FLP2425

CE
ERTIF
FICAT
TE IN MAR
RITIME SE CURIITY
MODULE
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Maritim
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Edited by
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Charles Swan
nson Ms
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Indepen
ndent Secu
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T
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With
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ntributio
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m:
Bob Reev
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MA in Intternational Security
Secu
urity Consu
ultant
Welcome to the free tria
al of Module 1 of
o Certificate in
n Maritime Sec
curity
We hope you enjoy the module and find it beneficiall. Once you ha
ave read throug
gh the contentss, if you are interested in
completing
g the rest of the
e course you can
n enrol online viia the website:
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ademy.com/msec
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e or need more
e information, please
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CONTENTS
Page No.
LEARNING OUTCOMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1
Flag States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2
Coastal, Port or Littoral States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3
Classification Societies (Class) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.
MARITIME ECONOMICS OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1
Shipping and the Global Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2
Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3
Top 20 Merchant Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4
Ship Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5
Cargo Carried . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.6
The Global Pattern of Maritime Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.7
Shipping Choke Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.8
Marine Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.9
P&I Clubs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.10
Piracy and Insurance Premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.
INTRODUCTION TO THE MAIN THREATS TO SHIPPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1
Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2
Piracy Today. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)
1-1
Contents
Module 1
5.4
Maritime Terrorism before 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.5
Maritime Terrorism after 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.6
Maritime Terrorism and International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.7
2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.8
Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.8.1
Cargo Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.8.2
Smuggling Drugs, Contraband, and Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.8.3
Stowaways and Human Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.8.4
Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.9
Cyber Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND

REGULATORY BODIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.
MARITIME TRADE BODIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.
ISO 28000 A SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY STANDARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9.
OTHER SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY INITIATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10.
COUNTER-PIRACY SECURITY INITIATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.1
The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.2
Djibouti Code of Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11.
NAVAL ANTI-PIRACY ORGANISATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
12.
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1-2
Module 1
Contents
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Maritime zones pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea. Source: after Symonds et al., 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 2: General Purpose Carrier (Photo: Dirk Steffen 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 3: Chemical Oil Tanker (Photo: Dirk Steffen 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 4: Bulk Carrier (Photo: Dirk Steffen 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Figure 5: Caribbean Cruise Liner (Authors private collection). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Figure 6: Container Ship (Photo Credit: Author Juergen Lehle. Wikimedia
Commons: GNU Free Documentation License) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Figure 7: Greek Fast Ferry (Authors private collection). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 8: The complex network of global cargo ship movements Pablo
Kaluza, Andrea Klzsch, Michael T. Gastner and Bernd Blasius,
J. Royal Society: Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Figure 9: Panamanian motor vessel Gatun during the largest cocaine
seizure in United States Coast Guard history (20 tons), off the
coast of Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 10: Major cocaine and heroin routes. Source: Washingtonpost.com . . . . . . . 31
Figure 11: Over a thousand men, smuggled into Oman, return to Pakistan
by boat after they were arrested and imprisoned (Picture by Ansar
Burney Trust: http://www.ansarburney.org) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 12: Example of ReCAAP ISC Incident Reporting Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 13: Signatories of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Copyright IIR Limited 2013. All rights reserved.

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1-3
LEARNING OUTCOMES
On successful completion of this module, you will be able to:
1-4
Explain the Regulatory framework of the maritime industry
Understand the importance of the maritime industry in the global

economy
Identify the different types of ship and the patterns of global trade
Identify the main security threats to shipping
Discuss the roles of international and regional organisations, regulatory

bodies and maritime trade bodies
Describe the various supply chain security standards and initiatives
State the main international and regional counter piracy security

initiatives
1.
INTRODUCTION
1-001
This course is designed both for those who have some experience in either
security or the maritime industry or both. It assumes a position of no knowledge
from the student to begin with and so some students may already be familiar
with some of the content.
1-002
Maritime security then is usually associated with ships and with ports but it
should not be forgotten that the maritime industry is part of a larger security field,
that of supply chain security which seeks to secure goods through the life of a
product from producer to end user. The total value of goods stolen in transit
worldwide is estimated to be in the order of $3050 billion, about 8% of which
are in maritime transit.1 Of these over 90% of maritime cargo theft occurs in
ports. Maritime security, in the sense of the security of ships at sea and in port,
has always existed but has tended to be low profile and geographically specific.
In Europe and the United States generally the security of ships at sea has not
been a major issue since the days of European and Barbary piracy. Consequently
the security of ships both in port and at sea in the past was largely casual or
virtually non-existent.
1-003
In some parts of the world however a very different security regime was required.
For example ships that travelled the Malacca Straits and West African ports
were all too familiar with the dangers of piracy and robbery at sea and developed
various measures to mitigate those threats. But often there was little security
methodology beyond the experience and wits of the master and crew.
Occasionally other threats emerged that required mitigation. The hijacking of
ships by large numbers of refugees rescued at sea was one threat, and terrorism
another with the high profile attacks on the QE2 and Achille Lauro as shall be
discussed later. But the organisation and standardisation of security beyond
single ships or specific fleets was virtually unknown.
1-004
It took 9/11 and the threat of potential attacks on ships or using ships as
weapons before international legislation, the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code), created the first ever common framework and
principles for ship and port facility security. It also marked for the first time ever
the expansion of IMO authority beyond the hull of a ship and into ports, previously
areas of national sovereignty. To what degree the ISPS Code has helped
individual seamen or ships is arguable but whatever it has done or not done, it
has created the beginnings of a far-reaching international organisation that
enables the control and tracking of ships more than ever before, together with
the potential to react to attacks upon them.
1-005
This course is aimed primarily at ship security but it would be remiss to totally
ignore the associated port facility and port security which has grown out of the
ISPS Code and this is covered where appropriate.
The Detection and Prevention of Cargo Theft, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminology No. 214 (September
2001), published by the Australian Institute of Criminology.
1-5
2.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Shipping is an exciting business, surrounded by many false beliefs,

misconceptions, even taboos the facts of the matter are straightforward
enough and, when stripped of their emotional and sentimental overtones in
clinical analysis, are much less titillating than the popular literature and
maritime folklore lead one to expect.2
1-006
International trade among all the nations and regions of the world is nothing new.
From the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Chinese, Vikings,
Polynesians, Celts, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, British, French and Dutch, the
history of the world is a history of exploration, trade and conquest by sea. The
effects of the growth of sea trade still resonate in modern war and diplomacy too.
Afghanistan was a prosperous hub for the trade routes between east and west
for centuries until the great Silk Road was made obsolete by the ships of
European empires. Even
in the Golden Age of maritime piracy a merchant ship would face better
odds on the high seas than by trying to sneak a caravan through the
rapacious emirs of Transoxiana.3
1-007
2
3
4
Today, international trade has evolved to the point where no nation can be fully
self-sufficient and around 90% of all trade is carried by ship. Every country is
involved in the process of selling what it produces and buying what it lacks: none
can be dependent only on its own resources. Modern ships are technologically
advanced, sophisticated and often huge. Containerships nudge the 14,000 TEU4
barrier, too big to navigate the Panama Canal yet capable of speeds of 25 knots;
huge oil tankers and bulk carriers carry vast quantities of fuel, minerals, and
grain and other commodities around the world. Ships themselves are high value
assets, some costing over US$100 million to build.
Helmut Sohnen, What Bankers always wanted to know about shipping but were afraid to ask, Address to the Foreign
Banks Representatives Association, Hong Kong, 27 June 1985. Reprinted in Fairplay, London 1 August 1987.
Tanner, S., Afghanistan, a Military History from Alexander the Great to the Taliban, Revised Edition, Da Capo Press,
Philadelphia, USA, 2009.
Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, a measure used for capacity in container transportation, i.e., a Twenty-foot long container
equals 1 x TEU, a forty-foot long container equals 2 x TEU.
1-6
3.
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
1-008
It is a commonly held view among some (particularly some of those who

advocate the use of firearms against piracy) that the high seas are a kind of
lawless wilderness where anything goes because there are no laws and usually
no witnesses.
1-009
In fact the maritime industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the
world. Ships are subject to a range of laws and regulations, international,
national and regional. In addition ships no longer operate in isolation. They are
nowadays, through satellite communications and tracking, connected constantly
and directly to shipping companies and government agencies as well as being
part of a wider supply chain organisation. From construction through to breaking
the history of a ship is now traceable and transparent.
1-010
There are three regimes that regulate shipping;
The Flag State (the Flag)
Coastal (or Littoral or Port) States
Classification Societies.
3.1
FLAG STATES
1-011
Every ship or vessel, subject to some qualification on size or type, must be

registered with a state. This state then becomes the Flag state and the ship is
then subject to its municipal (domestic) laws as well as the international maritime
regulatory regime. Flag states have different rules for registering ships. Most
require some connection with the state but this requirement varies. For example
in the United Kingdom (UK) it is sufficient to register as a UK company, with a
UK registered address, even if the company or ship has no British employees.
1-012
Other countries require much closer ties with the state. For example a US Flag
vessel is required to employ an American crew, will probably pay higher taxes
and fees, requires more rigid training for crews, and more stringent licensing
requirements for crew documents. The regulations regarding fire fighting, life
saving, safety, navigation, and communication equipment are often more
rigorous than other flag states and the procedures regarding the stowage and
carriage of hazardous goods are more restrictive than international laws.
1-013
At the other end of the scale are the Open registries, once called Flags of
Convenience of which Panama and Liberia are the two biggest and best known.
Open or International registries registered just over a 55% share of the
worlds fleet in 2009. These are states which register ships essentially as a
business, although it should be noted that in a spirit of market liberalism nearly
all registries now compete for business with each other. In return for a fee ships
1-7
The Regulatory Framework
Module 1
can be registered, often more cheaply and under less stringent conditions
(although all ships have to comply with minimum international standards) than
some other flags. These states do not have to be maritime states (even Mongolia
has a ship registry) or sovereign nations (the Isle of Man has its own registry).
1-014
War and politics affect the shipping industry just as much, perhaps more, than
other industries. Panama became an open registry because the Second World
War and the US Neutrality Act kept American flagged ships away from Europe.
The US Government gave its permission and American ships reflagged to stay
in business. The Panama Flag was born.
1-015
Thus the flag of a ship is no guide to either ownership (which can be difficult to
establish through a complex system of chartering) or nationality of the crew.
Registering ships has become a part of business and owners change Flag (and
Class, see below) to suit the political and economic circumstances.
1-016
Under Articles 90 and 91 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) Flag States have been given the right to sail ships on the high seas
and the right to fix conditions for registering ships under their flag and giving
their nationality to these ships. Under Article 94 the Flag State is under the duty
to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over administrative, technical and
social matters on their ships on the high seas.
1-017
The flag of a ship has never been a total guarantee of security but a hundred
years ago the flag of a ship provided some protection. A British flagged ship
could trade relatively secure in the knowledge that if attacked, retribution from
the Royal Navy would be swift and decisive. Since the Second World War the
degree of protection of ships by Flag States changed, not just because of the
decline of British sea power, but because of a massive swing to open registries
which by their very nature are often unable to protect their ships or even provide
consular support to crews in trouble. But Open Registers can also surprise.
According to the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) top performing flags
in maritime safety include the Bahamas, Cyprus, Liberia and the Marshall
Islands, as well as national flags, e.g. Norway and the UK. But they also note the
worst flags include Cambodia and Mongolia, who simply take registration fees.5
Most open registers rely almost totally on Classification Societies acting on their
behalf as Recognized Organizations to verify the vessels compliance with
international and/or national statutory regulations and it is in this role that
Classification Societies are often responsible for approving and verifying ship
security plans and procedures.
3.2
COASTAL, PORT OR LITTORAL STATES
1-018
Every state with a coastline is a coastal or littoral or port state. All foreign
ships are entitled to a right of innocent passage through the territorial waters
of a coastal state (special conditions apply to government ships, warships and
submarines), but are subject to that states laws for the safety of navigation, the
Simon Bennett, Secretary, International Chamber of Shipping Experiences and Challenges in Maritime Safety UN ICP,
24 June 2008, www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative.../9_bennett_presentation.pdf. accessed 09 July 2009.
1-8
Module 1
regulation of maritime traffic and other relevant laws regarding environment and
so on, and may be detained or arrested for breaching the coastal states laws.
1-019
So where do territorial waters begin and end?
Figure 1
Maritime zones pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
Source: after Symonds et al., 1998
1-020
Historically, territorial or national waters extended up to 3 nautical miles (nm)

from the baseline, the low water line (as depicted on large scale charts
recognised by the coastal state) of the coastal state. In recent years and for a
variety of reasons this has now generally been extended to 12 nm. But some
states have claimed territorial rights over waters up to 200 nm from the baseline.
Not every other state recognises these limits. Essentially each nation can
declare its own limit, and enforce it if it can.
1-021
Coastal States also have limited authority in the other Maritime Zones defined
by UNCLOS. The Contiguous zone extends a further 12 nautical miles or 24
nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines limit, the contiguous zone, in
which a Coastal state could continue to enforce laws in four specific areas:
pollution, taxation, customs, and immigration.
1-022
Exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extend from the edge of the territorial sea out
to 200 nm from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole
exploitation rights over all natural resources. In casual use, the term may include
the territorial sea and even the continental shelf. The continental shelf is defined
as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margins outer
edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal states baseline, whichever is
greater. A states continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the
natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from
the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500-metre
isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres). Coastal states have the
right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental
shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over
living resources attached to the continental shelf, but not to creatures living in
the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.
1-9
Module 1
3.3
CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES (CLASS)
1-023
Classification Societies are major players in the maritime industry. They are
usually not for profit Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Their origins lie
in the second half of the 18th century when marine insurers, based at Lloyds
Coffee House in London, developed a system for the independent inspection of
the hull and equipment of ships presented to them for insurance cover. In 1760
a Committee was formed for this express purpose, and Lloyds Register was
born. At that time, an attempt was made to classify the condition of each ship
on an annual basis. The condition of the hull was classified A, E, I, O or U,
according to the excellence of its construction and its adjudged continuing
soundness (or otherwise). Equipment was G, M, or B: simply, good, middling or
bad. In time, G, M and B were replaced by 1, 2 or 3, which is the origin of the
well-known expression A1, meaning first or highest class.
1-024
More than 50 organisations worldwide define their activities as providing marine

classification. Today more than 90% of the worlds cargo-carrying tonnage is
covered by the classification design, construction and through-life compliance
rules and standards set by the eleven largest Classification Societies:
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) United States
Bureau Veritas (BV) France
China Classification Society (CCS)
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Norway
Germanischer Lloyd (GL) Germany
Indian Register of Shipping (IRCLASS)
Korean Register of Shipping
Lloyds Register (United Kingdom)
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK or NK) (Japan)
Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) Italy
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RS)
1-025
Classification societies are represented by the International Association of

Classification Societies (IACS). IACS contributes to maritime safety and
regulation through technical support, compliance verification and research and
development.6
1-026
Classification societies contribute to the development and implementation of

technical standards for the protection of life, property and the environment. They
http://www.iacs.org.uk/explained/members.aspx accessed 9 July 2010.
1-10
Module 1
establish and apply technical requirements for the design, construction and
survey of marine-related facilities, principally ships and offshore structures.
These requirements are published as classification rules. Classification societies
maintain significant research departments that participate in the on-going
development of technical safety standards.
1-027
The owner of a ship that has been designed, built and tested in accordance with
the appropriate rules of a class society may apply for a certificate of classification
from that society. The society issues this certificate if it is verified (upon
completion of relevant plan approval and surveys) that the ship complies with the
rules. However, classification societies are not guarantors of safety of life or
property at sea or the seaworthiness of a vessel. This is because the Classification
Society has no control over how a vessel is operated and maintained in between
the periodic surveys which it conducts. A Classification Society does not design,
build, own, operate, manage, maintain, repair, finance, insure or charter ships.
Safe operation and maintenance of a ship depends principally upon the
shipowner, the shipowners representatives and the crew, who operate, manage
and maintain the ship on a day-to-day basis.
1-028
Classification Societies are in a unique position. They are in effect judge and jury
on just about every issue that affect ships ability to trade, and at the same time
a commercial service provider, in competition with other classification societies
for business. Competition is fierce. Shipowners can pick or choose which
Classification Society classes which part of the ship, so for example a ship can
be classed with Det Norske Veritas for its seaworthiness, but with Germanischer
Lloyd for its ship security plan. Classification Society Surveyors often have little
time to carry out their work, being limited to the time a ship is in port, sometimes
only a few hours. The cost to shipowners of being delayed for want of
Classification Society certification is significant. All these pressures can lead to
a drop in standards. For this reason some national registers do not delegate
work related to safety and security to Classification Societies.
Directed Learning:
On the web, search for the classification society that best represents
your industry section or country and see if you can find what its policies
are in respect of ship security.
1-11
4.
MARITIME ECONOMICS OVERVIEW
1-029
It is very difficult to get a meaningful picture of world trade without going into
considerable detail. The facts and figures here are only to give a very brief
overview of world trade patterns, with the aim of providing a context for maritime
security issues.
4.1
SHIPPING AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
1-030
More than 90% of global trade is carried by sea. Throughout the last century the
shipping industry has seen a general trend of increases in total trade volume.
Industrialisation, globalisation and liberalisation have fuelled trade and a growing
demand for consumer products. Technological improvements have also made
shipping an increasingly efficient method of transport. But shipping is not
immune to economic downturn. Until the latest recession, global trade was
booming, fuelled by growth in several countries including Brazil, Russia, India
and China. Shipping had gained from an upsurge in demand for the transport of
all kinds of raw materials, components, finished goods, fuel and foodstuffs.
4.2
SHIPS
1-031
Todays world fleet of propelled sea-going merchant ships of no less than 100
GT7 comprises 99,741 ships of 830.7 million GT with an average age of 22
years.8 They are registered in over 150 nations and manned by over a million
seafarers of virtually every nationality. The worlds cargo carrying fleet is 52,944
ships of 1,156.7 million dwt9 (791.1 million GT) and the average age is 20
years.
4.3
TOP 20 MERCHANT FLEETS
Flag State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7
8
9
Panama
Liberia
Bahamas
Marshall Islands
Singapore
Hong Kong, China
Greece
GT of Shipping (Millions)
183,503
82,389
46,542
42,636
39,885
39,100
36,822
GT: Gross ton: internal measurement of the ships open spaces. Now calculated from a formula set out in the IMO
Tonnage Convention.
LRF/Fairplay World Fleet Statistics 2008.
Dwt: Deadweight: the weight a ship can carry when loaded to its marks, including cargo, fuel, fresh water, stores
and crew.
1-12
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Maritime Economics Overview
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Malta
The Peoples Republic of China
Cyprus
Germany
United Kingdom
Norway
The Republic of Korea
Italy
Japan
United States
Denmark
Bermuda
Antigua and Barbuda
31,633
26,811
20,109
15,282
15,246
15,039
14,144
13,599
13,536
11,267
10,094
9,592
9,536
4.4
SHIP TYPES
1-032
Ships come in many shapes and sizes but can be generally classified as the
types set out below. In terms of maritime security the ship type is important
because it often defines the level of vulnerability to attack and which security
measures are practicable. For example a cable ship with low freeboard is an
easy target for boarding whereas a car carrier with high freeboard presents a
much more difficult target. Equally ships carrying inert bulk cargoes present very
different issues from ships carrying volatile or explosive cargo.
General Cargo Ships
General cargo ships are the largest single category. The trend among new ships
is more and more in favour of specialisation. It could be argued that handy-sized,
geared bulk carriers and versatile medium-sized containerships, of which some
have the ability to accommodate several different box sizes as well as palletised
cargo, are the natural successors of the old general cargo vessels.
Figure 2
General Purpose Carrier
(Photo: Dirk Steffen 2007)
1-13
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Tankers
Tankers make up the second largest category. There are many different types of
tanker, ranging from those carrying crude oil, through those built to transport
various refined hydrocarbon products, to highly specialised ships that carry
liquefied petroleum gas and natural gas. There are even tankers designed to
carry cargoes such as fresh water, wine or orange juice. Most large modern
tankers are in the 200,000300,000 tonnage range. These are massive vessels
and enormously expensive to build.
Figure 3
Chemical Oil Tanker
Bulk Carriers
Bulk carriers are the workhorses of the international shipping fleet. They can be
thought of as simple, relatively unsophisticated but nevertheless highly efficient
vessels that typically transport commodities such as grain, coal and
mineral ores. Bulk carriers are responsible for moving the raw materials that are
the lifeblood of the modern economy. The bulk carrier fleet has three
categories.
1-14
Ships of up to 50,000 dwt are known as Handy-Sized.
Ships of 50,000 to 80,000 dwt are known as Panamax (being the

largest ships able to transit the Panama Canal) and
Ships of more than 80,000 dwt are known as Capesize
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Figure 4
Bulk Carrier
Bulk carriers come in a number of variations, single or double hull, with or

without their own cargo-handling equipment. All are characterised by the huge
hatch covers that can be rolled or lifted away to reveal to cavernous holds
beneath.
Passenger Ships
Passenger ships come next in the world fleet league table. There are two basic
categories, which can be summed up as fun or function.
Function: those which are designed to move people and, often, vehicles on
regular itineraries from one place to another as quickly and cheaply as possible
(i.e. ferries).
Figure 5
Caribbean Cruise Liner
(Authors private collection)
1-15
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Fun: those which the passengers see as a leisure destination in their own right
(i.e. cruise ships).
In both categories, the size, sophistication and the sheer number of passengers
that can be carried have reached mind-boggling proportions. Because of their
individuality, as well as their resonance with the great ocean liners of a bygone
era, these ships tend to be the best known and most recognised among the
general public at large.
Container Ships
The container is now ubiquitous and is the standard unit of cargo for just about
every form of manufactured item on the planet there are exceptions: cars, for
example, are transported in special ships designed solely for the purpose.
Todays giant containerships typically operate between purpose-built ports
served by massive cranes that can load and unload containers at astonishing
rates. Containership operators can offer fixed sailing schedules with tight delivery
margins and these ships are now an integral part of the modern, multimodal
transport and logistics industry.
Figure 6
Container Ship
(Photo Credit: Author Juergen Lehle. Wikimedia
Commons: GNU Free Documentation License)
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High-speed craft (HSC)
Figure 7
Greek Fast Ferry
(Authors private collection)
High-speed craft (HSC) are high-speed water vessels for civilian use, also called
fastcraft or fast ferries. The first high-speed craft were often hydrofoils or
hovercraft, but in the 1990s catamaran and even monohull designs have become
popular. Most high-speed craft serve as passenger ferries, but the largest
catamarans and monohulls also carry cars and even buses and freight.
Fishing vessels
The world totals for fish-catching vessels amounts to 22,358 ships with a GT of
9,760,738 and an average age of 27 years. Other fishing vessels (fish carriers,
support vessels etc.) amount to 1,258 with a GT of 1,557,802 and an average
age of 24 years.10
Further subdivisions
The table below shows further subdivisions of ship types based on the
classifications used by David Hornsby in his book Ocean Vessels11 and which
demonstrates the variety of ship types that can be seen.
10
11
Abbreviation
Type of Vessel
B
BC
BO
Bu
Bv
Bw
C
Bulk Carrier
Bulk/Container Carrier
Bulk/Oil Carrier
Bulk Carrier Self Unloading
Bulk/Vehicle Carrier
Bulk woodchip carrier
General Cargo
Lloyds Register/Fairplay. World Fleet Statistics 2008, Table 2K p 54

Hornsby, David, Ocean Ships, Plymouth Press, 14th edn.
1-17
Ca
CC
CO
CT
HL
HLS
HLC
HLR
L
LC
LGC
LNG
LPG
O
OBO
OO
R
RO
ROI
RR
T
Tfj
Ts
V
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Cable Layer
Cellular Container
Cargo/Part Container
Cargo Training
Heavy Lift vessel
Heavy Lift/semi-submersible
Heavy Lift/cellular container
Heavy Lift Ro-Ro
Livestock Carrier
Lighter/Containers
Liquefied Gas Carrier
Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Carrier
Ore Carrier
Ore/bulk/oil Carrier
Ore/oil carrier
Refrigerated Cargo
Roll on-Roll Off
Roll on-Roll off/icebreaker
Refrigerated with Ro-Ro
Tanker
Tanker Fruit Juice
Storage Tanker
Vehicle Carrier
Directed Learning:
On the web, search for shipping companies who often publish details of
their fleets, including photographs or search http://www.shipspotting.
com/ for photographs of all types of ships.
4.5
CARGO CARRIED
1-033
In the last 40 years the total amount of cargo carried by sea has quadrupled. In
2008 international seaborne trade totalled 8.17 billion tons of cargo between
some 160 countries, of which roughly a third was crude oil and oil products
(11,292 of a world total of 32,746).12
1-034
A similar amount of dry bulk cargoes (iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite/alumina and
phosphate and other dry bulk) are carried, closely followed by mainly
containerised manufactured cargoes. The remainder is made up of grain (wheat,
maize, barley, oats, rye, sorghum and soya beans) and other cargoes.13
12
13
Measured in billions of ton-miles.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Review of Maritime Transport 2009, Geneva, p. 14,
Table 5, 2009.
1-18
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4.6
THE GLOBAL PATTERN OF MARITIME TRADE
1-035
The size of many ships is one factor that restricts their ability to trade. As a result
hub ports capable of berthing and unloading large ships have developed. It is
from these that most cargo is carried. These hubs are fed by smaller vessels
from other ports, creating a two-tier system.
1-036
The top ten container hubs (2009) are:14

Port
TEU15 millions per annum
Singapore
Shanghai
Hong Kong
Shenzen
Busan
Dubai
Ningbo
Guangzhou
Rotterdam
Qingdao
1-037
30
28
24
22
14
12
11
11
11
10
Besides Rotterdam, Europe has three other ports in the top twenty:
Hamburg
Bremen/Bremerhaven
Antwerp
1-038
The US has three:

Los Angeles,
Long Beach,
New York/New Jersey.
1-039
Taking exports and imports together, Western Europe has the most overall trade
(25%), followed by:
Location
The US and South East Asia (each)
13
Japan
10
Middle East
8
Mediterranean excluding Western Europe and South America (each) 7
West Africa and Oceania (each)
5
Caribbean and Central America
3
The remainder
<1
14
15
Ibid. p113, Table 38.

TEU, Twenty-foot equivalent Unit
1-19
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Directed Learning:
On the UNCTAD website (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2010_
en.pdf) find the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Review of Maritime Transport 2010, and familiarise yourself
with the latest developments in international seaborne trade
4.7
SHIPPING CHOKE POINTS
Figure 8
The complex network of global cargo ship movements Pablo Kaluza, Andrea Klzsch,
Michael T. Gastner and Bernd Blasius, J. Royal Society: Interface
1-040
While training several hundred classification society surveyors tasked with the
job of approving and verifying ship security plans on a series of maritime security
training courses worldwide, the author posed the question if you were a terrorist
planning to attack shipping where would you choose to attack? On every course
virtually the same scenario was repeated. The Suez or Panama Canals would
be the place. Why? Well to sink or damage a ship in either of those places would
affect not just the ship itself but the whole industry, so critical are those choke
points. The above map shows clearly those places where shipping routes and
ships are most concentrated around the world.
1-041
Today of course the spotlight is on the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa where
shipping is channelled on route to the Suez Canal. But choke points can be
local as well as international and should always be taken into account when
completing risk assessments for ships. Not all choke points are as dramatic or
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strategic in nature as the Suez and Panama Canals or the Red Sea. Any areas
where shipping is concentrated provide opportunity of target, one of the
preconditions for a successful piracy or terrorist operation. The English Channel,
Gibraltar Strait and Malacca Strait are all examples of places where high
volumes of shipping are concentrated and of course the approaches to any
major port provide opportunities of target. It should also not be forgotten that
modern technology can create virtual choke points with readily available
technology (such as AIS) providing information as to the location of ships
enabling them to be targeted.
1-042
The total value of goods stolen in transit worldwide is estimated to be in the

order of $3050 bn, about 8% of which are in maritime transit.16 Of these over
90% of maritime cargo theft occurs in ports.
4.8
MARINE INSURANCE
1-043
Marine insurance is coverage for goods in transit, and for the commercial
vehicles that transport them, on water and on land.
1-044
There are four basic types of marine insurance:

1.
hull insurance that covers physical risk to the ship, like grounding or
damage from heavy seas, collision, sinking, capsizing, being stranded,
fire, piracy, and jettisoning cargo to save other property;
2.
cargo insurance that covers the goods transported in the ship;
3.
war risk insurance; and
4.
protection and indemnity (P&I).
1-045
In addition, shipowners can purchase separate kidnap and ransom (K&R)

insurance for crew members.
1-046
Hull insurance primarily covers physical damage to vessels (hull) and the
machinery and equipment. The insurance also covers collision liability associated
with damage to other vessels and their cargoes resulting from collision with the
insured vessel.
1-047
Cargo insurance policies are written as separate coverage from hull insurance
because merchants typically ship cargo via vessels owned by others. Cargo
policies may be classified by whether they are designed to cover a particular
voyage; a specific time period; or a commodity such as grain, cotton, and iron
ore; or whether they are adapted to cover cargo general in its nature. Cargo
is insured by the owners of the cargo which can be a large number of parties
with a variety of different insurers. The principle of general average is
incurred for emergency situations when part of the ship or part of the cargo
16
The Detection and Prevention of Cargo Theft in: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminology No. 214 (September
2001), published by the Australian Institute of Criminology.
1-21
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has to be sacrificed to save the whole. All parties share in the common loss
incurred.
1-048
War risk insurance is special coverage on cargo in ships that protects against
the risk of confiscation by a government in wartime. War risk insurance coverage
protects, at an additional premium, against the danger of loss in a war zone. The
war risk zones are established by the London-based Lloyds Market Associations
Joint War Committee (JWC), which has recently included the Gulf of Aden as a
war risk area due to piracy. About a decade ago, the Malacca Strait was similarly
designated a war risk area due to piracy. The JWC represents the interests of
underwriters writing war and related risks within the London ocean marine
insurance market.
4.9
P&I CLUBS
1-049
Hull insurance does not protect the vessel owner against liability for damage
to:
Cargo in the custody of the insured;
Injury to passengers, crew members, or labourers handling cargo; and
Damage to docks, piers, and other fixed objects.
1-050
Ship-owners typically purchase a Protection and Indemnity (P&I) marine

insurance policy to cover these risks from ship owners clubs that form to
mutually insure these risks. In the 19th century, shipowners banded together in
mutual underwriting clubs to insure liability risk amongst them. These clubs are
still in existence today. Members of the clubs are generally levied an initial sum
that is used to purchase reinsurance to cover their mutual liability risks. If a club
experiences unfavourable losses, the members are assessed a supplementary
premium. The club attempts to build up loss reserves.
4.10
PIRACY AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS
1-051
The Cost of Piracy Model17 calculates the additional cost of insurance to the shipping
industry using a lower bound estimate (10% of ships purchasing these insurance
premiums) and an upper bound estimate (70% of ships). From these calculations, it is
estimated that total excess costs of insurance due to Somali piracy are between $460
million and $3.2 billion per year.
1-052
According to the Cost of Piracy Project the total cost of piracy in 2010 is estimated to be
between $7 and $12 billion.
17
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/.
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Directed Learning:
Read the latest Cost of Piracy Report in full at:
http://www.saveourseafarers.com/assets/files/The_Economic_Cost_of_
Piracy_Summary.pdf
1-23
5.
INTRODUCTION TO THE MAIN THREATS

TO SHIPPING
1-053
The main security threats to shipping are commonly considered to be piracy,

terrorism and other crime, including cargo theft, fraud, drug smuggling,
contraband and arms smuggling. But it is often difficult to establish exactly the
scale of any of these crimes because of the fragmented nature of the industry
and the absence of any centralised maritime crime reporting agency. It is true
that ships are encouraged to report piracy and robbery at sea to the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Piracy Reporting Centre but even this is
uneven and often inaccurate. Attempted piracy attacks reported may be innocent
approaches to ships by tradesmen or small fishing vessels or simply navigational
misunderstandings. Other genuine piracy attacks may not be reported at all as
some shipping companies are reluctant to report incidents of piracy for fear of
raising their insurance premiums and prompting protracted, time-consuming
investigations.
1-054
Similarly, crime reported to port state authorities may or may not be recorded or
even acknowledged, particularly where a particular port state does not wish to
discourage trade by building a reputation as being high risk. Even if it is recorded
this information is often not readily available. Local police records do not
generally define a theft on board a ship as a maritime crime, but simply as a
crime within that forces jurisdiction. Crime internally on board ships is often not
reported to flag states and where registered with an open registry, that registry
may not have the capability or interest to deal effectively with the incident.
1-055
Mark Twain popularised the saying Lies, damned lies, and statistics and while
this might be a little coloured, security professionals should always view maritime
crime statistics with a healthy caution, particularly where terrorism and piracy
are concerned, because politics and vested interests will follow not far behind
and as in war, the truth, or at least the whole truth, is often the first casualty.
5.1
PIRACY
1-056
In the City of London not far from where today bankers sip their skinny lattes
and gaze out over the Thames, dreaming up ways to separate people from their
money once swung on gibbets the bodies of executed pirates, men who had
been guilty of similar thoughts, but in the violent fashion of their time. There is
much debate as to exactly what constitutes piracy but sea robbery probably
describes best (if not fully) what most pirates did and do. Robbery of course is
theft involving violence or the threat of violence. The intent to rob, animus
furandi, has been an important part of the development of law of piracy. Piracy
has never been a harmless crime. Piracy went hand in hand with slavery for
many centuries. With no international law to protect seafarers, states often used
pirates for their own ends. Roman Catholic pirates preyed on heretical Protestant
nations ships, Christians on Moors, and Turks on everyone. Navies, pirates
and their legal brethren, privateers, were often one and the same, or were able
to switch instantly to suit the circumstances.
1-24
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Introduction to the Main Threats to Shipping
5.2
PIRACY TODAY
1-057
The number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported to the
IMO to have been allegedly committed or attempted in 2010 was 489, against
406 during the previous year, an increase of 20.4% from the figure for 2009. The
areas most affected (i.e. five incidents reported or more) in 2010 were East
Africa and the Indian Ocean (249 Incidents in total) followed by the Far East and,
in particular, the South China Sea (134 incidents), West Africa (47 incidents),
South America (35 incidents).
1-058
During 2010 it was reported to the IMO that 2 crew members were killed and 27
crew members were wounded, while 1,027 crew members were reportedly
taken hostage. Fifty-seven vessels were reportedly hijacked, with one vessel
reportedly still unaccounted for.18
1-059
In the first four months of 2011, 214 incidents were reported to the IMO.
1-060
Modern piracy may be seen as a combination of many factors: opportunity, the

ability to profit from weak state and institutional structures, inadequate finance
and supporting infrastructure, poverty and local traditions which create social
acceptance for piracy.
1-061
The current piracy debate is centred on Somali-based piracy for a number of

reasons: the failure of the international community to prevent Somalias descent
into chaos; the unprecedented success of Somali pirates; the commercial value
of the targets attacked and subsequent publicity; the perceived danger to global
trade; the proximity of Somalia to Yemen and its connection to extreme terrorism;
and a linkage, actual or otherwise, between Somali pirates and Al Qaeda.
1-062
The economic impact of piracy in the Gulf of Aden on global trade.
1-063
With over 80% of the maritime trade bound for Europe through the Gulf of Aden
and the Suez Canal, clearly Europe is most affected by piracy attacks there.
Piracy poses significant burdens on governments and the maritime industry as
they take steps to protect themselves from attack. Costs involved include a
military presence in high-risk areas, rerouting of ships, higher insurance
premiums, hiring private security guards, and the hardening of ships by
installing physical barriers and counter measures. Since 2012 there has been an
increase in the number of shipping lines employing armed security personnel
from Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC), and whilst this is not a
comfortable strategic approach from all governments, shipping lines are facing
a dangerous situation whereby military cover is diminishing. Ultimately, these
costs are passed to the tax payer and the end user.
1-064
Ships have two choices: avoiding the area by rerouting vessels via the Cape of
Good Hope, or accepting and mitigating the risk by enhancing vessel security.
Rerouting may be a viable option for lower value cargoes, such as some bulk
commodities. However, for high value consumer goods or items needed for justin-time manufacturing, the added delay may be unacceptable to the shipper.
18
MSC.4/Circ.169, 1 April 2011, Reports On Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report 2010
/15_MSC_4.Circ.169%20-%202010.pdf
1-25
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1-065
For example, routing a tanker from Saudi Arabia to the United States via the
Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 2,700 miles to the voyage. This longer
distance will increase the annual operating cost of the vessel by reducing the
delivery capacity for the ship from about six round-trip voyages to five voyages,
or a drop of about 26%. The additional fuel cost of travelling via the Cape of
Good Hope is about $3.5 million annually.
1-066
The cost of avoiding risk becomes more complex in the liner19 trades. A long
route change would result in the need for an additional vessel in order to
maintain the scheduled service and capacity commitments of the liner operation.
For example, a routing from Europe to the Far East via the Cape of Good Hope,
rather than through the Suez Canal, would incur an estimated additional $89
million annually, which includes $74.4 million in fuel and $14.6 million in charter
expenses. In addition, the rerouting would increase transit times by about 5.7
days per ship. This would result in the need for an additional vessel to maintain
the service frequency. However, these costs do not consider the disruption in the
logistics chains.
1-067
The cost of the war risk insurance for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden is
estimated at US$20,000 per ship, per voyage, excluding injury, liability, and
ransom coverage.
1-068
It is estimated that the increased cost of war risk insurance premiums for the
20,000 ships passing through the Gulf of Aden could reach as much as $400
million.20
1-069
Clearly, this estimate represents an upper bound on the additional insurance

cost as not all vessels will seek the additional coverage, and the estimate
excludes rebates given when no claim is exercised on the policy.
5.3
TERRORISM
1-070
The closest to an agreed international legal definition of terrorism is UN

Resolution 1566 (3) 8 October 200421 which refers to:
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or
particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.22
1-071
19
20
21
22
Terrorism then involves indiscriminate violence with the objective of influencing

governments or international organisations for political ends.
Ships sailing fixed routes to fixed schedules.

Piracy Could Add $400m to Owners Insurance Cover Costs, Lloyds List, 21 November 2008.
http://www.unrol.org/files/n0454282.pdf.
Resolution 1566 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5053rd meeting, on 8 October 2004.
1-26
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5.4
MARITIME TERRORISM BEFORE 9/11
1-072
A RAND23 paper on maritime terror24 lists 13 Selected High-Profile Maritime

Terrorist incidents between 1961 and 2004. An unpublished paper by the UKs
Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate lists 19 between 1940 and
2004. However a (pre-9/11) RAND report25 lists no less than 111 incidents
between 1960 and 1984 alone. Not all these attacks were terrorism one was
a mutiny and two were clearly piracy but nonetheless the report says:
Although terrorist groups have not operated extensively in the maritime
environment, they have carried out a variety of actions: They have attacked
47 ships. They hijacked 11 ships. They sank (or totally destroyed) 12 seagoing vessels. Since 1960, anti-Castro Cuban exile groups have been
responsible for 25 attacks. Various Palestinian groups were responsible for
9 incidents. Other groups include the IRA, Moslem separatists in the
Southern Philippines, right-wing Christian extremists in Lebanon, Polisario
guerrillas,26 Portuguese dissidents, Angolan rebels, and members of the
Maltese National Front.
1-073
In the 1950s Cuban groups were trained by the US Navy in navigation and
underwater demolitions. Earlier they had been armed and equipped by the CIA.
Until 1968 the US government supported a guerrilla navy that operated against
Cuban ports and Soviet shipping in the Caribbean. The fleet comprised small,
fast boats armed with 57 mm recoilless rifles and machineguns. They were
responsible for a number of attacks on Soviet shipping.27 Maritime terrorism is
not then such a stranger as is sometimes suggested.
5.5
MARITIME TERRORISM AFTER 9/11
1-074
The September 11 (9/11), 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States have
provoked increasing concern that terrorists may attack targets in the maritime
environment. Applying the model of the 9/11 attacks to the shipping industry,
security experts have highlighted the danger of similar and potentially much
more devastating attacks carried out by ships. With the increasing importance
of offshore facilities to the worlds supply of energy, the vulnerability of marine
facilities, and no shortage of inspiration provided by security experts and
fiction writers alike, it seems the authors of the 1985 RAND report were
correct: terrorists will turn their attention to harbours, offshore platforms, and
ships at sea.28
23
24
25
26
27
28
http://www.rand.org/.
Chalk, Peter, The Maritime Dimension of International Security; Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United
States, Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG697/, 2008.
Brian Michael Jenkins (with Bonnie Cordes, Karen Gardela and Geraldine Petty), Chronology of Terrorist and Other
Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets, 19601983, Published by the Rand Corporation 1984.
Frente Popular de Liberacin de Sagua el Hamra y Ro de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra
and Ro de Oro) is a Sahrawi rebel national liberation movement working for the independence of Western Sahara from
Morocco.
Warren Hinkle and William W. Turner, The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro, New York: Harper &
Row, 1981.
Brian Michael Jenkins (with Bonnie Cordes, Karen Gardela & Geraldine Petty), Chronology of Terrorist and Other
Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets, 19601983, Published by the Rand Corporation 1984.
1-27
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1-075
They have already done so. The attacks on the Limburg and USS Cole
demonstrate that. But not as much as might be expected. There are plenty of
targets. About 53,000 ships ply their trade internationally29 and this does not
include naval and other government vessels, fishing vessels, leisure craft,
riverine trade and non-international ferries.
1-076
The UK alone has some 350 port facilities subject to the ISPS Code. Port
Facilities contain Liquid Nitrogen Gas (LNG) terminals, refineries, re-gasification
plants, and petrochemical installations. Vital pipelines and cables criss-cross the
seabed. Such attacks as have been carried out were usually the work of specific
groups working in specific areas (for example the LTTE30 in Sri Lanka) and not
connected with Al Qaedas broader aims. A few incidents do stand out as the
work of Al Qaeda (AQ) or its franchises, the attacks on the USS Cole and the
Limburg and an attempted attack on the USS Sullivan being the most frequently
cited.
1-077
Although maritime targets may appear vulnerable, are they attractive to

terrorists? The seizure of a passenger ship, oil or gas tanker, or an offshore
platform would certainly capture headlines. It could have a high political value for
the terrorists with economic losses thrown in; and attacks could exploit
environmentalist sentiments, attacking, for example, ships carrying nuclear
waste or contaminated soil. However, there are constraints on maritime terrorist
activity.
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Port facilities, offshore platforms, and ships at sea may be theoretically

vulnerable, but the ease with which moving ships can be boarded, platforms
taken over, or refineries set on fire should not be exaggerated. Terrorists are not,
for the most part, highly trained commandos. Taking over ships or platforms may
require more men than most terrorist groups generally have fielded, and the
larger the operation the greater the chances it will be detected by security forces
before it can be conducted. Moreover, although assaulting a large vessel that
has been seized by terrorists poses tactical problems for security forces; holding
a large vessel or oil platform against an assault by well armed, resourced and
trained security forces poses major problems for terrorists. Authorities also can
more easily cut off communications and isolate a ship or offshore platform from
television cameras and modern mass media than they can a land-based scene.
In short, increased terrorist attacks on maritime targets, while possible, are not
inevitable.
5.6
MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
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The 1985 hijacking by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) of the Achille Lauro,
in which one person was killed, prompted the IMO to introduce the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
1988 (SUA).31
29
30
31
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/number-of-ships.php?SID=b21fb8572c97ed3ba21218f0938dc507.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (commonly known as the LTTE, or the Tamil Tigers) was a separatist militant
organisation formerly based in northern Sri Lanka.
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Facilitation/SUAConvention/Pages/Default.aspx.
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The SUA was adopted on 10 March 1988 and came into force on 1 March
1992. The main purpose of the Convention is to ensure that appropriate action
is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. These
include:
the seizure of ships by force;
acts of violence against persons on board ships; and
the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or

damage it.
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The Convention obliges Contracting Governments either to extradite or prosecute

alleged offenders. It was extended by the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf, 1988 which extends the requirements of the Convention to fixed platforms,
such as those engaged in the exploitation of offshore oil and gas.
5.7
2005 PROTOCOL TO THE SUA CONVENTION
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Among the unlawful acts covered by the SUA Convention in Article 3 are:
the seizure of ships by force;
acts of violence against persons on board ships; and
the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or

damage it.
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A new 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention adds Article 3bis which creates a
number of offences where a person intends to intimidate a population or to
compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from
any act by using any explosive, radioactive material or BCN (biological, chemical,
nuclear) weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious
injury or damage.
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Other shipboard offences include:
discharging any oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious

substance that is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage;
using a ship to cause death or serious injury or damage;
transporting any explosive or radioactive material or BCN weapon;
transporting any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment

or material for the processing of special fissionable material and;
transporting any equipment, materials or software or related technology

that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a
BCN weapon.
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The new instrument also makes it an offence to:
unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill any person in connection with the
commission of any of the offences in the Convention;
attempt to commit an offence;
participate as an accomplice;
organise or direct others to commit an offence; or to contribute to the

commissioning of an offence.
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And a new article requires Parties to take necessary measures to enable a legal
entity (this could be a company or organisation, for example) to be made liable and
to face sanctions when a person responsible for management or control of that
legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence under the Convention.
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Under the new instrument, a person commits an offence within the meaning of
the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally transports another
person on board a ship knowing that the person has committed an act that
constitutes an offence under the SUA Convention or an offence set forth in any
treaty listed in the Annex. The Annex lists nine such treaties.
Directed Learning:
Browse the IMOs web pages on maritime security at:
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/Pages/MaritimeSecurity.aspx
5.8
CRIME
5.8.1
Cargo Theft
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Cargo is any commercial shipment. Cargo theft has been around for many years
and is often characterised by the presence of international organised crime.
Economic crises always increase the demand for black market goods. The
introduction of containers has done a great deal to reduce small scale thefts
from ships cargoes but they still occur regularly.
1-089
Because cargo theft statistics are often not a separate reportable category of
crime and because many companies dont report cargo crimes (to avoid bad
publicity, higher insurance rates, damage to reputation, embarrassment, etc.),
the exact losses arent known. Some industry experts estimate all cargo thefts
ring up as much as $30 billion in losses each year, but this includes that stolen
not just from ships and wharves but also from trucks, planes, rail cars, etc.;
anywhere from point of origin to final destination.
5.8.2
Smuggling Drugs, Contraband, and Arms
1-090
Only a small percentage (often less than 1%, particularly in developing

economies) of containers are screened or searched. This makes it relatively
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easy for the smuggling of drugs and arms to take place. In the UK alone, the
drug industry is said to account for 8% of all yearly international trade the
same as oil or tourism. Its helped by the profit made from drugs like cocaine,
worth some 24,000 per kilogram as compared to the cost at source in Pakistan
of 850 per kilo. The UK heroin industry is said to be worth 2.3 billion with an
estimated 270,000 users.
Figure 9
Panamanian motor vessel Gatun during the largest cocaine seizure
in United States Coast Guard history (20 tons), off the coast of Panama
Figure 10
Major cocaine and heroin routes
Source: Washingtonpost.com
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For ships, the high drug smuggling risks are said to originate from:
Container services from South America
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Bulk from Brazil
Charters from/via Jamaica
Any ship from the Caribbean
Northwest Africa
Cambodia/North Korea flag
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But this is a constantly moving target. As police and other agencies close down
one operation, others spring up operating differently or using different routes.
5.8.3
Stowaways and Human Trafficking
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The trafficking of human beings is the recruitment, transportation, transfer,

harbouring or receipt of people for the purpose of exploitation.
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People smuggling is a multi-billion dollar business fuelled by the increasingly

restrictive asylum practices of many of the worlds industrialised countries. What
was once a relatively visible and quantifiable flow of people seeking asylum has
become a covert, irregular movement that is ever more difficult to control. It is
estimated that four million people are trafficked or smuggled across international
borders each year. The value of this criminal trade has been estimated at
approximately US$10 billion per year.
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Human trafficking is, by its very nature, a covert crime. This means its difficult
to establish the scale of the problem, although the harm it causes is clear. The
majority of people trafficked into the UK for sexual exploitation arrive overtly by
air or rail; or as foot, car, lorry or coach passengers on the many sea routes that
serve the UK and its international neighbours.
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Research indicates the UK is primarily a destination country for trafficking

victims, with most originating from Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, Balkans or
Far East, especially China, Malaysia and Thailand.
Figure 11
Over a thousand men, smuggled into Oman, return to Pakistan by
boat after they were arrested and imprisoned
(Picture by Ansar Burney Trust: http://www.ansarburney.org)
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5.8.4
Fraud
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Fraud is an intentional deception made for personal gain or to damage another

individual. Maritime fraud usually occurs when one of the parties involved in an
international trade transaction (the buyer, seller, ship-owner, charterer, ships
master or crew, insurer, banker, broker or agent) illegally secures money or
goods from another party.
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Frauds can be broadly classified into Documentary, Shipping and Charter Party
frauds:
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Documentary: Some or all of the documents specified by the buyer for

presentation by the seller to the bank to receive payments are forged.
Shipping Fraud includes scuttling, deviation, cargo theft, or arson in which

vessel or cargo is disposed of with the connivance of her owners.
Charter Party Fraud occurs when one or two contracting parties default,
leaving the others to bear the cost.
Theft of cargo by crew.
Fraud may also involve:
Deviation Fraud
Insurance Fraud.
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Deviation Fraud is the theft or misappropriation of the cargo by the shipowner.

Instead of sailing to an agreed destination, the ship deviates to another port
where the cargo is sold illegally. The ship is then either deliberately sunk or
renamed.
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Insurance Fraud is all too commonplace and covers everything from false claims
for damage and loss by recreational sailors, to the loss of whole vessels and
their cargoes.
5.9
CYBER CRIME
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Although the term cyber-crime is usually restricted to describing criminal activity

in which the computer or network is an essential part of the crime, this term is
also used to include traditional crimes in which computers or networks are used
to enable the illicit activity. Terrorists are increasingly aware of this method of
attack.
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Cyber-crime in the context of national security may involve hacktivism (online

activity intended to influence policy), traditional espionage or information warfare
and related activities.
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Additionally, certain other information crimes, including trade secret theft and
industrial or economic espionage are sometimes considered cyber-crimes when
computers or networks are involved.
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6.
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL

ORGANISATIONS AND REGULATORY
BODIES
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The organisations described below are all major players in the maritime industry and individually or collectively are responsible for, or have considerable
influence on, the laws and regulations that govern the maritime industry. Ships
ignore these laws at their peril. The economic price of being found to be nonconformant with any of them is significant, resulting in delay and possible
detention in port. Security on board a ship cannot be blistered on to the normal
shipboard operation of a ship but must be fully integrated and integral to how
the ship is run. The influence and role of these organisations must be understood
when designing a security system whether it be writing a relatively simple
security plan or procedures, or mounting an additional counter piracy onboard
security team.
United Nations (UN)32
The United Nations is an international organisation founded in 1945 after the

Second World War by 51 countries, committed to maintaining international
peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting
social progress, better living standards and human rights.
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32
The UN has four main purposes:
To keep peace throughout the world;
To develop friendly relations among nations;
To help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to

conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each
others rights and freedoms;
To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations to achieve these

goals.
Due to its unique international character, and the powers vested in its founding
Charter, the Organization can take action on a wide range of issues, and provide
a forum for its 192 Member States to express their views, through the General
Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other
bodies and committees.
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml.
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International and Regional Organisations and Regulatory Bodies
The work of the United Nations reaches every corner of the globe. Although best
known for peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and humanitarian
assistance, there are many other ways the United Nations and its System
(specialised agencies, funds and programmes) affect lives. The UN works on a
broad range of fundamental issues, from sustainable development, environment
and refugees protection, disaster relief, counter terrorism, disarmament and
non-proliferation, to promoting democracy, human rights, gender equality and
the advancement of women, governance, economic and social development and
international health, clearing landmines, expanding food production, and more,
in order to achieve its goals and coordinate efforts for a safer world for this and
future generations.
International Maritime Organization (IMO)33
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An agency of the United Nations with 169 member states, the IMOs task is to
provide a regulatory framework for shipping, including safety, environmental,
legal matters, technical cooperation, maritime security and the efficiency of
shipping.34
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It has always been recognised that the best way of improving safety at sea is by
developing international regulations that are followed by all shipping nations,
and from the mid-19th century onwards a number of such treaties were adopted.
Several countries proposed that a permanent international body should be
established to promote maritime safety more effectively, but it was not until the
establishment of the United Nations itself that these hopes were realised. In
1948 an international conference in Geneva adopted a convention formally
establishing IMO (the original name was the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization, or IMCO, but the name was changed in 1982 to
IMO).
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The IMO Convention entered into force in 1958 and the new Organization met
for the first time the following year.
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The purposes of the Organization, as summarised by Article 1(a) of the

Convention, are:
33
34
to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of

governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all
kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade;
to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable

standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation
and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.
http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx.
www.imo.org/about.
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1-113
The Organization is also empowered to deal with administrative and legal

matters related to these purposes. IMOs first task was to adopt a new version
of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the most
important of all treaties dealing with maritime safety. This was achieved in 1960
and IMO then turned its attention to such matters as the facilitation of international
maritime traffic, load lines and the carriage of dangerous goods, while the
system of measuring the tonnage of ships was revised.
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In the 1970s a global search and rescue system was initiated, with the
establishment of the International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO), which
has greatly improved the provision of radio and other messages to ships. The
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) was adopted in 1988 and
began to be phased in from 1992. In February 1999, the GMDSS became fully
operational, so that now a ship that is in distress anywhere in the world can be
virtually guaranteed assistance, even if the ships crew does not have time to
radio for help, as the message will be transmitted automatically.
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On 1 July 1998 the International Safety Management Code entered into force
and became applicable to passenger ships, oil and chemical tankers, bulk
carriers, gas carriers and cargo high-speed craft of 500 gross tonnage and
above. It became applicable to other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling
units of 500 gross tonnage and above from 1 July 2002.
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On 1 February 1997, the 1995 amendments to the International Convention on

Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) for Seafarers,
1978 entered into force. They greatly improve seafarer standards and, for the
first time, give IMO itself powers to check Government actions with Parties
required to submit information to IMO regarding their compliance with the
Convention. A major revision of the STCW Convention and Code was completed
in 2010 with the adoption of the Manila amendments to the STCW Convention
and Code.
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The 2000s also saw a focus on maritime security, with the entry into force in July
2004 of a new, comprehensive security regime for international shipping,
including the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, made
mandatory under amendments to SOLAS adopted in 2002.
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In 2005, IMO adopted amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of

Unlawful Acts (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and its
related Protocol (the 2005 SUA Protocols), which amongst other things,
introduce the right of a State Party to board a ship flying the flag of another State
Party when the requesting Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the
ship or a person on board the ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in, the
commission of an offence under the Convention.
World Customs Organization (WCO)35
35
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/About%20Us/DEPL%20OMD%20UK%20A4.pdf.
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The WCO is the only international intergovernmental organisation that deals

with Customs procedures governing trade between countries. Its work aims to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Customs administrations across the
globe, and to help them fulfil their dual role of facilitating trade whilst ensuring its
security. Born after the Second World War out of a desire by countries to
re-launch world trade, and to provide a platform for the discussion of Customs
issues, the WCO officially established in 1952 as the Customs Co-operation
Council held its first meeting on 26 January 1953. Since then the Organization
has grown from its original 17 founding members to encompass a truly global
membership now numbering 176.
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The WCOs mission is to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of its
Member Customs administrations across the globe. While three-quarters of its
Members are developing countries, the WCOs combined membership is
collectively responsible for managing and processing more than 98% of world
trade.
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The responsibilities linked to the international movement of goods, people and

means of transport have expanded and will continue to do so, ranging from
traditional Customs activities such as the collection of revenue to activities as
diverse as environmental protection, combating drug trafficking and money
laundering, and ensuring food safety and revenue security. To facilitate the work
of Customs at borders, over time the WCO has developed a number of
instruments and tools, and introduced a number of programmes and initiatives,
that significantly enhance Customs operations.
Security and enforcement
Strengthening the security of the international trade supply chain through

the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards that lists the minimum standards
that Customs and economic operators should apply in order to avert the
risk of terrorist attacks and other criminal threats.
Bolstering efforts to combat fraudulent and criminal activities by improving

enforcement methods and practices through training, managing a global
network of regional intelligence liaison offices, developing secure
communication tools for the exchange of information, preparing analyses
of smuggling trends and modus operandi, and facilitating field and border
enforcement operations.
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
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The ILO is a specialised agency of the United Nations that deals with labour
issues pertaining to international labour standards. Its headquarters are in
Geneva. The ILO has significant input into matters of maritime safety and
security.
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European Union (EU)
1-123
The European Union is an economic and political partnership between 27

European countries.
1-124
It is progressively building a single Europe-wide market in which people, goods,

services, and capital move among Member States as freely as within one
country. The EU was created in the aftermath of the Second World War. Since
then, the Union has developed into a huge single market with the euro as its
common currency. What began as a purely economic union has evolved into an
organisation spanning all areas, from development aid to environmental policy.
It is now possible for people to travel freely within most of the EU. It has also
become much easier to live and work in another EU country.
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The European Union is not a super-state. The EUs ability to influence the
international order depends on its ability to bring together the whole of the EU,
most crucially the Member States, who while independent in foreign and security
affairs, are parties to a strategy for EU international policy.
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The European Union remains essentially a civilian power that confines the use
of force to the most exceptional circumstances and broad international
legitimacy.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
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NATO was created in 1949. Its member countries are Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom
and the United States. Its fundamental role is to safeguard the freedom and
security of its member countries by political and military means.
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Ongoing military operations and missions include counter-piracy operations off

the Horn of Africa.
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NATO has very few permanent military forces of its own. Once members agree,
by consensus, to engage in an operation, they contribute forces on a voluntary
basis.
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7.
MARITIME TRADE BODIES
1-130
Maritime trade bodies represent various groupings throughout the maritime

industry and like the international and regional bodies described in the previous
chapter are often influential in the forming of maritime laws and regulation. They
also often provide excellent guidelines for the industry on every major issue
including safety and security. These guidelines often become the de facto legal
standard for the implementation of regulations.
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the

International Shipping Federation
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The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the principal international trade

association for the shipping industry, representing all sectors and trades. ICS
membership comprises national shipowners associations whose member
shipping companies operate two-thirds of the worlds merchant tonnage.
Established in 1921, ICS is concerned with all technical, legal and policy issues
that may have an impact on international shipping.36
Nautical Institute
1-132
The Nautical Institute is the international professional body for maritime

professionals. It has over 40 branches worldwide and more than 7,000 members
in over 110 countries. Nautical Institute membership is open to all nationalities
in grades appropriate to qualifications.
World Shipping Council
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36
The World Shipping Councils goal is to provide a coordinated voice for the liner
shipping industry in its work with policymakers and other industry groups with an
interest in international transportation. The WSC plays an active role in the
development of programmes that improve maritime security without impeding
the free flow of commerce.
http://www.marisec.org/index.html.
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Maritime Trade Bodies
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Baltic and International Maritime

Council (BIMCO)
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BIMCO is an independent international shipping association, with a membership

composed of shipowners, managers, brokers agents and many other stakeholders
with vested interests in the shipping industry. The association acts on behalf of
its global membership to promote higher standards and greater harmony in
regulatory matters. BIMCO is accredited as a Non-Governmental Organisation
(NGO), and holds observer status with a number of United Nations organs. The
association provides one of the most comprehensive sources of practical
shipping information and a broad range of advisory and consulting services to
its members.
The International Group of

P&I Clubs (IGP&I)
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The 13 principal underwriting member clubs of the International Group of P&I

Clubs (the Group) between them provide liability cover (protection and
indemnity) for approximately 90% of the worlds ocean-going tonnage. Each
Group club is an independent, non-profit making mutual insurance association,
providing cover for its shipowner and charterer members against third-party
liabilities relating to the use and operation of ships. Each club is controlled by its
members through a board of directors or committee elected from the membership.
Clubs cover a wide range of liabilities including personal injury to crew,
passengers and others on board, cargo loss and damage, oil pollution, wreck
removal and dock damage. Clubs also provide a wide range of services to their
members on claims, legal issues and loss prevention, and often play a leading
role in the management of casualties.
International Maritime
Bureau (IMB)
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Dedicated to the prevention of trade finance, maritime, transport and trade fraud
and malpractice, the IMB is a focal point for the international trading and shipping
industry and those associated with facilitating the movement of goods. The IMB
also manages the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), which is dedicated to the
suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The main objective of
the PRC is to be the first point of contact for the shipmaster to report an actual
or attempted attack or even suspicious movements thus initiating the process of
response. The PRC raises awareness within the shipping industry, which
includes the shipmaster, shipowner, insurance companies, traders, etc, of the
areas of high risk associated with piratical attacks or specific ports and
anchorages associated with armed robberies on board ships. They work closely
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with various governments and law enforcement agencies, and are involved in
information sharing in an attempt to reduce and ultimately eradicate piracy.
INTERCARGO
1-137
INTERCARGO is the short name for the International Association of Dry Cargo
Shipowners. Since 1980, it has represented the interests of owners, operators
and managers of dry cargo shipping.
INTERTANKO
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INTERTANKO has been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970.
Membership is open to independent tanker owners and operators of oil and
chemical tankers, i.e. non-oil companies and non-state controlled tanker owners,
who fulfil the Associations membership criteria. Independent owners operate
some 80% of the worlds tanker fleet and the vast majority are INTERTANKO
members. As of January 2010, the organisation had 250 members, whose
combined fleet comprises some 3,050 tankers.
International Shipping
Federation (ISF)
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The International Shipping Federation is the principal international employers

organisation for the shipping industry, representing all sectors and trades. ISF
membership comprises national shipowners associations whose member
shipping companies together operate 75% of the worlds merchant tonnage and
employ a commensurate proportion of the worlds 1.25 million seafarers.
Established in 1909, ISF is concerned with all labour affairs, manpower and
training, and seafarers health and welfare issues that may have an impact on
international shipping.
The International Parcel Tankers

Association (IPTA)
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The International Parcel Tankers Association was formed in 1987 to represent

the interests of the specialised chemical/parcel tanker fleet and has since
developed into an established representative body for shipowners operating
IMO classified chemical/parcel tankers, being recognised as a focal point
through which regulatory authorities and trade organisations may liaise with
such owners. IPTA was granted consultative status as a Non-Governmental
Organisation to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1997.
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JOINT HULL COMMITTEE (JHC)

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The Joint Hull Committee (JHC) was founded in 1910 and comprises underwriting
representatives from both Lloyds syndicates and the International Underwriting
Association (IUA) company market. It discusses all matters connected with hull
insurance, and represents the interests of those writing marine hull business
within the London market. It liaises widely with the broad maritime sector.
THE JOINT WAR COMMITTEE (JWC)
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JWC comprises underwriting representatives from both Lloyds syndicates and

the IUA company market. It discusses all matters connected with hull war
insurance, and represents the interests of those writing marine hull war business
within the London market. JWC takes advice from independent security advisers
and from time to time, issues updates to its published Listed Areas. These are
the areas of perceived enhanced risk for those writing the range of perils insured
in the war market where coverage may be arranged against the risks of
confiscation, derelict weapons, piracy, strikes, terrorism and war.
The Society of International Gas Tanker

and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)
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SIGTTO was established in 1979 to encourage safe and responsible operation

of liquefied gas tankers and marine terminals handling liquefied gas, to develop
advice and guidance for best industry practice among its members and to
promote criteria for best practice to all who either have responsibilities for, or an
interest in, the continuing safety of gas tankers and terminals. The Society is
registered as a not for profit entity in Bermuda and is owned by its members
who are predominately the owners of assets in the LPG/LNG ship and terminal
business. The Society has observer status at the IMO.
8.
ISO 28000 A SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

STANDARD
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ISO 28000:2007 was developed to codify operations of security within the

broader supply chain management system. The PDCA (plandocheckact)
management systems structure was adopted in developing ISO 28000:2007 to
bring the elements of this standard in line with related standards such as ISO
9001:2000 and ISO 14001:2004.
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ISO 28000:2007 was developed so that organisations of varying scale could

apply the standard to supply chains of various degrees of complexity. The
general rationale for organisations to adopt ISO 28000:2007 pertains to:
developing a security management system
internal compliance with objectives of a security management policy
external compliance with best practice benchmarks
ISO accreditation.
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9.
OTHER SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

INITIATIVES
Customs-Trade Partnership Against

Terrorism C-TPAT
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C-TPAT is a voluntary governmentbusiness initiative to strengthen and improve

the overall international supply chain and US border security introduced by the
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). C-TPAT recognises that the highest
level of cargo security is only possible through close cooperation with the
ultimate owners of the international supply chain such as importers, carriers,
consolidators, licensed customs brokers, and manufacturers. Through this
initiative, CBP asks businesses to ensure the integrity of their security practices
and communicate and verify the security guidelines of their business partners
within the supply chain.
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Benefits:
CBP offers benefits to certain certified C-TPAT member categories, including:
A reduced number of CBP inspections (reduced border delay times)
Priority processing for CBP inspections. (Front of the Line processing for
inspections when possible.)
Assignment of a C-TPAT Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) who will

work with the company to validate and enhance security throughout the
companys international supply chain.
Potential eligibility for CBP Importer Self-Assessment program (ISA) with

an emphasis on self-policing, not CBP audits.
Eligibility to attend C-TPAT supply chain security training seminars.
US Container Security Initiative (CSI)
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1-44
Within months of 9/11 the US Customs Service had created the Container
Security Initiative (CSI). CSI proposes a security regime to ensure all containers
that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign
ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. CBP has
stationed multidisciplinary teams of US officers from both CBP and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to work together with host foreign government
counterparts. Their mission is to target and pre-screen containers and to develop
Module 1
Other Supply Chain Security Initiatives
additional investigative leads related to the terrorist threat to cargo destined to

the United States.
1-149
The three core elements of CSI are:

1.
Identify high-risk containers. CBP uses automated targeting tools to

identify containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on
advance information and strategic intelligence.
2.
Pre-screen and evaluate containers before they are shipped. Containers

are screened as early in the supply chain as possible, generally at the port
of departure.
3.
Use technology to pre-screen high-risk containers to ensure that screening

can be done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade. This
technology includes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and
radiation detection devices.
1-150
Through CSI, CBP officers work with host customs administrations to establish
security criteria for identifying high-risk containers. Those administrations use
non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection technology to screen highrisk containers before they are shipped to US ports.
1-151
CSI, a reciprocal programme, offers its participant countries the opportunity to

send their customs officers to major US ports to target ocean-going,
containerised cargo to be exported to their countries. Likewise, CBP shares
information on a bilateral basis with its CSI partners. Japan and Canada
currently station their customs personnel in some US ports as part of the CSI
programme.
1-152
CSI is now operational at ports in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and Latin and Central America. CBPs 58 operational CSI ports
now make approximately 86% of all maritime containerised cargo imported into
the United States subject to pre-screening prior to importation.
1-153
CSI continues to expand to strategic locations around the world. The World
Customs Organization (WCO), the European Union (EU), and the G8 support
CSI expansion and have adopted resolutions implementing CSI security
measures introduced at ports throughout the world
1-154
UK ports involved in CSI initiatives have included Felixstowe, Liverpool,

Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton.
European Union Authorised Economic Operator

(AEO)
1-155
AEO status is an EU concept with two elements: customs and security. One of
the main elements is the security amendment of the Community Customs Code
(Regulation (EC) 648/2005) and the creation of the AEO concept.
1-45
Other Supply Chain Security Initiatives
1-156
1-157
1-46
Module 1
On the basis of Article 5a of the security amendments, member states can grant
the AEO status to any economic operator meeting the following common
criteria:
customs compliance;
appropriate record-keeping;
financial solvency; and
security and safety standards.
The security and safety standards relate to:
Building construction
Access control measures
Anti-tampering
Identification of business partners
Security screening of employees
Security awareness programmes
Pre-arrival and pre-departure information on goods entering or leaving

the EU.
10.
COUNTER-PIRACY SECURITY INITIATIVES
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)
1-158
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery

against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was formed primarily to combat piracy in the
Strait of Malacca around Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It was the first
regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance
cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. It was finalised on 11
November 2004 and entered into force on 4 September 2006. To date, 17 states
have become Contracting Parties to ReCAAP:
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh
Brunei Darussalam
Kingdom of Cambodia
Peoples Republic of China
Kingdom of Denmark
Republic of India, Japan
Republic of Korea
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic
Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Kingdom of the Netherlands
Kingdom of Norway
Republic of the Philippines
Republic of Singapore
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Kingdom of Thailand
Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
1-47
Counter-piracy Security Initiatives
1-159
Module 1
Unfortunately while Singapore is a contracting party, neither Indonesia nor

Malaysia are members.37 This somewhat negates the effectiveness of ReCAAP
given the close proximity of the territorial waters of those countries in and around
the Malacca Strait and the commonly held belief that many pirate attacks
originate from bases in Indonesia.
Figure 12
Example of ReCAAP ISC Incident Reporting Map
10.1
THE ReCAAP INFORMATION SHARING CENTRE (ReCAAP ISC)
1-160
The ISC was established under the ReCAAP Agreement, and was officially
launched in Singapore on 29 November 2006. It was formally recognised as an
international organisation on 30 January 2007. The roles of the ReCAAP ISC
are to:
37
serve as a platform for information exchange with the ReCAAP Focal

Points via the Information Network System (IFN);
facilitate communications and information exchange among participating

governments to improve incident response by member countries;
analyse and prove accurate statistics of the piracy and armed robbery
incidents to foster better understanding of the situation in Asia
Annex 1 to ReCAAP Press Release, March 2010; http://www.recaap.org/news/pdf/press/2010/Press%20Release%20

-%204th%20GC%20%2811Mar10%29.pdf.
1-48
Module 1
facilitate capacity building efforts that help improve the capability of

member countries in combating piracy and armed robbery in the region;
and
cooperate on joint exercises, information sharing, capacity building

programme, or other forms of cooperation.
1-161
The ReCAAP ISC facilitates exchange of information among the ReCAAP Focal
Points through a secure web-based Information Network System (IFN). Through
this network, the ReCAAP Focal Points are linked to each other as well as the
ReCAAP ISC on a 24/7 basis, and are able to facilitate appropriate responses
to any incident. The agency receiving the incident report will manage the incident
in accordance to its national policies and response procedures, and provide
assistance to the victim ship where possible. The agency will in turn, inform their
ReCAAP Focal Point which will submit an incident report to the ReCAAP ISC
and its neighbouring Focal Points.
10.2
DJIBOUTI CODE OF CONDUCT
1-162
The Djibouti Meeting adopted the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression
of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and
the Gulf of Aden, which was signed on 29 January 2009. Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of
Tanzania, Yemen, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Mauritius, Oman, Saudi
Arabia and Sudan are all signatories of the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
Figure 13
Signatories of the Djibouti Code of Conduct
1-163
The Djibouti Code of Conduct remains open for signature by other countries in
the region.
1-49
1-164
Module 1
The Code, which became effective from the date it was signed (29 January
2009), takes into account and promotes the implementation of those aspects of
UN Security Council resolutions 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1846 (2008) and
1851 (2008) and of UN General Assembly resolution 63/111, which fall within
the competence of IMO. In particular, the signatories to the Code have agreed
to cooperate, in a manner consistent with international law, in:
(a)
the investigation, arrest and prosecution of persons, who are reasonably

suspected of having committed acts of piracy and armed robbery against
ships;
(b)
the interdiction and seizure of suspect ships and property on board such
ships;
(c)
the rescue of ships, persons and property subject to piracy and armed
robbery and the facilitation of proper care, treatment and repatriation of
seafarers, fishermen, other shipboard personnel and passengers subject
to such acts, particularly those who have been subjected to violence; and
(d)
the conduct of shared operations both among signatory States and with
navies from countries outside the region such as nominating law
enforcement or other authorised officials to embark on patrol ships or
aircraft of another signatory.
1-165
In addition, the Code provides for sharing of related information, through a

number of centres and national focal points using existing infrastructures and
arrangements for ship to shore to ship communications (i.e. the Regional
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Mombasa, Kenya and the Rescue
Coordination Sub-Centre in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania) and
the Regional Maritime Information Centre (Sanaa, Yemen).
1-166
The signatories also undertook to review their national legislation with a view to
ensuring that there are laws in place to criminalise piracy and armed robbery
against ships and to make adequate provision for the exercise of jurisdiction,
conduct of investigations and prosecution of alleged offenders.
1-50
11.
NAVAL ANTI-PIRACY ORGANISATIONS
The European Union Naval Force

(EU NAVFOR)
1-167
EU NAVFOR is the main coordinating authority which operates the Maritime

Security Centre (Horn of Africa). Operation Atalanta includes the deployment of
a major EU Naval Task Group into the region to improve maritime security off the
Somali coast. Additionally the mission also encompasses a broad range of
liaison, both regionally and with industry, to help establish best practices and to
disseminate information through its 24/7 manned Maritime Security Centre
Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa
(MSCHOA)
1-168
MSCHOA is an initiative established by EU NAVFOR with close cooperation

from the maritime industry. MSCHOA centre provides 24-hour manned
monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden whilst the provision of
an interactive website enables the Centre to communicate the latest anti-piracy
guidance to industry and for shipping companies and operators to register their
movements through the region.
1-169
A further initiative is the introduction of Group Transits where vessels are

coordinated to transit through high risk areas overnight when attacks are
reduced. This enables military forces to sanitise the area ahead of the merchant
ships. MSCHOA will also identify particularly vulnerable shipping and coordinate
appropriate protection arrangements, either from within EU NAVFOR, or other
forces in the region.
1-170
Finally in between routine or baseline operations, EU NAVFOR conducts

focused operations aimed at achieving specific effects within a given area or
time window. By concentrating forces to achieve specific effects EU NAVFOR
can provide influence, deterrence or insight into legitimate and illicit activities in
order to better coordinate future activities to deter piracy and armed robbery and
thus reassure legitimate merchant mariners.
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
1-171
Combined Maritime Forces is a 24 nation coalition committed to ensuring

regional security. CMF operates in accordance with international law and
relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and is supported by three
distinct missions.
1-51
Naval Anti-piracy Organisations
Module 1
1.
Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operates in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden,
Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman conducting Maritime
Security Operations.
2.
CTF 151 operates in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin to deter, disrupt
and suppress piracy, protecting the safe passage of maritime vessels of
any nationality.
3.
CTF 152 operates in the Arabian Gulf conducting maritime security

operations in conjunction with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners in
order to prevent destabilising activities.
The Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)
1-172
The Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) mission is to facilitate the exchange of

information between the United States Navy, Combined Maritime Forces, and
the commercial maritime community in the United States Central Commands
(CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility. MARLO operates as a conduit for information
focused on the safety and security of shipping and is committed to assisting all
members of the commercial maritime community. To help combat piracy, MARLO
serves as a secondary emergency point of contact for mariners in distress (after
UKMTO see below) and also disseminates transit guidance to the maritime
industry.
Operation Ocean Shield
1-173
Operation Ocean Shield is NATOs contribution to international efforts to combat

piracy off the Horn of Africa. The operation develops a distinctive NATO role
based on the broad strength of the Alliance by adopting a more comprehensive
approach to counter-piracy efforts. NATOs counter piracy efforts focus on at sea
counter-piracy operations, support to the maritime community to take actions to
reduce incidence of piracy, as well as regional state counter-piracy capacity
building. The operation is designed to complement the efforts of existing
international organisations and forces operating in the area.
NATO Shipping Centre (NSC)
1-174
1-52
NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) provides the commercial link with NATOs Maritime
Forces. The NSC is NATOs primary point of contact with the maritime community
and is used by NATO as the tool for communicating and coordinating initiatives
Module 1
Naval Anti-piracy Organisations
and efforts with other military actors (most notably UK MTO, MSCHOA and
MARLO) as well as directly with the maritime community, and thereby supporting
the overall efforts to reduce the incidence of piracy.
UK ROYAL NAVYS MARITIME TRADE ORGANISATION (UKMTO)
1-175
The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in Dubai acts as the primary
point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces in the
region. UKMTO also administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which
merchant vessels are encouraged to send regular reports, providing their
position/course/speed and ETA at their next port while transiting the region
bound by Suez, 78E and 10S.
1-176
UKMTO subsequently tracks vessels and the positional information is passed to

CMF and EU headquarters. Emerging and relevant information affecting
commercial traffic can then be passed directly to ships, rather than by company
offices, improving responsiveness to any incident and saving time.
1-53
12.
CONCLUSION
1-177
In this module we have looked at the history of the maritime industry and, to
create an understanding of the legal and regulatory requirements of the industry,
how the regulatory framework for the maritime industry works. We then looked
briefly at the economics of the industry and the trade patterns that govern
shipping.
1-178
In the introduction to the main threats to the industry we briefly analysed the
threats from terrorism and piracy as well as the more traditional types of crime
committed within and on the industry such as fraud and smuggling.
1-179
Towards the end of the module we looked at some of the organisations that
govern, control and influence the day-to-day affairs of the shipping industry. We
also looked at some security initiatives that everyone with an interest in maritime
security should at least be aware of and some of the counter-piracy initiatives
and naval forces that are in operation today.
1-180
This sets the scene for the rest of the course. In the next module we shall look
in more depth at the key legal concepts and issues of international law which
have always been and remain problematic today.
1-54
Whats next?
We hope that you enjoyed this module and can see the quality of the materials provided and
how much you could gain from the rest of the course.
To secure your place on the course please enrol online:
http://www.lloydsmaritimeacademy.com/msec
Or if you have any further questions about the course or need more information, please do
not hesitate to contact us on:
Tel: +44 (0)20 7017 5510
Email: LMAadmin@informa.com

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THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Coastal, Port or Littoral States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Classification Societies (Class) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

MARITIME ECONOMICS OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Shipping and the Global Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Top 20 Merchant Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Global Pattern of Maritime Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Shipping Choke Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Piracy and Insurance Premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

INTRODUCTION TO THE MAIN THREATS TO SHIPPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

Maritime Terrorism before 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Maritime Terrorism after 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Maritime Terrorism and International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Smuggling Drugs, Contraband, and Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Stowaways and Human Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND

MARITIME TRADE BODIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

ISO 28000 A SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY STANDARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

OTHER SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY INITIATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

COUNTER-PIRACY SECURITY INITIATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Djibouti Code of Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

NAVAL ANTI-PIRACY ORGANISATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

Copyright IIR Limited 2013. All rights reserved.

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

On successful completion of this module, you will be able to:

Explain the Regulatory framework of the maritime industry

Understand the importance of the maritime industry in the global

Identify the main security threats to shipping

Discuss the roles of international and regional organisations, regulatory

Describe the various supply chain security standards and initiatives

State the main international and regional counter piracy security

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

Shipping is an exciting business, surrounded by many false beliefs,

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

It is a commonly held view among some (particularly some of those who

There are three regimes that regulate shipping;

The Flag State (the Flag)

Coastal (or Littoral or Port) States

Every ship or vessel, subject to some qualification on size or type, must be

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

The Regulatory Framework

COASTAL, PORT OR LITTORAL STATES

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

The Regulatory Framework

So where do territorial waters begin and end?

Historically, territorial or national waters extended up to 3 nautical miles (nm)

Certificate in Maritime Security 2013 (FLP2329)

The Regulatory Framework

CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES (CLASS)

More than 50 organisations worldwide define their activities as providing marine

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) United States

Bureau Veritas (BV) France

China Classification Society (CCS)

Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Norway

Germanischer Lloyd (GL) Germany

Indian Register of Shipping (IRCLASS)

Korean Register of Shipping