Facts: On May 11, 1998, the party-list election was held simultaneously with the national election.

A total
of 123 parties, organizations and coalitions participated but only 13 party-list representatives from 12
parties and organizations which obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system were proclaimed. The COMELEC enbanc determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters Federation Inc.), was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 2.04% of the
total votes cast for the part-list system. Thereafter, several party-list organization filed a petition to the
COMELEC to proclaim the said winner under the Constitution which was later on granted by the
COMELEC in division and affirmed by COMELEC en banc. Consequently, several petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of the temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction were filed to the Supreme Court by the parties who also obtained at least two
percent
votes
cast
for
party-list
system.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC commit grave abused of discretion in ruling that 38 parties,
organizations,
and
coalitions
are
entitled
to
a
party-list
seat.
Held: The COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the 38 herein respondents are
each entitled to a party-list seat because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA7941 which is the
two percent threshold and proportional representation.
RA 7941 the Party list Act (1995)
BANAT V. COMELEC
, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National Board of
Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the fullnumber of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by theCOMELEC en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to
proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the partylistresults, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked theCOMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the
Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus andprohibition assailing the resolution of the
COMELEC in its decision to use theVeterans formula.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 toqualify for one seat is
constitutional
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in theparty-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participatingin the party-list elections?
RULING:

The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that aqualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device thatprevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering more than twopercent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interestsin the House of Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:1. The
parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest tothe lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.2. The
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seateach.3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking inparagraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties fromparticipating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitutionclearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections throughtheir sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that
participates in party-list elections aseither "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended thatmajor political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party List System; Proportional Representation;
Proper Computation
Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in
the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant
to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3
seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation
as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported
by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It
also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted
for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives,
hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not
exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2%
of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified.
This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least
2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters
are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional
seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall
not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed
one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3
seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall
be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from
participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of
the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that
they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because
it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the
country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly
or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC[G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02 APRIL 2013 ]Facts:
1. A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission on Elections reinterpreted Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT).2. In granting the petition of 52 party list groups and
organizations which were disqualified by the Commission on Election from participating in the May 13, 2013 party list elections
because they allegedly do not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector of society, the majority is of the view
that the party list system includes not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. Hence, cont rar y to t he Ang Bagon g
Ba yan i , t he part y- li st syst em i s not t he ex cl usi ve dom ai n of sect oral representatives belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors but may be participated in by non-sectoral parties as well who do not need to represent marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections
Held:
1. We hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this court in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the coming 13 may 2013 party-list elections. However, since the court adopts in this decision new
parameters in the qualification of national, regional,and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in
the decisions applied by the Comelec in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to all the present petitions for the Comelec to determine
whoare qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 may 2013 partylist elections,
under the new parameters prescribed in this decision.
What is the objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution?
To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the
house of representatives.
Who are included in the party list system? Sectoral and Non-sectoral parties.
What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties?
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Political parties can participate in the party-list system [f]or as long as they filed candidates who come from the different
marginalizedsectors that we shall designate in this constitution.
Three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties
or organizations.
Mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of congress after the ratification of the 1987 constitution, one-half of the
seatsallocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor,indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.

Changing Rules on the Party List System

Posted on May 1, 2013 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law
Much like a swinging pendulum, the decision of the Supreme Court on which parties compose the party list system swings from one
side to the other. Previously, the Supreme Court limited the party list system to representatives of marginalized and underprivileged
sectors. In Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 203766, et al., April 2, 2013), the latest in the series of party list cases, the
pendulum now points to the opposite side.
The New Ruling
Atong Paglaum involved 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups against
COMELEC for disqualifying them from participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. One of the main reasons for the
disqualification was their failure to represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Two issues were presented:
(1)
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioners from participating in the May 2013
elections; and
(2)
Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (ABB) and
BANAT v. COMELEC (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming May 2013 elections.

The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it merely followed the rulings laid down
in ABB and BANAT. However, the Court decided to abandon these rulings and adopted new parameters for the upcoming elections;
thus, it remanded the case to COMELEC so the latter can determine the status of the petitioners based on the following new
guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need
to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list system have to represent a sector that is
marginalized and underrepresented.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution never intended the party-list system to be reserved for sectoral
parties. The latter were only part of the party-list system not the entirety of it. There were two more groups composing the system
national and regional parties. This is evident from the phrasing of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districtsand those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied)
National and regional parties are different from sectoral parties such that the former need not organize along sectoral lines and
represent a particular sector. Hence, it is not necessary for these parties to be representative of the marginalized and underrepresented.
In fact, Republic Act No. 7941, the enabling law of the party-list elections under the Constitution, does not require these parties to fall
under this criterion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the phrase marginalized and underrepresented appeared only once in R.A.
No. 7941, particularly in the Declaration of Policy. The section provides:
The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided the simplest scheme
possible.
The oft-quoted phrase neither appeared in the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 nor did it require sectors,
organizations, or parties to fall under the criterion as well. In this regard, how then should the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of

R.A. No. 7941 be harmonized with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the matter?
The Supreme Court answered in this wise:
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of
the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must
belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need
not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and
underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those
marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members
to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need
for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend
sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
Based on the Courts ratiocination, only sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society must
comply with the criterion of representing the marginalized and underrepresented. For national, regional, and sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, it is sufficient that they consist of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Consequently, since political parties are essentially national and regional parties, the Supreme Court categorically stated that they may
participate in the party-list elections. The rules for their participation are found under guideline number three.
Evolution of Party-List Cases
ABB and BANAT were the prevailing jurisprudence prior to Atong Paglaum.
In ABB, the Supreme Court recognized that even major political parties may join the party list elections. However, the Supreme Court
went on saying that although they may participate, it does not mean that any political party or group for that matter may do so. It
is essential for these parties to be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the party-list system is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving
more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Essentially, the
goal is to give voice to the voiceless to enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented to become
members of Congress.
Hence, only parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented may join the party-list elections. The Supreme Court stressed
that the party-list system cannot be exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented because if the rich and overrepresented can
participate, it would desecrate the spirit of the party-list system.
In BANAT where the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to deal with the matter, it categorically declared, by a vote of 8-7, that
major political parties are barred from participating either directly or indirectly from the party-list elections.
Clearly, the doctrine in Atong Paglaum is in stark contrast with the former interpretation of the party-list system. The Supreme Courts
reasoning in both decisions also sits at opposite sides of the scale. In ABB and BANAT, the Supreme Court concentrated on the spirit
and purpose of the party-list system while in Atong Paglaum, it focused on the letter of the law and the intent of the Constitutions
framers and Congress.

No wonder this decision has sparked intense debate and passionate reaction from the stakeholders. These party-list cases constitute
three decisions with two exceptionally different doctrines. Which then is correct? Should the spirit of the law prevail over the letter?
Should the party-list system be really open to all? Should the court engage in socio-political engineering as it did in the first two cases
or should it remain as neutral magistrates of the law, blindfolded like lady justice, interpreting the letter of the law strictly according to
its words?
The decision in Atong Paglaum is not yet final and executory. The case is still, if not already, subject to a motion for reconsideration. It
is still possible for the pendulum to swing back to its former side or it may remain suspended where it is now.