AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

AFTER THE WAR: Nationbuilding from FDR to George

W. Bush.
James Dobbins, Michelle A. Poolie, Austin
Long, Benjamin Runkle.

Sumaiya Qureshi

1. INTRODUCTION:
The author in this book has examine that how the United States
has gained considerable experience in nation-building operations
through its participation in at least eight significant operations
since World War II-in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In the United States, military and
foreign policies are most obviously shaped by the president.
Presidential personality clearly influences the sort of decisionmaking process each incumbent feels comfortable with whether
he prefers oral or written interactions, has an appetite for detail,
or can tolerate conflict among and with subordinates. He has
given a review of the personal styles of five American presidents
which can reveal three broad approaches that can be categorized
as formalistic, competitive and collegial.
The first approach, often associated with President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, emphasizes order and hierarchy. The second
Emphasizes by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, seeks wisdom through
the clash of ideas among competing subordinates. The third,
identified with George H.W. Bush, encourages greater cooperation
among these advisers

2. EXPLANATION:
In recent decades, the United States overwhelming military
superiority has allowed it to overrun adversaries with comparative
ease. However, consolidating victory and preventing a renewal of
conflict has usually taken more time, energy, and resources than
originally foreseen. Few recent efforts of this sort can be regarded
as unqualified successes, and one or two must be accounted as
clear failures. Prior rand research examined the factors that
contribute to this success or failure, including the natures of the
society being reformed and of the conflict being terminated, as
well as the quality and quantity of the military and civil assets of
external actors. This volume addresses the manner in which U.S.
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policy toward post conflict reconstruction has been created and

implemented and the effect that these processes have had on
mission outcomes.
Through the lens of presidential decision-making style and
administrative structure, from the post-World War II era through
the Cold War, post-Cold War era, and current war on terrorism, it
is both possible and necessary to reassess how these elements
can work in favor of, as well as against, the nation-building goals
of the U.S. government and military and those of its coalition
partners and allies.
3. ANALYSIS:
The occupations of Germany and Japan were planned under
Franklin D. Roosevelt and executed under Harry Truman. It is hard
to imagine two more different personalities, the first was a worldly
aristocrat, debonair, secretive and informal; the second a
Midwestern machine politician prepared to delegate but ready to
take responsibility. Roosevelt was the last American president to
function without a formal structure for the conduct of nationalsecurity policy. Truman introduced the system under which the US
government still operates.
Despite their differences, there was a great deal of continuity
between the two administrations. Truman kept many of
Roosevelts cabinet and subcabinet officials. He was also able to
draw on a number of highly talented military or ex-military
leaders who had matured in command of Americas immense war
effort, including Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower and
George Marshall.
Truman also inherited and worked within the intellectual
framework set by his predecessor, putting his own stamp on
American policy only gradually. Roosevelt integrated military and
diplomatic considerations in his head.
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Truman established more formal structures to bring together the

military and civil aspects of his administration. Both men listened
to conflicting advice and tried to ensure that all relevant actors
were heard from before making major decisions.

4. CONCLUSION:
This study of U.S. nation-building efforts in Germany, Japan,
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq both
challenges and confirms Churchill's approach. On the one hand, it
seems clear from these experiences that postwar planning is best
begun well before the end of hostilities and that, in an ideal world,
war fighting would take more account of the post conflict stage.
At the same time, the most important lesson of history seems to
be that the only thing more vital than catching your hare
thoroughly is catching the right one.
The reconstruction of Germany and Japan, the authors note, was
successful not only because both countries had been thoroughly
defeated but also because they had strong economic and social
foundations on which to rebuild. More recent efforts at nation
building have been challenged either because the groups were
not completely caught (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq) or because,
caught or not, the groups were not suitable for containing
(Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan). The astonishingly poor
quality of the planning processes for Afghanistan and, even less
excusably, Iraq exacerbated the difficulties of what would have
been difficult missions anyway.