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ISSUE:
FACTS:
FACTS:
SHIPSIDE INC. VS CA
G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001
DOCTRINE:
HELD:
FACTS:
The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a
married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years
old. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the
deceased.
The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his
child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon
his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by
the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of
such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant
would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question
by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.
Trial Court: judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the
proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Articles 320 provides:
"The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If
the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance. Article 321 states: "The property which the
unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or
industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership,
and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives; . . ."
ISSUE:
WON the doctrine of parens patriae finds application in this case.
[Walang discussion sa facts kung ano contentions ng parties; bigla
na lang sumulpot yang parens patriae na yan, ganyan.]
HELD:
Yes. The Court adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an
agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot
remain insensible to the validity of the mothers plea. The United
States Supreme Court opines: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power
HELD:
No. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the
obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. The
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of
our times."
The words "temporary allegiance," as descriptive of the relations
borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, may, at
most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives and
does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance
which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own
government or sovereign.
Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by
the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his
own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort. Article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government,
because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound
by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation.
In short, military occupant cannot repeal or suspend operation of
law of treason. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
Some of the features of the summary procedure are: that the court
may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to
clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to
answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him,
among others.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
3.
HELD:
1. No. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de
facto government of the second kind (of paramount force -existence is maintained by active military power within the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government|), the questions
involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government,
because the belligerent occupant was totally independent
of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out
the administration over said territory.
The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a
belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of
another act of the same occupant, whose criminal
jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations. The government
established over an enemy's territory during the military
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws
of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject
to all restrictions which that code imposes. Its character is
the same and the source of its authority the same. In either
case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so
far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the
rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality
or illegality of its acts.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE:
WON NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner.
HELD:
No. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including
its Departments (AQD) (established in Iloilo), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in whose
territory its office is located. Permanent international commissions
and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of
a considerable number of States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. In so far as
they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State,
they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the
municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such,
according to one leading authority they must be deemed to
possess a species of international personality of their own.
Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of
the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the
governing SEAFDEC Council and that its national laws and
regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC
of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property
and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the
Center" are concerned. It expressly waived the application of the
Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner
SEAFDEC-AQD.
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the
legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection
of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would
afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies
and decisions of the organization: besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-state.
MINUCHER vs. CA
G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003
SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be
sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil
process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the
SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity
performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit
provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be
deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it
does not thereby concede its liability.
FACTS:
HELD:
Yes. SSS can be made legally responsible for its acts through a
judicial action.
ISSUE:
WON SSS can be made legally responsible for its acts through a
judicial action.
with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for
profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money
paid for the use of money, plus other charges.
What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an
injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage is caused to a
citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when it
arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between
said individual and the System.
The SC ruled that there was clear negligence on the part of SSS
when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of
private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the
error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The
SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of
damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private
respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate or
recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by
petitioner SSS. As to all other damages, the SC deleted them for
lack of basis.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) filed a
complaint alleging that Serafin Salvador (Acting Secretary of the
Dept. of General Services) and Mariano Ledesma (Director of the
Bureau of Printing) have been engaging in unfair labor practice
by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of
Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association,
in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating
HELD:
No. The CIR did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner Bureau
of Printing.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by
the National Government and such other work of the same
character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary
of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .."
(Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and
ISSUE:
1. WON The Department of Agriculture is immune from suit
pursuant to the doctrine of Non-suability of the State.
2.
HELD:
1. No. The doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued
without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State
may at times be sued.
2.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are covered under the state immunity doctrine
HELD:
Yes. SC found the complained acts were done by petitioners in the
discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special
services, had supervision over its personnel, and had a hand in
their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had
written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior for more
information regarding the case of the private respondents. As for
Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of
Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private
respondents' type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings commenced. This act is clearly official in nature.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have
to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued
as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority,
it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. There should be no question by now that
such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to
be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.
REPUBLIC VS SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 84607. March 19, 1993.
DOCTRINE:
The State's recommendation to indemnify the victims of a certain
case does not amount to waiver of immunity from suits.
FACTS:
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the military bases agreement between the
Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the
bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in
said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this
reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the
US.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners can sue the State for damages after said
recommendation
HELD:
HELD:
Yes. The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from
being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or
waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of
independence and equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are continually and
evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has
been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts.
The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts.
US vs RUIZ
In this case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which
is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines. Indisputably,
it is a function of the government of the highest order. They are not
utilized for, nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
RCBC vs. De Castro
G.R. No. L-34548. November 29, 1988
GOMEZ
FACTS:
In a civil case entitled Badoc Planters, Inc. vs. Phil. Virginia Tobacco
Administration, et al., the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX
issued an Order (Partial Judgment) on January 15, 1970 by the then
Presiding Judge San Diego. The said order required defendants to
pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc.
Therafter, Judge San Diego was promoted as a Justice of the CA so
herein public respodent (Judge De Castro) took over and acted on
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by BADOC. Judge De Castro
granted said Motion.
Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day,
issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino
Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the
General Manager and/or Cashier of RCBC, requesting a reply within
five (5) days to said garnishment as to any property which the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) might have in the
possession or control of petitioner or of any debts owing by the
petitioner to said defendant. Upon receipt of such Notice, RCBC
notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary
steps for the protection of its own interest.
Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
eventually granted. The court set aside the Orders of Execution
and of Payment and the Writ of Execution. It likewise ordered
petitioner and BADOC "to restore, jointly and severally, the account
of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was
before the issuance of the aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the
PVTA of the amount of P 206, 916.76 with interests at the legal rate
from January 27, 1970 until fully paid to the account of the PVTA.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was
denied. It then appealed to the CA. CA in turn certified this case to
the SC as it involves purely questions of law.
ISSUE:
WON PVTA funds are public funds exempt from garnishment
HELD:
PVTA funds are subject to garnishment.
HELD:
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second
PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the
municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule
that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute.
More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached
and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for
the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions
of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated
June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No.
S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected
on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263530850-7.
ISSUE:
WON the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based
on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein
petitioners
HELD: