ZAMINDARS:

The zamindar, a Persian word, became a common term for the landed
gentry along with other terms such as bhumidar, malik or 17th century
onwards, taluqdar, etc.)
Issues a) nature of rights
b) relationship with peasants and state.
Moreland was among the earliest to write on this class of zamindars. He
did not attach much importance to this class and identified them only as
vassal chiefs who accepted Mughal authority. In this he found support by
P.Saran. Such an account stems from certain limitations in his research. It
is only in recent times that work done by Nurul Hassan and I.Habib have
really dwelled on the matter.
Hassan and Habib argue that one cannot equate zamindars with vassal
chiefs simply as they were found everywhere, whether in khalisa land, or
jagir land or paibaqi land. They were not confined to khalisa land. The
zamindars had rights over land and its resources. But these rights were
not proprietary rights and were confined to share in revenue.
The zamindars were also not a homogenous class. Previously the term
zamindars has been used in a generic sense for all peasantry that had
superior rights. They ranged from autonomous or semi-autonomous
chiefs, intermediary zamindars to primary zamindars at the village level.
The differentiation also arose from the degree of acceptance of the
authority of the Mughals.
AUTONOMOUS/ SEMI-AUTONOMOUS CHIEFTAINS
These were the hereditary rulers of certain territories with superior rights
over them. They were also known as ranas, rayas, rawats, etc. No Mughal
authority could afford to completely ignore them. They commanded vast
fiscal and military resources and were therefore, a constant threat to
imperial authority. They were brought under subjugation by military force
by early Sultans. Alauddin Khilji was the one who decided to use
administrative policy to incorporate them.
Any state realised that peasantry could be dealt with only through these
chiefs. They ranged from petty chieftains like the Kachwahas or Prem
Narayan, to very powerful chieftains whose authority extended over large
areas, such as the chiefs of Mewar and Marwar. Some chieftains identified
themselves with the regions they ruled, or by their clan names, such as
the Rathores. There was a very thin line differing the two because clans
often identified themselves with certain territories like the Rathores with
Marwar, Sisodhiyas with Mewar and the Kachwahas with Amer.

An indication of their military strength is evident from contemporary

accounts. Under Babub, 1/6th of revenue came from these chieftains. Arif
Bhandari states that nearly 200-300 rajas commanded strong forces. Abul
Fazl estimated that the total number of forces at the disposal of these
chieftains was 4.4 million.
Their vast resources also supplied possibilities of conflict with the state.
The greater their resources, the greater the protection in resisting the
state.
In the 16th century, with the decline of the Sultanate, these chiefs
constituted a formidable force. Akbar tried to evolve an administrative
system whereby they became part of the Mughal state structure while
also retaining their own territories as watan jagirs. They were expected to
render both military and administrative services in return. They could also
participate actively in the affairs of the Mughal state through this
arrangement. Such an alliance resolved some amount of the conflicts and
dissipated the tension between the state and the chieftains.
There were different levels in this relationship:
Firstly, there were those chieftains who entered into the alliance, and were
consequently given a mansab, military and administrative obligations and
watan jagirs. Their military services could be required to be rendered
anywhere. This category included the likes of the Kachawahas, Jaswant
Singh, etc.
Secondly, there were those chieftains who although enter into an alliance
with the Mughal state, accepting Mughals as the paramount power and
even offer to pay tribute, but are not given a mansab. Their military
service is confined to their own territory and they were not expected to
render military and administrative services to the state.
Thirdly, there were those chieftains who entered into a very limited
alliance. They were not given a mansab nor did they render military
service. They did however, offer to pay tribute and recognized the Mughal
state as paramount power. These were peshkashi chieftains.
N.ASiddiqui has even identified a fourth category, who did not pay tribute,
or recognize the Mughal state as a paramount power. But they did accept
Mughal currency.

MEASURES OF CONTROLLING THEM (AUTONOMOUS/ SEMI-AUTONOMOUS

CHIEFTAINS)
There were several measures used by the Mughal state to keep this
category of zamindars in check ranging from military powers to peshkash
(tribute) in cash or kind. Luxurious items were produced from the area of
chieftains. There was very little information about the value or amount of
peshkash expected and depended on the suitability of that ruler. There
were also no established rules regarding its payment or regularity.
The Mughal overlordship was also expressed in term of personal homage.
Sometimes in case of a tensed relationship, chieftains were forced to send
their sons as hostages to the court. Sometimes the Mughal state entered
into a direct relationship with the vassal states of these chieftains which
automatically undermined the power of bigger chieftains.
Matters pertaining to successions were also decided by the Mughal
emperor, further enforcing his supremacy. While the chieftains had the
independence to govern according to their own customs and traditions,
they were also expected to follow imperial regulations in spheres like
trade, and in dealing with the peasantry. Generally, the imperial orders
and firmans were accepted.
The Mughal concept of watan-jagir played a very important role in these
alliances. It enabled the Mughal state to extend its authority over areas
without assuming responsibility of governance of the same. Thereby it
could also overcome the hostility of the region and gain the best
administrators into its service as well as military contingents.

INTERMEDIARY ZAMINDARS
They existed at the village level, below the chieftains. They did not claim
proprietary right but had malikani rights or right to share in produce.
They were also powerful and commanded huge resources, armed
retainers and contingents. Their main job was to collect the revenue from
the primary zamindars and pass it on to the bigger chieftains. They did
aspire to become autonomous chieftains.

PRIMARY ZAMINDARS
They collected revenue at the village level. They belonged to the class of
the khudkasht peasantry. They were often among the original colonisers of
the area and possessed enough resources. They were known by different

names- muqaddams, chaudhuris, patwaris, etc. they collected revenue

directly from the villagers and aspired to become intermediary zamindars.
Both the intermediary and primary zamindars were ordinary zamindars
whose rights were created over time. Their rights as original colonisers
were thus created on the basis of conquest and were termed as rights
historically created.
RIGHTS ENJOYED BY THE ORDINARY ZAMINDAR:
First and foremost they had malikana rights- or share in produce. While
they were the malik of the land, they did not have proprietary rights.
Even if they did not collect revenue, they had malikana rights as
recognition of their historical rights over the land. While malikana rights
did not bestow proprietorship, they could not be taken away by anyone as
these rights were hereditary.
But in the late 17th century and 18th century, references begin to be made
to the sale and purchase of zamindari rights, which were duly recognized
by the state.
The malikana varied from region to region. There was no common rate at
which it was collected. It could either be collected in kind or in cash. In
some areas where it was collected in kind, it was set as 10 seh per bigha.
Where it was collected as cash, it could be part of revenue or a separate
imposition itself. Sometimes it was the difference between what was
collected and what was due to the state. Mostly, it ranged between 2.5%
to 25% of the produce depending on the productivity and local customary
traditions. For example, in Rajasthan, it was fixed at 2.5%-3% whereas in
fertile areas of northern India it was 10% and higher still in Deccan and
Gujarat at 25% of the produce.
If the zamindars collected revenue on behalf of the state, they were
sometimes entitled to nanka rights- which were allowed only if they
played a crucial role in revenue collection. They even sometimes also
applied additional taxes on birth, marriage, etc. They were in a position to
impose begar as well. Their income was clearly quite lucrative. However it
did not seem so lucrative in comparison to the states income. This is
indicated by the rate at which the zamindari rights were sold.
The origins of zamindari rights were various. They could be created on
basis of conquest of new land. They were also created on basis of force,
annexation of area, subjugation through expansion (as done by Shivaji).
They could be even brought and sold as was the case in the late 17th and
18th centuries. There were very few conditions when the state was
responsible for creating the zamindari rights, such as instances were

rights were granted for expanding cultivation to uncultivated or barren

lands. They could also be granted to control recalcitrant zamindars. For
example, certain Afghan nobles were given zamindari rights in Banswara.
Main features:
Sometimes these rights also had a caste basis, with a tendency of
zamindars belonging to a particular clan to become localised. But in the
Mughal period, social homogeneity of zamidnari rights was eroded
because they became alienable by way of sale and purchase.
The zamindars had direct links with the peasantry on basis of caste/clan
ties.
The rights also had a military basis as most zamindars maintained huge
contingents which enabled them to defy Mughal authority.
According to Irfan Habib, the zamindars exploited the peasantry and they
were the symbols of power and authority in village society. They emerged
even more powerful because of their armed contingents, fortresses, deep
knowledge of customary agrarian practices and caste and clan ties with
peasants, according to Abul Fazl, the total armed strength of zamindars
was 4.2 million.
While ideally, the Mughal state would have wanted direct links with the
peasantry without any intermediaries, it had also realised that the
zamindari class could not be eroded or wholly ignored. The fiscal and
military resources that they commanded made them a powerful and
exploitative class. Therefore the Mughal state was compelled to build a
working relationship with this class.
The zamindars had other responsibilities as well other than collecting
revenue. They were also responsible for maintain revenue records as also
law and order. They were also expected to increase area under cultivation
and invest in agriculture by encouraging cash crops, advancing loans,
hiring out implements to peasantry, building irrigation facilities, etc. This
strengthened the position of the zamindar vis-a-vis the peasantry and the
Mughal state as well. The Mughal state recognized them as a possible
threat but yet, could not ignore them. Many Mughal documents refer to
them as opportunist and rebellious groups but many others also recognize
their significance.
Thus clearly, there was a clash of interest between imperial authority and
the zamindars while both were simultaneously involved in exploiting the
peasant. Those zamindars who had large means and were able to resist
the state, did resist and were known as zamindar-i-zortalab or recalcitrant
zamindars. The state recognized their superior rights and made efforts-

militarily, administratively, through negotiations- to make them part of the

Mughal state for the sake of stability.
The conflict existed at various levels. There was conflict even between the
zamindars themselves. Since they were not a homogenous body, the
conflict took place in form of caste/clan rivalry or between intermediary
zamindars and the chieftains. Conflict could also occur in the process of
acquiring more power and infringing on each others land. Conflict also
arose between the state and the zamindars regarding surplus. While the
bigger zamindars tried to appropriate bigger portions of surplus, the petty
zamindars also tried to appropriate.
The increasing difference between the jama and hasil added on to the
tension and affected the stability of the Mughal state. The zamindars
continuously tried to withhold revenue and the state tried to extract even
more. In certain cases, double extraction by the jagirdar and zamindars
further oppressed the peasantry. For example, in Deccan, the Maratha
collection of the chauth was in addition to the Mughal state tax.
DEVIKA SETHI:- We can observe many contradictory strands existing
together in the tripolar relationships. For instance, the state depended
heavily on zamindars for revenue collection, extension of cultivation and
maintenance of law and order. In this sense, devolution of responsibility
made for more efficient augmentation of resources. However the
enhancement of the powers of zamindars was done at the expense of and
not at the service of the state. This was because the zamindars were
semi-independent entities whose interests did not always coincide with
those of the Mughal state and whose existence also predated the Mughal
state, further cementing their clan/caste ties with the peasantry. Therefore
the state had to balance its reliance on zamindars with its efforts to
undermine their position. Zamindars as a class, with their internal
differentiation, were simultaneously within and without the Mughal
imperial system.