Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Anthony Blair, rst published in 1977.[8] Earlier precursors in this tradition can be considered Monroe Beardsley's Practical Logic (1950) and Stephen Toulmin's The
Uses of Argument (1958).[10]
History
with Blair and Johnson as initial editors, with the editorial board now including two other colleagues from the
University of WindsorChristopher Tindale and Hans
V. Hansen.[12] Other journals that regularly publish articles on informal logic include Argumentation (founded in
1986), Philosophy and Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advocacy (the journal of the American Forensic Association), and Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines
(founded in 1988).[13]
Proposed denitions
Johnson and Blair (2000) proposed the following denition: Informal logic designates that branch of logic
whose task is to develop non-formal2 standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation,
critique and construction of argumentation in everyday
discourse. Their meaning of non-formal2 is taken from
Barth and Krabbe (1982), which is explained below.
Johnson and Blair (2000) noticed a limitation of their
To understand the denition above, one must understand own denition, particularly with respect to everyday disinformal which takes its meaning in contrast to its coun- course, which could indicate that it does not seek to unterpart formal. (This point was not made for a very derstand specialized, domain-specic arguments made in
long time, hence the nature of informal logic remained natural languages. Consequently, they have argued that
opaque, even to those involved in it, for a period of time.) the crucial divide is between arguments made in formal
Here it is helpful to have recourse[14] to Barth and Krabbe languages and those made in natural languages.
(1982:14f) where they distinguish three senses of the
term form. By form1 , Barth and Krabbe mean the
sense of the term which derives from the Platonic idea of
formthe ultimate metaphysical unit. Barth and Krabbe
claim that most traditional logic is formal in this sense.
That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms
could naturally be understood as place-holders for Platonic (or Aristotelian) forms. In this rst sense of form,
almost all logic is informal (not-formal). Understanding
informal logic this way would be much too broad to be
useful.
Fisher and Scriven (1997) proposed a more encompassing denition, seeing informal logic as the discipline
which studies the practice of critical thinking and provides its intellectual spine. By critical thinking they
understand skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications, information
and argumentation.[15]
By form2 , Barth and Krabbe mean the form of sentences and statements as these are understood in modern systems of logic. Here validity is the focus: if the
premises are true, the conclusion must then also be true.
Now validity has to do with the logical form of the statement that makes up the argument. In this sense of formal, most modern and contemporary logic is formal.
That is, such logics canonize the notion of logical form,
and the notion of validity plays the central normative
role. In this second sense of form, informal logic is notformal, because it abandons the notion of logical form as
the key to understanding the structure of arguments, and
likewise retires validity as normative for the purposes of
the evaluation of argument. It seems to many that validity is too stringent a requirement, that there are good
arguments in which the conclusion is supported by the
premises even though it does not follow necessarily from
them (as validity requires). An argument in which the
conclusion is thought to be beyond reasonable doubt,
given the premises is sucient in law to cause a person
3 Criticisms
3
thinking. The precise denition of "critical thinking" is a
subject of much dispute.[20] Critical thinking, as dened
by Johnson, is the evaluation of an intellectual product
(an argument, an explanation, a theory) in terms of its
strengths and weaknesses.[20] While critical thinking will
include evaluation of arguments and hence require skills
of argumentation including informal logic, critical thinking requires additional abilities not supplied by informal
logic, such as the ability to obtain and assess information
and to clarify meaning. Also, many believe that critical
thinking requires certain dispositions.[21] Understood in
this way, critical thinking is a broad term for the attitudes and skills that are involved in analyzing and evaluating arguments. The critical thinking movement promotes
critical thinking as an educational ideal. The movement
emerged with great force in the '80s in North America
as part of an ongoing critique of education as regards the
thinking skills not being taught.
Lemma
Philosophy of language
Semantics
7 Footnotes
[1] See Johnson 1999 for a survey of denitions.
[2] Johnson, Ralph H., and Blair, J. Anthony (1987), The
Current State of Informal Logic, Informal Logic, 9(2
3), 147151. Johnson & Blair added "... in everyday
discourse but in (2000), modied their denition, and
broadened the focus now to include the sorts of argument
that occurs not just in everyday discourse but also disciplined inquirywhat Weinstein (1990) calls stylized discourse.
[3] Scriven, 1976
See also
Argument map
Informal fallacy
Inference objection
References
Barth, E. M., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (Eds.). (1982).
From axiom to dialogue: A philosophical study
of logics and argumentation. Berlin: Walter De
Gruyter.
Blair, J. A & Johnson, R.H. (1980). The recent development of informal logic. In J. Anthony Blair
and Ralph H. Johnson (Eds.). Informal logic: The
rst international symposium, (pp. 328). Inverness, CA: Edgepress.
Ennis, R.H. (1987). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J.B. Baron and R.J.
Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching critical thinking skills:
Theory and practice, (pp. 926). New York: Freeman.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1992). Argumentation, communication and fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Fisher, A. and Scriven, M. (1997). Critical thinking: Its denition and assessment. Point Reyes, CA:
Edgepress
Fisher, Alec (2004). The logic of real arguments
(2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780-521-65481-4.
Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis
and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.
Govier, T. (1999). The Philosophy of Argument.
Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
Groarke, L. (2006). Informal Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, from http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/logic-informal/
Hitchcock, David (2007). Informal logic and the
concept of argument. In Jacquette, Dale. Philosophy of logic. Elsevier. ISBN 978-0-444-51541-4.
preprint
Johnson, R. H. (1992). The problem of dening
critical thinking. In S. P. Norris (Ed.), The generalizability of critical thinking (pp. 3853). New
York: Teachers College Press. (Reprinted in Johnson (1996).)
Johnson, R. H. (1996). The rise of informal logic.
Newport News, VA: Vale Press
Johnson, R. H. (1999). The relation between formal
and informal logic. Argumentation, 13(3) 265-74.
Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest rationality: A
pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
REFERENCES
8.2
Textbooks
External links
Informal Logic entry by Leo Groarke in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
10
10
10.1
10.2
Images
File:Logic_portal.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7c/Logic_portal.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Watchduck (a.k.a. Tilman Piesk)
File:Unbalanced_scales.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Unbalanced_scales.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
10.3
Content license