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PHIL 60
Exam No. 1
Question 1 (b)
science. We cannot begin studying aspects of science without knowing what science is.
Therefore, philosophy of science needs to have a way to distinguish science from other
ways of explaining the world (like religion and astrology). The problem of demarcation
is exactly this. In addition, the problem of demarcation can be useful in practice, as seen
from the court case of McLean v. Arkansas. However, specifying specific criteria that is
valid for all sciences can be quite difficult. I think it would be an ideal case if philosophy
of science provided a concrete answer to the demarcation problem. But realistically, the
Finding unique criteria for science can tell us a lot about the methodologies of
science. We can use these criteria as a clue to what methods are (and aren’t) used in
science. This works sometimes for specific sciences, but cannot be held as a general rule.
states that for a theory to be scientific, it needs to be falsifiable. This was in contrast to
some theories (like Freudian) whose proponents could always find confirming evidence.
Thus, falsifiability implies that scientists should be open-minded and allow possibilities
which can prove their theory false. The example Popper pointed to was the corroborating
evidence of Einstein’s theory of relativity during an eclipse. At that point, the whole
theory was put to the test, and had an unmistakable risk of being falsified.
Here, we see that falsifiability imparts a normative statement about scientific
theories, and how scientists ought to behave. A lot of science does indeed follow the
The methods of science, too, can shed some light on what constitutes something
being scientific. Kuhn proposed that philosophy of science should reflect what scientists
have done. For example, Kuhn said there are two major distinctions in science: normal
and revolutionary. During normal science, people are basically performing puzzle
solving. They take for granted the core theories within a paradigm, and solve puzzles that
are well-posed within the context of the theory. This has the effect of pushing theories to
their limits and providing depth in the field by analyzing new phenomena using accepted
theory. Revolutionary science occurs when the actual core theories are being challenged,
puzzles may or may not be solvable, but are puzzles nonetheless. From this example, we
see that examining the history of science can lead us to ideas about demarcation.
Lakatos says that theories have a hard core that is surrounded by auxiliary hypothesis.
The programme uses the auxiliary hypothesis to protect the hard core. In this way, the
theory is protected and the programme can continue. He makes the distinction between
to make novel predictions, while the degenerate ones are not making predictions and are,
in fact, playing “catch up” to new phenomenon that seem to be inconsistent with their
theories. We see that just by considering some of the qualities present in existing and
progressive and degenerate programmes. This may be used to (for example) refute the
In conclusion, we have seen that the methods of science and the demarcation
problem are intertwined. Kuhn and Lakatos held the view that the demarcation problem
should be solved by looking to the past and present scientific methods. In some cases, we
see that purely demarcative statements (like Popper’s falsifiability) are normative with
respect to science, while some historical scientific methods (like Lakatos’ research
programmes) are descriptive with respect to the demarcation problem. Studying the
history of science proves to be helpful for demarcating by examining what scientists have
done. Also, studying the demarcation problem can lead us to judge how scientific a
theory is, and also point us to what methods are trademark to a theory being scientific.
Question 2 (a)
The logical empiricists derived their beliefs from the empiricist ideology. Thus, at
its core, the logical empiricists only believed in things and ideas that are observable.
Analytic truths are truths in virtue of the meaning of the words. These truths are
said to be empty, since if one has knowledge of the meanings, the truth adds no new
knowledge. Synthetic truths are claims about the actual world, and are not true in virtue
of their meanings. These types of truths hold a special view by logical empiricists—that
synthetic truths are only meaningful is verifiable. If a synthetic claim cannot be broken
down to observable phenomenon, then the logical empiricist will say that it is
However, their concept of truth is still very much attached to the idea of verifiable claims.
Thus, for example, Einstein’s special relativity is better than Lorentz’s since Einstein
dropped the idea of absolute space. Lorentz’s theory included the idea that there is an
absolute space, but we can never measure it. Even though the two theories are
empirically equivalent, the logical empiricists turn down Lorentz’s theory since it
The logical empiricists’ view of science is highly non-theoretical. When they talk
about a concept in science, like a cathode ray, they are really talking about the observable
consequences of a cathode ray (like how they bend in a magnetic field). The theory
behind the cathode ray is meaningless, since we cannot “know” an electron without
seeing consequences. Thus, science to an empiricist is a tool to relate statements about
Popper is the ultimate skeptic when it comes to scientific truth. His basic belief is
that no theory can be proved true. The closest thing to truth Popper admits is that a
Popper gives no real way to justify a scientific claim other than to say that it isn’t
a normative statement that good theories need to be bold and risky, and avoid ad hoc
There has been a lot of criticism about Popper’s falsification criteria, which has
made Popper admit to another property: corroboration. Popper says that non-falsified
theories land in two categories: severely tested and not. The ones that are severely tested
he deems corroborated. However, he stresses that this is not the same as confirmation,
and is merely like a report card that shows the track record of the theory. It makes no
predictions on the validity of the theory in future tests. But he does say that when there is
The view of science that Popper gives us is one of conjecture and refutation.
After a new hypothesis is made, scientists are to keep an open mind and continually test
their hypothesis until it is falsified. This cycle continues with another hypothesis that is
conjectured to replace it. Thus, Popper’s view of science is one of continued falsification
—the real truth may be out there, but, we will never know when we have happened upon
it, nor will we know if we will ever find it. All we can do is come up with new