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Mandoriao,
Jr.C.A., 51 O.G. 4619
FACTS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo held a religious rally at a public place in Baguio. About
200 people attended the meeting; about 50 of who weremembers of the
Iglesia ni Cristo but the rest were outsiders and curious listeners. While
Salvio, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo, was expounding onhis topic to the
effect that Christ is not God, but only man, the crowd became unruly. Some
people urged Mandoriao to go up the stage and havea debate with Salvio.
Mandoriao however, was not able to speak before the microphone because
the wire connecting it was abruptlydisconnected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the meeting was a religious ceremony
HELD:
The meeting here was not a religious ceremony. A religious meeting is an
assemblage of people met for the
purpose of performing acts
of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform religious services in
recognition of God as an object of worship The meeti
ng here was notlimited to the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The
supposed prayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental because
the principal objectof the rally was to persuade new converts to their
religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant
cannot be said tohave performed acts or uttered words offensive to the
feelings of the faithful. The act complained of must be directed against a
dogma or ritual,or upon an object of veneration. There was no object of
veneration at the meeting.
RATIO:
Religious ceremonies are those religious acts performed outside of a church, such as
processions and special prayers for burying dead persons. When the application of
the Church of Christ was to hold the meeting at a public place and the
permit expressly stated that the purposewas to hold a prayer rally, what was held
on that occasion was not a religious ceremony, even if a minister was then
preaching (that Jesus Christwas not God but only a man). The rally was
attended by persons who are not members of the sect
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46000
the fiscal not omitted this essential part, he would not have come to the
conclusion that the acts complained of do not constitute the crime defined
and penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act
committed by the accused had offended the religious feelings of the
Catholics of the municipality in which the act complained of took place. We
believe that such ground of the motion is indefensible. As the fiscal was
discussing the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot
deny any of them, but must admit them, although hypothetically, as they
are alleged. The motion raises a question of law, not one of fact. In the
second place, whether or of the act complained of is offensive to the
religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of
other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the
feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise
offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore,
take the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense
defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should
the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter
held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court
may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of
coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code,
as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.
The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his
duty under the law, without pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
People v. Tengson
Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937,
dismissed the case, reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file
another information for the crime found to have been committed by the
accused.
From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but
thereafter given due course by the court by virtue of an order of this court.
The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal.
This officer questions the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint,
but omits an essential part thereof, to wit, that the churchyard belongs to
the church, and is devoted to the religious services of said church, and it is
through this churchyard that the accused, over the objection of the parish
priest and through force and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of
one under the rites of the religious sect known as the Church of Christ. Had
Christ is the answer Funeral; performed religious rites inthe house and in
an unfinishedbarrio chapelChanting of Alleluia,singing religious hymnsAcquitted.Second element that
the act isnotoriously offensive to the feelingsof the faithful was not
present.Offense should not be depend uponthe subjective conception
orcharacterization of such religious act.Laurel Standard: (dissent from
Baes)Perspective of the faithful IN GENERAL-Believers of Jesus Christ regardless
of religious sect or denomination
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO
TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN.
EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police
District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE,respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON.
JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal
jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the
focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of
its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a
marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public
attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are
now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate
Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the
plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General
filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No.
921647 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of
Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does
not fall within the Hernandezruling because-and this is putting it very
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be
re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law,
its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges
and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago,
the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom
Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942
of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the
occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title
3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which
graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the
most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court
can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory
that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that
the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of
rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the
proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus
was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real
thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of
Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority
opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at thatwhy Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion,
and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming
that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty
would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of
a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if
construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the
several acts performed by him were punished separately.
In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de
concurso de delitos a que hace referencia
este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta
basado francamente en el principio pro
reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to
Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the
counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no
son aplicables en el caso de que un solo
hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario
para cometer el otro.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or
innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the
trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a
take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the
petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of
the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed
against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the
amended information against defendant-appellant Amado
V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by said defendants, as means
"necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons
and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under
such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with
the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does
not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court
has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere
flight of rhetoric. Read in the context ofHernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed
and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise,
that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned
information.14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were
based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday
party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1,
1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about
6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred
with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully
armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution
thereby concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the
presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully
armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in
the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis
supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion
charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the
charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the
Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one
crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder
but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD
No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the
fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no
other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a
component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to
commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against
the political order, as well as such common crimes as may
be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive
factor is the intent or motive.(p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100
Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez,
107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the
act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It
cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case
of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can
only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very
nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed
to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or
physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so,
when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the
subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be
punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for
smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held
guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution
for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another
offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or
concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion
case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one
law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in
rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail.
The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and
hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge.
This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's
turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the
integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who
stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan
who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of
record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first
asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query
he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation
has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving
testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort
of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt.
Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with
regularity and legality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT
WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF. The crime of rebellion consists
of may acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues
and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act
of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in
authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203).
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted
of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor
General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his
conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him
guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who are still at
large, in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of
this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill,
treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use of
motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Redempto
Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused
his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a
policeman who was then in the performance of his official duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of "not
guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness,
accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the
lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said
accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While
trial was still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4,
1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora
were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in canning the traffic at
M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled
the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc.
Catamora acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8)
persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He
noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc.
Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed,
they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.
Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of
shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on
the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora
sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons
take Pfc. Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is
dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back up.
Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the
scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify
accused-appellant Nues because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near
the left eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in
front of him together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct
surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit
located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw
Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape. The team of Capt.
Antonio Gorre captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3
magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo
pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his
left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver with
17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.
Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nues
was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig
one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally
lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice
as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In
the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the
accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and
afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor
Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the
investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not
his choice only during trial. Thus it was too late."
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession
was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a
mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal
liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the
reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation.
Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that
appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's
sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant
made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable
to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively.
Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been substantiated
by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out,
such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his
prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial
confession was done with regularity and legality.
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is
guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and
hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as
manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously
convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of
Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among
other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not
only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but also
his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while
manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It
is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New
People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc.
Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive
ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion,
not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away
from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside
him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as
he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor
Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he
knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro,
his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he
knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of
Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot
wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body. 2 On autopsy,
the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic
shock. 3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on
November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias
Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less
5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality
of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already
therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this
Court favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New
People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed
as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of
the NPA. 22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in
the case at bench. He states that accused-appellant's belated claims to
membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self
serving 23an averment to which, given a thorough review of the
circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of
the NPA, clearly overcame the burden of proving motive or
intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the
killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected
as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a
letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning
to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in
the case at bar where the evidence for the appellant
merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not
substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in
the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his
extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as
follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male
person a certainalias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to
me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin
handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and
told me board on said jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October
19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership
in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought, something which
the defense merely picked up and followed through upon prosecution
eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew
appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same
testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as
an NPA member.28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did
not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after
all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony
while upholding the rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's
testimony on appellant's alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court
correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was
committed. 30 Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions,
except as to the identity of the gun wielder, by the testimony of the
appellant himself.
In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the
commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on
his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding
of aliasAlwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the
organization's
goals. 31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had
offended our organization," 32 without, however, specifying what the
"offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of the NPA
for five months before the shooting incident. 33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are
couched in terms so general and non-specific 34 that they offer no
explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards
the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere
policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were
specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts
to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence
on record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty
imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas,
crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an
ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating
the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes
perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice
Narvasa aptly observed:
EN BANC
March 4, 1922
G.R. No. 17748
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Vicente Sotto for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee
MALCOLM, J.:
As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the
Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge upon the police of the city of
Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted
in the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission,
and sentenced either to the maximum penalty or a near approach to the
maximum penalty provided by the punitive provisions of that law, all of the
defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement of the case
and of the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no
reversible error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, will be taken
up in the order named.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman
who was a member of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at
the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the woman was
considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed
by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of
Manila police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio
Mojica, posted on Calle Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila,
had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the
shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag was
seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the
Manila force and private Macasinag and other companions of the
4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? Yes,
sir.
5. For what reason, and where did you go? We went in search of the
policemen and secret service men of Manila. It has been sometime now
since we have been having standing grudge against now since we have
been having a standing grudge against the police of Manila. The wife of
one of our comrades was first arrested by the policemen and then abused
by the same; and not content with having abused her, they gave this
woman to an American; after this incident, they arrested two soldiers of
the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping women of bad
reputation; after this incident, came the shooting of Macasinag, a shooting
not justified, because we have come to know that Macasinag did nothing
and the policemen could have arrested him if they desired. Moreover, the
rumor spread among us that the police department of Manila had given
orders to the policemen to fire upon any Constabulary soldier they found in
the streets, and we believe that the rumor was not without foundation
since we noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila,
Contrary to the usual practice, were armed with carbines or shotguns. For
this reason we believe that if we did not put an end to these abuses of the
policemen and secret service men, they would continue abusing the
constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we did what we had done last
night.
11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state
whether the victim was a policeman or a civilian. I cannot tell whether I
hit any policeman or any civilian.
12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. I cannot given an
exact account of the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession of
my faculties until I reached Calle Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that
I was bathed with perspiration only upon reaching the barracks.
13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many
cartidge did you use? I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the
number of cartridges I used; however, I placed in my pocket the twenty
cartridges belonging to me and I must have lost.
14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? By the window of the
quarter of the Fourth Company, through the grating which I found cut off.
15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and
spontaneously given? Yes, sir.
16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is
made to you? Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.
6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? I
saw that almost all the soldiers were jumping through the window and I
was to be left alone in the barracks and so I followed.
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.
S. GALLARDO.
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.
8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the
Manila police the night before last on Calle Real? Yes, Sir, I know him
because he was our comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said
soldier? Indeed, yes, not only was I offended, but my companions also
were.
10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. I
cannot tell precisely the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat
obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I fired more than once.
Witnesses:
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another
information filed in the same, court, with the crimes of murder and serious
physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different
judges of first instance.
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles,
Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caa, first
pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but later, after the first witness for
the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty were
permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of
not guilty. the prosecution, in making out it case, presented the seventyseven confession of the defendants, introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to
C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of those made by Daniel Coralde,
Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective
Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking
them. The prosecution further relied on oral testimony, including
eyewitness to the uprising.
The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense
was in favor of all the defendants and was based on the contention that
the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were not freely and voluntarily
made by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants Vicente
Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso
de la Cruz, Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Paciano Caa,
Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello,
Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio Decea, Venancio Mira, Baldomero
Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and was to the
effect these men did not take part in the riot.
The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the
accused had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the
defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum imprisonment of ten
years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however,
distinguished fines from that of a defendants Francisco Garcia, a private
and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente
Manigdeg, Juan Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar
and Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was imposed, and
of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio
Eugenio, upon each of whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs
were divided proportionately among the defendants.
For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we
are indebted in large measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful
decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition
case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder
case. As stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the
defendants, the proof is substantially the same in both cases.
In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the
trial court in this case. The rule is again applied that the Supreme Court will
not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs.
Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37
Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or circumstance
appears.
OPINION
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and
appellants. Two the assignment of error merit little or no consideration.
Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its counterpart in assignments of error 5
and 6 in the murder case), in which it is attempted to establish that
Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarquez, Mariano
Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez,
Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano
Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado,
Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia
Barracks in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special defense
raised in the lower court for these defendants and three other and which
was found untenable by the trial court. Any further discussion of this
question falls more appropriately under consideration of assignment of
error No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.
Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it
had not been shown that the policemen were not aware of the armed
attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the evidence supports
this conclusion of the trial court.
The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of
Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder
case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused (assignment of error No. 4,
sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the
conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law
(assignment of error No. 5, sedition case).
1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76
Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the
seventy seven confessions. It is alleged that some of the defendants
signed the confessions under the impression that those who had taken part
in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did
not in fact so participate, affirmed that they because of a desire to leave
Manila; that other stepped forward "for the good of the service" in
response to appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still
others simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of
Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the
violation of section 5, paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission.
JUDGEMENT
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of
sedition as defined in section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not
exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both. In
this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each of the
private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio
Decea, Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron
(Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel,
Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway, Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana,
Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto Palabay,
Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco
Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon,
Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio
Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob,
Paciano Caa, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde,
Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos
Marquez, Victorino Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian
Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia, Rafael
Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan
Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix
Lamsing, and Vicente Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and
to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the private Francisco Garcia,
who sawed the bars of the window through which the defendants passed
from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos,
Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan
Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten
years and to pay a fine of P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs;
and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and
Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of
P10,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to
have made a reasonable exercise of the discretion which the law reposes in
him.
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own
the pertinent observations found in the decision of the trial court in this
case. Therein, along toward the closed of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey
said:
In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph the
judgment of conviction in this case must be sustained, if it appears from
the evidence in the record that the accused was guilty as charged of any
one of those offenses. We are all agreed that the publication and
presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tend to instigate others
to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and
incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the
safety and order of the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time,
place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred
and enmity against the American people and the Government of the United
States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal object and
intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to
open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to
be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its
stead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to commit
the crime with which he is charged does not appear from the evidence of
record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely literary and artistic
production wherein the legendary history of these Islands and their future,
as imagined by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and
entertainment of the public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation of the
drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less than two years after the
establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a widespread and dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and
here and there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required
the use of the armed forces of the Government for their suppression. A
junta in the city of Hongkong, composed of persons whose announced
purpose and object in organizing was the overthrow of the present
Government, was actively engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of
these Islands from peaceably accepting the authority of that Government,
and this junta, acting with confederates in the Philippines, was still able to
keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty which it hoped to fan
into open revolt and rebellion at the first favorable
opportunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time
and under such conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it was merely
or even principally a literary or artistic production, and the clumsy devices,
the allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness, past and future, of the
events portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave the
audience in doubt as to its present and immediate application, nor should
they blind this court to the true purpose and intent of the author and
director of the play.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is further contended that even though the accused were in fact guilty as
charged, the court erred in imposing an excessive and unjust penalty, and
in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars instead of Philippine currency. As
to the latter objection it is sufficient to say that the use of the word
"dollars" was in strict conformance with the words of the statute, and that
the equivalent of that word in Philippine currency is fixed by law. The
penalty was within the limits prescribed by law, and we are not prepared to
hold that the trial court erred in the exercise of its discretion in imposing
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
against the appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2990
BENGZON, J.:
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write,
publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the
people againts the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said
court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both
dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza
had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in
truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several
newspapers and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not
only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made
to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and
addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note
in hereunder reproduced:
Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my
grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need
them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic
cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right
to burried among Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry.
Wipe me out of your lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell
them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of
Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point
out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that
here in the Philippines our government is infested with many
Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come
across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government
under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this
dirty government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de
Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own
self.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above
quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News,
the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had
impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name
in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture
taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of
a tree."
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. It calls our
government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis
and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.
1
Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and
armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities cannot
but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the
open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government,
the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless
depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a
state on lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better
than the maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed
suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the
Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo
means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and
arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be
conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to
free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of
fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or
assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a
majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such
suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matter with
several persons in a public place uttered theses words: "Filipinos must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head" referring to the them GovernorGeneral, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a
judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports.
That precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was penned
by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably of speech. Adopting his own words we
could say, "Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive
of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the President of the
United States and other high office, under form of government, instead of
affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite
abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes
the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a
figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words
used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being
no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision
will be affirmed with costs.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings, one to which no
authoritative answer has been yielded by past decisions, is the scope to be
accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to
and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach
of the peace. 1 Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin 2 and Fernando
Bautista, Sr.,3 as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention would
invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional
provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions
of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor." 4 For under the Constitutional
Convention Act, 5 delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of
a senator or a representative. 6 Both petitioners are facing criminal
prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y
Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations against
petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above
proceedings, 7 would dispute such a contention on the ground that the
constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being
merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being
that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an
immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. A
careful study of the above constitutional provision, in the light of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, adopting the then wellsettled principle under American law and of the purposes to be served by
such an immunity, persuade us that the stand taken by the Solicitor
General is correct. Thesecertiorari proceedings cannot prosper.
The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute. Petitioner
Martinez y Festin 8 alleged that on June 10, 1971, an information against
him for falsification a public document was filed. Its basis was his stating
under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional
Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he
knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. There was on July 9, 1971, a
the Assembly can very well perform the duties incumbent upon them. I
submit my amendment for the consideration of this Convention." 18
It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is
granted by the Constitution was understood in the same sense it has in
American law, there being a similar provision in the American
Constitution. 20 Its authoritative interpretation in the United States was
supplied by the Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21
According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned the
opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach of the peace," as used in
the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the
privilege all criminal offenses, ... " 22 He traced its historical background
thus: "A brief consideration of the subject of parliamentary privilege in
England will, we think, show the source whence the expression "treason
felony, and breach of the peace" was drawn, and leave no doubt that the
words were used in England for the very purpose of excluding all crimes
from the operation of the parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave
that privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature." 23 Story's
treatise on the Constitution was likewise cited, his view on the matter
being quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses against the peace,
the phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend to all indictable
offenses, as well those which are in fact attended with force and violence,
as those which are only constructive breaches of the peace of the
government, inasmuch as they violate its good order." 24
As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick 25 and
Willoughby 26 could use practically identical appraising such immunity, the
former stating that it "is not now of great importance" and the latter
affirming that it "is of little importance as arrest of the person is now
almost never authorized except for crimes which fall within the classes
exempt from the priviledge." The state of the American law on this point is
aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By common parliamentary law, the members
of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during the
session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable
them to go to and return from the same." 27 A prosecution for a criminal
offense, is thus excluded from this grant of immunity. So it should be
The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All laws of the
Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution until amended,
altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all
references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines
shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution." 29 In People v.
Linsangan 30 decided in December, 1935, barely a month after the
Constitution took effect, the continued applicability of Section 2718 of the
Revised Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person
who remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, 31 this Court, in its
opinion thru the pen of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos,
after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt
on non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It seems too clear to require
demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is
inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution in
that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of the poll
or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of
the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction
can be based thereon." 33
judiciary would main independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate
Manuel Martinez by Festin in L-34022 and the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. in L-34046 and L-34047 are
hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128618. November 16, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELICISIMO
NARVASA, JIMMY ORANIA and MATEO NARVASA, accused,
FELICISIMO NARVASA and JIMMY ORANIA appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
What crime or crimes are committed when a killing is perpetrated with
the use of unlicensed firearms? In the absence of the firearms themselves,
may illegal possession of firearms be proven by parol evidence?
The Case
The Facts
In his Brief, the solicitor general [8] presented the following narration of
facts:
In the process of the retreat, Camba [bled] profusely and he died even
before he could be brought out from the scene of the crime.
The body of Camba was left at the scene of the crime while his
companions escaped and called for help. Several policemen arrived. Pieces
of evidence like empty shells of M-16, M-14 and caliber .30 U.S. carbine
bullets were gathered and some policemen were tasked to track down the
goons (Exhs. C, C-1 to C-4; tsn., August 16, 1994, pp. 6-10).
The two are familiar with those kind[s] of guns as they have seen similar
ones carried by policemen. They said, a carbine is shorter than [an] M-14
and [an] M-16 is longer than [an] M-14 (Tsn., April 21, 1994, pp. 1-35,
December 13, 1995, pp. 1-12).
Laderas and Nagal simply stared at the five and then they proceeded to
their way home. Unluckily for the goons, the two councilmen met the two
policemen[,] SPO3 Primo Camba and PO2 Simeon Navora who were on
patrol and they reported what they saw (Ibid).
The two policemen were also responding to a report about the missing
animals and they suggested that all of them should track down the armed
goons (Ibid).
After walking some distance, the four responding men saw the house of
appellant Felicisimo Narvasa on a hilly portion around 100 meters away
from their path. They decided to investigate at the house but before they
could negotiate the distance, they were met by a volley of gunfire. The
four[,] who were ten meters apart[,] dove and sought cover (Tsn., April,
1994, p. 11). When the firing took a halt, Laderas had the courage to raise
his head and [view] xxx the source of the gunfire. Laderas saw Felicisimo
Narvasa in a squatting position aiming at the two policemen and Jimmy
Orania was seated near him guiding him at his target. Mateo Narvasa was
also aiming his gun. There was an exchange of gunfire as the policemen
were able to take proper positions. Unfortunately, SPO3 Camba was hit.
Navora summoned Laderas and Nagal to get closer to give aid to Camba.
Laderas and Nagal carried Camba as they retreated and, Navora followed
moving backwards as he kept firing at their enemies (Ibid, tsn., July 20,
1994, pp. 1-8; tsn., August 15, 1994, pp. 2-30).
of Felicisimo. The latter was awakened by Glicerio and when he asked his
son who shot him, Arnel answered that it was the group of Laderas.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM.[15]
In the main, the resolution of this case revolves around the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses, the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence
and the characterization of the crime committed.
The Courts Ruling
burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the subject
firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.
Appellants contend that the existence of the firearms was not sufficiently
proven because the prosecution had not presented the firearms as
evidence. It is necessary, they argue, that said firearms allegedly
possessed by the accused-appellants and allegedly used in the killing of
Policeman Primo Camba be presented in evidence as those firearms
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime with which they are
sentenced.[20]
Appellants argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this
Court merely stated that the existence of the firearm must be
established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be presented as
evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela,[21] the Court held that the existence
of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the
presentation of the said firearm. In the said case, Appellant Orehuela was
convicted of qualified illegal possession of a firearm despite the fact that
the firearm used was not presented as evidence. The existence of the
weapon was deemed amply established by the testimony of an eyewitness
that Orehuela was in possession of it and had used it to kill the victim, viz.:
We consider that the certification was adequate to show that the firearm
used by Modesto Orehuela in killing Teoberto Canizares was a firearm
which Orehuela was not licensed to possess and to carry outside his
residence on the night that Teoberto Canizares was shot to death. That that
firearm was a .38 caliber pistol was shown by the testimony and report of
NBI Ballistician Bonifacio Ayag. When the above circumstances are taken
together with the testimony of the eyewitness that Modesto
Orehuela was in fact in possession of a firearm and used the same
to kill Teoberto Canizares, we believe that accused Orehuela was
properly found guilty of aggravated or qualified illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
In the present case, the testimonies of several witnesses indubitably
demonstrate the existence of the firearms. Villamor Laderas stated that
when he went to Barangay Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan to investigate
a report regarding missing carabaos, pigs and goats, he saw the appellants
carrying long firearms. We quote hereunder the relevant portion of his
testimony:
Q And when you saw the two accused together with the three others,
what have you noticed in their persons?
Who of the five persons did you see was holding long firearms?
That herein appellants were the ones who had shot at the prosecution
witnesses was confirmed by Laderas, who testified as follows:
Q How did you know that the gunfire came from the west?
A
And while the gunfire was going on, did you know who fired those
gunshots?
In addition, Primo Camba was hit by a bullet, and empty shells of M16, M-14 and .30 caliber carbine bullets were later on recovered in the
vicinity of the place where the shooting occurred.
The above facts, duly proven and taken together, sufficiently establish
the existence of the subject firearms and the fact that appellants
possessed and used said firearms in firing at Villamor Laderas, Ernesto
Nagal, and Simeon Navora, as well as Primo Camba who succumbed to the
gunshot wound he had sustained.
The
present
case
can
be
distinguished
from People
v.
Navarro[25] wherein the Court held that illegal possession of firearm could
not be deemed an aggravating circumstance because the existence of the
said firearm was not proven. In said case, a witness testified that he saw
appellant shoot the victim with a short firearm. No firearm, however,
was presented as evidence, although a gun was recovered from the
accused when he was arrested. Moreover, no proof was adduced to
show that the firearm allegedly seen by the witness was the same
one recovered by the authorities from the accused. Thus, the Court
held:
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5, 1991, the
appellant had in his possession an unlicensed firearm which he used in
killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was allegedly recovered on January
5, 1994, when appellant was arrested. However, said firearm was not
presented in court or offered as evidence against the appellant. Although
Rabago testified that he saw the appellant with a short firearm when the
latter shot Rabadon on January 5, 1991 no other proof was presented to
show that such gun, allegedly used on January 5, 1991, was the same
one recovered on January 5, 1994. The prosecution was not able to
establish sufficiently the existence of the subject firearm x x x.
In other words, the evidence on the existence of the firearm was beset
with doubt and conflict. Such uncertainty is not found in the present case,
for the testimonies of several witnesses indubitably established that the
subject firearms were in the possession of the appellants.
Yes, sir.
Appellants did not present any evidence and neither did they even
claim -- that they were in fact licensed firearm holders.
Appellants Responsible
xxx
xxx
How did you come to know that Primo Camba was hit by the first
exchange of gunfire?
Just after we dived to the ground, xxx Primo Camba told me that he
was hit.
And when Primo Camba told you that he was hit, what did you do?
xxx
xxx
And when you reach[ed] the premises of Prudencio, what was the
condition of Primo Camba?
xxx
xxx
xxx
''Q After giving instruction to the two (2) councilmen, what did you do?
A
We retreated [to the] East direction, until we reach the yard of [a]
certain Prudencio.
The Crime
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
Thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as
high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also
lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three; Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.
EN BANC
SO ORDERED.
RELOVA, J.:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, alias Minong; Rogelio Bugarin, alias
Boy; Cresencio Siazon, alias Ising; Manuel Puzon, alias Noling; Domingo
Hernandez, alias Doming; and, Ceferino Beltran, alias Ebing, were indicted
for murder and double attempted murder with direct assault in the then
Court of First Instance of Cagayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 158- S.
Likewise, Delfino Beltran was charged with attempted murder in Criminal
Case No. 160-S.
After trial they were convicted and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused DELFINO BELTRAN alias
Minong, ROGELIO BUGARIN alias Boy, CRESENCIO SIAZON alias Ising,
MANUEL PUZON alias Noling, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ alias Doming and
CEFERINO BELTRAN alias Ebing, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder for the death of VICENTE QUIROLGICO. There being no
mitigating circumstance, the Court has no other alternative than to impose
the maximum penalty provided for by law. Accused Delfino Beltran, Rogelio
Bugarin, Cresencio Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo Hernandez and
Ceferino Beltran are hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of DEATH,
to indemnify the heirs of Vicente Quirolgico the sum of P 12,000.00 for the
loss of his life; P 75,000.00 as reimbursement for expenses covering
medical funeral embalming mausoleum and burial lot, and the further sum
of P 50,000.00 for moral damages, jointly and severally and to pay the
costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, taking into
consideration the nature of the principal penalty imposed.
The Court likewise finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of DOUBLE ATTEMPTED MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT and
hereby imposes upon an of them the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in
its medium period and orders them to undergo a prison term ranging from
14 years, 8 months and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months as
maximum and to pay the costs.
Under Crim. Case No, 160-S, accused DELFINO BELTRAN is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and hereby sentence him to
undergo a prison term ranging from 2 years, 4 months and
1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision
correccional and to pay the costs. (pp. 402-403, Record)
The People's evidence shows that in the evening of January 11, 1972,
between 9:00 and 10:00, in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was
bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound,
Delfino Beltran alias Minong, shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your
mother). They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado
had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido
Quirolgico and reported the matter. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief
of Police that something should be done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to talk to
Delfino Beltran and his companions to surrender considering that he knew
them personally as all of them were once working for Congressman David
Puzon When they came near the compound, they saw appellants Delfino
Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez and suddenly there was
which he saw a man falling down from the fence. As the firing continued,
he stealthily mounted his gun on top of the fence and fired the same.
When the firing ceased, he proceeded to the residence of Congressman
Puzon. In the sala, he saw Boy Bugarin, Doming Hernandez, Ising Siazon,
Noling Puzon, Ebing Beltran and Floresida Amayon, conversing. Upon
seeing him, his companions asked him what was that firing all about. He
told them that he traded shots with a group of armed men. Thereafter,
they hid in the basement of the residence of the Congressman, staying
there for one whole day. The following day, Delfino Beltran surrendered to
Captain Retuta, while the rest escaped but thereafter surrendered.
The defense of appellant Delfino Beltran, alias Minong, is self- defense;
whereas appellants Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy, Ceferino Beltran, alias
Ebing, and Manuel Puzon, alias Noling denied having anything to do with
the incident.
In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in: (1) giving
credence to the evidence for the prosecution; (2) holding that conspiracy
existed among them in the commission of the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 158-S; (3) finding that treachery and evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crimes; (4) not finding that appellant
Delfino Beltran acted in self-defense; (5) finding appellants guilty of
attempted murder with direct assault on Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Rolando
Tolentino; and (6) not appreciating in favor of the appellants the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On the first assigned error, We reiterate the established doctrine that when
the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally
not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
hearing, unless it had overlooked certain facts of substance and value that,
if considered, might affect the result of the case.
The judgment of conviction is not bereft of evidence to support the same.
Hereunder are the testimonies of the prosecution's eyewitnesses, namely:
Carmelita Collado who declared the following:
Q Will you inform the Honorable Court who
was that one shouting?
the Rural Bank and the Puzon Compound. Vicente de Vera testified on
direct examination, the following:
Q Under your findings No. 1, will you inform us your conclusion?
A My conclusion was that the 27 fired cartridges marked as CIS-1 to 27
were fired from the firearm marked as Exhibit 'R' (SIG Natu Rifle).
Q Your other findings, please tell the Court.
A Under findings Nos. 2: Microscopic examination and comparison of the
223 Cal. fired cartridge cases marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154 revealed the
non-congruency of striations with the test cartridge cases fired from the
abovementioned 223 caliber M16 Armalite rifle with Serial No. 527226.
They further revealed the following:
Q With reference to the first rifle which you have mentioned, which is
marked as Exhibit 'R', with different serial numbers, in the barrel group,
receiver group, and the barrel link, will you inform this Honorable Court
your findings?
A I found that the barrel of the Armalite is positive for the presence of
gunpowder, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q With reference to this Armalite, M15, marked as Exhibit 'S', in this
particular case, will you tell us your findings about the presence of
gunpowder?
A Exhibit 'S', the barrel is positive of gunpowder. (tsn., pp. 52, 55, 57, & 58,
January 8, 1973 hearing)
The above findings further confirm the truth of the statements of
eyewitnesses Gavino Collado, Patrolman Usita, Mayor Quirolgico and
Carmelita Collado that appellants traded shots with the Mayor's group,
using long or high powered guns.
Anent the second assigned error, We agree with the trial court's finding on
the existence of conspiracy. In the case at bar, the sequence of events that
transpired in the evening of January 11, 1972, from the time Delfino
Beltran first fired upon the passing jeep of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico,
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70639 June 30, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DOLLANTES, HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES,
LAURO DOLLANTES, MONICO DOLLANTES, SIDRITO LOKESIO,
MERLANDO DOLLANTES, HUGO GRENGIA, DANNY ESTEBAN AND
LEONILO VILLAESTER, accused-appellants.
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XL, in Criminal Case No. 5832, convicting
the nine (9) accused, Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes,
Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia,
Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, all equally guilty of the complex
crime of "Assault upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder" and
sentencing the abovementioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally,
the sum of P30,000.00 to pay attomey's fees in the amount of P3,000.00
and to pay the costs.
All of the accused were charged as follows:
6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located
at the lateral aspect of the right upper extreme about five (5) cm. above
the elbow joint and five (5) cm. away from the posterior midline laterally.
The wound was oriented horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper extremity the
wound of entrance measuring about three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length
and one (1) cm. in width located at the posterior aspect of the forearm
above five (5) em. below the elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line medially. The wound was oriented vertically.
8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in width located
at the lateral aspect of the left upper extremity about five (5) cm. below
the elbow joint and (5) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound
was oriented horizontally.
9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width and four
(4) cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk, about
seven and a half (7 1/2) cm. above the ihac crest and twelve (12) cm. away
from the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed
downward, slightly to the right and posteriority, perforating part of the
intestine.
10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm. in width and
seven and a half (7) cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior of the
trunk about three (3) cm. above the lower angle of the scapula, and seven
(7) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented
obliquely and directed downward and slightly to the left.
11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm. in width and
twelve (12) cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior aspect of the
trunk about thirteen (13) cm. below the lower angle of the scapula and six
(6) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented
obliquely and directed anteriority to the left.
12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds caused the
latter's untimely death.
Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that due to the
approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in said barangay
in the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the Barangay Captain was
delivering a speech to start the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went
to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known in the
visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone
as to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay Captain
approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not to
disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice
of the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm; that accused
Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo
Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife.
Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards
the Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back and the
other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the
Barangay Captain at that time was not armed. Except for the accused
Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely
holding stones, the other co-accused participated in the stabbing incident.
When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused in this
case took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and were
dancing around said dead body; that the Barangay Captain suffered eleven
(11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which happened to be
at the back of his dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr.
Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of
"Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds."
(Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo, p. 75).
The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of
Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero, Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the deceased,
Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho who conducted the post mortem
examination of the deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the Municipal Treasurer
of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and Pat. Jose Amis of the Integrated National
Police.
On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses:
Accused: Hugo Grengia, Leonilo Villaester, Danny Esteban, Alfredo
Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses: Machim Dollantes and
Tacio Fausto.After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was
convinced that all the accused in this case conspired in the commission of
the crime.
Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding all
the accused guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in
3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook
of the Tayasan Integrated National Police, dated April 21, 1983, as testified
to by Patrolman Jose Amis.
5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People vs. Agag (L64951, June 29, 1984) is applicable to the case at bar to justify the
conviction of the accused-appellants.
6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the
testimony of the defense witnesses.
7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant herein
is guilty of the crime charged. (Brief for accusedappellant Hugo Grengia,
pp. 1-2)
Danny Esteban stoned him because they intended to kill him also. He also
testified that when he returned to the crime scene, he saw Hugo Grengia,
Danny Esteban and companions simultaneously kicking the dead body and
shouting "who is brave among here. "
the ground that he ran towards the municipal hall to report the incident to
the police (TSN, page 11, Oct. 17, 1983).
Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the credibility of
Dionilo Garol was his failure to report to the police authorities the fact of
stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).
However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the victim and
the omission of the same in the narration in the report does not detract
from the established fact that the victim was stabbed several times which
caused his death.
It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store of the
victim's wife was stoned while Bonifacio Cero also testified that he was the
one being stoned.
There appears to be no inconsistency between the two testimonies. The
fact that the store of the victim's wife was stoned does not preclude the
possibility that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.
Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have seen with
precision the stabbing of the victim while he was being hugged by Danny
Esteban and he had a feeling that he would be killed by the group. Much
less could it be possiblefor accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo Villaester,
Sidrito Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes who were at the store of Severina
Cadillero, to join in stabbing the victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp.
73-74).
The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab the
deceased before he was embraced by appellant Danny Esteban who told
him "do not interfere you are not a party to this. We have already gotten
what we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly, the
language is unmistakable that in that at said point, the stabbing and the
killing being described by all the witnesses had already been
accomphshed.
Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their testimonies,
the same are trivial and merely refer to minor matters which do not affect
credibility. They do not detract from the essential facts or vital details of
the crime pinpointing their criminal responsibility (Appellee's Brief, p. 16).
As held by this Court, discrepancies in minor details are to be expected
from an uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor
variations would rather show the sincerity of the witnesses and the
The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester by their
acts, aimed at the same object, and their acts, though apparently
independent, are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The
conduct of the defendants, before, during and after the commission of the
crime clearly shows that they acted in concert. (People v. Emilio Agag, L64951, June 29, 1984, Justice Relova) There being conspiracy, the Court
finds them guilty of Murder. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo p. 77)
In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the petitioners
herein vary from those of their co-accused, there is no question that they
were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate
against the group..... Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts
done by the participants in the felonious undertaking." (Pring v. Court of
Appeals, 138 SCRA 185-186 [1985]).
Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of Dr. Rogeho
Kho that it is possible that all the stab wounds were inflicted by the same
weapon, in a desperate effort to show that only one person committed the
crime and that there is no conspiracy.
The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to he questions
propounded by the defense lawyer as to the different possibilities on how
the wounds of the victim may have been inflicted. But testifying
specifically on the case at bar, he categorically stated that actually the
wounds could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes
but not necessarily only a single bladed weapon.
Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:
Atty. Jayme:
Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim Marcos
Gabutero, is it possible Doc, that in accordance with your drawing that the
wounds inflicted was caused by a single bladed weapon, is it possible,
Doctor, that this wound was caused by a single bladed weapon? Is it
possible that this. I repeat the question, your Honor.
Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which according to you
"blunt and sharp bladed weapon which is practically single bladed weapon,
according to your physical findings there is similarly in the weapons used,
could we say practically, Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as those
incised wounds may be caused by one single-bladed weapon?
Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying
to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when
he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance
of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court
ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and
ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs,
the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime
committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority."
There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on credibilitY of
witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal. (People v. Oliverio, 120
SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records, no plausible reason could
be found to disturb the findings of fact and of law of the lower court in this
case.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31839 June 30, 1980
EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO C. INTIA
1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of
Camarines Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA,respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminay
injunction, to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Judge, dated
January 26, 1970, directing the petitioners, Provincial Fiscal and Assitant
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, to amend the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of CamarinesSur,
entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita,
accused," so as to include, as defendants, Governor Armando Cledera and
Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur; as well as
the order dated February 18, 1970, denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said order.
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Eligio Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity in
the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed, as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod,
municipality of Canaman, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then
a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and specially charged
with the duty of keeping under custody and vigilance detention prisoner
Pablo Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and
unjustifiable negligence leave the latter unguarded while in said barrio,
thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact said
detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the
custody of the said accused. 1
In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the crossexamination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial
warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought forht and confronted the
witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov.
Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the
construction of a fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur,
then leased by the province and used as an official guest house. Jose
Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded
the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature
appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made
and signed by Gov. Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque
was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that
Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which tha
accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion
in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Gov.
cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein. 3
Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution
officers 4 and finding that "the court cannot grant the motion or order the
inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage unless an
investigation is made," the respondent Judge directed the Fiscals office,
within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case,
taking into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles
223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine once and for
all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his assistant have
any criminatory participation in the circumstances of Pablo Denaque's
escape from judicial custody. 5
In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the case
for December 19, 1969. Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose
Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden, and the accused Eligio
Orbita to be present thereat. 6 Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for the
reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo
Padua appeared. The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither was the
note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no additional evidence was presented, the
Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that "after conducting a
reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of
the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against Governor Cledera
and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged. 7
On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated
December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to
reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce during
the trial of this case, he be ordered to amend the information on to include
Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their inclusion is
warranted. 8
On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order complained of,
the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought about
by the prosecuting fiscal let the charges be so amended by including in the
information the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and the person or persons who
carried out the said orders considering the provisions of Article 156 in
relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code. 9
The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the
motion was denied on February 18, 1970. 11Hence, the instant recourse.
From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge
committed an error in ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as to
include Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal
Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the rule
that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to support the allegations thereof. 12 Although this power and
prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand
is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an
offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, 13 it would be
embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a
case when he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does not
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. The city Of arrests mayor in its
maximum period to prison correccional in its minimum Period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal
establishment t any person confined therein or shall help the escape of
such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.
If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If
the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments
by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in
their minimum period.
The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person
confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a
person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place
of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person
released To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal
institution means to furnished that person with the material means such as
a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. 15 The offenders
under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from
jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a
public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for
infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223
of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of
the province, 16 and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they
cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156
of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to
warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads, as follows:
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any Public
officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or
charge, shall be punished
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
temporary disqualification in its minimum period to perpetual special
disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment
to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary
special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally
convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of
law or municipal ordinance.
xxx
xxx
DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner
Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during the hearing and from the return
filed
by
the
respondents
through
the Solicitor General,
and
other pleadings in this case, the following facts emerged:
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the records
before this Court), petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an
aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one
(1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos.
68810, 91041 and F-138107). These convictions were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The maximum
sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.1
which his recommitment was ordered. 6 Thus, this Court held that by
accepting the terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had
in effect agreed that the Governor-Generals determination (rather than
that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the
conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally
at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. In reaching this
conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code which empowered the Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or
partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole,
remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole,
subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest
and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or
suspension of sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been convicted of the
crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little more than two years of his
sentence, he was given a conditional pardon by the President of the
Philippines, the condition being that he shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he
shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. 8 Eight years
after the grant of his conditional pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa and
sentenced to three months and eleven days of arresto mayor. He was
thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his
original sentence. Sales raised before this Court two principal contentions.
Firstly, he argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. He
contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935 Constitution).
This Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected
both contentions of Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal
Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act No.
4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which was enacted subsequent to
the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved the authority conferred upon
the President by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and
Section 64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one
provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other. Sales held,
secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the constitutional
guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held that since the petitioner
was a convict who had already been seized in a constitutional was been
confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted
of crime and been sentenced to punishment therefor, he was not
constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he
had breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent
offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity for any
action by the courts in the premises. The executive clemency under it is
extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those
conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a
certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself
determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and
agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated
the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and
remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. 9
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the petitioner had been
convicted of the crime of inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence,
he was granted by the President a conditional pardon on condition that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 11 Espuelas
accepted the conditional pardon and was released from confinement.
Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of authority. He appealed to
the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the Court of
First Instance dismissed the case provisionally, an important prosecution
witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few months
later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
President ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired
period of his original sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of Section
64
(i)
of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code.
This
Court,
quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in
court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial
for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he was charged, that
brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in
the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous
exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative.The
acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority
or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions
of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the
Government [has] such power been intrusted. 12
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be
summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions
of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a
pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of
trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may
be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood
rules and doctrine on this matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the
prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course
of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the
ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he
would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines for
ESCOLIN, J.:+.wph!1
Mandatory review of the death sentences imposed by the Circuit Court of
Rizal upon Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca for the crime of murder.
The crime was committed inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa,
Rizal where both accused were serving sentence, Abarca having been
previously convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide, and Dioso,
of robbery.
At the time of the incident, Dioso and Abarca were members of the
"Batang Mindanao" gang, while the victims Angelito Reyno and Fernando
Gomez, also prisoners at the New Bilibid Prisons, belonged to a group
known as the "Happy Go Lucky" gang. These rival factions had been
involved in intermittent, and sometimes bloody, clashes, the latest of
which resulted in the death of one Balerio a member of the "Batang
Mindanao" gang
Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez had authored the slaying of their
gangmate, the two accused set their Minds to avenge his death. They
found the occasion to execute their nefarious design when they learned
that Reyno and Gomez were sick and confined in the prison hospital. At
6:15 in the 'morning of September 12, 1972, Abarca, feigning illness, went
to the hospital to seek admission as a patient. He was accompanied by his
co-accused Dioso. Inside Ward 6 of the hospital they saw their intended
victims: Reyno was taking breakfast with Gomez was lying down on a
"tarima" [wooden bed] under a mosquito net. Dioso approached Reyno and
spoke briefly to him, while Abarca headed towards the "tarima". Then, both
accused suddenly drew out their improvised knives matalas Abarca raised
the mosquito net over the "tarima" and stabbed Gomez, as Dioso, almost
simultaneously, attacked Reyno with his knife. And after the latter had
fallen, Dioso strode to the "tarima" to help his co-accused finish off Gomez.
When the accused rushed out of Ward 6, they were met at the corridor by
Prison Guard Enriquito Aguilar Both gave themselves up and handed their
weapons to him.
Dr. Ricardo E. Baryola medico-legal officer of the NBI, who performed the
autopsy, found that both accused died of massive bleeding due to multiple
stab wounds on the chest and abdomen. 1
The accused were immediately interrogated by prison investigator
Buenaventura dela Cuesta; and they; readily executed their respective
sworn statements, wherein they admitted responsibility for the death of
the victims. 2
In his sworn statement, Teofilo Dioso narrated how he delivered the death
blow on Reyno, thus: t.hqw
T Pagdating ninyo sa ward 6 ano ang inyong ginawa?
S Tumuloy ho ako kay Reyno at tinamong ko kung saan si Intsik
[Gomez] ngayon tinuro ni Reyno sa akin. Sabi ho iyong nakakulambo.
Pagkatapos, sinabi ko naman kay Abarca ang lugar ni Intsik ngayon,
pinuntahan naman niya. Pagtapat niya kay Intsik, sinipa ko si Reyno sabay
bunot ng aking matalas at sinaksak ko sa kanya. Noong sa pag-aakala
kong patay na, iniwan ko at tumulong ako kay Abarca sa pagsaksak kay
Gomez. Noong tumihaya na si Gomez, sumigaw ako kay Abarca na labas
na tayo. Tumakas ka palabas at noong nasa pasilyo kami ng hospital
nasalubong namin iyong guardiya at doon namin sinurender ang mga
matalas namin. Tapos karning makapag-surrender, dinala kami ng guardiya
sa Control Gate tuloy dito. [Exhibit "D", p. 21]
Jacinto Abarca on the other hand narrated his version of the killing as
follows: t.hqw
T Pagkatapos ninyong mapagkasunduan na manaksak sa ward 6,
ano ang inyong ginawa?
S Ang sabi pa niya na bukas na tayo titira pagkatapos ng
almosalan tapos naghiwalay na kami baka pa marinig ng iba. Kaninang
umaga . pagkatapos naming kumain lumabas na ako sa ward 2 at nakita ko
siya sa pintuan ng ward 4 na naghihintay sa akin. Ngayon, pumasok muna
siya sa ward 4 at kumuha ng sigarilyo at pagkatapos tumuloy kami sa ward
6. Pagdating namin sa ward 6, siya ang umuna dahil sa hindi ko pa alam
kung saan naka puwesto ang mga Happy Go [gang]. Pagkatapos lumapit
siya doon sa nakaupo hindi ko alam kong kumakain o hindi at ako naman
ay umupo sa isang tarima sa tabi ni intsik iyong tinira ko tapos bigla na
lang siya bumunot ng matalas niya bago tinira iyong nakaupo sabay sabi
na "tira na". Pagkatira niya, ako naman ay lumapit doon sa tarima ni intsik
[Gomez] bago ko biglang tinaas ang kulambo dahil nakahiga siya tapos
tumakbo. Hinabol ko tapos paghabol ko, nadapa siya tapos sumuot sa
silong ng tarima. Doon ko siya inabutan at sinaksak ko. Ngayon sa
pagsaksak ko sa kanya, biglang dumating itong si Dioso at tumulong sa
akin sa pagsaksak. Hindi nagtagal, sumigao si Dioso ng 'tama na' bago
kami tumakbo palabas ng ward 6. Noong nasa pasilyo kami ng hospital,
nasalubong namin iyong guardiya at doon namin sinurender ang mga
matalas namin. Pagkatapos naming ma surrender ang mga matalas nang
dinala kami ng guardiya sa labas. [Exhibit "C ", p. 2].
Dioso revealed the motive for the killing as follows: t.hqw
T Bakit naman ninyo ni Abarca sinaksak sina Reyno at Gomez sa
ward 6?
S Dahil po doon sa nangyari kay Balerio. Si Balerio po ay sinaksak
ng mga "Happy Go" at iyong panaksak namin kanina ay iyon ang ganti
naming mga BM sa mga "Happy Go". [Exhibit "D", p. 1]
Of similar tenor is the following statement of Abarca: t.hqw
T lbig mo bang sabihin, iyong mga sinaksak ninyo sa hospital
kanina ay iyon din ang pumatay sa sinasabi mong kakusa ninyo na si
Balerio?
S Hindi ho pero katatak nila iyong pumatay kay Balerio. Pareho
silang miembro ng "Happy Go Lucky" gang. Ngayon ang pagka panaksak
namin kanina sa hospital noong dalawa na miembro ng "Happy Go" ay
ganti naming mga BM [Batang Mindanao] sa pagkapatay nila kay Balerio.
[Exhibit "C", p. 1].
When arraigned for the crime of murder, both accused voluntarily entered
the plea of guilty. Thereafter the trial court required the presentation of
evidence to determine the degree of their culpability. At the hearing, they
acknowledged the voluntary execution of their respective confessions.
The trial court correctly found that the crime was perpetrated
with alevosia. As revealed by the accused themselves, they inflicted the
fatal blows while Gomez was lying down under a mosquito net, and Reyno
was taking his breakfast. Clearly, neither of the victims was in a position to
defend himself from the sudden and unexpected assault.
It is thus noted that in their briefs, no attempt was made to impugn the
lower court's conclusion as to their guilt. Instead, they seek attenuation of
the death sentence imposed by the trial court by invoking the
circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. We find no
necessity to discuss at length the effects of such mitigating circumstances
on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to say that the accused are quasirecidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for
a prior offense. As such, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony [murder] is death, regardless of the presence or absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstance or the complete absence thereof. 3
But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is constrained to commute the
death sentence imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua