sell the car.

At that time, plaintiff's certificate of registration was missing and, upon the suggestion of Belizo, plaintiff
wrote a letter addressed to the Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for the issuance of a new
registration certificate alleging as reason the loss of the one previously issued to him and stating that
he was intending to sell his car.

This letter was falsified by Belizo who turned it into an authorized deed of sale in favor of himself. Using
the falsified deed, he was able to register the car in his name.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs CA and City of Dagupan | GR No L-54526, Aug. 25, 1986

Belizo then sold the car to Bulahan who in turn sold the car to Pahati a second hand car dealer.

Facts: The City of Dagupan (referred to as City) filed a complaint against Nawasa (now Metropolitan Waterworks
sewerage system called Nawasa na lang) for the recovery of ownership and possession of the Dagupan
Waterworks System. Nawasa imposed the special defense of RA 1383, vesting upon it ownership, possession and
control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines, and counterclaimed that it must be reimbursed
P255,000 for necessary and useful improvements. TC rendered judgment in favor of City, finding Nawasa to be a
possessor in bad faith, thus not entitled to indemnities.

Lower Court held that Bulahan and Cruz are both buyers in good faith and are victims of fraud devised
by Belizo

Held: Teodoro Santos. Aznar accepts that the car in question originally belonged to and was owned by Santos, and
that the latter was unlawfully deprived of the same by Vicente Marella. However, he contends that upon the facts of
the case, the applicable provision was Art. 1506, and not Art. 559. The SC held that this was unmeritorious, since
it is required that in 1506, the seller should have a voidable at least in this case, the seller had no title at all. The
car in question was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor as to complete or consummate the transfer of
ownership by virtue of contract. Marella obtained the car through theft. Common law principle also states that
where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon
the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, does not apply in a case where
it is covered by an express provision of the NCC. Between common law principle and a statutory provision, the
latter must prevail.

Issue: (1) WON MWSS/Nawasa has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by Nawasa to the
Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that Nawasa was found to be a possessor in bad faith?

Issue:
Who has the better right to the said car?
Holding:

(2) Do the provisions of Art. 546, 547, 549 of the NCC settle the question of whether a possessor in bad faith has
the right to remove useful improvements
Held: NO. Art 449 of the NCC states that he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. As builder in bad faith, Nawasa lost whatever useful
improvements it has made without right to indemnity. Art. 546 states that only a possessor in good faith shall be
refunded for useful expenses with right of retention until reimbursed and that Art. 547 states that only a possessor
in good faith may remove useful improvements IF this can be done without damage to principal thing and the
person who recovers does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor
in bad faith is to remove improvements done for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury
thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters
into possession.

Cruz has the better right

The law applicable to the case is Article 559 of the new Civil Code which provides:
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
It appears that "one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same" and the only defense the latter may have is if he "has acquired it in good faith at
a public sale" in which case "the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." And
supplementing this provision, Article 1505 of the same Code provides that "where goods are sold by a person

who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner,
the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his
conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell.
Applying the above legal provisions to the facts of this case, one is inevitably led to the conclusion that plaintiff has
a better right to the car in question than defendant Bulahan for it cannot be disputed that plaintiff had been illegally
deprived thereof because of the ingenious scheme utilized by Belizo to enable him to dispose of it as if he were the
owner thereof. Plaintiff therefore can still recover the possession of the car even if defendant Bulahan had acted in
good faith in purchasing it from Belizo. Nor can it be pretended that the conduct of plaintiff in giving Belizo a letter to
secure the issuance of a new certificate of registration constitutes a sufficient defense that would preclude recovery
because of the undisputed fact that that letter was falsified and this fact can be clearly seen by a cursory
examination of the document. If Bulahan had been more diligent he could have seen that the pertinent portion of
the letter had been erased which would have placed him on guard to make an inquiry as regards the authority of
Belizo to sell the car. This he failed to do.
The Court further said: It is a fundamental principle of our law of personal property that no man can be divested of it
without his own consent; consequently, even an honest purchaser, under a defective title, cannot resist the claim of
the true owner. The maxim that 'No man can transfer a better title than he has himself "obtain in the civil as well as
in the common law."
The common law principle that states "Where one of two innocent parties must suffer by a fraud perpetrated
by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the
fraud to be committed" (Sager vs. W. T. Rawleight Co. 153 Va. 514, 150 S. E. 244, 66 A.L.R. 305), cannot be
applied to this case which is covered by an express provision of our new Civil Code. Between a common law
principle and a statutory provision, the latter must undoubtedly prevail in this jurisdiction.

EDCA sought the assistance of the Police to set an entrapment operation, further investigation
disclosed that Cruz was really Tomas de la Pena and that he sold 120 of the books to Private
Respondents
On the night of the same day, petitioner with the help of the police forced their way to the bookstore,
threatened Leonor for prosecution of buying stolen goods and seized the books w/o warrant and later
turned over the books to the pet.
PR sued for recover
The petitioner contends that the private respondents have not established their ownership of the
disputed books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock.
And that petitioner acquired the goods not in good faith
Lower courts ruled in favor of the Private Respondents, and upholding their good faith citing first
paragraph of Art. 559 because the PR relied on the invoice presented to them by the impostor
EDCA then contends that they have been unlawfully deprived of their property because the imposter
acquired no title to the books since the check paid bounced for lack of funds, they cited cases defining
unlawful deprivation which favors them the recovery or reimbursement.

Issue:
Whether respondents were unlawfully deprived of their property
Ruling:
NO, there was no unlawful deprivation.
EDCA was negligent in issuing the invoice to the impostor without first verifying his identity and without first waiting
for the check to be cleared.

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,

vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of "SANTOS
BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Interpretation of unlawfully deprived, Art. 559 of the CC:
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who
has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith
at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor
Facts:

A certain Prof. Jose Cruz who claimed to be the dean of the De la Salle College placed an order of 406
books with EDCA payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the
books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of P8,995.65
He later then sold 120 of these books to Pivate Respondent for 1,700 who relied on the invoice for the
ownership of the seller
After placing another order, EDCA became suspicious and inquired to De La Salle College and who
denied the employ of Jose Cruz and Phil. Amanah Bank who denied having the accounts of such

As regards the sale to of aka Cruz:

The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject
matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code:
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual
or constructive delivery thereof.
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass
to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that

such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing
sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter
between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
The remedy for EDCA is to go after the imposter who caused all the trouble.

CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B. GUEVARA, respondents.
This case is a petition for Certiorari on the decision held by CA, however, SC in its introduction already affirms in
toto the decision of the CA
Facts:

This is a case for the recovery of the ring allegedly owned by Angelina Guevarra.
That sometime before the case was instituted, Guevarra was talking to Garcia who was wearing the
said ring, Guevarra having recognized the ring, told Garcia that the ring belongs to her and it was the
ring that was stolen. That very moment, Garcia lent the ring to Guevarra and the ring fitted.
Few days later upon the request of Guevarra, she and her Lt. husband together with Lt. Cementina and
Garcia and Garcias lawyer went to the Mr. Rebullida to verify whether the ring was the same ring that
was bought by Guevarra to Mr. Rebullidas pawnshop.
Mr. Rebullida then confirmed that the ring was the one that Guevarra bought from him sometime ago.
The ring was returned to Garcia.
After demand by Guevarra, Garcia did not return the ring.
Thus, Guevarra sued for recovery, RTC denied because of the discrepancy in the weight of stone on
the ring, CA reversed.

Issue:

right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the
possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco.7Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard
that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his
being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by
his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is
covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law
principle and statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction."

2)

"Actually, even under the first clause, possession in good faith does not really amount to title, for the
reason that Art. 1132 of the Code provides for a period of acquisitive prescription for movables through
`uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith' (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code, which provided a
period of three years), so that many Spanish writers, including Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and
Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of the Spanish Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil Code), the title of the possessor
is not that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis of acquisitive
prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. p. 258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Espaol, 6th Ed., p. 380). And
it is for the very reason that the title established by the first clause of Art. 559 is only a presumptive title
sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription, that the clause immediately following provides
that `one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same.' As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court in Sotto vs.
Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: `Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is as yet not the
owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire indefeasible title by, let us say,
adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former
owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover it under any condition.'
FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO T. SYCIP,respondents
Facts:

1) Whether Guevarra has been unlawfully deprived of her ring and is entitled to the remedy provided for by Art. 559
2) Whether possession Good Faith is equivalent to title in favor of Garcia

Holding:
1)

NO.

Yes.

Art. 559: "The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who
has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the
same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent
Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to
recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only
exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As authoritative interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the

Petitioner Francel Realty Corporation filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against private respondent
Francisco T. Sycip. The case was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite.
Petitioner alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to private respondent Lot 16, Building No. 14 of
the Francel Townhomes, at 22 Real Street, Maliksi, Bacoor, Cavite, for P451,000.00. The Contract to
Sell provides inter alia that in case of default in the payment of two or more installments, the whole
obligation will become due and demandable and the seller will then be entitled to rescind the contract
and take possession of the property; the buyer will vacate the premises without the necessity of any
court action and the down payment will be treated as earnest money or as rental for the use of the
premises.
Petitioner alleged that PR failed to pay the demandable installment and therefore prayed that he vacate
the premises and pay monthly rental.
After having been denied by MTC the motion to dismiss PR in his answer, said that his non-payment is
due to the pending case he filed in Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against Pet for unsound
real estate business practice.

In his complaint filed with HLURB PR sought the ff amounts; P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, P75,000.00 as attorneys fees and that he be given all other
remedies just and equitable.
MTC later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction however MTC awarded damages to PR which was
affirmed by RTC.
CA, decided that MTC has jurisdiction for unlawful detainer case irrespective of the damages

Issue:
Whether the MTC has jurisdiction to award the damages after it has decided that it has no jurisdiction of the case

is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It should
accordingly be stricken out. With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the record is bereft
of any proof that petitioner acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the present action which would warrant
such an award.
G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972
DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under the firm name "Pawnshop of Dominador Dizon", petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES G. SUNTAY, respondent.

Ruling:
No, MTC does have jurisdiction to award damages.
A reading of the MTC decision showed no justification for the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. As held in Buan v. Camaganacan, an award of attorneys fees without justification is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It should accordingly be stricken
out. With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the record is bereft of any proof that petitioner
acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the present action which would warrant such an award
Petitioners complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such action falls within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment requires a consideration of the
rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property. Indeed private respondent claims that he has a right under
P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after giving due notice to the owner or developer of his
decision to do so because of petitioners alleged failure to develop the subdivision or condominium project
according to the approved plans and within the time for complying with the same. The case thus involves a
determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957. Private respondent
has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice with the HLURB.
The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization
payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and 1344, and
accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and industry,
and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices. Although the case involving Antonio Sarte
is still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order from the HLURB authorizing
suspension of payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good its warranties, there is no
question to Our mind that the matter of collecting amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied
up to the complaint against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a subdivision
lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended. It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the m
Even assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, however the award of damages to private respondent must
be disallowed for the following reasons:
(1) The MTC decision itself stated that the answer with its counterclaim was filed out of time or more than
10 days from private respondents receipt of summons. In effect, therefore, private respondent did not
make any counterclaim.
(2) Moreover, a reading of the MTC decision showed no justification for the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. As held in Buan v. Camaganacan,[9] an award of attorneys fees without justification

ARTICLE 559 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE: 'The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has
been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.'

FACTS:

Respondent Suntay entered into an agency of sale agreement with a certain Clarita R. Sison on June
13, 1962;
Respondent herein delivered a diamond ring worth P 5,500 for Clarita R. Sison to sell;
Unbeknownst to the respondent, the niece of Clarita R. Sison, Melia Sison, pledged the subject ring
herein to the Petitioner for the amount of P 2,600;
Due to insistent demands from the Respondent, Clarita R. Sison finally caved in and gave her the
receipt for the pledge;
Upon knowing this, Respondent herein immediately filed a case for Estafa against Clarita R. Sison;
During the pendency of the case against Sison, Respondent thru counsel wrote a letter to the Petitioner,
demanding the return of her ring;
When the Petitioner refused to return the ring, the Respondent filed a case with CFI Manila for the
recovery of said ring;
The CFI issued the writ of replevin prayed for by the Respondent herein (Plaintiff in the CFI case) and
thus the ring was return to her possession;
Therefore, the CFI ruled that the Respondent herein had the right to possession of the ring in question;
Subsequently, the Petitioner herein sought to have the decision of CFI reversed by the CA but was
unsuccessful thereto;
Thus the Petitioner herein went to the SC for a petition on review

ISSUE: Who has rightful possession of the ring?

HOLDING: The SC declared emphatically that the Petitioner herein has the right to the ring in question. In holding
its decision, the SC anchored the same on Article 559 of the New Civil Code. (See above)
December 26, 1967

G.R. No. L-21577

REMEDIOS C. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and POLICARPIO MAMON, respondents.

First Instance of Iloilo in Civil Case No. 4562 by declaring that she and Policarpio Mamon are the
owners pro-indiviso of a 1/6 portion each of Lot No. 9403 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, Iloilo,
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7958
From the assailed decision of the CA, Petitioner herein filed this case for review

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is qualified to hold 1/3 of the subject land thru judicial sale?
FACTS:
HOLDING: The SC AFFIRMED the decision of the CA. In its decision, the SC averred that:

On August 18, 1951, Benigno Labrador sold his and that of his wife's share, interest and participation in
the aforementioned property to Policarpio Mamon , reserving for themselves, however, the right to
repurchase it within two years after the expiration of three years from the date of the deed of sale
THEY FAILED TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT
Said deed was not signed by Benigno's wife, nor was it registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo. However, Mamon immediately took possession of the property and cultivated it until the middle
part of 1959.
On August 23, 1951, Marcelina J. Labrador Benigno Labrador's wife executed in Manila a power
of attorney authorizing her husband to encumber her share in the same property to secure a loan.
The record further discloses that in Civil Case No. 2932, entitled "Remedios C. Ledesma, plaintiff, vs.
Marcelina J. Labrador, accompanied by her husband, Benigno Labrador, etc.," the Municipal Court of
Iloilo City, on February 19, 1955, rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant
Marcelina J. Labrador to pay to the herein plaintiff the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY
(P870.00) pesos, with legal rate of interest from October 26, 1954 (date of the filing of the
complaint) until fully paid; TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) pesos for damages; ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) for attorney's fees and the costs of this suit.
After the decision had become executory, the corresponding writ of execution was issued and the sheriff
levied upon and sold at public auction on April 9, 1956, 1/3 of Lot No. 9403 to the herein petitioner, as
the highest bidder
Upon failure of the spouses to redeem their property within one year from the auction sale, the
corresponding final certificate of sale was executed in favor of the purchaser
The provisional as well as the final certificates of sale were duly registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Iloilo. Thereafter, Ledesma repaired to the land to take possession thereof, but found
Mamon cultivating it. Demands on the latter were made for him to vacate and surrender the land to
petitioner, but said demands were not heeded.
Thereupon, petitioner instituted the present action (Civil Case No. 4562) against Jose Labrador,
Magdalena Labrador and Policarpio Mamon
In their answer to the complaint Jose Labrador and Magdalena Labrador denied that a big portion of the
property was riceland and, as special defense, further alleged that it was already subdivided for taxation
purposes into three equal parts of 26,750 square meters each between them and Mamon as lawful
owners,
In his separate answer Mamon made a general denial of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as
special defense, invoked possession and ownership of 1/3 of said realty since 1951, which portion had
already been segregated from that of the two other owners
On June 24, 1959, through the intervention of the Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, Mamon eventually
surrendered possession of the property to Ledesma who, since then has been in possession
thereof. After due trial, the lower court on June 21, 1961 rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Remedios C.
Ledesma by declaring her as absolute owner of 1/3 of Lot No. 9403 of the cadastral survey of Pototan,
Iloilo, described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7953, with costs against defendant Policarpio
Mamon.
From the above decision only Mamon appealed to the Court of Appeals where, after proper
proceedings, the appealed judgment was rendered: MODIFYING the one rendered by the Court of

To be borne in mind in this case is the fact that the present action is for partition (see p. 7, record on appeal) where
respondent Mamon alleged in his answer that he was the exclusive owner of 1/3 portion of Lot No. 9403 also
claimed by petitioner. The action, therefore, necessarily involved the question of whether or not it was petitioner or it
was respondent Mamon who was a co-owner of the land sought to be partitioned. Such being the case it cannot be
denied that the auction sale made pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 2932 of the Municipal
Court of Iloilo in which petitioner was the purchaser of the alleged 1/3 share of Marcelina J. Labrador in the property
covered by T.C.T. No. 7958, was directly and necessarily involved in the action.

G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994

FELICIDAD JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales and REINO
ROSETE, respondents.
FACTS:

It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641,
Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, with the District Land
Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly
dispossessed of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry
before the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 926,
On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4, 2 dismissed Civil Case No. 926 on the
ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to be
outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. . . ."3 The Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City became final and
executory on 30 April 1973 when the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br.
3, 4 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City Court holding that
appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient evidence to prove that the area in question was
within the boundaries of Lot No. 1641. 5
Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and
issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was
the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying,
including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete.
Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly
refused to comply with the demand.
On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 926,
petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against
Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0,
Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent herein)

moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did not file any
pleading.
In its Order dated 27 January 1978, 7 the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1, 8 sustained
the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied
Thereafter, Petitioner herein filed a motion for review on certiorari with the SC

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Petitioner is barred by res judicata

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the then Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent
Order denying reconsideration of the dismissal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

In SC's decision, please note the following:

Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following
requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is
between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action

And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, 24 even if we treat Civil Case No. 2203-0
as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action different from that for ejectment.
Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0,
the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.

G.R. No. 112734 July 7, 1994

SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUPO CALAYCAY, respondents.

FACTS:

Subject of this controversy [are the] premises identified as 24-B Scout Santiago Street, Barangay
Laging Handa, Quezon City, also identified as 26-B [South] D Street, Quezon City.
It was the object of a written lease contract executed by the late Nazario Penas in favor of [private
respondent] Lupo Calaycay on June 26, 1964, at an agreed monthly rental of One Hundred Ten
(P110.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency.
The written lease contract was on a month to month basis
Nazario Penas, Sr. died on February 5, 1976 and, thereafter, on June 15, 1976, an extra-judicial

settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is his son, Nazario Penas, Jr.
Likewise, after the death of plaintiff's mother Concepcion P. Penas on March 2, 1985, her children
including [petitioner] Nazario Penas, Jr. executed an extra judicial settlement of her estate.
As time [went] on, the monthly rental on the subject premises had been gradually increased by the
[petitioners], the latest of which was Six Hundred Ninety One and 20/100 (P691.20) Pesos, Philippine
Currency.
In a letter of January 18, 1990, [petitioner]-spouses Penas, through counsel notified the [private
respondent] that effective March 1990, they were terminating the written month to month lease contract
as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded from the latter to vacate the
premises in question on or before February 28, 1990. In the same letter, [petitioners] opted to allow the
defendant to continue occupying the leased premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease
contract for a period of one (1) year at an increased monthly rental of Two Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus two (2) months deposit and, further, gave the
[private respondent] up to February 28, 1990 to decide, otherwise judicial action for unlawful detainer
against the [private respondent] shall ensue. [Petitioners] later finally reduced the monthly rental to Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, only. - THIS IS THE DEMAND WITH WHICH THE
MTCC, RTC AND CA CONTEMPLATED (THEY WERE WRONG!)
[Private respondent] failed to abide by the demand of the [petitioners].
However, he continued staying on the leased premises and effective March 1990, he deposited the
monthly rentals in the subject premises with the PNB in his name ITF (in trust for) spouses Lucila and
Nazario Penas, Jr. under Account No. 688930.
Prior to such deposit, [private respondent] together with others, in a letter of March 26, 1990, informed
the [petitioners], inter alia, that since [petitioners'] representative refused to accept the rentals, he will
deposit the same with a reputable bank and he will [hold] the same intact for the [petitioners]. There was
no instance that [petitioners] manifested any desire to withdraw the same deposit in the bank.
On August 10, 1992, plaintiffs through counsel sent another letter to the defendant to vacate the subject
premises and to pay back rental arrearages in the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, per month from March 1990 in the total sum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, which defendant failed to satisfy. - THIS IS THE DEMAND AS CONTEMPLATED
BY SEC. 1 RULE 70 OF ROC
Accordingly, on September 25, 1992, after the corresponding Certification to File Action was issued by
Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, [petitioners] filed the present suit for unlawful detainer on the
grounds of termination of the month to month lease contract and failure of the defendant to execute a
new lease agreement with increased rentals.
[Petitioners] tried to impress the Court that after they [had] agreed [to] a new monthly rental of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, [private respondent] refused to enter into a new
contract and insisted in paying at a lower rate; that they gave defendant allowance of more than one (1)
year within which to sign a new contract of lease but still he refused to do so; that even if conciliation
before the barangay is unnecessary as [petitioners] reside abroad, their attorney-in-fact referred the
case to the barangay level.
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City rendered a decision dated 16 March 1993
dismissing herein petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court based its decision on the
finding that the complaint was filed more than one (1) year after private respondent began unlawfully
occupying the premises.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the trial court decision was upheld, the RTC ruling that herein
petitioners' remedy was converted from an actio de mero hecho to an accion publiciana since more
than one (1) year had elapsed from the demand upon defendants to vacate. The Regional Trial Court
concluded that herein petitioners could initiate a proper complaint with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent Court of Appeals in a decision * in CA G.R. SP No. 31480 dated 19 November 1993 upheld
the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that since herein petitioners were not collecting the rentals being
deposited by private respondent, there no longer was any lease contract between the parties for two (2)
years since the first letter of petitioners to private respondent. The Court of Appeals thus agreed that the
proper remedy of the petitioners is to file an action for recovery of possession in the Regional Trial
Court.
Hence an appeal was made by Petitioners herein to the SC

ISSUE: The only issue to be resolved in this ejectment case is whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by herein petitioner-spouses represented by their attorney-in-fact Elpidio R.
Viernes.

ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING

ORDER

HOLDING: The SC SET ASIDE the decision of the CA. In its decision, SC averred the following:

In Vda. de Murga v. Chan 4 we held that:

The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the
demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects
to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in said obligation and
necessary demand is first made.
When private respondent elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him the letter of 18 January
1990 giving him the option to vacate by 28 February 1990 or to sign a new lease contract for one (1) year at an
increased rental rate of P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he assumed the new rental rate and could
be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the petitioners. The demand was
made on 10 August 1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992. - THEREFORE,
DEMAND WAS MADE WITHIN THE TIME FOR A CASE AGAINST UNLAWFUL DETAINER (Within 1 year of
last demand)
G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991
LIM KIEH TONG, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge of Branch 16 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and REGINALDO Y. LIM, respondents.

10. Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing allegations by way of reference to form part of
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction;

11. The failure and/or refusal of defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key,
above-cited, constitutes a violation of the substantial rights of plaintiff, who has a clear
and unmistakable right to the use and enjoyment of Room 301 of the building owned
by defendant corporation, such that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order commanding
defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key in order to prevent great and and/or
irreparable damages and injury upon plaintiff.
THESE ARE THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCES PRAYED FOR BY THE APPELLEE
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction/restraining order commanding defendant to provide plaintiff the appropriate key or a duplicate
key to the lock of the main door of the building be immediately issued, and, after hearing the case on its merits,
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant ordering:
l. the injunction prayed for in the complaint;
2. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Pl,253.00 as actual compensatory damages;
3. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
4. the cost of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and/or remedies which the Honorable Court may deem just and proper in the
premises. (p. 13, orig. rec.)

FACTS:

3. Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the building adverted to in the next
preceding paragraph, until they transferred to their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon
City;
4. The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place where he keeps some of his
important belongings, such as his law books, important documents, appliances, etc.;
5. The aforementioned building has only one common main door through which all the occupants of the
various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get in and out therefrom;
6. Accordingly, each and every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the building including plaintiff
has been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock by Rafael Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of
defendant corporation;
7. When plaintiff wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of September 30, 1987 to fetch
three (3) of his law books, which he needed to read in connection with a case he is handling, he was
surprised to find out that the key given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already
changed;
8. Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he incurred expenses in the sum
of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his cases;

On October 2, 1987, by reason of the unjustifiable ouster of private respondent from said premises, he
instituted Civil Case No. 122546 entitled Reginaldo Y. Lim vs. Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc.
before the Metropolitan Trial Court which was raffled to Branch 25. Said complaint was denominated as
an action for damages with injunction despite the allegations contained therein . . .. The aforesaid case
was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
On October 23, 1987, private respondent again instituted another action at the Metropolitan Trial Court
docketed as Civil Case No. 122775 which was raffled to Branch 16. The complaint reiterated the same
allegations . . .
On November 2, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued by respondent judge pending trial on
the merits, commanding petitioner to deliver the appropriate keys to private respondent and allow him to
enter the premises and occupancy of Room No. 301 of the building . . .
On November 3, 1987, petitioners instituted the instant petition;
On the same date after an ex-parte hearing, the Executive Judge of this Court, in order to obviate any
possible injustice pending the determination of the issuance of the injunctive writ, issued a temporary
restraining order, enjoining the enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by
respondent judge and from further taking cognizance of said Civil Case No. 122775;

ISSUE: The issue of whether a complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is one for forcible entry and
detainer or one for specific performance is the center of this litigation.

HOLDING: From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the suit is one for forcible entry
and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Private respondent retained the possession of Room 301 of
petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but petitioner prevented him from enjoying
his right by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the main door of the building. Through stealth,
petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving private respondent of the possession of his rented room.

him 4This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other
person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise
unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and
detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from