-This is probably tangential to the OP, but when we read all things are not-self (sabbe dhamm anatt),

thisall things is
with reference to the thoughts and intentions (sakappavittakk) which are based in recognition of forms (objects)
(nmarpa) of the elements of cognition.
-See AN.8.2.4.3 (8.83) and AN.9.1.2.4. (9.14) & AN. 10.2.1.8 (10.58).
-These are the all things that the puthujjana takes as his att.
Q: I've just been reading Olivelle's translation of the Upanisads, and to my surprise I find an unusual use of "atman". Besides
the 2 we are familiar with (ie as Atman and as a reflexive pronoun), it apparently also means "body". Not the physical body,
for which arra is used (eg in BAU 2.1.18), but apparently to refer to the conglomeration of or vessel for the vital functions
(prn a) - breath, speech, vision, hearing, olfaction, taste, touch, mind, perception, thought
This looks about as close a listing to the MN 44 concept of the 3 sankhras. I suspect that the Buddha was turning the old
competition for supremacy between the prn as on its head, by showing that the breath is not supreme after all.
A: In the Upanis ads the tman and prn a are synonymous, or rather, prn a is descriptive of the support of tmanto the
living organism. This was also discussed in Brian Blacks The Character of Self in Ancient India: Priests, Kings and Women
in the Early Upanis ads, that tman and prn a are interdependent, that the composers of the Upanis ads did not
associate the life breaths of the human body with the lungs, but rather the breaths are usually described in terms of how they
move and where they operate within the body. Black cites Br had-ran yaka Upanis ad I.3.19, I will give Radhakrisnans
translation:
He is (called) Aysya girasa for he is the essence of the limbs. Verily, life-breath is the essence of the limbs, yes, life
breath is the essence of the limbs. Therefore, from whatever limb life-breath de[arts, that, indeed, dries up; for, it is, verily,
the essence of the limbs.
so 'ysya giraso 'gnm hi rasah , prn o v agnm rasah , prn o hi v agnm rasah , tasmd yasmt kasmccgt
prn a utkrmati tad eva tac chus yati, es a hi v agnm rasah (B h
Up_1,3.19)
-Im not sure as yet how it would fit, but it also reminds me of the body of the breath associated with npnasati.
Q: Breath in the BAU strikes me as corresponding to MN 44's kyasakhra, while speech has a tenuous connection
to vacsakhra. MN 44's cittasakhra concerns perception and feeling, and I wonder if that has any correspondence with
the faculties, and perceiving (sajsti at BAU 2.4.12). To be certain, I've not actually seen feelings discussed much in the
context of the prn a, except at BAU 2.4.11 where the sensory prn a are discussed in terms of spar/phass .
-Have you perchance seen feeling discussed as vedan in the Ups?
A: Yes, thats right, Dhammadinn Theris dialogue with Viskha makes this distinction from the usual wholesome and
unwholesome volitions for the 3 sankhras.
-I haven't seen vedan in the Upanis ads in my search for corresponding terms in the Pli Nikyas. But Keith mentions that
we wont find any.
-Arthur Keith in The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanisads
Vol. 2 mentions (translations of Keith's
references are added for convenience):
On the side of feeling the terminology of the Upanis ads marks a great advance in the normal employment of Sukha to
denote pleasure generically and Duh kha, based upon it, for misery. A generic term to cover both forms of feeling is not
found before the Vedan of the Pli texts. But we have the definite statement [2] that, when a man experiences pleasure, he
acts, when he experiences pain, he refrains from action, while the Kaus taki [3] asserts that pleasure and pain are felt by
means of the body.
[2]Chndogya Upanis ad VII.22 (translation S. Radhakrishnan)
When one obtains happiness (sukham), then one is active (karoti). One who does not obtain happiness is not active.
yad vai sukham labhatetha karoti, nsukham labdhv karoti
[3] Kaus taki-Brhman a Upanis ad I.7
By what, pleasure and pain? By the Body.
kena sukha-duh khe iti, arren eti
-However, this does not give us what we are looking for with reference to vedan or an equivalent to it in the Upanis ads, but
rather the somatic base for it.
Q: Given your research into the philological correspondences, are you any closer to solving that wretched anidassanam
vin am issue? Of the phenomena which DN 11 says are brought to an end with the cessation of consciousness Ettha dghaca rassaca, an um thlam subhsubham;
Ettha nmaca rpaca, asesam uparujjhati;
Here long & short
coarse & fine
fair & foul
name & form
are all brought to an end.
We find an precedent in Yjnavalkya's reply to Grgi's query on the basis of space (k). Taking Olivelle's translation sa hovca: etad vai tad aks aram, grg, brhman abhivadanti, asthlam, anan u, ahrasvam, adrgham, alohitam, asneham,
acchyam, atamah , avyv ankam, asagam, arasam, agandham, acaksus
arotram, avk, amanah , atejaskam,
kam,

aprn am, amukham, amtram, anantaram, abhyam; na tad anti ki cana, na tad anti ka cana.
He replied: 'That, Grgi, is the imperishable (aks aram), and Brahmins refer to it like this - it is neither coarse nor fine
(asthlam, anan u); it is neither short nor long (ahrasvam, adrgham); it has neither fat nor blood (not in DN 11); it is without
shadow or darkness (acchyam, atamah - perhaps idiomatic for day and night?); it is without air or space; it is without
contact; it has no taste or smell; it is without sight or hearing; it is without speech or mind; it is without energy, breath or
mouth; it is beyond measure; it has nothing within it or outside of it; it does not eat anything; and no one eats it.
2 pairs are in common in DN 11 and BAU 3.8.8, not counting a tenuous half in sneha possibly corresponding tosubha.
Certainly not enough out of which to make a mountain of dogma, but intriguing nonetheless.
A: The subject of vin am anidassanam is one of those controversies that keeps on giving.
-The verse at Br h.U. III.8.8 is an interesting find. If only this section gave the Imperishable (aks aram) the attribute of
possessing nothing but knowledge (vijna-ghana), as we find earlier in Br h.U. II.4.12, to connect it well with the sections
in DN.11 & MN. 49 of the Nikyas.
-In Br h.U. II.4.12 the Self is considered as a great being consisting of nothing but knowledge (evam v ara idam mahad
bhtam anatam apram vijna-ghana), and is immersed into the corporeal and permeates it as were a lump of salt into
water. With the departing of Self, so departs knowledge.
-Two verses later (II.4.14), this is explained, that where there is duality (yatra hi dvaitram iva bhavati): one smells another,
sees another, hears another, speaks to another, thinks of another, understands anotheralthough where everything has
become unified with Self (sarvam tmaivbht), the question is asked by what and whom should one smell ect.
whereas the tman is then indicated as the knower of all that is known:
By what should one know that by which all this is known? By what, my dear, should one know the knower?
yenedam sarvam vijnti, tam kena vijnyt, vijtram are kena vijnyd iti. (Br h.U. II.4.14)
-This is consistent with the tman as ultimate knower. But could this indicate a vijna as attribute of tman that is
transcended from the corporeal? It would seem so. Even though the Tathgata did restrict vin awithin the range of
the khandhas and yatan of sense-contact, in the Upanis ads vijna was not.
-Although these are separate exchanges of dialogue, Br h.U. II.4 & III.8., the context is still the dynamic of tman,
immersed in the corporeal but not touched by it, attributes notwithstanding. We know that the Tathgata used the manner of
philosophical exchange in his day, and in some cases made direct puns on contemporary doctrinal idiom. This may well be
one of those. But as you say, Certainly not enough out of which to make a mountain of dogma, but intriguing nonetheless.
Even still, Ill bookmark it for later.
-I did notice later in the section you cited, Br h.U. III.8.11, another Upanis adic idiom that the Tathgata punched at some.
That is drs t e, rute, mate, vijte, that I mentioned after the earlier comment on Vaccagotta here. This came up at least twice
that I know of in the Nikyas at MN.22 and AN.4.24. What makes this occurrence interesting is that this verse says that the
Imperishable (aksaram):

is unseen but is the seer, is unheard but is the hearer, unthought but is the thinker, unknown but is the knower. There is no
other seer but this, there is no other hearer but this, there is no other thinker but this, there is no other knower but this.
tad v etad aks aram grgy adrs t am
dras tr, arutam rotr, amatam mantr, avijtam vijtr, nnyad ato 'sti drast r , nnyad
ato 'sti rotr, nnyad ato 'sti mantr,nnyad
ato 'sti vijtr

-Which seems to be reflected in AN. 4.24 where the Tathgata says:

Thus it is, bhikkhus, when the Tathgata sees what is to be seen; he does not imagine the seen, does not imagine the notseen, does not imagine what is to be seen, and does not imagine a seer. When hearing what is to be heard; does not imagine
the heard, does not imagine the not-heard, does not imagine what is to be heard, and does not imagine a hearer. When
thinking what is to be thought; does not imagine the thought, does not imagine the not-thought, does not imagine what is to
be thought, and does not imagine a thinker. When cognizing what is to be cognized; does not imagine the cognized, does not
imagine the not-cognized, does not imagine what is to be cognized, and does not imagine a cognizer.
Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathgato datth
, dittham
na maati, adittham
na maati, datthabbam
na maati,
datthabbam

datthram
na maati; sutv sotabbam, sutam na maati, asutam na maati, sotabbam na maati, sotram na maati;

mutv motabbam, mutam na maati, amutam na maati, motabbam na maati, motram na maati; viatv
vitabbam, vitam na maati, avitam na maati, vitabbam na maati, vitram na maati.
-Another strike at the tman as just another form of papaca.
-It could be that Thnissaro is revisiting his old grudge with bare attention, which I have assumed to be his left-handed
critique of its use by modern Vipassan teachers.
-Goldstein has used bare attention, but this does resonate with the Satipat t hna Sutta where in what has been called the
refrain of insight we read:
Atthi kyoti v panassa sati paccupatthit
hoti yvadeva n amattya patissatimattya.

Anissito ca viharati. Na ca kici loke updiyati. Evampi bhikkhave bhikkhu kye kynupass viharati.
Therefore it is readily evident to his awareness thus this is body. Thus there is bare knowledge and bare awareness, and
one does not abide dependant on nor identifies with anything in this condition. Bhikkhus, thus it is a bhikkhu abides
observing the body in the body.
-This, with reference to the Pl i n amattya patissatimattya, specifically matt for renderings such as bare of mere
(see @ PED for matta 1 (2 (negative) as much as, i. e. only, a mere, even as little as and @ Matt (f.) [Vedic mtr, of
m] measure, quantity ...).

-So Thnissaros critique could be misplaced considering that Goldstein and other Vipassan teachers that I have heard use
this term place it within the context of the suttas.
-Thnissaro may suggest that one actively do something with an arisen dhamm e.g. to have a skeptical ear skeptical
eye, but the suttas tell us that when there is present knowledge (pajnti) of the cycle of such phenomena, that this lends to
nibbindati where one no longer seeks (nis+vindati) anything in it, whereby these are released. He is missing the refined
point of unprompted release only to add something else to let go of.
-With reference to bare attention as taught by mainstream Vipassan teachers, T hnissaro is misunderstanding their use of
the term.
-The suttas you referenced (not cited) give contemplative objects for seclusion from unskillful thoughts etc. for the
establishment of samdhi and calm which lends to sati progressions of practice. The latter reference precisely indicates this
quality of bare attention where we read:
As he remains thus focused on mental qualities in & of themselves, his mind becomes concentrated, his defilements are
abandoned. He takes note of that fact. As a result, he is rewarded with a pleasant abiding here & now, together with
mindfulness & alertness. Why is that? Because the wise, experienced, skillful monk picks up on the theme of his own mind.
-And this is on topic with what this quibble over 'bare attention' is about; that there is nothing to really do with these
phenomena other than to cultivate present awareness with knowledge of cognition.
-And sati not exactly mindfulness either, but requires some unpacking to understand its use in context. Additionally, bare
has more nuance than the example you gave.
-I was merely (pun intended) giving a likely connection for bare attention to the Satipat t hna refrain; as Pl i
patissatimattya rendering matt as bare or mere as we find in the 4th case for bare having nothing left over or added a
mere, this indicating the essential quality of the dynamic of sati we are discussing as bare sati or mere sati. Not that my
previous post was not clear enough.
-If you are working with translations from Pl i into English (or other sakya nirutti), these matters have far more confusion
than if you work with the Pl i for yourself. I have no problem with Goldsteins use of bare attention just as I have no
problem with Bodhis translation of matt as bare because it fits well with the contemplative work of Satipat t hna as I
understand it in suttanta.
-With reference to Thnissaros critique of these terms, it is his suggestion that there is something to actively do with
unwholesome cognitions arising during satipat t hna practice that appears to require textual support from the context of
satipat t hna in the suttas.
Q: Should I use words to make mindfulness easier?
A: Silent observation is mostly advised. Internal chatter is very unproductive IMO. It is best not to train the mind to incline
towards internal dialogs with every experience and feeling. It is unproductive in daily life and certainly a big hindrance to
reach deeper stages in meditation.
-This would fit with the suttas. When discursive thought gets in the way, the problem lies mostly in a lack of correct npna
to develop calm. Once established, this calm is unperturbed by discursive thoughts.
npnassatisamdhissa, bhikkhave, bhvitatt bahulkatatt neva kyassa ijitattam v hoti phanditattam v, na cittassa
ijitattam v hoti phanditattam v.
Monks, it is composure through mindfulness of in and out breathing, when developed and practiced of which there is no
shaking or movement in the body, and no shaking or movement in the mind. - SN. 5.10.1.7
-Thoughts are things, as it were. And these things are sensate. When these can be experienced as such without exploring a
concept of them, then the knowledge of how they construct will be evident. This is the building of contemplative knowledge
and wisdom.
-Nma-rpa is best understood in the context of its interplay as recognition of form (rpa as both embodiment and objects
of sense). n ananda Bhikkhu has somewhere in his writings (Nibbna sermons?) given a nice analogy of this as nma-rpa
likened to a reflection or mirage cast over vin a. This is helpful for the practitioner of Dhamma because it is precisely this
dynamic of illusion intrinsic to mental impressions, mood and internal dialog at sensate events that one must experience with
contemplative knowing for release of the cause of dukkha.
-In Concept and Reality, n ananda mentions this: Concepts, pp. 78-9
-This pathways of concepts and designations converged on it, is the same dynamic we find in AN. 10.2.1.8/8.2.4.3
(Kimmlaka Suttas) where such concepts and designations are the sabbe dhamm all things which converge at
sensations (vedan samosaran a), the basis of which are in nma-rpa and diversity are in the 18 dhtus of sal yatana
(AN.9.1.2.4. Samiddhi Sutta), and are led by the contemplative through the pathway of samdhi and sati to the utmost of
wisdom and release into the deathless of nibbna.
-Actually you are referring here to my comments on n anandas in Concepts which was cited in quotations, but no matter.
n ananda does disagree with the commentators on the meaning of the Kimmlaka Suttas, specifically with reference to
skilful dhamm where he mentions this as a misunderstanding of context with chanda. Sabbe dhamm as a range of
potentiality at nma-rpa makes better sense.
-My comment you quoted is really in disagreement with some of n anandas idea as I recall it. But what is helpful for me
with his examination of the Kimmlaka Suttas (Mind-Stilled II ?) is the DO in brief at the convergence of vedan. This
gives us a generic template of mind-moment dynamics; however we may interpret the rest of the Jacobs Ladder.
-The role of concentration in Dhamma practice fits into a greater dynamic of contemplative effort which supports
knowledge-development, wisdom and release. This dynamic bears the idiom calm and insight (samatha-vipassan).

Although this idiom is rarely used in the Nikyas, there are other groupings in the early texts which support it, such as the
three classifications of the 8-fold path (tayo khandh sa gahit MN.44); here we find the contemplative supports of righteffort (sammvyma), right-concentration (sammsamdhi) and right-mindfulness (sammsati) grouped as the
concentration aggregate (samdhikkhandhe sagahit); right-view (sammdit t hi) and right-intention (sammsakappo)
grouped as the wisdom aggregate (pakkhandhe sagahit). And just as we have in the 'three trainings' (tisso sikkh DN.3.10, AN.3.2.4.9. & 10) higher training of the mind (adhicittasikkh) (through jhna), and higher training of wisdom
(adhipasikkh).
-Although the Buddha gave little description of calm and insight compared to so much emphasis given jhna, I think we
find the hallmark of it where npnasati and Satipat t hna meet in the npnasati Sutta. I also think that it is in
npnasati/Satipat t hna where access concentration finds implicit support from the Nikyas to otherwise dubious origins
in the Visuddhimagga; as the requisite calm unification of body and mind which supports contemplative examination of
states, knowledge development and the pathway to wisdom and release.
-As indicated earlier in the thread, I think this dynamic of calm and insight has been missed to some extent by the extremes
of jhna and vipassan traditions. And this is an interesting disconnect for me to find in Theravda of all places, for what Zen
has retained as shinkantaza is essentially the same.
Cakama walking back and forth or about is still taught by present-day meditation teachers, and can be traced back to the
pl i suttas where we find numerous references to the Buddha and monks practicing ca kama in forest sanctuaries. (viz. MN
35, SN 1.7.16, SN 1.4.7) The practice of cakama was also recognized as beneficial for exercise and health in general, as we
find the Buddha mentioning physical health in addition to the contemplative benefits of walking in the
Cakamnisamsa Sutta The Discourse on the Advantage of Walking:
Monks, there are five advantages to walking back and forth. What five?
Endurance of the duration (of travel); endurance of exertion; the oppression of illness is reduced; of what is eaten, drunk,
chewed and tasted becomes thoroughly digested; engaged in walking there is composure of mind (samdhi) for a long time.
AN. 5.3.9
-We also find the contemplative advantages of walking mentioned in the Theragth of the Khuddaka Nikya, where a monk
describes overcoming dullness and clumsiness with walking, perfected to the development of mental composure, vigilance,
freedom of the mental faculties and the attainment of contemplative knowledge of the Buddhas teachings:
I have the condition of sluggishness when departing from the abode;
Walking about, ascending and falling to the ground.
Having brushed off my limbs and robe to continue walking;
Thus I am walking, walking about well composed within myself.
Thereafter I consider properly this walking about;
Unconcerned about the edge, dangers are evident.
Thus so my mental faculties are freed;
Seen is the nature of this excellent Dhamma.
Thus knowledge is attained;
The teaching of the Buddha has been made. Bhaguttheragth (Thag. 4.2)
The nanda Sutta (SN. 44.10) has been the basis for a number of specious claims (T hnissaro, Collins, Harvey et al) that the
Tathgata never denied the Self with reference to the ontological claims of tman as we find in the Upanis ads. The
Tathgatas silence does not represent a position, although the exchange with nanda does tell us that his silence was
provisional to Vacchagottas confusion and misapprehension over a self as understood by eternalist (sassatavd) or
annihilationist doctrines (ucchedavd) which were in currency. Vacchagottas state of mind would also reflect on the
improper attention (ayoniso manasi karoto) of the untaught commoner (assutav puthujjano), as mentioned in the
Sabbsava Sutta cited below.
-See Bhikkhu Bodhis footnote to the nanda Sutta.
Q: Here the Buddha argues that to say "there is no self" falls into holding an assimilationist view point, this ties in with this
sutta
A: The section on thicket of views in the Sabbsava Sutta is with reference to those views on self of the puthujjana, who
wrongly considers a personal existence for me Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? (ahosim nu kho aham
attamaddhnam, na nu kho ahosim attamaddhnam) I have a self I do not have a self (atthi me attti natthi me
attti).
-However, the noble disciple is not on the same footing.
When the Buddha did give instruction on views of self as held by the world, it was to a suitable audience informed with a
contemplative understanding of dependent origination and of the habits of volitional processes which cause false reification
of sentient experience. In other words, they, the noble disciples, understood what props-up the illusion of substantiality. Thus
they appreciated entirely the falsity of an enduring att, both in contexts of doctrinal claim and contemplative knowledge.
Otherwise there would be no utility in simply denying the Self to someone who is ignorant of causal processes, devoid of
contemplative understanding, and whos awareness is only informed with either a dogma of self or at least an infatuation
with sentient experience born of this ignorance as this would only lead to vexation.

Q: So the Buddha seems to have not taught that there is "no self" as this is a metaphysical view point. Instead he taught to
view all dhammas as "not self" as this leads to non-clinging and due to compounded phenomena being subject to change and
dissolution.
A: In the Nikyas the Tathgatas discussion of anatt has two contexts: contemplative knowledge and doctrinal polemic.
-The three characteristics (tilakkhan a) is with reference to contemplative realisation of the nature of sentient causal
processes. Otherwise, the Tathgatas polemic to a metaphysical viewpoint of att as an ontological dynamic was necessary,
when delivered to a suitable audience, to assist the overall discussion of anatt. He would often explain anatt doctrine in the
fashion of this is what some Brahmans and ascetics teach on att this is why it is wrong, and this is how to examine it for
yourelves.
-In Suttanta, the most direct and uncompromising refutation of self given by the Tathgata, is the section on six positions on
views in MN. 22.
-In the Alagaddpama Sutta, the Buddha framed a discussion with bhikkhus on a set of six positions on views (chayimni
dit t hit t hnni) that were held by the untaught commoner (assutav puthujjano), and through this discussion leveled a
sweeping refutation of the Upanis adic theory of tman. This section of MN.22 did so by specifically punning on
Yjavalkyas view as we find in Br had-ran yaka Upanis ad, IV, 5.6., and on other epithets we find for tman in
Upanis adic texts.
-In this section of MN. 22 the six positions on views (dit t hit t hnni) held by the untaught commoner (assutav
puthujjano) are: He regards material form thus: this is mine, this I am, this is my self (rpam etam mama, esohamasmi,
eso me att'ti samanupassati), and the same for feeling, perception, and formations (vedanam saam sakhre ).
Where we would expect to find vin a we read instead He regards what is seen, heard, sensed, cognized ( dit t ham
sutam mutam vitam), encountered, sought, mentally pondered thus: this is mine, this I am, this is my self. This
phrase makes a punning reflection of Yjavalkyas view in Br hadran yaka Upanis ad, IV, 5.6. which posits It is not out of
endearment for the husband that the husband is dear, but of the endearment of the self that the husband is dear. and the same
for wife, sons, cattle and other things and stations one would identify with in life, viewed that When the self is seen, heard,
thought and cognized, then all this is known. (tmani khalv are dr s t e, rute, mate, vijte, idam sarvam viditam); that is,
the Self is the basis of cognition.
-The sixth position on views is That which is the self is the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not
subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity this too he regards thus: This is mine, This I am, this is my self. (B.
Bodhi p. 229) (yampidam dit t hit t hnam 'so loko so att, so pecca bhavissmi: nicco dhuvo sassato aviparin madhammo,
sassatisamam tatheva t hassm'ti tampi 'etam mama, esohamasmi, eso me att'ti samanupassati.). Which also makes punning
reflection on the Upanis adic epithets of tman as the universal-self or self and the world as the underlying support of all,
such as Whoever has found and awakened to the self that has entered into this perilous inaccessible place (the body), he is
the maker of the universe, for he is the maker of all. His is the world; indeed he is the world itself. (Radhakrishnan)
(yasynuvittah pratibuddha tmsmin samdehye gahane pravis t ah | sa vivakr t sa hi sarvasya kart tasya lokah sa u loka
eva (Br h U. 4,4.13). We also find in this passage epithetic equivalents for tman as: nityo (Kt ha U. II. 2.13),
dhruvam( Br h.U. 4,4.20), vata (Kt ha U. II. 2.12 ) etc. All of which would have been current knowledge at the time this
discourse was spoken. After demonstrating that the well-taught noble disciple regards these views as This is not mine, this I
am not, this is not my self., the Tathgata flat out denies the self by stating since a self and what belongs to a self are not
apprehended as true and established, then this standpoint for views, namely, That which is the self is the world; after death I
shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity would it not be an utterly
and completely foolish teaching? (B. Bodhi p. 232).
-With reference to this case example and others, K.R. Norman and R.F. Gombrich have soundly argued that the Buddha and
his followers were well aware of the brhman a culture of the time, and that the att he was refuting as nonexistent (asat) is
the dogma of tman just as we find in the Upanis ads.
Q: Please note very carefully the following sentence in the Satipatthana Sutta:
"Or his mindfulness that 'There is a body' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & remembrance. And he remains
independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) anything in the world." [ Same with reference to vedana, citta, and dhamma.]
-The not-clinging state of mind is without any question the consequence of not-self perception that I mentioned earlier.
A: There is an epithet for nibbna that fits nicely with the Satipat t hna refrain, found in the Suttanipta: 1054. Sakhya
lokasmi paroparni, (pun n akti bhagav)
Yassijitam natthi kuhici loke;
Santo vidhmo angho nirso, atri so jtijaranti brmti.
Having considered what is crossed to the other side in this world said the Sublime One
There is no more agitation whatsoever anywhere in this world.
That one is unclouded, without confusion and without passion. He, I say, is unimpeded by birth and aging. Sn. 5.3
(Pun n akamn avapucch)
-This fits when considering the former as an epithet for anattasa, by giving us the fruit of liberation expressed in the latter
to which anattasa is aimed.
-True, there are examples of analysis in suttanta that give literal birth and re-birth definitions to the 12-nidna system. But in
the main, the Tathgata was pointing the matrices of pacupdnakkhandha and pat iccasamuppda at the misapprehension
of an atta or asmimna as the central assumption of ignorance.
-Kalupahana discusses this distinction in THE BUDDHIST TANTRIC DECONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION:
THEIR STRA ORIGIN pp. 311312, that the Buddha deconstructed the person into the pacakkhandha (or sal yatana),
and reconstructed what in ignorance is taken up as self through analysis of pat iccasamuppda.

-From this perspective the contemplative analysis is brought further to instruct the adherent to develop direct knowledge of
tan h (Loka Sutta SN.12.4) as pivotal to the pathway to subjective dukkha, and refined further still by understanding how
psychophysical processes are taken up through perceptions determined by proliferation (papacasasa kh)
(Madhupin d ika Sutta MN. 18).