Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor
as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining
to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage
to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the
Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it
is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . .
acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not
to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a
factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . .
. . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact
that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law accurate or inaccurate
moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but
when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching
their particular business or
profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by
his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the
employee matters to a
management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without regard
to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service
that the larger employers get from
their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations
is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, wellestablished method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is
practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily
to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the law.
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and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some
of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and
property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as
a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
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THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634
xxx
xxx
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xxx
x x x.1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline,2 respondent filed his
Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for
being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly
been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law
partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a
demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which
the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business
partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested
that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without
informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the
former's law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
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them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and
the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied.10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the
receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was
erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed
upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment
for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if
indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken
steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling
complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued
another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the
practice of law is a profession and not a business. 11Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be
attained without making much money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant
-- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of
respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
25
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J.*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated
February 12,1987, reinstating its decision promulgated on May 9,
1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein it affirmed the decision of
the that court holding that the services rendered by private
respondent was on a professional, and not on a gratis et
amore basis and ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the
sum of P50,000.00 as the balance of the latter's legal fee therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and
his father went to the residence of private respondent,
accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding
the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner's brother,
Dewey Dee, to Caesar's Palace, a well-known gambling casino at
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declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void
ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper
proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to
disclose the outcome of this case.
33
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while
he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The
Certification20 from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that
he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private
Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of
Marriage21 from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong,
proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9,
1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second
marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P.
Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend. 22
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.23
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we
have somehow come up with a common definition of what
constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community."24 Measured against this definition,
respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as
a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:
1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,25 respondent entered into
multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to
sever them. There, we ruled that "[S]uch pattern of
misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to
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SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez*, Corona, Callejo, Sr.,
Carpio Morales*, Tinga, Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario**, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313
September 7, 2006
36
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more
sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of
these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer,
being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the
misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.1
37
While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided
on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement. 7 It was
only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the
import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest
when he personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign
the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making
false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated
by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled,
respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual
desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and
dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to
appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her
daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule
1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed the
instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to
him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file the
aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high
school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow
barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand
letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an
emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle
things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum
provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is
not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his
advice. He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and
with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and
cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that
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SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., ,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late
at night or early in the morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with
her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident,
Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social
card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from
walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you
may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to
find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it
44
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the
first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together,
up to the final moments of your single life. But more
importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and
until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have
enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my
soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG
AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI
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Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the
same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the
final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to
grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
"notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution
shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was
subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared null
and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before
the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before
complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon
Datumanong held:
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RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint1 for violation of the lawyers oath,
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, oppression,
dishonesty, harassment, and immorality against Atty. Jerry Radam
Toledo, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 259,
Paraaque City.
Complainants, all relatives of respondent, allege that the latter is
utilizing his profession as a lawyer and his position in the judiciary
to harass them and make them agree to an unequal distribution of
the estate of the late Florencia R. Toledo. 2
Florencia Toledo - mother of complainant Regidor, mother-in-law of
Zenaida, and grandmother of Ronaldo, Joeffrey, and respondent was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tarlac covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 125017. She died intestate on
December 14, 2002.3
Complainants claim that respondent, after Florencias death, never
informed them that he was in possession of the Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 125017. As a result of such concealment,
complainants executed an Affidavit of Loss of the document on the
basis of which they filed a Verified Petition for the issuance of the
Owners Duplicate Copy before the RTC of Tarlac City. Respondent
opposed the petition on the ground that he had the subject
document in his possession allegedly because he bought part of
the land from Florencia. Thus, complainants withdrew the petition
before the Tarlac court.4
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other. They also attribute his unruly and bullying behavior to his
being a drunkard with a fondness for the "night life." 10
The complainants filed the present petition praying that this Court
conduct a formal investigation of respondents actions and impose
on him the proper penalty which, they submit, should be the
dismissal of respondent from the service as Branch Clerk of Court.
In his Comment,11 respondent calls the allegations "patently
malicious conjectures and surmises."
He states that 15,000 of the 18,681 square meters of the San
Clemente property in dispute had already been sold by the
decedent herself. Further, what was left of the property, about
2,800 sq.m., had already been sold by complainants to several
buyers. In fact, said buyers are now occupying the land. To prevent
further dissipation of the estate, he was prompted to file a petition
to settle the intestate estate of Florencia.
He alleges that it is the complainants who have shown their
propensity for criminal activities as evidenced by their execution of
an Affidavit of Loss to obtain a second copy of TCT No. T-125017,
and by Zenaidas declaration in Florencias death certificate that
the latter died in San Clemente, Tarlac. He also states that,
contrary to complainants assertion, the courts have painstakingly
been trying to have the parties amicably settle their cases.
As to the charges of immorality, he alleges that he has been the
sole breadwinner of their family, while Normita is in charge of the
household and taking care of their children. They have deferred
their "dream wedding" to give Normita the opportunity to advance
her career and to give way to the education of their children. In
support of this, he attached Normitas Affidavit12 where she states
the underlying reasons for their decision to remain unmarried,
thus:
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Upon evaluation of the records of this case, the OCA submitted the
following recommendations:
Complainants charges against the respondent and the
latters countercharges stem from their dispute over the
property left by their deceased relative, Florencia R. Toledo.
In fact, an intestate proceeding to settle the estate of the
above named deceased among the complainants and the
respondent has been filed in the RTC, Branch 260,
Paraaque City. Respondents claim that he had bought a
portion of the land left by the deceased Florencia R. Toledo,
which is the basis of his claim in the intestate proceeding,
is challenged by the complainants who have filed an action
to annul the alleged sale. There is also the perjury case
against the complainants for their execution of an Affidavit
of Loss of Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 125017.
The pendency of the aforesaid cases render[s] the charges
hurled against respondent Atty. Toledo beyond the ambit of
administrative inquiry. The issues raised involve judicial
matters which should be addressed by the courts where
they are pending.
Anent the charge of immorality ascribed to respondent for
maintaining a common-law wife, although both respondent
and his partner Normita are single, and do not appear to be
suffering from any impediment to marry, it is worth to
note, however, that this arrangement was sought by them
in order not to prejudice Normitas employment
opportunities abroad, as stated in the latters affidavit.
(Annex "4"). In effect, the sacred institution of marriage
was sacrificed for the "American Dream[,]" and this shows
a personality that is unprincipled and undesirable. It is for
this reason, not the relationship per se, that we fault him
for perpetuating such kind of love affair. While we are not
in a position to dictate what his life agenda should be, we
can certainly prescribe the character of the personnel to
man the frontlines in the dispensation of justice. As it is oft-
55
In disbarment cases, this Court has ruled that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior. 17 Whether
a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly
immoral conduct" will depend on the surrounding circumstances. 18
This Court has further ruled that intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both suffer from no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action against a member of the Bar. 19
Based on the allegations in the Complaint and in respondents
Comment, we cannot conclude that his act of cohabiting with a
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dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith,
to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved
for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP
in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on
the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's
non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in
his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060
for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24,
1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud
Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically
admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that
"being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect
in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example.
xxx
xxx
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SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1370
May 9, 2005
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SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678
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City. Complainant got the said address of Paul Desiderio from the
documents of FIRI. Although there was a street named Damascus
in the said village, there was no residence numbered "10." The
police officers checked the existence of the said address and
resident at the office of the subdivision association. They were told
that no such address existed and that no resident named Paul
Desiderio lived in the subdivision.
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drawn against insufficient funds, and the drawer of the check, Paul
Desiderio, could not be located when sought to be served a
warrant of arrest since his identity was unknown and his residential
address was found to be non-existent.
Hence, it is clear that the representations of respondent as legal
officer of FIRI caused material damage to complainant. In so
doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and lessened the confidence of the public in the
honesty and integrity of the same.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaa is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
the records of respondent, and furnished to all courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5333
69
making it appear that complainant was the applicant for said loans.
Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of
the loans.
. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some
personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership without
the consent of complainant.
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of
concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms.
Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married
to complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to
frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a position
diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing
complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized
strategies to obstruct justice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal
actions initiated against him, respondent used his legal skills not to
prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings.
(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his
favor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or
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crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and
secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais
Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262)
(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with her while
married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own family.
(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)
No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely
submit their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces
of evidence attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and
recommended:
(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months on the first charge; and
(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of
law on the second charge.
(ibid., p. 57)
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent for falsification and use of falsified documents
(Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578)
will not bar the filing of an administrative case for disbarment
against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required for conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a
preponderance of evidence is necessary.
71
The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned
signatures (referring to the signatures appearing in the loan
agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample
signatures of respondent were written by one and the same
person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras
that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments.
Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and is,
therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily
on the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's
children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair
with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their
statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,
"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly
sworn hereby depose and say:
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx
xxx
xxx
72
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9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and
that she was my father's "kabit" or concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my
father." p. 112, Records
Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children
is the damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who
was respondent's secretary when respondent was a mayor of
Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as follows:
"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a
resident of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been
sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his
secretary during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter's
recommendation and intercession, I was later on appointed
as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986 to
January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in
Dumaguete City, I became his personal aide and
performed various chores for the same. As his personal
aide, I stayed in the same house and room with the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me
that he felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn
A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a
dinner date at Chin Loong Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma.
Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had
dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant.
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SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx
xxx
xxx
75
The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the
deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a
former repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a
working student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both
gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship between
respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee
Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the Paras'
household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically
living in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the
other hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to
deliver money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill
after she gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by
respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate
after the latter was baptized in the house of respondent; she
further testified that in said baptismal certificate, respondent
appears as the father of Cyndee Rose which explains why the latter
is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are
substantiated by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature
"Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the
following results:
CONCLUSION:
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The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavitstatements of his children and three other persons who used to
work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose
Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child
(Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased
first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching
and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the
allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang,
206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen
below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the
bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other
than his wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case
No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129
[1998]).
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related
loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on
the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be
spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.
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SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
78