N. Beltran v.

Secretary of Health (Nov 25, 2005)

Facts Congress enacted a law which sought to provide an adequate supply of safe
blood through voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country.
The law and its implementing rules and regulations also provided for the phase-out of
commercial blood banks.
Petitioner operates several blood banks and is gravely prejudiced by the newly enacted
law.
Issue W/N Republic Act 7719 and the AO for its implementation are unconstitutional
since it allegedly violates the equal protection clause (commercial blood banks were
discriminated against), non-impairment clause (their contracts were unfairly affected),
and a persons right to liberty (why cant a person sell his blood if he wants to?). It is
further contended that it is an invalid use of police power (shouldnt the state keep its
hands away from the above-mentioned rights?)
Decision The court ruled in favor of respondent. The law is constitutional

Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)

Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any
and all productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City
a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States and other foreign
countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case
seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.
Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enacted, the
company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
of the same class as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.

Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)

F:
Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly
used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the
Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape
recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his
motion was denied.

HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to
include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are
legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is objectionable.
Bache and Co VS Ruiz
Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec
46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects
53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon
and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was
hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to
take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath
and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he
could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and
Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the
Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search
Warrant

Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and
check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and
of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

Moreno vs. Vivo

Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on
November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children
by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in
Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son
also by the first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted
only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they
posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah marriedEsteban
Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban
Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun
obtained severalextensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a
letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah
and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a
warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause
theconfiscation of their bond.
Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.
Held: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a
non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were
a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of
Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second,
she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must
thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port
of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the
immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an
alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first

departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the
Immigration Act. The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since
her entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly
help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her
deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such
solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the
care of neighborsin Fukien, China.Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to
is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from writing into the law an
additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso
facto make her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to judicial
action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the State's
power ofdeportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the
Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with
another man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration
law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a pernicious
trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a
flanking movement, we are confident, is impermissible.Recently we confirmed the rule
that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses.

Soliven vs. Makasiar

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for
libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.
Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat
her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president
cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself
to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be
sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able
to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit
is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

Lim vs. Felix

-On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport
road of the MasbateDomestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of
Masbate, Congressman MoisesEspinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial
Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, andArtemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr.
survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshotwound.-An
investigation of the incident then followed.-Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal
Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed anamended complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr.,Mayor
Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A.
Bagalihog, MayorNestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder
and frustrated murder in connectionwith the airport incident. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 9211.-After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued
an order dated July 31, 1989 statingtherein that:. . . after weighing the affidavits and
answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during thepreliminary examination in
searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has beenestablished
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint,
namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio
Fernandez, Jr., VicenteLim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag,
Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.- Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim
filed with the respondent court several motions andmanifestations which in substance
prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initialrecords of the
preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbatefor the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or prima
facie evidence as well asthe determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that nowarrant shall be issued unless the issuing
magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of suchprobable cause.- In
another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine
if there reallyexists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are
recantations of some witnessesin the preliminary investigation.- It should also be noted
that the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of
witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them.-On
July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions

andmanifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein. The judge wrote,
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal
TrialCourt of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the
offense of multiplemurder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty
thereof, which was affirmed uponreview by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed
with the Regional Trial Court four separateinformations for murder. Considering that both
the two competent officers to whom such duty wasentrusted by law have declared the
existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and
there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the
prosecutor's certification in each information
-Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix
I SSUE:WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution'scertification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56,
Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET
ASIDE.
RD:
As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and hiswitnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of theevidence. However, there should be necessary
documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's barecertification. All of these should be
before the Judge.We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's
examination should be. Usually,this depends on the circumstances of each case. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, thepersonal determination is vested in
the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must gobeyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary.As mentioned in
the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of recantations of the
witnesses.Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in
the determination of a caseand in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before
issuing his own warrants of arrest should, atthe very least, have gone over the records of
the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented
by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing inthe cases.In
making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the
evidenceearlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on
the circumstances of eachcase and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However,
the Judge abuses that discretion when havingno evidence before him, he issues a
warrant of arrest.Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when
he relied solely on theProsecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated
July 5, 1990 without having before himany other basis for his personal determination of
the existence of a probable cause.

Cruz vs. Judge Areolo

FACTS:
On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of theOffice
of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on
thecomplaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no
cogent reasonto reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
and recommended thatthe case be set for trial.Complainants filed the instant complaint
charging both respondent Judge and his BranchClerk of Court with ignorance of the law.
Complainants take issue of the fact that althoughrespondent Judge already issued a
warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to giveway to a reinvestigation of
the case on motion of the accused. They believe that there is nolonger any reason why
the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrestconsidering that
the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there existsprobable cause
to indict the accused.In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated
to determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent
Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand,claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to
release duly signed orders, resolutions anddecisions of the presiding judge of her branch.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementations of
thewarrant of arrest
HELD:NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except
uponprobable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.Preliminary
investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
prosecutions job. The secondkind of preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is
lodged with the judge.In making the required personal determination, a judge is not
precluded from relying onthe evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The
extent of reliance depends on thecircumstances of each case and is subject to the
judges sound discretion.It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue awarrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having
personally examined the complainant andhis witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. For the determination of whether aprobable cause exists and
whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustratethe ends of justice,
is left to his sound judgment or discretion.It appears from the records that the challenged
Orders issued by the respondent Judgewere not at all baseless. The respondent Judge

merely exercised his sound discretion in notimmediately issuing the warrant of arrest and
in suspending further proceedings pendingreinvestigation of the case. On her part,
respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted for performing a ministerial function,
that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge.

Okabe vs. Judge Gutierrez

FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner
Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on
December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500
to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan
to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed
upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000
through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her
witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation,
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding
probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the
city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond
of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left
the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and
returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1,
2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an
urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved
the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents
appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent
Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counteraffidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On
July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure
Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that
she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also
questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing
motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment,
petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner
filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the
other motions were denied, hence this case
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining
existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent

Maruyama and the latters documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
petitioner.
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or
complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the
parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the
resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the
complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.

People VS Tee
Facts The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was
convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense
assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized
from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend
that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to
produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing
down the trial procedure.
Issue Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced
during the hearing of the case.
Held
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was
not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the
criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a speedy
trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for
and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to
compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where
several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay,
and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to
the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing
unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of
the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always

subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that
the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of
reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.
Salazar vs. Achacoso and Marquez
FACTS: A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the
complainants PECC Card, it was further alleged that Salazar did not posses a license to
operate as a recruitment agency. POEA through its Director on Licensing and Regulation,
issued a warrant of arrest and seizure against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure is valid?
HELD: Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It
is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may not exercise
this power. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor,
not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process.

Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board

FACTS: The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus and certiorari bythe petitioners.On May 12, 1952, Special ProsecutorEmilio L.
Galang charged petitioner before theDeportation Board.The crimes:
purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong
attempted bribery of Phil and US officials
In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series
of 1951). Uponfixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport aliens.2. Whether or not
the Deportation Board also has authorityto file warrants of arrest.
HELD: 1. Yes. Section 69 of Act No. 2711 of RAC:No alien can be deported by prexy
EXCEPT upon priorinvestigation, conducted by said executive or his authorized agent, of
the ground upon which suchaction is contemplated2. Yes, but only after investigation has
resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest would havebeen necessary for
deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar, investigations were stillongoing
and no order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of
1951:declaredillegal.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staf

Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, law
enforcement officers searched the offices of the We forum and Metropolitan Mail
newspapers. During the course of the search, the law enforcement officers seized office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and several other materials used in the
distribution of newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the seizure of the
properties mentioned above amounts to seizure of real properties, which cannot be
validly conducted under the strength of a search warrant. It must be noted that real
properties are not susceptible of confiscation under a search warrant. Hence this appeal
which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the properties of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioners assertion that real property were
invalidly seized under the disputed warrants.
Held: No. The petitioners assertion does not hold water. Under Article 415(5) of the civil
code, machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are
considered immovable property. In another case decided by the Court, in which the
abovementioned legal provision was invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the
case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property susceptible to seizure under
a search warrant.