BELTRAN VS SEC.

OF HEALTH
Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the
Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by
commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based
blood banks ; showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. It was further found, among other things,
that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or
blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
than
those
donated
to
PNRC.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to
provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. One
of the provisions of the said act was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity.
Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail the constitutionality
of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to
petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the
Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period
that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act
constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment
of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be
filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the
Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that
the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective.
One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the
guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the
Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be
extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a
period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and
discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
NICOLAS vs. ROMULO
FACTS:
Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of
rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the United States, at
its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time
his presence was required.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty. He shall serve his sentence in the facilities
that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending agreement on such facilities,
accused is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, and brought to a facility
for detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and

the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This agreement provides that in accordance with the Visiting
Forces Agreement signed, Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in
Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because if they would allow such transfer of custody of an
accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution is also violated.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign
military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except
to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the
receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but
rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend
or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given
to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against
custody.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction,
because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the
detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine
authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of
the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine
authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreement
on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, is UPHELD as constitutional, but
the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.
Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City

In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which imposes a (1%) per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a
production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar
paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise
carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of
an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal
protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. The
defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the
same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
ISSUE: WON there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Ormoc Sugar Company. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and no other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established
sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied
upon.

ROMMEL
CORRO,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON. REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City; LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO,
respondents,
Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.
RELOVA, J.:
On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin
Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and
seizure of
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes
which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition defined and
penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1835 ... (p. 24, Rollo)
On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal properties alleging
among others that:
2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as they are,
connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has been rendered moot and
academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was responsible for the slaying of
the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport. The Agrava Board
which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing had virtually
affirmed by evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers killed Benigno Aquino, Jr.
4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed said case against the accused on all
documents pertinent and more so as we repeat, rendered moot and academic by the recent Agrava Report.
(p. 27, Rollo)
On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent portions of which state:
... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are not under the control
of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the proper forum from which the
petition to withdraw the articles should be addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with
this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is not even with this Branch of the Court that the
offense of inciting to sedition is pending. (p 29, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order to enjoin
respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 98 from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. S3-Q-29243,
praying (a) that Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and
that a mandatory injunction be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt.

Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return immediately the documents/properties illegally seized from herein petitioner and
that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st Lt. Ignacio from
utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in Criminal Case No. 29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A.
Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo Ignacio be directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine
Floor, Gochengco Building, T.M., Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.
In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The plea for temporary restraining order
was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined
from introducing as evidence for the state the documents/properties seized under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in Criminal Cage No.
Q-29243 (Sedition case against petitioner), pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders from the Court.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present action is premature because petitioner
should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists
justifying the issuance of a search warrant; (3) the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a search was
conducted in an orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife; (6) the
findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of the validity of the search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an issue; and, (8)
the petition is barred by laches.
There is merit in the petition.
Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order in question before coming to Us.
This is not always so. When the questions raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and
passed upon by the lower court, the filing of the motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the
Supreme Court is no longer a pre-requisite. As held in Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied
without considering the circumstances. The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due
process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al.
vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil. 905 and in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only when questions are
raised for the first time before the high court in a certiorari case that the writ shall not issue, unless the lower court had first been
given an opportunity to pass upon the same." Further, in the case of Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, We held that "while
as a matter of policy a motion for reconsideration in the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non for the
granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a patent nullity or where
'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process ... taints the proceeding against him in the court below not only
with irregularity but with nullity (Luzon Surety Co. v. Marbella et al., L-16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special circumstances warrant
immediate and more direct action. ..." The records of this petition clearly disclose that the issues herein raised have already been
presented to and passed upon by the court a quo.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief
that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189,
cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus, an application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive
materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have
stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will not suffice." A
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of
this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures
may not be committed, that abuses may not be committed Bache & Co. Phil. Inc. vs, Ruiz, supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo
states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:

... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the
Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. They can not serve as
basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant
issued, the items confiscated from the premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M.
Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the following:
1. One bundle of assorted negative;
2. One bundle of assorted lay out;
3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and other paraphernalias;
4. Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino and a speech of one various
artist;
5. One bundle Dummies;
6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates (Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14 & 15):
7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373;
8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;
9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26, Rollo)
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records
"showing all the business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene
the explicit comment of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective
of eliminating general warrants. In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies
of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and
even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as
to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant
under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which petitioner was the publisher-editor was
padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the printing and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."
Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29, 1983 and was executed on the very same day,
it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year, one (1) month and six (6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the
warrant and the return of the documents/personal properties. Having failed to act seasonably, respondents claim that petitioner is
guilty of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April
15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).

In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after the military operatives shut down his
newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the Director-General PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was
charged with the crime of inciting to sedition before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a preventive
detention action was served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a petition for habeas corpus. It was only on November 8, 1984
when this Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No. 68976, entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro
Angle Corro vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto B. Basco,
Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce, In the same month, November 1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to
return the seized documents. When respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us.
Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the possession of the seized properties is
incorrect.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29, 1983 is declared null and void and,
accordingly, SET ASIDE.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all properties seized thereunder
are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further, respondents Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are
ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw,
Ermita, Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)

F:
Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of
sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape
recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.

HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The
language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal
or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers
and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles
thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the
same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial
in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search
two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on

which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause,
the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description
and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of
the said items.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
and
ALYNN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BILLY CERBO and JONATHAN CERBO, respondents.

PLEZETTE

DY,

petitioners,

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not case should be
filed in court. Courts must. respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the accused valid on its face,
and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to reverse the June 28, 1996 Decision and the August 27, 1996 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-GR SP No. 36018. 2 The assailed Decision dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioners,
which sought to annul and set aside two Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan, Davao: the June 28, 1994 Order
dismissing the Information for murder filed against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and the August 18, 1994 Order denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The assailed August 27, 1996 Court of Appeals (CA) Resolution likewise denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The case below arose from the fatal shooting of Petitioner Dy's mother, Rosalinda Dy, in which the primary suspect was Private
Respondent Jonathan Cerbo, son of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case were summarized in the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
On August 30, 1993, Rosalinda Dy, according to the petition, was shot at pointblank range by private
respondent Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent Billy Cerbo at
Purok 9, Poblacion, Nabunturan, Davao.
On September 2, 1993, eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban executed an affidavit positively identifying private
respondent Jonathan Cerbo as the assailant. (Annex C, Rollo, p. 34).
On September 20, 1993, private respondent Jonathan Cerbo executed a counter-affidavit interposing the
defense that the shooting was accidental (Annex D: Rollo, pp. 35-36).
On October 6, 1993, the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a preliminary
investigation, found "sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief" that the crime of murder has been
committed by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the case to
the provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao (Annex E, Rollo, pp. 37-38).

After [an] information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of
the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy
in the killing (Annex F, Rollo, p. 39), supported by a supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban, alleging "in
addition" to her previous statement that:
3. In addition to my said sworn statement, I voluntarily and freely aver as follows:
a) I vividly recall that while my mistress Rosalinda Go and I were in the office of Billy
Cerbo at about 11:45 a.m. on August 30, 1993, Mr. Cerbo personally instructed me to
fetch the food from the kitchen [and to bring it] to the office instead of the dining room.
b) While bringing the food, Mr. Cerbo again instructed me to place the food [o]n a
corner table and commanded me to sit behind the entrance door and at the same time
Mr. Cerbo positioned Rosalinda [on] a chair facing the entrance door for an easy target.
c) Immediately after Rosalinda was shot, Mr. Billy Cerbo called his son Jonathan who
was running, but did not and ha[s] never bothered to bring Rosalinda to a hospital or
even apply first aid.
d) To my surprise, Mr. Billy Cerbo, instead of bringing Rosalinda to the hospital, brought
her to the funeral parlor and immediately ordered her to be embalmed without even
informing her children or any of her immediate relatives xxx.' Annex G. Rollo, p. 40.)
Private respondent Billy Cerbo submitted a counter-affidavit denying the allegations of both petitioner Alynn
Plezette Dy and Elsa B. Gumban (Annex H, Rollo, pp. 41-42).
On or about April 8, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad filed a "Motion for leave of court to reinvestigate
the case" (Annex I, Rollo, pp. 43-44) which was granted by the respondent judge in an order dated April 28,
1994 (Annex J, Rollo, p. 45).
In his resolution dated May 5, 1994, Prosecutor Lumangtad recommended the filing of an amended
information
including
Billy
Cerbo
". . . as one of the accused in the murder case . . ." (Annex K: Rollo, pp. 46-49).
Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant
for his arrest was later issued on May 27, 1994 (Rollo, p. 27).
Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was
issued without probable cause (Rollo, p. 27).
On June 28, 1994, respondent Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and
recalling the warrant for his arrest[;] the dispositive portion of [the order] reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, [an] order is hereby issued DISMISSING the case
as against Billy Cerbo only.
Let, therefore, the warrant of arrest, dated May 27, 1994, be RECALLED.
The prosecution is hereby ordered to withdraw its Amended Information and file a new
one charging Jonathan Cerbo only.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
Private Prosecutor Romeo Tagra filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the respondent judge
in his second assailed order dated August 18, 1994 (Annex B, Rollo, pp. 31-33). 3
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 10-page Decision, the Court of Appeals debunked petitioners' assertion that the trial judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in recalling the warrant of arrest and subsequently dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo. Citing jurisprudence, 4 the
appellate court held as follows:
The ruling is explicit. If upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the
information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists, must either call for the
complainant and the witnesses or simply dismiss the case.
Petitioners question the applicability of the doctrine laid down in the above[-]mentioned case, alleging that
the facts therein are different from the instant case. We rule that the disparity of facts does not prevent the
application of the principle.
We have gone over the supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban and taking into account the additional facts
and circumstances alleged therein, we cannot say that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the case as against private respondent Billy Cerbo for lack of probable cause.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution, if it really believed that Billy Cerbo is probably guilty by conspiracy, should have presented
additional evidence sufficiently and credibly demonstrating the existence of probable cause.
xxx xxx xxx 5
In sum, the Court of Appeals held that Judge Eugenio Valles did not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the warrant of
arrest issued against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and subsequently dismissing the Information for murder filed against the
private respondent, because the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate such charge.
Hence, this petition. 6
The Assigned Errors
Petitioner Dy avers:
1) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Regional Trial Court Judge had the authority to
reverse [the public prosecutor's] finding of probable cause to prosecute accused . . . and thus dismiss the case
filed by the latter on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest.
2) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in fully and unqualifiedly applying the case of Allado, et. al. vs. PACC, et.
al. G.R. No. 113630, [to] the case at bench despite [the] clear difference in their respective factual backdrop[s]
and the contrary earlier jurisprudence on the matter. 7
On the other hand, the solicitor general posits this sole issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges
against private respondent Billy Cerbo. 8
Essentially, the petitioners are questioning the propriety of the trial court's dismissal, for want of evidence, of the Information for
murder against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo.
In resolving this petition, the discussion of the Court will revolve around the points: first, the determination of probable cause as an
executive and judicial function and, second, the applicability of Allado and Salonga to the case at bar.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious. The trial court erred in dismissing the information filed against the private respondent. Consequently the
Court of Appeals was likewise in error when it upheld such ruling.
Executive Determination

of Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an
executive function, 9 the correctness of the exercise of which is matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled
to pass upon. The Separate (Concurring) Opinion of former Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts v. Court of Appeals 10
succinctly elucidates such point in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
In this special civil action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public prosecutor. It is being
asked to determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. More concretely, the Court is being
asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis
thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices "to engender a well founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial."
It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to
the public prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and
notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said
executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is
supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a
criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially
preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or
innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor i.e., whether or not he
has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon
the filing of the information against him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the
Trial Court praying for the quash or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon which
the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth
inadequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court praying that the public
prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom be or she
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case list be filed in court. 11 Thus, in Crespo v. Mogul, 12 we ruled:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution
under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private
persons. . . . Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by the law, not only have the authority but
also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are
shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the duty not
to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
This broad prosecutoral power is however nor unfettered, because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before the
law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent. Thus,
for crimes cognizable by regional trial courts, preliminary investigations are usually conducted. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 13 we
discussed the purposes and nature of a preliminary investigation in this manner:
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense,
ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable
probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law
for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the
unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous
or groundless charges.

Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not
required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a
dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence,
no double jeopardy attaches.
Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. The judicial determination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrants
has been emphasized in numerous cases. In Ho v. People, 14 the Court summarized the pertinent rulings on the subject, as follows:
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again
what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest,
"must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof." At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In
Webb v. De Leon we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of
the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest we be too repetitive,
we only emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause
by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is
what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and
the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the
contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused
of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings
on the existence or non-existence of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence of non-existence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less
than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and
speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution,
but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and
separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if
any) upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of
the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the
prosecutor's recommendation, as the Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report
the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounded duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.

xxx xxx xxx

Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so.
Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an accused
for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the
present case.
Indeed, it could be unfair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon
the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found in the nature and the objective of a preliminary investigation.
Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged;
they merely determine "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime . . . has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." 15 Evidentiary matters must be presented and heard
during the trial. 16 Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor , the trial court should respect such determination.
Inapplicabilty of Allado
and Salonga
The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the pronouncement made in Allado v. Diokno:" . . . [I]f, upon the filing of the information
in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, must either call for the complainant
and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to
an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists." 17
In Allado, Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto I. Mendoza, practicing lawyers, were accused by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC) of kidnapping with murder and ordered by Judge Roberto C. Diokno to be arrested without bail. The petitioners
questioned the issuance of the warrants for their arrest contending that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
and in excess of his jurisdiction in holding that there was probable cause against them. They contended that the trial court relied
merely on the resolution of the investigating panel and its certification that probable cause existed, without personally determining
the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence for such finding and without stating the basis thereof. They maintained that the
records of the preliminary investigation, which was the sole basis of the judge's ruling, failed to establish probable cause against
them that would justify the issuance of warrants for their arrest.
The Court declared that Judge Diokno has indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the arrest warrants. Contrary to the
constitutional mandate and established jurisprudence, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors as to the existence of
the probable cause, instead of personally examining the evidence, the complainant and his witness." For otherwise," the Court said
"he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of the petitioners" 18
In categorically stating that the evidence so far presented did not meet the standard of probable cause and subsequently granting
the petition, the Court noted the following circumstances: first, the corpus delicti was not established, and there was serious doubt
as to the alleged victim's death: second, the extra judicial statement of the principal witness, who had priorly confessed his
participation in the crime, was full of material inconsistencies; and third, the PACC operatives who investigated the case never
implicated the petitioners.
Citing Salonga v. Cruz-Pao, the Court of Appeals pointed out that when there was no prima facie case against a person sought to be
charged with a crime, "the judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn out during trial, for this would be flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold." 19
In the aforecited case, Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga sought to bar the filing of an Information for violation of the revised AntiSubversion Act, which Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano had ordered to be filed against him. In sustaining the petitioner, the Court held that
the evidence upon which the Information was based was not sufficient to charge him for a violation of the Revised Subversion Act.
In all, the Court decreed in both cases that there was no basis in law and in fact for the judicial and executive determination at
probable cause. The Court also held that the government, while vested with the right and the duty to protect itself and its people
against transgressors of the law, must perform the same in a manner that would not infringe the perceived violators' rights as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, the present case is not on all fours with Allado and Salonga. First, Elsa Gumban, the principal eyewitness to the killing of
Rosalinda Dy, was not a participation or conspirator in the commission of the said crime. In Allado and Salonga, however, the main
witnesses were the confessed perpetrators of the crimes, whose testimonies the court deemed 'tainted'. 20 Second, in the case at
bar, the private respondent was accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias during the investigation of the case can be

imputed to the public prosecutor. On the other hand, the Court noted in Allado the "undue haste in the filing of the Information and
in the inordinate interest of the government" in pursuing the case; 21 and in Salonga, " . . . the failure of the prosecution to show that
the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutioner rights [and]
the massive and damaging publicity against him." 22 In other words, while the respective sets of evidence before the prosecutors in
the Allado and Salonga were "utterly insufficient" to support a finding of probable cause, the same cannot be said of the present
case.
We stress that Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are
clearly shown to exist. But as the foregoing comparisons show, such similarities are absent in the instant case. Hence, the rulings in
the two aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.
Motion Without Requisite Notice
One more thing, Petitioners aver that Private Respondent Cerbo did not give them a copy of the Motion to Quash the Warrant of
Arrest, which had been issued against him, or a notice of the scheduled hearing. Thus, they contend, Judge Valles should not have
entertained such motion.
It is settled that every written motion in a trial court must be set for hearing by the applicant and served with the notice of hearing
thereof, in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party. The provisions on this matter in Section 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of the Court, 23 are categorical and mandatory character. 24 Under Section 6 of the said rule, no motion shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of service thereof. The rationale for this rule is simple: unless the movants set the time and the place of
hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse parties agree or object to the motions, since the rules
themselves do not fix any period within which they may file their replies or oppositions. 25
The motion to quash the warrant of arrest in the present case being pro forma, inasmuch as the requisite copy and notice were not
duly served upon the adverse party, the trial court had no authority to act on it.
Epilogue
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We
simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for 'want of evidence,' because evidentiary
matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in
"the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an ''oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to be
protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be
accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public
prosecutor's duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor's finding of probable cause, the accused
can appeal such finding to the justice secretary 26 and move for the deferment or suspension of the proceeding until such appeal is
resolved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan, Davao, which is ordered to reinstate the amended information against
Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and to proceed with judicious speed in hearing the case. No. costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Wednesday,
February
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

04,

2009

Posted

by

Coffeeholic

Writes

Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public
respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against
him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified

that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers
for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to
Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and
Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The
team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because
she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of
Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of
search
and
seizure
(or
arrest)
under
Article
38
of
the
Labor
Code

Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting
officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The
Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is
the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held
that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and
void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No.
1205.
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, GR L-10280September 30, 1983Ponente: J. BarreraFacts:May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged petitioners before the DeportationBoard, having purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00,
without the necessary licensefrom the Central Bank of the Philippines, which was then secretly remitted to Hong KongPetitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King attempted to bribeofficers of the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza,
Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution for theunauthorized purchase.A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed a surety bondof P10,000.00 and cash bond for
P10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting them at libertyPetitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board for the reasonthat the same does not constitute legal
ground for deportation of aliens, and that the Board hasno jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion was denied by the Board on Feb. 9,
1953Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but madereturnable to the Court of First Instance of
Manila. After securing and filing a bond for P5,000.00each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the DB fromhearing
deportation charges against petitioners pending termination of the habeas corpusand/or prohibition proceedings.The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized agent of thePresident, it has jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority
to order their arrest. TheCourt upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of hispower to conduct the investigations. It
also sustained the power of the DB to issue warrant of arres
t and fix bonds for the aliens temporary release pending investigation, pursuant to Section
69 of the Revised Adminsistrative Code.Hence this appeal.Issues:1.
WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently,2.
WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it the power toorder the arrest of the alien complained of Held:1.
Yes. As stated in Sec 69 od Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code
-x-SEC. 69
Deportation of subject to foreign power
.

A subject of a foreign power residing inthe Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriatedto his own country by the
President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation,

conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent

, of the ground upon which Suchaction is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the chargeor charges against him and he
shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparationof his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to
producewitnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."-x-