G.R. No. 132601.

October 12, 1998]

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104, respondents.
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, the Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Echegaray who
was convicted for the rape of the ten year old daughter of his common law spouse
and the imposition upon him of the death penalty. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first
time the constitutionality of RA 7659 The Death Penalty Law, and the imposition
of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court
finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant
with the requirements for its imposition.
Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA
7659. The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection.
The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A
8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal
Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary
of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution,
contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void.
The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch
104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the
parties to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status
quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the
RA in question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his
contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as
Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing
applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the
death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed
a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE :
Whether or not death by lethal injection is unconstitutional for being a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment.
HELD:
No. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is
cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain
or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man
is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. Numerous federal
and state courts of the United States have been asked to review whether lethal
injections constitute cruel and unusual punishment. No court has found lethal
injections to implicate prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that
have addressed the issue state in one or two sentences that lethal injection clearly
is a constitutional form of execution. A few jurisdictions, however, have addressed
the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have
found that lethal injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After
reviewing the medical evidence that indicates that improper doses or improper
administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to have
little training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few
minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have focused on 'standards of
decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it
comports with contemporary norms." the primary indicator of society's standard of
decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the country's
legislatures to the sanction . Hence, for as long as the death penalty remains in our
statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the
Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose
constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We find that
the legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein.

ZENON R. PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008
Facts:
On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin,
Provincial Auditors Office, Bohol,[4] conducted a cash examination on the account of
petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the
course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner.
The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which
also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was
supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the
P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team
as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the
money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent
for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated
January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the
filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer
of Bohol the amounts of P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively. On February 14,
1989, petitioner again remitted to the Provincial Treasurer an additional amount
of P35,000.00, followed by remittances made on February 16, 1989 in the amounts
of P2,000.00 andP2,784.00.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan and found guilty with
malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law relied upon in convicting the petitioner and the sentence
imposed is cruel and therefor violates Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.
Held:
No. The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. [79]

In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner argues that the penalty meted
for the crime of malversation of public funds that ha[ve] been replenished,
remitted and/or returned to the government is cruel and therefore
unconstitutional, as government has not suffered any damage.[80]
The argument is specious on two grounds.
First, Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it
may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is
not an element of malversation.
Second, There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why
such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of
petitioner, must fail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ANICETO BULAGAO

G.R. No. 184757, October 5, 2011
Facts:
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape for the
rape of his 14-year-old adopted sister, AAA. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on
both counts. AAA alleged that the first count of rape occurred in the house of
another older brother from her adoptive family. She was sleeping in a room when
accused entered and pointed a knife on her while accused proceeded to engage in a
sexual intercourse with her. The second count of rape occurred in the house of
another sister of her adoptive family. She was again sleeping when she awoke upon
noticing that the accused began undressing her. The accused then proceeded to
have sexual intercourse with her. AAA informed her adoptive mother of what had
happened but the latter refused to believe her. AAA was later placed in custody of
the DSWD but was eventually returned to her adoptive family even when the
proceedings were ongoing. Later on during the proceedings, AAA recanted her
previous statements stating that she only concocted the charges out of anger on
the accused. Regardless of the recantation of the testimony, the RTC found the
accused guilty for two counts of rape and imposed the penalty of Death. The RTC
observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she testified for the
prosecution, and was returned to the family of the accused-appellant after her
original testimony. It was during the time when she was back in the custody of the
accused-appellant,s family that she recanted her testimony for the prosecution.
According to the RTC, it is clear that she had no other place to go to as she was
completely orphaned and was dependent on the family of the accused, and it was
understandable that she may have recanted in order to remain in the good graces
of the accused-appellants family.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in imposing the penalty of death considering the
enactment of R.A. 9364.
Held:
Yes. It should be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would
have warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of
moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each from Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing
jurisprudence.[35]
In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when committed with the use of a deadly
weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This crime was proven as
charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to have occurred on June
17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating circumstance was alleged in
the Information, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used a knife
on June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000, the date of
Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.[36] As such, the crime that was proven in Crim. Case
No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any circumstance affecting criminal
liability. However, simple rape is also punishable by reclusion perpetua under
Article 266-B.
In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even without
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, both for each count of rape. [37] In addition, we have held that
since exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same can be awarded, not
only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender.[38] This Court believes that the conduct of accused-appellant
herein, who raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls under this category and is
therefore liable for exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count
of rape, in line with existing jurisprudence. [39]