Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
ISBN 978-1-74251-128-3
FACTUAL INFORMATION
History of the flight
- 1 -
Figure 1: Right main landing gear showing wheel assembly was shot peened2 during
fractured hub after removal of the manufacture; however, the manufacturing
wheel (image provided by the operator) specifications did not require the shot peening to
extend beyond the bearing bore to cup
intersection tangency.
Figure 2: Schematic diagram showing inboard
and outboard wheel halves and the
approximate location of the failure
origin (circled)
Aircraft information
Table 1: Aircraft details
Manufacturer
Model
737-8FE
Serial number
34441
Year of manufacture
2006
1 August 2006
79,015 kg
Honeywell International
2612311-1
Inboard assembly
2615480
B8154
Date of manufacture
April 2005
Wheel information
General
18 February 2009
23
14 September 2009
- 2 -
Maintenance history
The wheel was last overhauled on 18 February
2009, at its 21st tyre change. Wheel overhaul was
completed in accordance with the component
maintenance manual (CMM) and included:
visual inspection
eddy current inspections of the bead seat
and tube well outer diameter, and the wheel
halves at designated areas
replacement of the tie bolts.
The most recent tyre change (number 23)
occurred on 14 September 2009, and included
visual examination and eddy current inspection of
the bead seat and tube well outer diameters (as
shown in Figure 2).
The operator stated that the wheels in its
inventory were overhauled in accordance with the
schedule provided in the CMM, whereby full
overhauls were completed at every 7th tyre
change.
segment,
Figure 6: Same as Figure 5 from the opposite to fail. The revised inboard wheel half
side of the segment.
incorporated an increased interference fit 3
between the wheel bearing bore and bearing
cup/sleeve assembly, and slight geometry
changes to the hub to make it stiffer (Figure 9).
These changes commenced as of wheel serial
number B7900.
Figure 9: Comparison of revised (left) and prior
(right) inboard wheel half assemblies
(from CMM 32-40-14 Rev 7)
To identify the presence of any further cracking,
the remaining sections of inboard hub were
examined using a fluorescent penetrant
inspection technique. Multiple indications of other
radial and circumferential cracks were noted
within the region of the bearing bore radius
(Figure 7).
Figure 7: Radial
cracks
identified
during
fluorescent penetrant inspection
- 4 -
Wheel inspection
The aircraft and wheel manufacturers were aware
of an emerging issue relating to the propensity for
the post-2005 wheel design to initiate fatigue
cracks at the bearing bore shoulder radius of the
inboard wheel hub. The wheel manufacturer had
implemented a number of changes to address the
problem, including the use of a through-thickness
test method (ultrasonic testing) and a
design/manufacturing change to extend the shot
peening into the susceptible area.
SAFETY ACTION
The safety issues identified during this
investigation are listed in the Findings and Safety
Actions sections of this report. The Australian
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) expects that all
safety issues identified by the investigation should
be addressed by the relevant organisation(s). In
addressing those issues, the ATSB prefers to
encourage relevant organisation(s) to proactively
initiate safety action, rather than to issue formal
- 6 -
safety recommendations
notices.
or
safety
Aircraft manufacturer
No mandatory requirement for wheel inspection
Minor Safety Issue
At the time of the last tyre change, crack initiation
at the bearing bore shoulder radius was an
emerging issue with no requirement for
mandatory inspection of this area during a tyre
change.
The post-2005 main landing gear wheel design Action taken by the aircraft manufacturer
had shown a susceptibility to fatigue cracking at In November 2009, the aircraft manufacturer
the inner hub bearing bore shoulder radius.
updated the inboard hub fracture issue to a safety
service related problem (safety-SRP) and advised
Action taken by the wheel manufacturer
operators to incorporate the recommended
The wheel manufacturer made a change to the inspections and inspection intervals as soon as
design of new production wheel components, practical.
incorporating shot peening of the entire bearing
The aircraft manufacturer released a further
bore area to help prevent the fatigue cracks from
Service Bulletin (SB-737-32-1444, issued 8 April
developing. This change was introduced at wheel
assembly serial number B15419. The improved 2010) and an update to its previous Service Letter
(737-SL-32-162-A, issued 4 May 2010) that
wheels were intended for delivery on new aircraft
summarised the issue, and contained the
at line number 3099; scheduled for November
recommended non-destructive checks and
2009.
intervals. The service bulletin urged operators to
perform inspections as per the Honeywell Service
No mandatory requirement for wheel inspection
Bulletin and standard practices manual
Minor Safety Issue
mentioned previously.
At the time of the last tyre change, crack initiation
at the bearing bore shoulder radius was an
emerging issue with no requirement for
mandatory inspection of this area during a tyre
change.
Aircraft operator
- 7 -
Maintenance provider
The Boeing Company
Honeywell Aerospace
References
Fleet team digest article (FTD), 737NG-FTD-3208008, Inboard Hub Fractures on Honeywell
Main Gear Wheels, last revision 20 April
2010.
Boeing
Service
Bulletin
737-32-1444,
LANDING GEAR Tires and Wheels Main
- 8 -