Culpable homicide under s299 is defined as the generic offence of which murder

under s300 is one species. We will look at the differences between offences of
culpable homicide and murder by comparing the element of mens rea in both
sections.
First, we will look into the proof of intention in ss 299.1 and 300(a). Killing with
intent to kill is a paradigm example of murder, therefore, ss 300(a) and 299 do not
present theoretical or practical difficulties. Mens rea is inferred from the facts of the
case, from what the accused now says and what he did and said earlier. In deciding
whether the accused had the intention to kill, it is important to consider factors such
as nature, place and number of the injuries inflicted, method of infliction, the use
and nature of weapon etc. In Ismail bin Hussin v PP, the accused was a Home Guard
during the emergency. He was convicted of murder of one Omar and attempted
murder of Rifin. In the case of Omar, Court of Appeal found that he saw a man and
fired at once-on impulse without any conscious or reasoned thought. But however
suddenly the intention was formed, the intention was to kill. That amounts to kill.
As regards to Rifin, he had been shot in the legs and court held that it is not unusual
to fire a shot gun at a mans legs to prevent escape. Therefore, there is a definite
intention not to kill. The court substituted the conviction of for attempted murder for
voluntary causing hurt.
Next, we will compare ss 209.2, 209.3 and 300(b). Under s 300(b), the accused
intends to inflict bodily injury and knows that death is likely. Therefore, s 300(b)
combines subjective elements in the second and third limbs of s 299. Since s 300(b)
requires both aspects of s 299, it is narrower than the generic offence of culpable
homicide. The situation which is most likely to be covered by s 300(b) is the so
called pin-prick murder where the offender knows that the particular person is
likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, or immature age, or other special
circumstances, to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death.
Meanwhile, for ss 299.2 and 300(c), the distinction between both sections lies in
the likelihood of death resulting in injuries; the greater the probability of death
resulting, the more likely the case is to fall under s 300. s 299.2 is partly subjective
in that the prosecution must prove that the accused intended to cause bodily injury
and partly objective in that it must be proved that injury will likely to cause death.

Whereas s 300(c) is partly subjective; the prosecution must prove that accused
intended to cause bodily injury and partly objective; that such injury was sufficient
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In Virsa Singh v State
of Punjab, it was held that to prove that the offence falls under s 300, first, it must
establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of
the injury must be proved these are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must
be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, it was
not accident or unintentionally, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the
three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary cause of
nature. The fourth element is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do
with the intention of the offender.
Lastly, we will compare ss 299.3 and 300(d). In both sections, knowledge must be
proven. S 299.3 requires knowledge of the likelihood of death whereas s 300(d) is
narrower as it requires the accused to know that his conduct is so imminently
dangerous that it must in all probability cause death.