NOTES AND HIGHLIGHTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2009)

BY ATTY. CAESAR S. EUROPA

JURISDICTION
ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES:
a). Territorial Jurisdiction

(Sec. 2 Interim Rules)

- The limits of the geographical boundaries of a place within which a court has jurisdiction to act judicially and outside of which
its judicial acts are null and void.
- Jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by (a) the geographical area over which the court presides and (b) the
fact that the crime was committed or any of its essential elements took place within said area.

NOTE: SC can Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice (Par 4, Section 5,
Article 8 of the 87 Const)

Example:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAMILO PILOTIN, ET AL G.R. Nos. L-35377-78. July 31, 1975
Defendant-appellant Vincent Crisologo sought the transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas on the ground that if he
were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial, his life would be in jeopardy.
Finding the motion meritorious and applying Sec. 5(4), Article X of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed
the transfer of the record of the case to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame.
b)

Jurisdiction over the subject matter:

-

c)

is determined by the allegations of the criminal complaint or information in accordance with the law in force
at the time of the institution of the criminal action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
Essentially it is determined by the penalty provided by law for the offense as that offense is charged in the
complaint or information.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

-

conferred upon the court either by the voluntary surrender of the accused or by his arrest to answer for the
crime charged.
is not lost once acquired.

May a court act on a motion to quash the information without the surrender or arrest of the accused?
What about a petition to be allowed to post bail in non-bailable offenses?
Jose C. Miranda, Et al vs. Virgilio M. Tuliao
G.R. No. 158763. March 31, 2006
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, 9 while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of
a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the
issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire
paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the
processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application
for bail.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one
who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of
the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
law.'" The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings
whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences
of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that
is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

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To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself
to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for
him to be in the custody of the law.xxxxx
NOTE :
CASE.

ALL THE THREE ELEMENTS MUST EXIST OTHERWISE THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CRIMINAL

OUTLINE OF THE JURISDICTION OF PHILIPPINE COURTS IN CRIMINAL

CASES
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Basic Premises:
1.
ALL appeals from the CA go to the Supreme Court.
2.
ALL appeals from the Sandiganbayan go to the Supreme Court
3.
ALL appeals from the MTC, MTCC, MCTC, go to the RTC regardless of the ISSUE
Conclusion:
The ONLY PROBLEM in appeals is WHERE DO YOU APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE RTC?
.
GENERAL RULE:
Appeals, by notice of appeal or petition for review, from Decisions of the Regional Trial Court are
appealable to the COURT OF APPEALS
EXCEPTIONS
1.

To the Supreme Court directly

1.

All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. Note: in cases where the
jurisdiction of a court or the constitutionality of a law is in issue, it must be THE ONLY issue
left otherwise the appeal will be a mixed question of fact and law and must be appealed to the
CA.

PROCEDURE IN CASES WHERE PENALTY IMPOSED IS DEATH OR RECLUSION PERPETUA (as amended DUE
TO PEOPLE VS. EFREN G. MATEO (G.R. NO. 147678-87 July 7, 2004) (Note: The Death Penalty was
abolished by RA 9346 signed into law on June 24, 2006)
1.

If Death, appeal is AUTOMATIC to the Court of Appeals;

2.

If Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, appeal is to the Court of Appeals but is NOT
AUTOMATIC, a Notice of Appeal must be filed.

AMENDED RULES TO GOVERN REVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY CASES

a)

FROM THE RTC

If P=Death= Automatic Appeal to CA

If CA affirms it will render judgment but will not enter judgment and will transmit the case to the SC; Note:
If other accused are imposed lesser penalties for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose out of the same occurrence, all will be transmitted to the SC
If CA finds penalty should be reclusion perpetua or lesser, it will render judgment and enter judgment.
CAs decision can be appealed to the SC via the filing of a notice of appeal with the CA
b)

If P=Reclusion Perpetua or Life Imprisonment= Appeal by Notice of Appeal

If CA affirms or imposes lesser penalty then it will render judgment and enter judgment. CAs
decision can be appealed to the SC via the filing of a notice of appeal with the CA

FROM THE SANDIGANBAYAN

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GEN RULE:

Appeals from SB to SC via Rule 45

Exception:
a)
If Penalty imposed by SB is DEATH appeal to SC is AUTOMATIC
(including appeal of accused imposed lesser penalties for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose out of the same occurrence)

2.

b)

If Penalty imposed by SB is Reclusion Perpetua or Life Imprisonment, appeal to SC will be via Notice of
Appeal filed with the SB. (including appeal of accused imposed lesser penalties for offenses committed on
the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence)

c)

Whenever the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, finds that the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment should be imposed, it shall render judgment accordingly.
However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire
record to the Supreme Court for review.

To the Sandiganbayan:
4.

All cases decided by the RTC, whether in its original or appellate jurisdiction which would have
been within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan if any of the accused had been occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act
No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned in the Sandiganbayan law.

ORGINAL JURISDICTION
RULE OF THUMB IN DETERMINING WHICH COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICITON OVER A CRIMINAL CASE:
Determining the court which has original jurisdiction over a criminal case is a process of elimination
in the following order
1.

Sandiganbayan

2.

Special Courts:
a.
Family Courts
b.
Dangerous Drugs Court
c.
Intellectual Property Courts
Note:

3.

These special courts are all Regional Trial Courts designated by the
Supreme Court to take cognizance of special cases.

Regular Courts in the following order:

a.
MTC, MTCC, MCTC
b.
RTC
Note:

In the process of elimination, the MTC, MTCC,

MCTC comes before the RTC because the RTC is the catch all court
meaning if a case does not fall within the original jurisdiction of any
other court, then it is the RTC that will have jurisdiction over it.

SANDIGANBAYAN
1 + 1 = 2 METHOD
A very good exercise to have familiarity with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is to prepare TWO
COLUMNS, THUS:
1+

=2

In the first
column list
down all the
crimes covered
by the
sandiganbayan
law

In the second
column list
down all the
persons
covered by the
sandiganbayan
law

If both the crime

and the person
are covered by
the
sandiganbayan
law then
sandiganba-yan
will have original
jurisdic-tion over
the case if not
then the regular
courts will have
jurisdiction

Section 4 of RA 8249

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A.

"(1)

" Sec. 4.Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
"(a)

Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(b)

City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads;

"(c )

Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d)

Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e)

Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintended or higher;

"(f)

City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;

"(g)

Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities

or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2)

Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

"(3)

Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4)

Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and

"(5)

All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

B.

Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (A) of this section in relation to their office.

C.

Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.

In relation to their office

The tricky part of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determining whether or not common crimes
and felonies committed by public officials and employees were done in relation to their office
Guidelines as laid down in People vs. Demosthenes Magallanes (Oct. 11, 1995)
An offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if
a.

it cannot exist without the office, or

b.

if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised
Penal Code.

c.

the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and

d.

the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the
information.

Some Cases:
Azarcon vs. SB. 268 SCRA 747 (Feb. 26, 1997)
- The SB does not have jurisdiction over a private individual charged with malversation of public funds
simply because he was designated by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property. He did not become a
public officer thereby.
People vs. Magallanes 249 SCRA 298 (Oct 11, 1995)
- the allegation taking advantage of his position by itself is insufficient to bring the offense within
the purview of offenses committed in relation to public office

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Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary 301 SCRA 298 (Jan. 20, 1999)
How to allege an offense committed by the accused in relation to his office.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to
say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer "in relation to his office" is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a
conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged
and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase "committed in relation to
public office" does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and
the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to
public office.
Soller vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 144261-62. May 9, 2001
Even if the Information described the accused as being all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor,
Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife if there was no allegation that the
offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity,
authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case
No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the
law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in
the performance of official function, then the SB has no jurisdiction.
Other notable matters to remember:
1.

The Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a case if it has jurisdiction over ANY ONE OF THE
ACCUSED. Example:
Janitor charged with Anti-Graft together with a Regional Director.

2.

The Sandiganbayan will also have jurisdiction over PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS who are accused together
with public officers over whom and in cases where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

FAMILY COURT (RA 8369)

SECTION 5.
Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases:
a)

Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than
nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any
civil liability which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without
need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth
Welfare Code";

XXXXXXXXXXX
i)

Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

j)

Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and

k)

Cases of domestic violence against:

1)

Women which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical,
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as
battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom of
movement; and

2)

Children which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.

If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the
corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular
courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.

DANGEROUS DRUGS COURT

5

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The Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court as Dangerous Drugs Courts have
jurisdiction over ALL VIOLATIONS of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165) except cases against minors
cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES COURT

The Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court as Intellectual Properties Courts will have
jurisdiction over all criminal violations of the Intellectual Property Code and related laws.

REGULAR COURTS
FROM B.P. 129 and RA 7691, the jurisdiction of regular courts, the RTC and the MTC may be outlined as
follows:
RTC

MTC, MTCC,
MCTC

IF PENALTY IS
IMPRISONMENT
OR
IMPRISONMENT
AND FINE

PENALTY > 6 PENALTY < 6

y
years
e
a
r
s

IF PENALTY IS
PURELY FINE

FINE is > 4
thousand
pesos

FINE is < 4
thousand
pesos

IMPT.

ALL cases of reckless imprudence resulting to DAMAGE TO PROPERTY are cognizable by the
MTCC MCTC MTC, REGARDLESS of the amount of the fine (cf RA 7691)

NOTE:

JURISDICTION IS BASED ON THE MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE PENALTY

NOTE2:

The General Rules do not apply if the law specifies the court that will have
jurisdiction over the case e.g. Libel (Art. 360 RPC)

THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

AS AMENDED
(RULES 110 - 127, RULES OF COURT)
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1, 2000

RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

WHERE WILL THE CASE BE FILED [Section 1 pars. (a) and (b)]
GENERAL RULE:
Penalty > 4 YRS 2 mos.

-Preliminary Investigation is required

-file with the Prosecutors Office for PI
(MTC NO LONGER ALLOWED TO CONDUCT PI under NEW
RULE 112, as amended by A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC)

Penalty < 4YRS 2 mos.

-NO PI is required
-file directly with MTC for trial, except in chartered cities where it
should be filed with the prosecutor's office unless otherwise
provided in the citys charter
- OMBUDSMAN or Prosecutors Office but in case of the latter,
the Resolution will be approved by the Ombudsman

Cognizable by SB.

"The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense
charged unless otherwise provided in special laws" (Sec. 1, last paragraph)
ISSUE:

Will the filing of a complaint for preliminary investigation interrupt the running of the period of
the prescription of the offense charged?

RULE:

Prescription will be interrupted unless the special law provides otherwise.

MEANING:

If covered by the Revised Penal Code, prescription is interrupted. If under a Special Law then
the provisions of that law on prescription will apply (If the law requires institution of judicial

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proceedings then prescription will not be interrupted) Finally, if the Special Law does not have
provisions on prescription, SEC. 2 of ACT NO. 3326 (Dec. 4, 1926) will apply and prescription
will not be interrupted until the information or complaint is filed in court for trial.
Based on

REODICA vs. CA 292 SCRA 87

LLENES vs. DICDICAN 260 SCRA 207 (1996)

COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (Sec. 2)

1.
2.

Must be in writing
in the name of the People of the Philippines
- a mistake in the complaint or information where it is made in the name of the offended party (e.g.
Maria Dimapasok vs. Juan Dimakatusok for Rape) is only a formal defect. Though, if raised, the
complaint or information can be quashed, it will not invalidate the complaint or information and it is
curable by a formal amendment.

3.

against all persons responsible

-the public prosecutor has no authority to exclude anybody if there is a showing that such person
appears to be guilty of the offense.
Will the failure of the information to include other persons who also appear to be responsible be a ground to
dismiss the case against those who were included?
Betty Bagionza, Et al vs. Court of Appeals, Et al
G.R. No. 161057, September 12, 2008
It appears that the Court of Appeals was, without saying so, applying the rule in civil cases that all indispensable parties must be
impleaded in a civil action. There is no equivalent rule in criminal procedure, and certainly the Court of Appeals' decision failed to cite any statute,
procedural rule or jurisprudence to support its position that the failure to implead the traders who directly dealt with petitioners is indeed fatal to the
complaint.
Assuming that the traders could be tagged as principals by direct participation in tandem with Roxas and Nolasco the principals by
inducement does it make sense to compel that they be jointly charged in the same complaint to the extent that the exclusion of one leads to the
dismissal of the complaint? It does not. Unlike in civil cases, where indispensable parties are required to be impleaded in order to allow for complete
relief once the case is adjudicated, the determination of criminal liability is individual to each of the defendants. Even if the criminal court fails to
acquire jurisdiction over one or some participants to a crime, it still is able to try those accused over whom it acquired jurisdiction. The criminal court
will still be able to ascertain the individual liability of those accused whom it could try, and hand down penalties based on the degree of their
participation in the crime. The absence of one or some of the accused may bear impact on the available evidence for the prosecution or defense,
but it does not deprive the trial court to accordingly try the case based on the evidence that is actually available.
Complaint defined. A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any
peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. (Sec. 3, R110)

Who can file a complaint?

a)
b)
c)

the offended party

peace officer
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated

What if the complaint is not sworn or signed?

This is a formal defect that can be cured by having the complaint signed and sworn to by the person
who filed it.
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
Examples of these persons are Customs Officials in cases involving violations of the Customs and
Tariff Code, BIR officials in violations of the NIRC, DENR Officials for violations of the Forestry Code or
environmental laws, SSS officials for violations of the SSS law. etc.
Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. (Sec. 4, Rule 110)
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court
An information can be filed only by a public prosecutor and only in court.
The person filing a complaint or information must have authority to do so.
CUDIA vs. CA 284 SCRA 173 (1998)
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms committed in
Mabalacat, Pampanga.

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HELD: If the person who signed the information is not authorized to do so, the entire proceedings will
be null and void even if the accused participated actively in the proceedings.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN A COMPLAINT AND AN INFORMATION
1. A complaint may be signed or subscribed by the offended party, a peace oficer, or any other public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated while an information can only be subscribed by the
public prosecutor.
2. A complaint may be filed with the public prosecutor or it can be filed with the proper MTC or MCTC,
for trial in the cases where direct filing is allowed by law. An information, on the other hand, can only be filed
with the proper court for trial of the accused.
NOTE: Only a complaint filed in court for TRIAL not PI must be subscribed by the offended party, peace
officer or other public officer charged with enforcing the law violated.
EVARLE vs. SUCALDITO 156 SCRA 808
A complaint filed for purposes of preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor need not be filed
by the offended party. Such a complaint may be filed by any complainant. The complaint referred to in Section
3 of Rule 110 is one filed in court and not with the public prosecutors office in which case it has to be initiated
by the aggrieved party.
NOTE: This is because the public prosecutor is authorized by law to investigate any complaint. If such
an investigation leads to a finding of probable cause to hold a respondent for trial, the public prosecutor can
file the proper information in court.
Who must prosecute criminal actions? (Sec. 5, R110)
GEN. RULE:

Under the direction or control of the public prosecutor

EXCEPTION: AS AMENDED BY En Banc Resolution dated April 10, 2002 A.M. No. 02-2-07 SC
In case of heavy work schedule of a public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the
private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the
criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in
the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
BEFORE THE AMENDMENT THE EXCEPTION WAS:
IN CASES BEFORE MTCs, or MCTCs where the prosecutor assigned is NOT available, the following
may prosecute:
a)
b)
c)

the offended party

peace officer
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated

Nota Bene: The Supreme Court has, through circulars, explained that there was no intention to remove the
authority of the original exceptions to prosecute the case in the absence of the public prosecutor
PRIVATE CRIMES Crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio Based on Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Adultery and Concubinage
- the complaint or information must be signed by the offended spouse and must be against BOTH
guilty parties unless one is already dead.
- Consent and pardon are valid defenses in adultery or concubinage.
NOTE:
PP vs. ILARDE 125 SCRA 11
The affidavit complaint began with this statement:
Im formally charging my wife and X and would request this affidavit be considered a formal
complaint against them

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The prosecutor phrased the Information, filed after the death of the complainant, in this manner:
the undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended husband, xerox
copies of which are hereto attached as annexes A AND B
HELD:
The Information sufficiently complies with the requirement that the complaint or information be
signed by the offended party.
Seduction, Abduction and Acts of Lasciviousness
NOTE: Rape has been removed from the coverage of private crimes because under the new Anti-Rape
Law, rape is now a crime against persons rather than chastity. It is no longer a private crime.
Section 5 provides a list of the people who can file the complaint in cases of seduction, abduction and
acts of lasciviousness. These are the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

The Offended Party, EVEN IF SHE IS A MINOR.

The offended partys parents;
The offended partys grandparents;
The offended partys guardian; or
The State;

As stated in Section 5, from the parents to the State, the list is exclusive and followed in the order
given.
In practical terms this means that if the offended praty, EVEN IF SHE IS A MINOR, unless she is
incompetent or incapable of filing the complaint for reasons other than minority, if she wants to file the case,
her decision is to be followed regardless of the decision of her parents or of other people.
As probably discussed in the study of the Revised Penal Code, the reason for this is the fact that the
offended party may choose to suffer in silence rather than suffer the scandal of a public trial.
In these cases, even if there is clear evidence that a crime has been committed the public prosecutor
is helpless to do anything unless there is a complaint signed by the offended party.
NOTE: Section 5 DOES NOT APPLY to SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
If an information in the crimes under Section 5 is filed without a complaint, is the defect jurisdictional or not?
G.R. No. 124391. July 5, 2000.
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. ELMER YPARRAGUIRE y SEPE
Once the violation of the law becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the
victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape
"shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied.
Said provision is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is
governed by the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of felonies and their
punishment. Stated differently, the complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the offenses mentioned
above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended party.
DEFAMATION: SLANDER OR LIBEL IS NOT A PRIVATE CRIME
EXCEPT IF THE DEFAMATION IMPUTES THE COMMISSION OF Adultery, Concubinage, ,
seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness
Notable case:
Gonzales vs. Arcilla 203 SCRA 629
MANG-AAGAW NG ASAWA NG MAY ASAWA is not an imputation of adultery as the elements are not
imputed.
What must a complaint or information contain? (Sec. 6, R110)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

the name of the accused;

the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
the place where the offense was committed.

10
Purpose:
Pp. vs. Rosalindo Cutamora, Et. Al
G.R. Nos. 133448-53. October 6, 2000
The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Elaborating on the
accused's right to be informed, this Court held in Pecho v. People (262 SCRA 518) that the objectives of this
right are:
1.
To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make the defense;
2.
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the
same cause; and
3.
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction if one should be had.
On the Name of the Accused (Sec. 7, R110)
- An Erroneous name is not material it can be cured by amendment for as long as the identity of the
accused is established.
On the Designation of the Offense (Sec. 8., R110)
The rule is that the designation of the offense is not material. What is material are the averments in the
body of the information. Thus, an error in the designation of the offense will not invalidate the information.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: When the facts appearing in the body of the complaint or information are
AMBIGUOS as to permit two or more interpretations, the designation appearing in the caption controls.
Example:
U.S. vs. TICSON 25 PHIL 67
Early in the morning of October 6, 1911, and on an occasion when Braulio Calang, the husband of
Epifania Cupo, was absent from home and she was asleep with her young child in her arms, the defendant
entered their house, situated in Surigao, by cutting the fastenings of the door, approached the sleeping
woman and raised her skirt.
CRIME DESIGNATED WAS TRESPASS TO DWELLING BUT THE FACTS COULD ALSO CONSTITUTE ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS. RULE: FOLLOW THE DESIGNATION
On the Cause of the accusation (Sec. 9, R110)
-recite the elements of the crime but not necessarily in the actual words of the law.
-Other words can be used for as long as the same idea is conveyed
Example:
intent to kill in homicide can be inferred from the other allegations in the information.
Intent to gain in theft can be presumed from the allegation of appropriating a thing belonging to another.
Must conspiracy be expressly alleged or may it be inferred from the other allegations in the information?
People vs. Ronnie Quitlong
292 SCRA 360
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common
design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive
offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute
and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit,
or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective
statutes defining them."

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VERY IMPORTANT:
Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules have been amended by the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
said provisions now require that BOTH QUALIFYING AND ORDINARY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES MUST
be stated in the Information.
This requirement is MANDATORY and, being favorable to the accused, should be given retroactive
effect. Thus it affects cases filed prior to the effectivity of the the Revised Rules on December 1, 2000.
Pp. vs. Daniel Mauricio
G.R. No. 133695. February 28, 2001
The use of the word "must" indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to comply
with Sec. 4, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be
appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule
that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.
Example:
Pp. vs. Rogelio R. Moreno
G.R. No. 140033. January 25, 2002
Nocturnity was not alleged in the information filed prior to December 1, 2000 but it cannot be
appreciated EVEN IF PROVEN because the new rule is MANDATORY and is to be given retroactive effect.
May an aggravating circumstance which was not alleged in the information be appreciated in
determining CIVIL liability?
People vs. Suela
373 SCRA 163 (Jan. 15, 2002)
citing People vs. Catubig
363 SCRA 621
-While, under the new rules, an aggravating circumstance that is NOT alleged in the information CANNOT be
appreciated in determining the criminal liability of the accused, the rules do not prevent its appreciation for
the purpose of determining CIVIL liability.
IMPORTANT ISSUE:
Since both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must now be stated in the Information, is it necessary to
specify which circumstances are alleged as qualifying and which are alleged as ordinary aggravating
circumstances?
People vs. Rodelio R. Aquino
G.R. Nos. 144340-42. August 6, 2002 reiterated in
People vs. Rommel Dela Cruz G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008
xxxxx, the Court has repeatedly held, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or
"qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. The Court has repeatedly qualified cases of rape 6 where the twin
circumstances of minority and relationship have been specifically alleged in the Information even without the
use of the descriptive words "qualifying" or "qualified by."
"The fact that the circumstances were described as "aggravating" instead of "qualifying" does not
take the Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 248 does not use the
word "qualifying" or "aggravating" in enumerating the circumstances that raise a killing to the category of
murder. Article 248 merely refers to the enumerated circumstances as the "attendant circumstances."
We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information allege,
specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These
circumstances need not be preceded by the words "aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or "qualified by" to
be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the
Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense,
thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the
circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the
death penalty in proper cases.
In cases of rape, is the allegation in the Information that the accused is the uncle of the victim or that the
latter is his niece sufficient to qualify the offense?
People vs. Marcial L. Llanto
G.R. No. 146458. January 20, 2003

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The information:
"That on or about (the) twelfth day of November, 1999 at Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust, with use of a knife, through force, violence and
intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over his twelve (12) year old minor niece
MARIA CRISTY T. BALISI, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma.
Cristy T. Balisi against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever amounts may be
awarded to her under provisions of the Civil Code."
Held:
In a catena of cases, we have ruled that the allegation that the accused is the "uncle" of the victim
and the latter is his "niece" is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship under Art. 266-B, supra. In People v. Lachica, we held:
"If the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common
law spouse of the mother of the victim it must be alleged in the Information that he is 'a relative by
consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree.'" (People v. Libo-on, GR No.
136737, May 23, 2001, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.; People v. Banihit, 339 SCRA 86, 96, August 25, 2000, per YnaresSantiago, J. both citing People v. Ferolino, 329 SCRA 719, 735, April 5, 2000, per Davide, CJ.) Moreover,
even if the relationship by consanguinity or affinity is alleged in the Information, it is still necessary to allege
further that such relationship is within the third civil degree. . ." (emphasis supplied)
Consequently, because of the defect in the information, the accused can only be held liable for simple
rape.
As applied:
The failure to allege the accuseds lack of a license for a gun in the Information negates the appreciation of the
special aggravating circumstance against him
People vs. Jessielito Badajos, Et. Al.
G.R. No. 139692. January 15, 2004
Under Republic Act No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed gun to commit homicide is a special
aggravating circumstance. The culprit's lack of a license for the gun is an essential element of such
circumstance, which must be alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, there is no allegation in the Information that the appellant had no
license to possess the firearm he used to kill Donque. Thus, the appellant's use of an unlicensed firearm
cannot be considered against him.
The allegation in the information that the accused is armed with a knife is sufficient to comply with the need
to allege that the accused was armed with a deadly weapon to qualify the crime of rape to rape with the use
of a deadly weapon
People vs. Joseph Orilla
G.R. Nos. 148939-40. February 13, 2004
Appellant on the other hand argues that the allegation in the Amended Information that he was
"armed with a knife" does not comply with Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The allegation in the Amended Information that the accused was "armed with a knife" is not in any
way equivalent to "use of a deadly weapon." The "knife" could simply be a "butter knife," a harmless knife.
Appellant opines that the Amended Information should have stated that accused was "armed with a deadly
knife, which is a deadly weapon."
We have held in several cases that the allegation "armed with a knife" is sufficient to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him. 45 The prosecution also proved during the trial
appellant's use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn testified that she was not able to shout because appellant
pointed an eight-inch kitchen knife at her throat.
On the place of commission of the offense (Sec. 10, R 110)
-the place need not be specific for as long as it is clear that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court where it was filed.
-EXCEPTION: The place must be specific only in cases where it is an essential element of the offense
or necessary for the identification of the offense.
Example:
Some Violations of the Omnibus Election Code such as entering a polling place where
the accused is not a voter therein nor an authorized watcher of a candidate or party.

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On the date of the commission of the offense (Sec. 11, R110)
-

The date or the time of commission need not be specific. The phrase On or about is
sufficient to cover a span of a few months.
EXCEPTION- when the date or time is an essential element of the offense.

Examples:
Violation of the liquor ban on the day prior to or on the day of the elections. Also in the
crime of infanticide which must be committed within 72 hours (three days) from the birth of the child
otherwise it would be murder.
People vs. Meliton T. Jalbuena
G.R. No. 171163, July 4, 2007
Is an allegation that the offense of statutory rape was committed on or about the month of August 1996
sufficient?
In rape, the gravamen of the offense, being the carnal knowledge of a woman, the date is not an
essential element, hence, the specification of the exact date or time of its commission is not important.
In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that the information alleges that the victim is a
minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her.
People vs. Nelson Arraz
G.R. No. 163695, October 24, 2008
Information for Rape alleges the date of commission as on or about the 20 th day of April, 2003 but the
testimony showed that the offense was committed in the early morning of April 21, 2003.
-the Court sustains the lower courts in holding that the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime. Even a variance of a few months between the time in the Information and that
established by the evidence during the trial has been held not to constitute a serious error warranting the
reversal of a conviction on that ground
On the Name of the Offended Party (Sec. 12, R110)
General Rule: The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has
been or is known.
Examples:
Slander
Pp vs. Juliana Uba, 99 Phil 134
While it is probably true that the fiscal or his clerk made a clerical error in putting in the information
the name of Pastora Somod-ong instead of that of Demetria Somod-ong, as the offended party, the mistake
thus committed was on a very material matter in the case, such that it necessarily affected the identification of
the act charged. The act of insulting X is distinct from a similar act of insult against Y, even if the insult is
preferred by the same person, in the same language and at about the same time. Note that the pleading that
give the court jurisdiction to try the offense is not the complaint of the offended party, but the information by
the fiscal, because the charge is the utterance of insulting or defamatory language, not the imputation of an
offense which can be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party. (People vs. Marquez, 68 Phil., 521;
Blanco vs. People, 70 Phil., 735.)
Arturo Borjal vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary
that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.
citing:
Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922). See also Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr., No. L-16969, 30 April
1966, 16 SCRA 807; People v. Monton, No. L-16772, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 801.
Statutory Rape

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the victim must be described as being below 12 years of age
Pp. vs. Renato Puzon
G.R. Nos. 123156-59. August 29, 2000
Clearly, conviction of appellant for statutory rape (absent any allegation in the information that the
complainants were below 12 years of age at the time of the rape), and not for rape through force or
intimidation, which was the method alleged would violate the right of the appellant to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against him; which right is granted. by the Constitution to every accused to the end
that he could prepare an adequate defense for the offenses charged against him. Convicting appellant of a
crime not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the offense alleged would be unfair and
underhanded.
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULEIn offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
People vs. CFI of Quezon City
G.R. No. L-41903. June 10, 1992
We rule that it was error for the lower court to dismiss the information. The information was already
sufficient in form and substance. The argument that it was fatal for the prosecution not to have alleged the
State as the offended party is without merit for in the case of Sayson v. People, (G.R. No. 51745, October 28,
1988, 166 SCRA 680) in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now Sec. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure), we have clearly held that in offenses against property, the designation of the name of the
offended party is not absolutely indispensable as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified.
Ramon F. Sayson vs. People of the Phils.
G.R. No. L-51745. October 28, 1988
The petitioner vigorously maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the information
charging him of attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America because the totality of the
evidence presented by the prosecution show very clearly that the accused allegedly attempted to defraud
Mever Films, Inc., a corporate entity entirely separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr. He firmly asserts
that his conviction was in gross violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Petitioner's claim is unavailing. The rule in this jurisdiction is that "variance between the allegations of
the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support thereof does not of itself entitle the
accused to an acquittal." [People v. Catli, G.R. No. L-11641, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 642.]
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname
by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name [Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of
the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION
Robbery with violence or intimidation
The case of U.S. VS. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil., 330, appears to us to be in point and decisive of the case.
The reasons for the decision in that case were, first, because, to convict a person of robbing X when the
person robbed is Y is violative of the principles of pleading and, second, because then the plea of double
jeopardy would be of no avail to an accused. To this same effect is our decision in People vs. Balboa, 90 Phil.,
5. (quoted from the Uba case)
DUPLICITOUS COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (Sec. 13, R 110)
Duplicitous Information
An information charging more than one offense is called a duplicitous information.
Rule:

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Pp. vs. Manalili
G.R. No. 121671. August 14, 1998
Under the Constitution, an accused has the right to be informed, before trial, of the nature of the
offense with which he or she is charged. Regardless of how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt
may be, there can be no conviction, unless the offense is charged (or is necessarily included) in the complaint
or information. On the other hand, an accused, who fails to object prior to arraignment to a duplicitous
information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein and duly proven during the trial, for
the allegation of the elements of such component crimes in the said information has satisfied the
constitutional guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he or she is
being charged
Does not apply to complex crimes, compound crimes, continued crimes, and special complex crimes and
other instances where only one penalty will be imposed on several crimes.
Complex Crimes in General
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
1.

Delito Complejo (Complex Crimes Proper)

- when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other

Example:

Estafa through falsification of public documents

Note: Article 48 also applies to culpable felonies (criminal negligence)

Pp vs. Glenn De Los Santos
G.R. No. 131588. March 27, 2001
In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or
more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the
accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of
"homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," and was
sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in
Soriao v. Court of Appeals, 29 the accused was convicted of the complex crime of "multiple homicide with
damage to property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to
death its twenty-eight passengers.
2.

Delito Compuesto (Compound Crimes)

- a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
e.g. one gunshot hitting and killing two people

Interesting case:
Is there such a crime as Murder with Abortion?
Pp. vs. Bonifacio Lopez
G.R. No. 136861. November 15, 2000
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant was charged with the complex crime of murder with
abortion, not of two independent charges of murder and unintentional abortion. In a complex crime, although
two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law. The stabbing
and killing of the victim which caused likewise the death of the fetus arose from the single criminal intent of
killing the victim, as shown by accused-appellant's pursuit of the victim after she was able to escape (People
vs. Alacar, 211 SCRA 580 [1992]).
Effect of Complex Crimes:
In a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period. As between murder and unintentional abortion, murder is the more serious
crime and the penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death. Death being the maximum or the greater penalty
must then be imposed, and since this is an indivisible penalty, the presence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances is inconsequential.
3.

Delito Continuado (Continued Crimes)

a.k.a. Single Larceny Doctrine

-a series of acts arising out of a singe criminal intent
not under Article 48 but applied by the Supreme Court in the case of 49 Phil. 437 [1926]

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APPLIED IN THE FOLLOWING:
(1)

The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same place
and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939]).

(2)

The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period
of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974]).

(3)

The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437
[1926]).

(4)

The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits
on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v.
Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]). The collections of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that
of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal
impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955]).

NOT APPLIED IN THE FOLLOWING:

(1)

Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955
and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961]). The said acts
were committed on two different occasions.

(2)

Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal the said
offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the
result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil.
354 [1938]).

(3)

Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over
the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a
sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976]).

(4)

75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the
employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

Explained in Santiago vs. Gartichorena 228 SCRA 214

and made to apply to special laws under Article 10 of the RPC
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except
that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.
As Applied to Shooting Incidents
-one shot 3 dead= I crime

(Pp vs. Hubilo 220 SCRA 389)-compound crime (delito complejo)

-3 shots 3 dead on one occasion = separate crimes (People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1
-single pressing of the trigger of a machine gun resulting to multiple victims
= separate crimes (Pp. vs. Tabaco 270 SCRA 32) as many crimes as there are victims
4.

Hernandez Doctrine

99 Phil 515 and Enrile vs. Salazar 186 SCRA 217

-The felony of rebellion absorbs common crimes committed pursuant to the rebellion.
5.
Special Complex Crimes
-specifically provided for in the Revised Penal Code
Examples:
Robbery with Rape Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659
Robbery with Homicide Article 294

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Note: An Information alleging more than one way the same crime was committed IS NOT DUPLICITOUS
Example:
People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536,
where the defendant was charged with violation of the Medical Law and the information charged both
illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor, it was held that "the information was
not bad for duplicity inasmuch as the acts charged were merely different means of committing the same
offense, notwithstanding the fact that they are prohibited by separate sections of the statute
Bernardo Gallego vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-57841. July 30, 1982
The chairman and three other members of the Board for Marine Deck Officers in the May, 1979
examinations, two of whom are petitioners, were charged in the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for giving unwarranted benefits to particular examinees. In the
motion to quash the aforesaid information, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo claimed, among others, that
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is null and void because it is unconstitutionally vague
and therefore cannot be a basis of any criminal prosecution and that the information charges the accused with
three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: "(a) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through manifest partiality; (b) the
giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through
gross inexcusable negligence" while in the discharge of their official and/or administrative functions. The
motion to quash was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition.
The Supreme Court held that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer
from the constitutional defect of vagueness since the phrases "manifest partiality,'' "evident bad faith'' and
"gross inexcusable negligence'' merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in the
said section of the statute may be committed, and the use of all the phrases in the same information does not
mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses
AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION (Sec. 14, R110)
RULES ON AMENDMENTS BEFORE PLEA
General Rule: Before the arraignment of the accused, the prosecution may amend the information whether in
form or in substance.
Exception Introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor,
with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
RULES ON AMENDMENTS AFTER PLEA
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused
Requisites:
1.

The amendment is merely formal.

2.

There must be leave of court.

3.

It must not prejudice the rights of the accused.

Formal vs. Substantial Amendments

Substantial amendments consists of major or material changes in the information, such as a change in
the manner of the commission of the offense, in the date of the commission over a wide span of time, or
change in the name of the victim or offended party. Formal amendments come in the form of correcting the
spelling or clerical errors or other minor changes in the information which merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime charged.

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Examples of Formal Amendments:
In the case of Dennis T. Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001), the Supreme
court said that Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:
1.

it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription;

2.

it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged;

3.

it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to
undergo any material change or modification in his defense;

4.

it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty;

5.

it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment.

Cases:
Vega v. Panis, No. L-40842, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 269.
People v. Casey, No. L-30146, 24 February 1981, 103 SCRA 21
Examples of Substantial Amendments:
1.

An amendment which changes the manner of the commission of the offense

Pp. vs. Zulueta 89 Phil. 755

The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously
included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the
need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court.
2.

An amendment which changes the name of the offended party

Pp vs. Juliana Uba, 99 Phil 134

An amendment to change the name of the offended party in the information to the name of the true
victim as established by evidence is substantial because defamation against X is different from defamation
against Y.
Do not confuse this with
Danilo Buhat vs. CA
G.R. No. 119601. December 17, 1996
the amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with the name of Renato Buhat who was found by
the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held the arms of the victim while petitioner was
stabbing him, is only a formal amendment and one that does not prejudice any of the accused's rights. Such
amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused involves merely a matter of form as it
does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the
nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change
the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact. In fact, it is to be expected that
the information has to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public
prosecutor.
3.

An amendment to change the date of commission of the offense over a wide span of time.

People vs. Alfredo C. Reyes

G.R. No. L-32557. October 23, 1981
In the present case, private respondent Francisco Estrella was investigated for an offense allegedly
committed in August of 1964. Then, he was charged for an offense allegedly committed in August of 1969. He
pleaded not guilty to the latter charge. Now petitioner desires to put him on trial for the alleged 1964 offense.
This cannot legally be done.
While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise time of
commission need not be stated in the information, this Court stated that this does not mean that the
prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date
altogether, or that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing. The prosecution is
given the chance to allege an approximation of time of the commission of the offense and the precise date

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need not be stated but it does not mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given
approximate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused.
NOTE:
Dennis T. Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001
The public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information, to change the material
dates stated in the Information from "January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May 1992." Petitioner
opposed the motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in nature, hence to allow the
same would be a violation of his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him,
and would negate or prejudice defenses that were otherwise available to him.
Held: In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of substance.
The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of
the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the Information the precise time the offense was committed
unless time is a material factor. It is sufficient that the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as
near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the Complaint or Information will permit.
Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights is untenable. We fail to see how
his original defenses would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the prosecution's theory in
anyway altered by the same. Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence in support of his allegation that the
amendment would adversely affect his rights.
Note: but if the change is only within a span of a few months such as from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981,
the amendment is formal (Pp. vs. Borromeo, 123 SCRA 253) (See also Pp. vs. Molero 144 SCRA 397)
4.

An amendment for the purpose of making the information charge an offense when the original
information does not charge any offense

5.

An amendment which changes the fact or ground of responsibility of the accused.

People vs. Hon. Eduardo Montenegro, Et. Al.

G.R. No. L-45772. March 25, 1988
It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor
Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To
charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal,
would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED WILL BE PREJUDICED BY THE AMENDMENT
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. (People vs. Hon. Eduardo Montenegro, Et. Al. G.R.
No. L-45772. March 25, 1988)

New Interesting Case:

Susan Fronda-Baggao vs. People, G.R. No. 151785
December 10, 2007
Can four Informations for Simple Illegal Recruitment be amended into one information for Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment before arraignment?
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet entered her plea, the four
Informations could still be amended.

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Petitioner also contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one Information only, not four
or multiple Informations which cannot be joined into only one Information.
We disagree.
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular word complaint or
information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only one
Information. Surely, such could not have been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd
situation whereby two or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one or more
Informations.
SUBSTITUTION
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a)
Rule
There can be substitution only if the offense charged is WHOLLY DIFFERENT from the offense proven.
Test to determine identity of offenses:
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as
the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, and offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter(Teehankee, Jr. vs Madayag, et al.,G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134,
140.)
Does not apply if the offense proven is necessarily included in or necessarily includes the offense charged
Galvez vs. CA 237 SCRA 695
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court
can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily
include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information.
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUBSTITUTION AND AMENDMENT
Teehankee, Jr. vs Madayag, et al.,
G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 140.
"It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made
before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1.

Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original charge;

2.

Except for amendments which downgrade the offense or excludes any of the accused, an
amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must ALWAYS be with leave of court as the original information has
to be dismissed; (as amended by the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure)

3.

Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation
and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary
investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

4.

An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over
the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that
the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily
included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

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"In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section
14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the
second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is ecessarily
included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in
order."
WHERE SHOULD A CRIMINAL CASE BE INSTITUTED? (Sec. 15, R110)
GENERAL RULE: -shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
Ratio Legis
What is the reason why the rules provide that the case should be tried in the place where the crime was
committed?
1.

The interest of the public requires that to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of
crimes, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place or as near as may be
where he committed the crime.

2.

Insofar as the interest of the accused is concerned, it will be inconvenient for him to took for
witnesses and other evidence in another place.

Exceptions when existing laws provide otherwise:

Examples:
1.

Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code on Libel allows the filing of the case (a) where the libelous
matter was printed or first published (b) where the offended party resides or (c) if he is a public
officer, where he holds office at the time of commission.

2.

R.A. 8429by the law

3.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution- The Supreme Court can order a change of venue in
order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

Cases covered by the Sandiganbayan Law will be tried in the places designated

What are the types of offenses as to place of commission:

1. Local

-refers to an offense where all the elements were committed in the same place or, in
other words, one which was fully consummated in one place.

2. Transitory

-refers to a case where the elements of the offense were committed in several places.

Cases on Transitory Offenses:

People vs. Hon Nathaniel Gorospe
G.R. Nos. L-74053-54. January 20, 1988
As to estafa:
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic
elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this
case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the
check was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may,
therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court. For while the subject check was
issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it
was uttered and delivered. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited
in People vs. Yabut, supra).
As to B.P. 22
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true
that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29,
1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but
also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of
the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the

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place of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself
a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla,
G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in
the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
Robbery and Anti-Fencing Law
People vs. Hon Jose C. De Guzman
G.R. No. 77368. October 5, 1993
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. "Fencing," upon the other hand,
is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or shall be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft. The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The
law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have
been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery
or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in
fencing must have been previously taken by means of either robbery of theft but the place where the robbery
or theft occurs is inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which
presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the
place where the prior marriage has been contracted.
Specific rule on offenses committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle in the course of
its trip
-instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft, or other
vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.
Example:
People vs. Francisco Zafra
Oct. 19, 1994
The accused stole a passenger jeepney and killed the owner in Alabang, Muntinlupa and were
arrested, still riding the stolen jeepney in Calamba, Laguna
Held: As accused-appellants were apprehended in Calamba while they were in the carnapped
jeepney, the information was validly filed in Calamba.
Specific rule on offenses committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage
-shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where
the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
Venue of a Criminal Case committed aboard a seagoing vessel:
1.

First Port of Entry-

where the vessel will first dock. Note: does not include place of departure

2.

Any Municipality or Territory through which the vessel passed

Example:
Wenefredo Calme vs. CA
G.R. No. 116688. August 30, 1996
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly throwing him
overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and operated by William Lines, Inc.,
while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991. The case was filed in
Oroquieta City
Petitioner claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the Marine Protest filed by
the vessel's captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he
(Capt. Magallanes) received the report that "a passenger jumped overboard."

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The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established. The Marine
protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was
informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same
area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it
occurred while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" simply means "on the way or passage; while passing
from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation." Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable
provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 100 which provides that "(w)here an offense is
committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the
proper court of the first port of entry of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during
such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law."
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City would still be
excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining the venue under the
aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the municipalities/territories through which the ship
passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400.
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into which the ship
or water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission thereof, while
the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . ." This is the applicable
provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same.
Specific rule on Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
- shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)
Principle of Extraterritoriality in the Revised Penal Code
ARTICLE 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1.

Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;

2.

Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities
issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3.

Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the preceding number;

4.

While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or

5.

Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book
Two of this Code.

In these cases, the first court that takes cognizance of the case will have jurisdiction to try it.
PRIVATE PROSECUTORS:
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Sec. 16, R110)
What are the rights of the offended party in relation to a criminal case?
1.

To take part in the prosecution of the offense;

2.

To recover civil liabilities arising out of the offense charged.

3.

To appeal an adverse judgment or order affecting his claim

to such civil liability:

Can an offended party intervene in a case punished under a special law when the said law does not provide
for the civil aspect of the case?
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
Charmina Banal vs. Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr.,
156 SCRA 325, 330 (1987).

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-it is the fact of damage or injury party that is the basis of civil liability in a criminal case, thus there can be an
award of civil liability in Violations of B.P. 22 even if it is a crime against public order.
Who can be an offended party?
Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be
a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same
punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the
delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the
evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party

RULE 111-- PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

Institution of criminal and civil actions (Sec. 1, R. 111)
MAJOR AMENDMENT
Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising out
of ALL SOURCES of civil liability was deemed instituted in the criminal case and a waiver of any of the civil
actions extinguishes the others and even the institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said
civil actions separately waives the others.
However, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure ONLY THE CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS DEEMED INSTITUTED.
SOME MAJOR EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT
1.

Actions premised on quasi delicts and other independent civil actions may be filed separately
by the complainant/plaintiff WITHOUT ANY RESERVATION OF THE RIGHT TO FILE A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION. (Casupanan vs. Laroya, August 26, 2002)

2.

The acquittal of the accused in the criminal case or the failure of the judge therein to award
civil liability against the accused will not bar, by res judicata, the filing of a separate civil action
based on quasi delicts. (Jose S. Cancio, Jr. vs. Emerenciana Isip Nov. 12, 2002)

3.

The judge in a criminal case MAY NO LONGER APPLY the provisions in the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts as basis for an award of civil liability. (This is an abandonment of the rulings in
the cases of Maniago vs. CA 253 SCRA 674 and San Idelfonso Lines vs. CA 289 SCRA 568)

4.

The pendency of the criminal case will not preclude THE ACCUSED therein from filing a
separate civil action based on quasi-delict against the private complainant. (Casupanan vs.
Laroya, August 26, 2002)

When is the claim for civil liability ARISING out of the offense charged NOT deemed instituted?
1.

The offended party waives the civil action;

2.

He reserves the right to institute it separately

3.

He institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

4.

He institutes the civil action after the criminal action but before presentation of prosecutions evidence
and he duly informs the court where the criminal case is pending of the institution of the civil action.
(Yakult vs. CA 190 SCRA 357)

NOTE:

Again, the civil action referred to here is one ARISING OUT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED

DOCKET (FILING) FEES

RULE: There is NO FILING FEE for claims for ACTUAL DAMAGES in criminal cases. EXCEPTION: If the Rules
Provide otherwise. Example: B.P. 22 cases. and recently Estafa Cases

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Claims for OTHER (moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary) will be assessed filing fees upon filing of
the case in court ONLY when the amounts thereof are specified in the complaint or information. If the amounts
are not specified then the filing fees will be first lien on the judgment based on whatever is awarded by the
court.
Distinguish rules on docket fees in criminal cases from the rules in civil cases.
1.

In civil cases, docket fees are levied on ALL FORMS OF DAMAGES while in criminal cases no docket
fees are charged on ACTUAL DAMAGES.

2.

In civil cases, the amount of the claims must be stated in the Complaint or Counterclaim so that the
proper docket fees can be computed and paid. In criminal cases in general, even if the amount of the
damages are not stated I the information or complaint, these can still be proven and the docket fees on
these claims will be a lien on the judgment.

ANOTHER AMENDMENT:
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action. (1a)
- This abandons the Rulings in Shafer vs. RTC of Olongapo (167 SCRA 376) and Javier vs. IAC (171
SCRA 376)
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 (incorporation of Circ. 57-97 into the rules)
-

Exception to the rule that no filing fees are assessed on ACTUAL DAMAGES in criminal cases. In B.P.
22 cases, filing fees are based on the amount of the check which is considered as the actual damages
claimed.

As to other kinds of damages the applicable rule is the same as in other criminal cases.

The rules now require MANDATORY consolidation of the claim for civil liability in B.P. 22 cases but if
the civil case was filed ahead, consolidation will be done only if the trial of the civil case has not yet
commenced and there must be an application for consolidation in the court trying the criminal case.

Under OCA Circular 21-03, docket fees are NOW also assessed on estafa cases UPON filing of the information
in court
SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION (Sec. 2, R112)
Note: This applies only to the civil aspect arising out of the offense charged (based on Art. 100 of the RPC and
related articles)
-If the offended party reserves the right to file a separate civil action, it cannot be filed until the
criminal case is finished.
-if he filed the separate civil action ahead of the criminal case, then the civil case will be suspended
until the criminal case is finished.
-The prescriptive period of the suspended action will be tolled until there is a final judgment in the
criminal case while the criminal case is still ongoing.
Option:
-The offended party can ask for the consolidation of the separate civil action with the criminal case
only if there has been no judgment yet in the civil case.
-In case of such a consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action but the accused/defense shall have the right to crossexamine the witnesses of the offended party in the civil case and both parties may present additional
evidence.
Note:
The provision stating without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence- MUST
BE A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.

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This should be without prejudice to the right of the accused/defense to cross-examine the witness
presented by the offended party in the civil case.
Otherwise, it would not make sense. Why would the prosecution cross-examine the witnesses of the
offended party when they are on the same side?
If the consolidation cannot be done under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it may be allowed under the Rules
of Civil Procedure
Naguiat vs. IAC 164 SCRA 505
-Violation of P.D. 957 cannot be consolidated, under Section 2 of Rule 111, with civil action for specific
performance to deliver titles because the civil action did not arise out of the act complained of in the criminal
case
However, consolidation can be done under the Rules of Civil Procedure which allow consolidation of
cases with similar questions of fact and law.
GENERAL RULE:
CONSOLIDATION IS OPTIONAL EXCEPT
1.

Article 360 of the RPC.

2.

Cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

3.

B.P. 22 cases (SC Circ No. 57-97)

These are cases where the law imposes MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
OLD RULEExtinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999.
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON SUA, respondents.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where:
(a)

the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;

(b)

where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature; and. (Even if not expressly declared if based on an exempting
circumstance.)

(c)

where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the
accused is acquitted.

Plus some others based on criminal law:

(d)

acquittal is based on an exempting circumstance

NOTE: *IF ACQUITTAL IS BASED ON AN JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE except STATE OF NECESSITY then
there is NO CIVIL LIABILITY
Note:

People vs. Salao

284 SCRA 493

The civil liability referred to in this Rule is the civil liability arising from crime (ex delicto). It is not the
civil liability for quasi delict which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the criminal
action by Art. 33 of the Civil Code. The civil liability based on such cause of action is not extinguished even

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by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Indeed, because the offended party does not intervene in the criminal prosecution,
it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented by the
public prosecutor in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the criminal case may be acquitted.
This is what happened in the recent case of Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appeals where, because the only
survivor in a motor car accident whose testimony proved to be pivotal in the civil case was not called to
testify in the criminal prosecution of the driver of the other vehicle, the latter was acquitted on reasonable
doubt.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS (Sec. 3, R111)
RESERVATION IS NO LONGER REQUIRED IN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Hon. Alejandro Velez
G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include
recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the
same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."
What are the effects of the removal of the reservation requirement for independent civil actions?
Neplum, Inc., vs. Orbeso,
G.R. No. 141986, July 11, 2002 3rd Division
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of
reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones. Thus, the
civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and
independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such
revision and omission:
1.

The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal
prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2.

The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does
not extinguish the right to bring such action.

3.

The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.

EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY (Sec. 4, R111)
- An entirely new provision inserted that was based on the case of PP. vs. Bayotas. 236 SCRA 239
the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict.
Pp. vs. Pedro Abungan, Sept. 28, 2000
1.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.' "

"2.

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a)

Law

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b)
c)
d)
e)

Contracts
Quasi-contracts
...
Quasi-delicts

"3.

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

"4.

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription."

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (Secs. 6 and 7, R110)

MAJOR CHANGE:
OLD ELEMENTS:
a)

the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action;

(b)

the resolution of such issue is determinative of whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

NEW ELEMENTS:
(a)

the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and

(b)

the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Where and when may prejudicial questions be raised?

-During preliminary investigation (whether by a public prosecutor or an MTC) or in court if the case
has already been filed in court. However, the issue must be raised before the prosecution rests.
Some cases::
Alfredo Ching vs. Court of Appeals,
April 27, 2000
- civil action for nullity of documents is not a PQ in a case for estafa.
Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of
the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust receipt agreement,
nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his culpability under penal laws
determined by other evidence. To put it differently, even on the assumption that the documents are declared
null, it does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal
prosecution and liability.
Isabela Marbella Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis
July 31, 2000
- a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
bigamy.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot
have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of
the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the
first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite usually the
marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of

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the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions
on bigamy.
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
GOING BACK TO THE GENERAL RULE:
CRIMINAL CASES WILL HAVE PRECEDENCE OVER CIVIL EXCEPT:
1.

Independent Civil Actions

2.

When the civil action presents a prejudicial question.

3.

Where the civil action is consolidated with the criminal action.

4.

When the civil action is not one intended to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense.
(Naguiat vs. CA)

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

NOTE: AMENDED BY A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (RE: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from the judges of the first level
courts)
Preliminary investigation -an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.
PI is required if the imposable penalty for the offense exceeds 4 years and 2 months
Note: The 4 y 2 m guideline is a major amendment because the 1985 Rules required PI for all RTC cases and
this was heavily affected when RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the MTCs. The amendment, restored the
situation prior to RA 7691.
PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION:
People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 126005. January 21, 1999.)
citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free the respondent from the inconvenience,
expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable
probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law
for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the
unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false,
frivolous or groundless charges.
IS LACK OF PI A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT?
Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People 149 SCRA 1
Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan 177 SCRA 354 (1989)
as cited in Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan 221 SCRA 349
"The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do
they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence,

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the court, instead of dismissing the Information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to
conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted . . ."
Lack of jurisdiction is not waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In fact, it is
frequently waived
Is a new P.I. required if there is an amendment of the information.?
Remember the case of Teehankee vs. Madayag.
If the change in an information is only formal and thereby does not affect the defense of the accused, a
new P.I. is not required.
The test of Probable Cause
Teresita Domalanta, Et Al vs. COMELEC, Et Al
G.R. No. 125586, June 29, 2000
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such
a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.
Who may conduct Preliminary Investigations? (Sec. 2, R112)
(a)

Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b)

National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(c)

Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Note: MTC, MTCC, MCTC Judges cannot conduct preliminary investigations anymore under the amendments
of the rules in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC which took effect last October 3, 2005
What is the scope of their authority?
-all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions
CUDIA vs. CA 284 SCRA 173 (1998)
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms committed in
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
HELD: If the person who signed the information is not authorized to do so, the entire proceedings will
be null and void even if the accused participated actively in the proceedings.
Other officers :
Criminal Violations of the Omnibus Election Code
-P.I. to be conducted by the COMELEC
Office of the Ombudsman
May the Office of the Ombudsman investigate a public official even if the offense is not in relation to his public
office?
Deloso vs. Domingo G.R. No. 90591. November 21, 1990
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public
official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we. The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for
the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom
that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public

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officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations
into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.
In Relation to Public Office is material in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but it its NOT a
limit to the investigative powers of the Office of the Ombudsman
Natividad vs. Felix

(G.R. No. 111616. February 4, 1994)

As we held in Aguinaldo v. Domagas and recently, Sanchez v. Demetriou, such authority of the
Ombudsman "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged," in other words, concurrent with similarly authorized agencies of the government.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from any investigative
agency of the Government.
A careful scrutiny of Sec. 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 will reveal that the word "may" is used
in regard to the Ombudsman's assumption of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The word "may," being generally permissive and since it operates to confer discretion, it
follows that the Ombudsman's investigatory powers are but directory in nature.
IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE PROCEDURE FOR PI (Sec. 3, R112)
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant
may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be
made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination,
copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party
This provision came from Webb vs. De Leon 247 SCRA 652
We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the
original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary
investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of
their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be
operational even during the preliminary investigation to a potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3)(a)
of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint which shall . . .
state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents. . . ."
Will a delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation violate the right of the respondent to speedy
disposition of cases?
The Tatad Ruling
(Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 159 SCRA 70, 82, March 21, 1988)
- The delay of 3 years was already violative of the right of the respondent to speedy disposition of
cases and right to due process in view of the simplicity of the issues in the cases.
How should the Tatad Doctrine be applied?
Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan- G.R. Nos. 116259-60
February 20, 1996
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the application of the
constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine
should not be made to rely solely on the length of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise be
accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations.
Binay vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999
In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did
not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The "unexplained inaction" of the prosecutors
called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.

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In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy
disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of
procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and
the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the
functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to
assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, (228 SCRA 214)
the complexity of the issues and the failure of the
accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim to the
constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator, the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases ("not runof-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not
violated therein
.
Will the Tatad Ruling apply even if the respondent did not take actions to accelerate the disposition of his
case?
Elpidio C. Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan
May 18, 1999
It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence
provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.
NOTABLE ISSUES ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR AND ITS REVIEW (Sec. 4, R
112)
Will the lack of certification invalidate an information?
Sec. 4, R112 requires that in preparing the resolution and information when a prosecutor finds
probable cause, he shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence
Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan 220 SCRA 45
-The lack of a certification will not invalidate the information because the certification is not an essential part
of the information. It is merely a formal defect.
NOTE:
Resolutions of investigating prosecutors are forwarded for approval, within five days, to:
Provincial Prosecutor

If PI is conducted
Prosecutors Office

by

the

Provincial

City Prosecutor

If PI is conducted by the City Prosecutors

Office

Chief State Prosecutor

If PI is conducted by the Regional State

Prosecutors Office

Ombudsman or his Deputy

in cases of offenses cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction

Note: the amendment to include the Ombudsman or his deputy is intended to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction
since the authority of the Office of the Ombdusman to conduct PIs is concurrent with the prosecutors.
What happens if a resolution of dismissal is disapproved?
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the

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Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the
information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so
without conducting another preliminary investigation.
What happens in case a resolution is reversed by the Secretary of Justice?
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or
motu propio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information
without conducting anther preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by
the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (4a)
ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST
BY RTC OR MTC UPON FILING OF AN INFORMATION
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
Chester De Joya vs. Placido C. Marquez
G.R. No. 162416. January 31, 2006
Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. It bears remembering that "in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge
is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance."
Thus, the standard used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing
the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the
trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him.

NO WARRANT OF ARREST IS NECESSARY IF:

1.

Accused is already in detention due to:

a.

Warrantless arrest and subsequent inquest investigation.

b.

Accused was already arrested based on a warrant issued by an MTC judge during
preliminary investigation. (NOT APPLICABLE ANYMORE)

2.

Cases where the penalty is purely fine.

3.

Cases covered by the Summary Rules. Note in cases covered by the Summary rules, a warrant is
issued only if the accused fails to appear during arraignment despite notice.

SOME NOTES:
The requirement that the judge, upon filing of the information, shall personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and the additional power of the judge to immediately dismiss a
case if he finds that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause or to require the
prosecutor to present additional evidence in case he has doubts as to the existence of probable cause are
amendments recognizing jurisprudence establishing the following:
1.

The judge may issue a warrant of arrest on the basis of the records of the preliminary
investigation but he cannot rely on the certification of the prosecutor alone. (Soliven vs.
Makasiar 167 SCRA 393, Lim vs. Felix 194 SCRA 292, Teresa Ho vs. People of the Philippines
280 SCRA 365).

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2.

The judge is now clearly empowered to dismiss a case if he finds that the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause or to require the prosecutor to present additional
evidence in case he has doubts as to the existence of probable cause. (This clarifies some
confusion as to what the judge is supposed to do if the prosecutor finds probable cause to
hold the accused for trial but the judge does not find probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest.

Distinguish probable cause to hold an accused for trial from probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
People vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstance
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, "must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof."
On the other hand, probable cause to hold an accused for trial is a reasonable ground of presumption
that a matter is, or may be well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is
so. The term does nor mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainly. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
The determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial is within the authority of the
prosecutor while the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant is within the exclusive authority of
the judge.
CAN THE PROSECUTION OF A CRIMINAL CASE BE ENJOINED?
Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438- General rule
Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990)
Deloso v. Desierto, G.R. 129939, September 9, 1999.
Roger Posadas, et al vs. Ombudsman et al
G.R. No. 131492. September 29, 2000
GENERAL RULE:
circumstances:

The prosecution of a criminal case MAY NOT be enjoined except in the following

a.

To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-19272,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

b.

When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang,
et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

c.

When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

d.

When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);

e.

Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil.
556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f.

When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);

g.

Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966,
18 SCRA 616);

h.

Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March
25, 1960);

i.

Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18
L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs.
City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);

What happens if a person is arrested without a warrant? (Sec. 6, R112)

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If a person is arrested without a warrant, the police have a limited time within which to FILE A CASE
WITH THE COURT because Article 125 requires the delivery of the person arrested to JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
within the periods provided therein.
If the entire process of a preliminary investigation is utilized, all of our police officers will end up in jail.
Breakdown of the Process:
1.

Arrest

2.

Recording at the police station.

3.

Inquest Investigation- The fiscal will determine probable cause on the basis of the affidavit of
the arresting officer and the witnesses, whether by affidavit or examination.
Except if the accused asks for a full preliminary investigation and executes a waiver of his
rights under Article 125 of the RPC in the presence of his counsel in which case the normal
procedure for a preliminary investigation will be followed. Note: The waiver of Article 125 of the
RTC must be in the presence of the counsel of the accused due to Section 2 (e) of R.A. 7438)

4.

The prosecutor will file the information in court.

5.

Within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, the accused may ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule
(People vs. Court of Appeals March 23, 1995- the five day period is mandatory)
-but a motion for preliminary investigation must be filed before arraignment (Go v. Court of
Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, 153 (1992). The right to a preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea on arraignment. by her failure
to invoke her right to a preliminary investigation, Pria forfeited her right to one and she can no
longer invoke it for the first time on appeal.( People v. Lazo, 198 SCRA 274, 284 (1991).)

DIRECT FILING WITH THE RTC (THIS IS AN ENTIRELY NEW PROVISION)

In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or
a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting
officer or person.
IT SEEMS THAT THE RULES NOW ALLOW A SITUATION WHERE DIRECT FILING WITH THE RTC IS
ALLOWED.
Situation:
1.

A person is arrested via warrantless arrest.

2.

Inquest prosecutor is absent or unavailable.

3.

The complaint can be filed by the offended party or a peace officer

on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer
or person.

When may a criminal case be filed DIRECTLY with the courts for trial ?
1.
In cases in municipalities not requiring preliminary investigation, the complaint may be filed
directly with the MTC for trial by the offended party, peace officer, or person charged with the enforcement of
the law violated
2.
In cases cognizable by the RTC or MTC where the accused was arrested via a warrantless
arrest and no inquest prosecutor is available, the complaint can be filed by the offended party or a peace
officer on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Procedure in cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(Sec. 8, R112)

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(a) If filed with the prosecutor. If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an
offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure
outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal
Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3
(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in
writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he
shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days
from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause
despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of said period,
dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if
the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no
necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest. (9a)

REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

November 15, 1991
B.

Criminal Cases:

(1)

Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2)

Violations of the rental law;

(3)

Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

(4)

Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);1

(5)

All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the
civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not
exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

Thus, the foregoing procedure is generally applicable to cases punishable with a penalty from 6 mos. 1 day to
4yrs. 2 mos.

RULE 113 ARREST

Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense.
Cf. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused:
The Courts will acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused through the arrest or voluntary
submission of the accused.
Rule 113 deals with the provisions or procedure relating to the arrest of persons accused of criminal
offenses.
Relevance of the Constitution
Considering that the arrest of a person will necessarily involve a distraint of his personal liberty, the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, particularly on the right of all persons to be secure in their persons and
property will necessarily come into play.
Section 2 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution

As amended by A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC. March 25, 2003 to take effect on April 15, 2003

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SECTION 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
NORMALLY, a person will be arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest. The exceptions are the cases
where warrantless arrest are allowed.
Under the constitution, as we have already discussed, there are requirements for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest
1.

Issued by a judge

2.

probable cause

3.

premised upon the judges personal

evaluation of the affidavits of witnesses
and evidence

4.

particularly describing the person to be seized.

Pangandaman vs. Casar (159 SCRA 599, April 14, 1988)

A warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint
could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative
of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be
seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.
An invalid arrest will mean that the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused
However in
Pp. vs. Salvatierra 276 SCRA 55
Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this
before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. This is the first time that appellant is raising this issue as he did not even move for the
quashal of the information before the trial court on the ground of illegal arrest. Consequently, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest, if any, had been cured by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court
when he entered his plea and participated during the trial. Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and where the trial
was free from error.
PP vs. ROLANDO ZASPA
September 21, 2000
any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea
otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the voluntary submission by the accused to the jurisdiction of
the trial court.
Execution of a warrant of arrest (Sec 4, R. 113)
The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the
warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the
period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the
warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reason therefore. (4a)
What is the lifetime of a warrant of arrest?
Malaloan vs. CA
May 6, 1994
In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although
within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the

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issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is
enforced or recalled.
People vs. CESAR G. GIVERA
G.R. No. 132159. January 18, 2001
Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996 was made
without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on April 27,
1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was returned unserved by the arresting officer on
June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias
warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains
enforceable until it is executed, recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, 4 is only a
directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return to the court.
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS (Sec. 5 R113)
When may a person be arrested without a warrant?
Under Section 5 of Rule 113:
(a)

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b)

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c)

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

(d)

If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or
retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (Sec. 13, of
R113)

(e)

For the purpose of surrendering the accused, his bondsmen may arrest him without a warrant.
(Sec. 23, R114)

(f)

An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (Sec.
23, R114)

PLUS

OR A PRIVATE PERSON
In the situations covered by Section 5, even a private citizen can cause a CITIZENs ARREST.
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
What is meant by in his presence?
Pp. vs. Sucro March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 388
repeated in People vs. Evaristo 216 S 431
as stated in Pp. vs. Joselito del Rosario
April 14, 1999
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SP04 De Leon during the police raid at the place
of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro44 [G.R. No. 93239, 18 March 1991, 195
SCRA 388.] we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or
within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto
or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the

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purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery
with homicide.
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
-A.K.A. ARREST EFFECTED IN HOT PURSUIT
just been committed
People vs. Manlulu
April 22, 1994
-nineteen (19) hours later is no longer just been committed
What is meant by personal knowledge of facts?
Pp. vs. Anthony Escordial
G.R. No. 138934-35. January 16, 2002
Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388, 397 citing People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 709 (1991).
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officer making the arrest.
Probable Cause to justify a warrantless arrest?
Pp. vs. Doria January 22, 1999
probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest
Pp. vs. Nasario Molina, February 19, 2001
-Comprehensive discussion of situations relating to probable cause
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
-no explanation needed
Interesting case on the authority of a police officer to effect a warrantless arrest.
Pp. vs. Jose Rayray
G.R. No. 90628. February 1, 1995
We cannot yield to appellant's view that just because Lt. Ancheta was assigned in Baguio City he
could not arrest persons caught in the act of committing a crime in some other place, especially so where he
was the intended victim. A policemen cannot callously set aside his essential duty of apprehending criminal
offenders and of keeping peace and order on the shallow excuse that he is not in his place of assignment. His
responsibility to protect the public by apprehending violators of the law, especially one caught in flagrante
delicto is not limited by territorial constraints. It follows him wherever he goes. Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule
113, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes a warrantless arrest, otherwise called a citizen's
arrest, "when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Thus, although officially assigned in Baguio City, Lt. Anchetas act of
arresting accused-appellant (after the latter offered to sell him marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is
justified not only by his duty as a law enforcer but also by Sec. 5 of Rule 113, which authorizes instances of
warrantless or citizens' arrests.

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WHEN MAY AN ARREST BE EFFECTED? (Sec. 6, R113)

An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6)
-Under present law, there is no prohibition against arrests made on Fridays or weekends or at night.
In effecting an arrest with a warrant, what must the person to be arrested be informed of? (Sec. 7, R113)
GEN ERAL RULE:

Person to be arrested must be informed:

1.

The cause of the arrest.

2.

The fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest.

EXCEPT:
1.

When the person to be arrested flees

2.

He forcibly resists before the arresting officer had opportunity to inform him

3.

When giving the information will imperil the arrest.

The officer NEED NOT HAVE THE WARRANT in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if
the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
Diosdado Mallari vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996.
At this juncture, the Court would like to stress that this is not a case of a warrantless arrest but
merely an instance of an arrest effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their
possession at that precise moment. Finding as it does, this Court deems it unnecessary to delve into the
applicability of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and on the merits of both the petitioner's and the
Office of the Solicitor General's arguments with respect thereto. The applicable provision is not Section 5,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113 which provides as follows:
"Sec. 8.
Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. When making an
arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of
the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or
forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at
the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall
be shown to him as soon as practicable." [Emphasis supplied]
In effecting an arrest without warrant by a peace officer, what must the person to be arrested be informed of?
(Sec. 8, R113)
GENERAL RULE: Person to be arrested should be informed of:
1.

The authority of the person making the arrest

2.

The Cause of the arrest.

EXCEPT:
1.

When the person to be arrested is then ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE

2.

He is being pursued immediately after the commission

3.

He is being pursued immediately after escaping or fleeing;

4.

He forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to inform him

5.

When the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.

Pp. vs. Larry Mahinay

G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999

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It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or
indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in
the light of new legal developments:
1.

The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language
known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to
and understood by said person;

2.

He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used
as evidence against him;

3.

He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

4.

He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5.

That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;

6.

The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by
the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either retained
or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by
him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the
officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7.

He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;

8.

In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be
done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void
even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;

9.

That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of
the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication,
the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must
cease if it has already begun;

10.

The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;

11.

He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of
any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

In effecting an arrest without warrant by a private person, what must the person to be arrested be informed
of? (Sec. 9, R113)
GENERAL RULE: Person to be arrested should be informed of:
1.
2.

The intention of the private person of arresting him.

The Cause of the arrest.

EXCEPT:
1.

When the person to be arrested is then ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE

2.

He is being pursued immediately after the commission

3.

He is being pursued immediately after escaping or fleeing;

4.

He forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to inform him

5.

When the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.

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OFFICER MAY SUMMON ASSISTANCE. (Sec. 10, R113)
An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to
assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the
arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a)

History of this provision

U.S. vs. Silvestre Pompeya
G.R. No. 10255. August 6, 1915
This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his
community is still recognized in all well-organized governments in the "posse comitatus" (power of the
county, poder del condado). (Book 1 Cooley's Blackstone's Commentaries, 343; Book 4, 122.) Under this
power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged with the maintenance of peace and good
order were bound, ex officio, to pursue and to take all persons who had violated the law. For that purpose they
might command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. This power is called "posse
comitatus" (power of the county). This was a right well recognized at common law. Act No. 1309 is a statutory
recognition of such common-law right. Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when
and by which the people of the town (pueblo) may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of
the public and the preservation of peace and good order. It is an exercise of the police power of the state.
When can an officer making an arrest break into any building or enclosure?
(Sec. 11, R113)
1.
2.
3.

He has announced his authority to effect the arrest

He has announced his purpose in making the arrest
He is refused admittance after the foregoing announcements.

Right to break out from building or enclosure. (Sec. 12, R113)

Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may
break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. (12a)
Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested (Sec. 14)
Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his
behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at
any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also
exercise the same right. (14a)
This provision should be cross-referenced with RA 7438
Section 2 R.A. 7438 (took effect on July 7, 1992)
f. Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national nongovernmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international nongovernmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family"
shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild,
uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
-NOTE: A fianc or fiance is considered as immediate family
Section 4
SECTION 4. Penalty Clause. a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating
officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine
of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more
than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the
investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders
of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a

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person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter
cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
b)
Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate
family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting
and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual
needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
G.R. No. 129211. October 2, 2000
People vs. Wilfredo Rodriguez
In People v. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997), we declared as inadmissible the extrajudicial
confession of accused where the interrogation started at 9:00 A.M. and his lawyer arrived only at 11:00 A.M..
Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under custodial investigation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. In this case, Rodriguez and appellant were in the hands of the police
for about four days without the assistance of counsel. In People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135, 142 (1995) we held
that:
The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory
statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People
v. de Jesus (213 SCRA 345 [1992]) we said that admissions obtained during custodial investigation
without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are
still flawed under the Constitution.

So flagrant a violation of the constitutional right to counsel of the accused cannot be countenanced. In
People v. Olivarez, Jr., 299 SCRA 635, 650 (1998). we explained that:
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the
uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to
prosecute and thereafter convict him." These constitutional guarantees have been made available to
protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such
investigation.

RULE 114 - BAIL

Bail defined. (Sec. 1, R114)
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter
specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(1a)
Constitutional Provision on the Right to Bail
Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The Right to Bail does not apply to military personnel
under Court Martial
Jose Comendador vs. Renato S. De Villa
G.R. No. 95020, 20 August 1991.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the
Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist."
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

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The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men
from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within
the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues
collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and
against the existing political system.
xxx

xxx

xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that
release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say
1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990
Order were sustained, on 'provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting.
But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause
is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and
does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers
can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have
been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

Purpose and Nature of Bail

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals
247 SCRA 741 (1995)
reiterated in Go, et al. v. Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1464, 26 July 1999
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall
be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence
of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in
custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived
considering its personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the
law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after the trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established
beyond reasonable doubt.
The person seeking to be admitted to bail
must first be in the CUSTODY OF THE LAW
Manigbas vs. Luna, 98 Phil. 466 [1956]
Necito C. Hilario vs. Julian C. Ocampo III
ADM. CASE No. 3066. December 3, 2001
Bail is defined as the "security given for the release of a person in custody of the law." By its
definition, bail requires that a person must first be arrested or deprived of liberty before it can be availed of:
Thus, although the posting thereof is tantamount to submission to the jurisdiction of the court, it presupposes
that the accused is under detention or in the custody of law. Indeed, it would be absurd and incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free. In this case, respondent deemed it appropriate for the accused to file the
corresponding bail bonds, even when the latter had not yet been arrested or placed under custody.
Guillerma Delos Santos-Reyes vs. Judge Camilo O. Montesa
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-983. August 7, 1995
From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the criminal cases before the
trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed their petitions to grant bail and to reduce bail, motion to
reinstate petition to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants of arrests before the court acquired
jurisdiction over their persons either through the effective service and enforcement of the warrants of arrest
or their voluntary surrender, i.e., before they were placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
their liberty. Such being so, the trial court, initially, denied correctly the petition for grant of bail but
subsequently disregarded law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted on the motion to reinstate the
petition for grant of bail and set the motion for hearing on 6 April 1991, directing, for that purpose the

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Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the
preliminary investigation.
In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty xxxx
Theory of Constructive Custody
-an exception to the General Rule that an accused has to be arrested or has to voluntarily surrender before he
can be admitted to bail
Paderanga v. Court of Appeals
247 SCRA 741 (1995)
Santiago vs. Vasquez
217 SCRA 633
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the
prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was
then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could
not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding
their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest
warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed
just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently,
both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him
physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his
person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court; secondly, by furnishing true information of
his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by uneguivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.
Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the
authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission of his application for bail, and until
the day of the hearing thereof.
TYPES OF BAIL
Corporate Surety
Refers to the type of bail, similar to an insurance contract whereby a bonding company will issue a
bond in the amount fixed by the court which will be forfeited if the bonding company fails in its obligation to
warrant compliance with the conditions of bail.
Property Bond
Refers to a situation where property is put up by the accused or somebody else to warrant compliance
with the conditions of bail. If such conditions are violated, the said property will be sold at public auction and
the proceeds thereof, up to the amount of bail fixed by the court will be forfeited in favor of the government.
Cash Bond
Refers to the type of bail whereby the accused or somebody else will actually deposit the amount fixed
by the court as bail to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail. If these conditions are violated, the
money can be forefeited.
Recognizance
Refers to the type of bail where a person is released in his own custody or to the custody of a
responsible person. This type of bail is allowable only in the cases when specific provisions of the law or the
rules allow it.
Victory Liner vs. Reynaldo B. Bellosillo
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321. March 10, 2004
REQUIRING BAIL TO BE POSTED IN CASH AND IN THE AMOUNTS OF P50,000.00 AND P350,000.00 IN CASES
OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE AMOUNTS TO A DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BAIL. THE DECISION TO POST A SURETY BOND OR CASH AS BAIL BELONGS TO THE ACCUSED
AND THE COURT CANNOT REQUIRE HIM TO POST CASH
Conditions of the bail; requirements (Sec. 2, R114)

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All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at all
stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of
whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice shall be
deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia;
and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment.
The Court has the right to restrict the travel of the accused
Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 149
Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Court of Appeals
195 SCRA 760 (1991);
Imelda Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan,
247 SCRA 127 (1995).
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of the obligation
assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise,
said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
WHEN IS BAIL A MATTER OF RIGHT (Sec. 4, R114)
1.

BEFORE conviction by the MTC

2.

AFTER conviction by the MTC

3.

BEFORE conviction by the RTC except if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, where the evidence of guilt is strong.

4.

BEFORE conviction by the RTC in cases punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
where the court has already ruled that the evidence of guilt is NOT STRONG.

WHEN IS BAIL A MATTER OF DISCRETION? (Sec. 5, R114)

1.

AFTER conviction by the RTC if the penalty IMPOSED is 6 years or lower.

2.

AFTER conviction by the RTC even if the penalty imposed is greater than six years if none of the
conditions under par. 3 of Section 5 are present except if the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.

WHEN MUST BAIL BE DENIED (Secs. 5 and 7 R114)

1.

BEFORE conviction by the RTC if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, where the evidence of guilt is strong.

2.

AFTER conviction by the RTC where the penalty imposed is greater than 6 years and any of the
following conditions are present:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

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(d) That the circumstances of the case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
3.

AFTER conviction by the RTC if the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.

The conviction of the accused rebuts the presumption of innocence

Francisco Yap, Jr. vs. CA
G.R. No. 141529. June 6, 2001
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted
only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried
and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and
the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly
argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much
more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.
CAPITAL OFFENSE- is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of the
application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. (Sec. 6, R114)
THE APPLICATION FOR BAIL (Sec. 8, R114)
Once an application for bail has been filed in cases, punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE shifts to the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt is
strong
NOTE: What is discretionary on the part of the court in a hearing under Section 8 is only the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
IMPORTANT:

Where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the
accused files an application for bail, the courts discretion is limited to determining
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
If the evidence of guilt is strong the court MUST DENY bail. On the other hand if the
evidence of guilt is not strong the court MUST GRANT bail.

Steps to be taken by the judge when there is an application for bail

Basco vs. Rapatalo
269 SCRA 220,
"(1)

Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation

"(2)

Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion

"(3)

Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution ;

"(4)

If the evidence of the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."

Hearing is MANDATORY
Borinaga v. Tamin
26 SCRA 206 (1993);
Cardines v. Rozete, 242 SCRA 557 (1995).
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time
whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the prosecution is denied such an opportunity, there would be
a violation of procedural due process.

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Joselito V. Narciso vs. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz
G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing must
be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the order
granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion -EVEN IF THE PETITION FOR BAIL
HAS THE PROSECUTORS CONFORMITY.
People vs. Cresenia C. Reyes
G.R. Nos. 101127-31. August 7, 1992
If the accused in a case where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
is granted bail pending trial, such will be cancelled, and the accused placed in confinement upon conviction
for the crime charged.
Modifying Circumstances Shall NOT be considered in determining
the right to bail UNLESS admitted by the prosecution
Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr. vs. Hon. Melecio B. Borja
G.R. No. L-65228. February 18, 1985
Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law. Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
a capital offense is "an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of
the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death." It his clear from this provision that the
capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with reference to which it is
relatively easy to ascertain whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the
Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently to refers to a finding of innocence or
culpability, regardless of the modifying circumstances.
Where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years old, it follows that,
if convicted, he would be given "the penalty next lower then that prescribed by law," which effectively rules
out the death penalty. The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital
offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death
sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold where the accused has been
established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death.
Things to be considered in determining the amount of bail (Sec. 9 R114)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

Financial liability of the accused to give bail;

Nature and circumstance of the offense;
Penalty for the offense charged;
Character and reputation of the accused;
Age and health of the accused;
Weight of the evidence against the accused;
Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
Forfeiture of other bail;
The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

ON RECOGNIZANCE:
What are the instances when recognizance is allowed by the law and the rules?
Roberto Espiritu vs. Eduardo Jovellanos
Oct. 16, 1997 280 SCRA 579
(a)

when the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal offense,
the imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6 months imprisonment and/or P2,000 fine,
under the circumstances provided in R.A. No. 6036;

(b)

where a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the
imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any
modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion, may allow his release on his
own recognizance;

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(c)

where the accused has applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but no bail was
filed or the accused is incapable of filing one; and

(d)

in case of a youthful offender, held for physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal, if he is
unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances envisaged in P.D. No. 603, as amended (Art.
191).

R.A. 7610
SECTION 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. Any child who
has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled
to the following rights;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units;
Immediate free legal assistance;
Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and
Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the community as determined by the
court.

P.D. 603
ARTICLE 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. A youthful offender held for
physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his
arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a
detention home in the province or city which shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever
required: Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the
venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate
from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the Department of Social
Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to
the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever
required.
SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 20-79
R.A. 6036
SECTION 1.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required
of a person charged with violation of a municipal or city ordinance, a light felony and/or a criminal offense the
prescribed penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a fine of two thousand pesos,
or both, where said person has established to the satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate authority
hearing his case that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond, except in the following cases:
(a)

When he is caught committing the offense in flagrante;

(b)

When he confesses to the commission of the offense unless the confession is later repudiated by him
in a sworn statement or in open court as having been extracted through force or intimidation;

(c)

When he is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or jumped
bail;

(d)

When he is found to have previously violated the provisions of Section 2 hereof;

(e)

When he is found to be a recidivist or a habitual delinquent or has been previously convicted for an
offense to which the law or ordinance attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more offenses
to which it attaches a lighter penalty;

(f)

When he commits the offense while on parole or under conditional pardon; and

(g)

When the accused has previously been pardoned by the municipal or city mayor for violation of
municipal or city ordinance for at least two times.

SECTION 2.
Instead of bail, the person charged with any offense contemplated by Section 1 hereof
shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn
statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court hearing his
case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person
charged, require further that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible
citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein
mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to accept the authority of the
citizen so appointed by the Court. The Clerk of Court shall immediately report the presence of the accused
person to the Court. Except when his failure to report is for justifiable reasons including circumstances

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beyond his control to be determined by the Court, any violation of this sworn statement shall justify the Court
to order his immediate arrest unless he files bail in the amount forthwith fixed by the Court.
Where a person is charged with any offense contemplated by Republic Act No. 6036 (copy attached),
the Judge should as therein provided order the release of the accused on recognizance instead of requiring
bail.

SEC. 16. OF REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

SECTION 16. Arrest of accused. The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for
failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on recognizance
by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.
SEC. 16. OF RULE 114
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed
for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
(16a)

WHERE SHOULD BAIL BE FILED (Sec. 17, R114)

GENERAL RULE:
Bail must be filed with the court where the case is pending.
EXCEPTIONS:
1.

If the judge of the court where the case is pending is absent or unavailable bail may be filed
with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge in the province, city or municipality.

2.

If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, of if no judge thereof
is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.

3.

Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city, or municipality where he is held.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION:

Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance,
the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending.
PROCEDURE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF BAIL (Sec. 21, R114)
When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be
notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as
required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce
their principal and to show why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail.
Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
(a)
(b)

produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

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Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally,
for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen,
unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)
CANCELLATION OF BAIL. (Sec. 22, R114)
Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case,
or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. (22a)
POSTING BAIL IS NOT A WAIVER OF ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST OR LACK OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION (Sec. 26-NEW PROVISION)
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation.
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or
the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The
court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)
-This abandons the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Timon 281 SCRA 597 (1997)
and similar cases that an application for bail constitutes a waiver of right of the accused to question
whatever irregularities and defects attended the arrest
This principle was reiterated as lately as the case of People vs. Carmen Lacson G.R. No. 126174.
August 29, 2000.

RULE 115 - RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

On the Presumption of Innocence
The equipoise rule
People vs. Edgar Lagmay April 21, 1999
where the evidence in a criminal case evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should
tilt the scales in favor of the accused. (People vs. Benemerito, 264 SCRA 677.)
On the right to be informed of the charges against him
Rationale
Inasmuch as `not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always wise
and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all and
any possible surprises which may be detrimental to their rights and interests. The main purpose of this
requirement is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to be innocent and has,
therefore, no independent knowledge of the acts that constitute the offense with which he is charged. (Matilde
v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456)
Pp. vs. Artemio Calayca Jan. 20, 1999
Pp. vs. Cesar Larena June 29, 1999
A person charged with simple rape cannot be convicted of qualified forms of rape if the qualifying
circumstances are not stated in the information. Otherwise there will be a violation of his right to be informed.
On the right of the accused to be present and defended by counsel
Pp. vs. Rufino Bermas April 21, 1999
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard
by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.

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Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires
the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and
he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." Citing Pp. vs. Holgado 85 Phil.
752.

On the right to remain silent

Pp. vs. Donato Continente August 25, 2000
The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clear that the accused was initially accorded his
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. In addition, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. If the waiver
complies with the constitutional requirements, then the extrajudicial confession will be tested for
voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility, 2 i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.
We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or "Paliwanag" found at the
beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do not meet
the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that do not evince a clear and
sufficient effort to inform and explain to the appellant his constitutional rights. 36 We emphasized that when
the constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his rights to remain silent and to
have an independent and competent counsel preferably of his own choice, it must be presumed to
contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. 37 In other words, the right of a person under investigation
"to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this,
there is a denial of the right.

Pp. vs. Ayson July 7, 1989

In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1)

BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation),
but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way,
and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and

2)

AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for
some crime other than that for which he is prosecuted.

A pro-forma question and answer form prepared by the police is insufficient to inform the accused of his
rights prior to questioning him under custodial investigation
People vs. Benjamin Sabayoc
G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004
Citing People vs. Jara 144 SCRA 516,
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it
together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting.
Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up
of a right is missing.

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The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to
consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the
suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya,
and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit
for another offense.
A counsel assisting the accused who remains silent throughout the custodial investigation indicates that the
accused was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel.
People vs. Benjamin Sabayoc
G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004
citing People vs. Deniega 321 Phil. 1028, 1043 (1995)
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the
lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person
undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession. Indeed,
as an officer of the court, it is an attorney's duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth. However, counsel
should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his
client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the
suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at
any time.
On the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
Beltran v. Samson 53 Phil. 570 (1929).
the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any attempt to
compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the
handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. "Writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention,"
Pp. vs. Radel Gallarde
Feb. 17, 2000
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he
was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have
the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things
to be done.
On the Right to crossexamine the witnesses against him
Pp. vs. Edgar Crispin, March 2, 2000
Affidavits cannot be allowed because they cannot be cross-examined.
An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand
to testify on it. Being hearsay evidence, it is inadmissible because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statement or writing is
attributed. The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him is a fundamental right of every
accused which may not be summarily done away with. Another reason why the right to confrontation is so
essential is because the trial judge's duty to observe and test the credibility of the affiant can only be met by
his being brought to the witness stand. That the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary
investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation
does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during
trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same. The prosecution having failed to
present Cesar Delima as a witness, his sworn statement was patently inadmissible and deserves no
consideration at all.

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On the Right to compulsory processes
If the defense believes that there are other witnesses who could have exculpated the accused, it should have
called for them even by compulsory process. (People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263 [1987]).
On the Right to Speedy Trial

Roque vs. Desierto May 12, 1999

Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution
commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the
failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is clearly violative of this
mandate and the public officials rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the
complaint.
Canson vs. Garchitorena, July 28, 1999
Once again we reiterate that tired old legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. It need not be
overemphasized that this oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes much more so in
criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial, which, as defined is
one "[c]onducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays." The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent
the oppression of the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. It, likewise, is
intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.
Binay vs. Sandiganbayan Oct. 1, 1999
However, the right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is
a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept .
Right to appeal The only right under Rule 115 not found in the constitution

RULE 116 - ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to
him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses
other than those named in the complaint or information. (Sec. 1, par (a))
Is arraignment mandatory or can it be waived?
Pp vs. Demetrio Cabale May 8, 1990
In the instant cases, counsel for the appellant entered into trial without objecting that his client, the
appellant herein, had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full opportunity of cross-examining
the witnesses for the prosecution. Then, when the cases were being retried after the appellant had been
arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint manifestation with the prosecution, adopting all proceedings had
previous to the arraignment of the appellant. There was, therefore, no violation of the appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

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What is the effect of arraignment on the right of an accused to preliminary investigation?
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. (Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138)
Exceptional case:
Francisco Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, March 13, 1998
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and
consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he was charged in court. Also,
petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court
regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his
counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot
be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.
Can there be an arraignment of a respondent during a preliminary investigation by a municipal trial court
judge? (MTC JUDGES NO LONGER ALLOWED TO CONDUCT PI)
Warlito Alisangco vs. Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. (224 SCRA 1)
Considering that the MCTC of Manukan-Jose Dalman only had preliminary jurisdiction over the case,
the respondent judge did not have any authority to set the case for arraignment. All it could do was to
calendar the same for preliminary investigation. There is no law or rule requiring an arraignment during the
preliminary investigation. Under Section 1, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, the arraignment must be
conducted by the court having jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. Thus, with respect to the case filed
against the complainant, this would be the proper Regional Trial Court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said case by reason of the prescribed penalty.

reading the same in the language or dialect known to him

Pp. vs. Arnel B. Alicando Dec. 12, 1995
Pp. vs. Melchor Estomaca , April 22, 1996
The records of the court must clearly indicate full compliance with Section 1 of Rule 116, otherwise,
the arraignment, and consequently all subsequent proceedings will be declared null and void.
The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and
knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial
courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate
regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is,
therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an
integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment
and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
NO ARRAIGNMENT BY PROXY This is one of the instances when the rules requires the presence of
the accused (cf Bail)
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for
him. (1a)
What is considered by law to be a proper plea of guilty is an absolute plea of guilt.
If the accused will make a conditional plea, i.e. I am guilty but it was his fault or Opo sinakal ko sya
pero kasi inunahan nya ako or if he refuses to plea at all, the court will enter a plea of not guilty.
What is deemed admitted when a plea of guilty is entered?
"While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it, at the same time, constitutes an admission of all
the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein recited (People
vs. Egido, 90 Phil. 762; People vs. Santos and Vicente, 105 Phil. 40)

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What is then not deemed admitted?
1.
2.
3.
4.

facts and circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information.

Conclusions of fact
Jurisdiction of the court (conferred by law not by admission)
Sufficiency of the Complaint or Information

When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and
a plea of not guilty shall se entered for him. (n)
Pp. vs Padernal 21 SCRA 34 (1967)
Where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to prove the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting full and complete self-defense. The trial judge should
declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn, order that a plea of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial on
the merits.
When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the
judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or complaint. The
accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case
shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment.
-This provision is NEW and is meant to ensure compliance with the right of an accused to speedy trial.
The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining,
determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party
to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 189)
This is from Section B par. 1 of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89. However, there is an additional
proviso that the failure of the private offended party to appear will be a waiver of the requirement of his
consent to a plea bargain.
Plea of guilty to a lesser offense
At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 2, R116)

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (Pp. vs. Martin Villarama June 23,
1992)
REQUISITES
1.

It must be B4 trial (cf Pp. vs. Martin Villarama)

2.

The prosecutor and the offended party must consent except if the offended party fails
to appear during arraignment DESPITE NOTICE in which case the consent of the
prosecutor alone is sufficient.

3.

the plea of guilt must be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense
charged.

Pp. vs. Martin Villarama June 23, 1992

In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the
prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the
Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in
People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a Plea only
when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then
Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:

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". . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and
the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to
murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the
evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section
2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been
intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining."
necessarily included
UNDER THE 1985 RULES
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court
Theoretically, under the 1985 Rules, an accused charged with serious physical injuries could plead
guilty to jaywalking.
This produced too much confusion and the Supreme Court apparently decided to go back to the
language of the 1964.
Thus, the rule under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require that the plea be made to an
offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.
Can a person charged with murder plead guilty to attempted homicide?
Panfilo Amatan vs. Vicente Aujero Sept. 27, 1995
Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the
accused in a criminal case to plead guilty "to a lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was
criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the
lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code necessarily produces death, attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the
case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright
confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an
amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
PLEA OF GUILT TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE (Sec. 3, R116)
-Despite a plea of guilt to a capital offense, the Court MUST require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and to determine the precise degree of culpability.
Pp. vs. Joseph Lakindanum G.R. No. 127123. March 10, 1999
People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 reiterated n People vs. Jonathan Besonia
G.R. Nos. 151284-85. February 5, 2004 and People vs. Joselito A. Lopit
G.R. No. 177742, December 17, 2008
The rule is that where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to
observe the following:
1.

It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;

2.

The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and

3.

The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so
if he desires

Guidelines on what is covered by the searching inquiry particularly in relation to cases punishable by death.
People vs. Jonathan Besonia
G.R. Nos. 151284-85. February 5, 2004
A searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension by the
accused of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can truly be said to be based on a free and
informed judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a searching

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inquiry, we declared in People v. Aranzado, [418 Phil. 125 (2001)] citing a plethora of cases, that it would be
well for the court to do the following:
(1)

Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress by actual threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent or avenging quarters.

(2)

Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he has conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

(3)

Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and educational background which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4)

Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the
duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions.

(5)

Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or
make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply
missing details of significance.

Moreover, in some cases, we ruled that the trial court should also explain to the accused the essential
elements of the crime charged, as well as the penalty and civil liabilities.
Pp. vs. Paulino Sevilleno March 29, 1999
Facts: After the accused pleaded guilty to rape with homicide, the judge asked him only two questions,
First, Do you understand your plea of guilt? and second Do you know that your plea of guilt could bring
death penalty?
Held: Only a clear, definite and unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be accepted by trial
courts. There is no such rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge
that his conviction should automatically follow. A judge should always be an embodiment of competence. As
an administrator of justice, it is imperative that the trial judge carry out his duties ably and competently so as
not to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The judge was found to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

Plea of guilty to non-capital offense (Sec. 4)

-Reception of Evidence is DISCRETIONARY
Please take note of the exceptional case of:
People vs. Mendoza 231 SCRA 264
Facts:
Accused pleaded guilty to robbery but the court required presentation of evidence.
When the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence, the court acquitted the accused.
Was the procedure proper?
Held: While the court was correct in acquitting the accused, the proper procedure should have been to
consider the plea of guilt withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered before acquitting the accused to avoid the
absurd situation of an acquittal when the plea was guilty.
Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. (Sec. 5, R116)
At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of
guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.

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Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel (Sec. 6, R116)
Counsel De Parte- engaged by the accused himself
Counsel De Officio- appointed by the court to defend the accused.
What are the steps that a court must take to properly inform the accused of his right to counsel?
Pp. vs. Holgado 85 Phil. 752
(1)

It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;

(2)

after giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;

(3)

if he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and

(4)

if the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable
time therefor.

The right of an accused to a counsel de parte is not absolute

Pp. vs. Mario Serzo, Jr., June 20, 1997
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a
court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is
immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is
obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the offended party's
equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to
retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a
member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e. g. conflict of
interest and the like.
Bill of particulars
- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and
prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details
desired. (Sec.9, R116)
A Bill of Particulars is one of the Modes of Discovery.
The accused is basically asking the Court to Order the the prosecution to set forth the details in vague
portions of a complaint or information.
Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan 202 SCRA 726
Webb vs. De Leon, et al., 247 SCRA 652
-The remedy of a Bill of Particulars is not available in a preliminary investigation

Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution.

Procedure:
There must be a motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the parties, the
court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration.
Coverage:
The court may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing of any written statement given by the complainant and other witnesses in any
investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other investigating officers, as well as
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, object, or tangible things
not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
case and which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law
investigating agencies.

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Purpose:
The purpose of this remedy is to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration of evidence.
When may the arraignment be suspended? (Sec. 11, R116)
(a)

The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;

(b)

There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c)

A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice,
or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a)

Effects of insanity:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Time of CommissionTime of Arraignment

Time of Trial
Serving Sentence

Exempting (Art. 12, RPC)

Suspension of Arraignment (11, 116)
Suspension of Trial (
Suspension of Execution of Sentence
(ART. 79 RPC)

RULE 117 - MOTION TO QUASH

When must a motion to quash be filed:
-BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT because generally, the arraignment of the accused will operate as a waiver
of the defects in the information or preliminary investigation.
Is the movant in a motion to quash limited to what is stated in the information?
General Rule:
In resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information, the facts alleged in the complaint
or information should be taken as they are.
Exception:
However, the following may be considered in a motion to quash:
a)

facts showing the extinction of criminal liability

b)

double jeopardy: and

c)

facts that have been admitted or are not denied by the prosecution (Edgardo Lopez vs.
Sandiganbayan October, 13, 1995)

People v. Alagao 16 SCRA 879

Jose Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
January 27, 1997
The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably
unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, 24 which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as
provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117 viz., (a)
extinction of criminal liability, and (k) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the exception of
extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former Section 4, 25 Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally without merit.
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal
grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the

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grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts
outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds.
The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case IS CONFERRED BY LAW and CANNOT
BE WAIVED.
Can the judge initiate the consideration of a ground for quashal?
Pp. vs. David G. Nitafan, Feb. 1, 1999
It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused.
There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if
no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the
accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the
information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of
the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an
independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a
magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges
and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with
citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance with the
orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that of respondent judge.
Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to overturn the reasons he relied upon in
his different orders without contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the
guise of a show cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in
effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two personalities in one
person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution.

Grounds for a Motion to quash:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

(a)

That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)
That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

This ground simply means that the facts as alleged in the complaint or information do not charge an
offense.
In other words, there is no law penalizing the acts stated in the complaint or information. NULLUM
CRIMEN NULLE POENA SINE LEGE
Example: Than on or about the evening of September 12, 2001, X went inside the premises of the
Hallelujah Massage Parlor and went out one hour later with a big smile on his face.
Contrary to law
-These facts do not constitute an offense.
(b)

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
This refers to lack of jurisdiction over the
1) person of the accused
2) subject matter of the case; or
3) territory;

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(d)

That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

Can the lack of authority on the part of the officer signing the information be cured by silence,
acquiescence or express consent?
CUDIA vs. CA
G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms committed in
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
HELD: If the person who signed the information is not authorized to do so, the entire proceedings will
be null and void even if the accused participated actively in the proceedings.
(e)

That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

Refer to Rule 110 on the essential requisites of a sufficient complaint or information. If there is no
compliance with these requisites, this is the proper ground for a motion to quash.
(f)

That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
This refers to DUPLICITOUS COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATIONS. Cf. Rule110, Section 13.

(g)

That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

How is criminal liability extinguished?

ARTICLE 89.
1.

How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
By service of the sentence.
By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
By absolute pardon.
By prescription of the crime.
By prescription of the penalty.
By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

(h)

That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

In relation to Libel
Danguilan-Vitug vs. CA 232 SCRA 460
Where the complaint or information itself alleged that the averred libelous material was privileged
communication, then this would constitute a legal excuse or justification.
(i)

That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)
- double jeopardy

PROCEDURE IF GROUND IS CURABLE BY AMENDMENT (Sec. 4, R117)

1.
If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can
be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)
2.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if
the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same
defect despite the amendment. (n)
What is the effect if a motion to quash is sustained? (Sec. 5, R. 117)
If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed
except if it was sustained on the grounds of double jeopardy or extinction of criminal liability, In such case,
the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail.

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-If not, or if the prosecutor fails to comply with the order of the court within the time allowed, the accused, if in
custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge.
NOTE: The quashal of an information will not prevent the refilling of the same case unless it was quashed due
to double jeopardy or extinction of the criminal liability. (Sec. 6, R117)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Sec. 7 R117)
BASIS: Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
1st Sentence SAME OFFENSE
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
2nd Sentence SAME ACT
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
RULE:

Double jeopardy will bar a second prosecution for the SAME ACT only if it is punished by a
national law AND a local ordinance

Example: B.P. 22 and ESTAFA can co-exist because both are punished by national laws. Nierra vs. Dacuycuy
181 S 1
Elements of Double Jeopardy
People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238,
People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202.
(a)
(b)
(c)

the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,

the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated and
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof

When does the first jeopardy attach?

Cudia v. CA, G.R. No. 110315, January 16, 1998;
Guerrero v. CA, 257 SCRA 703
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

upon a valid indictment,

before a competent court,
after arraignment,
when a valid plea has been entered, and
when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.

Will the pendency of another criminal case for the same offense bar subsequent prosecution by reason of
double jeopardy?
This is already clear under the new rules because the phrase previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted under the old Section 3 has been amended to read previously convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged
The change was based on the ruling in Pp. vs. Pineda which overturned the ruling in cases like Pp. vs.
City Court of Manila 121 S 627 where a contrary rule was espoused.
Later reiterations:
Pp. vs. David G. Nitafan, Feb. 1, 1999
-other pending cases will not amount to double jeopardy
Binay vs. Sandiganbayan Oct. 1, 1999.

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The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even
though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy
never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double
jeopardy where the accused entered as plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners,
therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of
double jeopardy. Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

EXCEPTIONS UNDER SECTION 7

(a)

the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
(E.G. TEEHANKEE)

(b)

the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea
was entered in the former complaint or information; or
Note: Under the 1985 RULES after filing of the information NEW RULES after a plea was
entered
why?- b4 plea there can be, as yet, no double jeopardy

(c)

the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of
the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.

1(f) of Rule 116- If the offended party fails to show up during the arraignment, there can be a plea to a lesser
offense even if only the prosecutor agrees.
DISMISSAL WAS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED
If the accused invokes his right to a speedy trial and the case is dismissed, can the case be refiled?NO, it cannot because DOUBLE JEOPARDY WILL ATTACH.
If the accused moves for a reinvestigation and, thereafter, the prosecutor moves for the dismissal of the case,
will double jeopardy lie to bar subsequent prosecution?
People vs. Vergara 221 SCRA 960
Filing a Motion for Reinvestigation does not amount to express consent to the dismissal of the case.
Express consent means direct and unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication.
If the acquittal was void, double jeopardy will not lie (Pp. vs. Bagul
131 S 296 Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu)
213 S 138
TEST TO DETERMINE IDENTITY OF OFFENSES
Andres S. Suero vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 156408. January 31, 2005
The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to
commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
Can double jeopardy operate to bar a prosecution for falsification of public documents when there is already a
prior acquittal in a case for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019?
Andres S. Suero vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 156408. January 31, 2005
Indeed, the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shares two common elements with the felony under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code that the offender is a public officer and that the act is related to the
officer's public position. However, the latter offense is not necessarily inclusive of the former. The essential
elements of each are not included among or do not form part of those enumerated in the former. For there to
be double jeopardy, the elements of one offense should like the ribs of an umbrella ideally encompass
those of the other. The elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the realm of those of

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falsification of a public document and vice versa. At most, the two offenses may be considered as two
conjoined umbrellas with one or two common ribs. Clearly, one offense does not include the other.
Provisional dismissal. (NEW, Sec. 8, R117 )
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine
of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. (n)
THE FAILURE TO RAISE A GROUND IN A MOTION TO QUASH OPERATES AS A WAIVER OF THE GROUND
EXCEPT THE FOLLOWING:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Sec. 9, R 117)

RULE 118 - PRE-TRIAL

PURPOSE OF PRE-TRIAL
Abubakar vs. Abubakar Oct 22, 1999
That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly laid out in
Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be tackled and
proved at the trial. A less cluttered case environment means that there will be fewer points of contention for
the trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution according every
person the right to a speedy disposition of their cases. If the parties can agree on certain facts prior to trial
hence, the prefix "pre" the court can later concentrate on those which are seemingly irreconcilable. The
purpose of pre-trials is the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation. The stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial order which legally binds the parties to honor the
same.
Pre-trial agreement. (Sec. 2)
All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The
agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (from
sec. 4 cir. 38-98)
Is the approval by the court of the pre-trial agreement necessary for it to be binding upon the parties?
Bayas, Et Al vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 143689-91. November 12, 2002
for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the
agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel.
The court's approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the
stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the
court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
Cristeta Chua-Burce, vs. CA
G.R. No. 109595. April 27, 2000.
Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. While the trial
of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of arraignment, the civil
case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference of the criminal case, the
parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal
case. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their written agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of
the Rules of Court. Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by her counsel, with the conforme of the public
prosecutor, entered into a pre-trial agreement.

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The accused now assails the validity of the proceedings in the criminal case.
HELD: It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in
the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court 17
which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote
a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, 18 reduced to writing such
agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by
the pre-trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its contents.
The express admission of the accused during pre-trial that he is the father of the complainant is inadmissible
if he and his counsel did not sign the Stipulation of Facts.
People vs. Dionisio
G.R. No. 142431. January 14, 2004
Moreover, the fact that appellant admitted that he is the father of Ginalyn during the pre-trial, thus
dispensing with the need to present evidence to prove the same, will not justify the trial court's appreciation
of the qualifying circumstance of relationship. A perusal of the pre-trial order would readily show that the said
stipulation was not signed by the appellant and his counsel. Hence, it cannot be used as evidence against
him. Rule 118, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "all agreements or admissions
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused." This requirement is mandatory. Thus, the
omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the
Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
SEC. 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor
does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of
cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. (sec. 5, cir. 38-98)
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice. (3)

RULE 119 TRIAL

Trial is the time allotted by law for the parties to present their evidence in accordance with the
rules of procedure.
SECTION 1. Time to prepare for trial. After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at
least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
pre-trial order. (sec. 6, cir. 38-98)
- under the old rule (1985 Rules) the time to prepare for trial was only 2 days.
SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. Trial once commenced shall continue from
day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good
cause. (2a)
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for
continuous trail on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (sec. 8, cir. 38-98).
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial. (n)
The second and third paragraphs are new provisions that are taken from the Speedy Trial Act and,
more particularly, from Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98
What is important to remember here is to remember that the law now sets or provides for a time limit
of (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. for the trial to be
terminated.

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NOTA BENE:
Sections 3 to 10 ARE ALL NEW PROVISIONS LIFTED FROM THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND SC Circular
No. 38-98
REVIEW THEM!
SEC. 9 IS VERY IMPORTANT
SEC. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. If the accused is not
brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6
of this rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to
speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The
dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Section 1 (g) Rule 116- accused should be arraigned within 30 days from the
date the court acquires jurisdiction over his person
excluding
the
pendency of a motion to quash or for a
bill of particulars or other grounds
for suspending
arraignment
Section 1

Rule 119trial should begin within (30) days from receipt of pretrial order (Note pre-trial should be conducted within
30
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the
accused Sec. 1 Rule 118)
Extension under Sec. 6period from arraignment to trial is 80 days (Note: This
is because over three years have already passed
September 15, 1998)

since

NOTE: Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to
dismiss under this section. (sec. 14, cir. 38-98)
Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution. (Sec. 10, R119)
No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any
charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by section 14(2), article III, of the 1987 Constitution.
(sec. 15, cir. 38-98)
INTERESTING CASE ON THE ORDER OF TRIAL (Section 11)
Section 11 (e) of Rule 119 provides:
When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a
lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
Is this Mandatory or Discretionary?
People vs. Mario Marcial, Et Al
G.R. Nos. 152864-65. September 27, 2006.
Modifying the Order of Trial is within the sound discretion of the court. Section 11 (e) uses the phrase
the order of trial MAY be modified, Section 7 of R.A. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act) uses the phrase MAY modify
the order of trial and Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 uses the SAME phrase.
Thus, even if an accused raises justifying circumstances or some other lawful defense while admitting
the act or omission charged in the information, the court may still deny a motion to reverse the order of trial.

SEC. 12. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. When the accused has been
held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to the other parties, have witnesses
conditionally examined in his behalf. The motion shall state: (a) the name and residence of the witness; (b) the
substance of his testimony; and (c) that the witness is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for
believing tha the will not be able to attend the trial, or resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from

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the place of trial and has no means to attend the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would
make him unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit of
the accused and such other evidence as the court may require. (4a)
SEC. 13. Examination of defense witness; how made. If the court is satisfied that the examination of
a witness for the accused is necessary, an order shall be made directing that the witness be examined at a
specific date, time and place and that a copy of the order be served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days
before the scheduled examination. The examination shall be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a
member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court
of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein. The examination shall proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified of the hearing. A written record
of the testimony shall be taken. (5a)
SEC. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness. When the court is satisfied, upon proof of
oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, UPON MOTION OF EITHER PARTY, order the
witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit
him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken. (6a)
-applies to witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.
Cross reference with WITNESS PROTECTION LAW (R.A. 6981) to protect witnesses who do not want
to testify by reason of fear.
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it is satisfactorily appears that a witness
for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, of has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner
as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (7a)
Distiguish Section 13 and 15
13-

Defense Witness

15-

Prosecution Witness

13-

examination may be made before any member of the bar in good standing or the judge of an
inferior court designated by the judge of the court where the case is pending.

15-

Examination may be made only before the judge or the court where the case is pending.

Why? Because the prosecution (the State) is presumed to have all the resources of the government
available to it to cause the production of its witnesses.

SEC. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:
(a)

There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b)

There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c)

The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d)

Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e)

Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the
court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence. (9a)
SEC. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. The order indicated in the preceding
section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution

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for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in
accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. (10a)
Important principles:
1.

Since the discharge of the accused operates as an acquittal, (SEC. 18) regardless of whether or not his
testimony is used by the prosecution.

2.

Even if the judge erred in granting the discharge (e.g. the accused was the most guilty) this will not
affect the validity of the discharge or the admissibility of the testimony of the witness but judges are
warned in these instances to take the said testimony with a grain of salt. ( GOCO CASE 209 scra 329)

3.

The term does not appear to be the most guilty refers to degree of actual participation and not to the
imposable penalty which would be equal if there is conspiracy (Pp. Vs. Sumail 212 SCRA 626)

4.

The witness who is an accused may be discharged AFTER he testifies (for as long as the prosecution
has not yet rested upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case (Sec 17) ) Rosales vs. CA
215 SCRA 102)

5.

The fiscal has no right to omit the inclusion of any of the accused from the information even if he
intends to use him as a state witness (because under Rule 110 Sec. 2 the information is supposed to
be filed against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved) and it is the judge
who is trying the case who has the authority, under Sec. 17, to order the discharge of the accused.

6.

For this same reason, an MTC JUDGE who is conducting a preliminary investigation in a crim case
cognizable by the RTC cannot order the discharge of an accused since he is not the judge trying the
case. (MTCs cannot conduct PI anymore)

7.

What is meant by the requirement of a hearing in support of the discharge? It is the hearing where
the affidavit of the witness who is proposed to be discharged is presented to the court and the other
accused are given an opportunity to oppose the motion to discharge him. The witness is not actually
required to testify during that same hearing (Pp. Vs. CA and Jose Pring 223 SCRA 479)
Note: The requirement of the submission of an affidavit of the proposed witness was introduced in
the 1985 Rules so that the judge would have an idea as to what this witness will be testifying on. (This
inadequacy in the old law was noted by the SC in the case of Flores vs. SB 124 scra 109)
Is it necessary for the testimony of a proposed state witness to be corroborated by other witnesses?
Rimberto T. Salvanera vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 143093, May 21, 2007

To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix
on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that there must be no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state
witness. The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same
evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that a conspiracy is more
readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of
the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the
confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the
truth in other respects. It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other
witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of
Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each others testimonies and the circumstances
disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and to such extent that their
trustworthiness becomes manifest.
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. When it becomes manifest at
any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused
cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused
shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the
accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper
information. (11a)
Cf with last par of Sec. 14, R. 110
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a)

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Also Secs. 4 and 5 of R117
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect
of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment
be made. (4a)
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall
be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect
despite the amendment. (n)
SEC. 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may
order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the order is
made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if
having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further
time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also
in custody of another charge. (5a)
Exclusion of the public. (Sec. 21, R119)
The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during
the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public
from the trial except court personnel and the counsel of the parties. (13a)
The right of the accused to a public trial is not absolute. The public may be excluded if the evidence to
be produced is offensive to decency or public morals.
Examples of instances when the public or some of the public may be excluded:
1.

The evidence to be presented is of such character as to be offensive to public morals.

2.

When the accused requests it.

3.

To prevent disorder in the court.

4.

To prevent the embarrasment of a witness.

5.

To limit the attendance to seating capacity.

Consolidation of trials of related offenses. (SEC. 22, R119)

Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character
may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. (14a)
Cf: Section 2, R 111- TAKE NOTE that R111 refers to consolidation of the civil aspect with the
criminal in case where a separate civil action was filed..
Section 22 refers to consolidation of trials of related cases.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SOME PRINCIPLES RELATING TO DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE:
1. After the prosecution rests, the court motu propio can dismiss the case due to insufficiency of
evidence without the accused filing a demurrer to evidence. However, the judge must give the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard before he can dismiss the case.
2. The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall be filed within a non-extendible period
of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case and the prosecution may oppose the motion within
a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
3. If a demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of court, the accused can present evidence if it is denied.
However, if it is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence.
4. The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall
not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
5. If the court grants a demurrer to evidence and thus, dismisses the case, this amounts to an acquittal.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CAN ARISE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DEMURRER WAS FILED BY THE

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ACCUSED. (i.e., filing a demurrer to evidence does not amount to the express consent of the accused
to the dismissal)
Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear on the fact that if an accused files a Demurrer
to Evidence WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT, he WAIVES the right to present evidence if it is DENIED.
People vs. Dominador Cachola
G.R. Nos. 148712-15. January 21, 2004
The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a
clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had been denied due
process because the evidence they belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow
them to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever
dictated by convenience.
Reopening

(SEC. 24, R119)

. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with
hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be
terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it. (n)
Crossreference Rule 119 with
RA 4908-

SPEEDY TRIAL OF CASES WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS ABOUT TO LEAVE THE PHILS WITH
NO DEFINITE DATE OF RETURN.

RA 6033

- PREFERRENCE OF CASES INVOLVING INDIGENTS

RA 6034

TRANSPORT AND ALLOWANCES FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS

RA 6035

FREE TRANSCRIPTS FOR INDIGENT LITIGANTS

RULE 120 JUDGMENT

Judgment; definition and form.

Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged
and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and
distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. (1a)

JUDGMENT MUST BE IN WRITING

Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia
162 SCRA 665
Marcelino Rivera, Jr. vs. Pp
August 30, 1990
"Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order of dismissal issued
by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case, whether based on the merits or for failure
of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches.
The order is also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions
of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely
dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is no showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever
reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so
that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly
signed by him, reinstating the case."
What must a judgment contain? (Sec. 2 R120)
IF FOR CONVICTION:
(1)

the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission;

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(2)

the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact;

(3)

the penalty imposed upon the accused; and

(4)

the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

Pp vs. Marcelino A. Bugarin

June 13, 1997
Pp. vs. Elegio Nadera
Feb. 2, 2000
Eligio Madrid vs. CA
May 31, 2000
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993, the trial court, after giving a summary of the
testimonies of the complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her story of how she was
raped? The answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a definite yes.
Does this comply with the required contents of a judgment?

The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects. First, it does not
contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal questions involved. It does
not explain why the trial court considered the complainant's testimony credible despite the fact that, as
accused-appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly
raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of complainant's genital constituted attempted rape
and not another crime. Second, the complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in
November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December 23, 1991, and that
once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her father who licked her private part, for which reason six
informations were filed against him, but the decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of
rape (which the trial court erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape, without explaining
whether accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape. Third, the decision is so carelessly
prepared that it finds the accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among
other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he
can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he
disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge
did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of
his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in
the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.
These requirements are applicable even on appealed cases
Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA
Nov. 23, 2000
The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed
peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:
"This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their corresponding
memorandum or brief. The prosecution filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.
"After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto and exhibits
thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated decision and hereby affirms
the decision of the lower court in toto."
The Constitution requires that "[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides that "[T]he judgment must be written in the official language, personally and

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directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based."
Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full findings of fact and
conclusion of law of its own.
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity.
IF FOR ACQUITTAL
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (2a)
Judgment for two or more offenses. (Sec. 3, R120)
Considering that it has already been settled that while under Rule 110, an information or complaint
should only charge one offense and that this is a ground for quashal under Rule 117, this defect is waivable.
Thus, if it is waived, the accused can be convicted of as many crimes as there are charged in the
information or complaint.
People vs. Conde Rapisora
January 25, 2001
The information against the accused has charged him with multiple rape, at least six times according
to the trial court in its findings. Section 3, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that "when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each and every one of them . . ." Rapisora can thus be held responsible for as many rapes as
might have been committed by him which are duly proven at the trial.
Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. (Sec. 4, R120)
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved. (4a)
SIMPLE PRINCIPLE:
e.g.

The accused can be convicted of an offense necessarily included in the offense

charged but he can NEVER be convicted of a higher offense

Charged with murder. If only homicide is proven he can be convicted of homicide.

But if charged with homicide, even if murder is proven, he can only be convicted of homicide.

When does an offense include and when is it included in another offense?

(Sec. 5, R120)
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.
IMPT: If the offense proven is not necessarily included or does not necessarily include the offense
charged then follow the rule on mistake in charging the offense. This is because, in this situation, the offense
proven it is clearly a WHOLLY DIFFERENT OFFENSE from the offense charged.
Can a municipal mayor charged with UNLAWFUL INTERVENTION in the issuance of a cockpit license be
convicted of POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED INTEREST of the same cockpit when the latter offense is not
included in the information but was proven during the trial?
Edgar Teves vs. Sandiganbayan (EN BANC)
G.R. No. 154182. December 17, 2004
The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.,

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Can a person accused of murder as a principal be convicted of murder as an accessory?

Lito Vino vs. CA
Oct. 19, 1989
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the
said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is
in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a
principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an
accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as
an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.

Is Malversation included in Technical Malversation?

Oscar Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan
May 15, 1991
A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distinct and different from the
other. In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or
allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the
public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another's personal use, but to a
public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical malversation is,
therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged in
the information. Since the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the
information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the crime of malversation
of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical malversation.
Rape and Qualified Seduction
Pp. vs. Servillano Velasquez
205 PHIL 741
Assuming it to be a fact that the appellant may be considered a "domestic" within the meaning of Art.
337 of the Revised Penal Code a point disputed by the appellant who claimed that he was not staying in the
house of his sister but only operated a radio repair shop in the ground floor of said house still, no
conviction for qualified seduction may be decreed against the appellant. This is because there is no allegation
in the information filed against him of two of the essential elements of the crime of qualified seduction, to wit:
virginity of the offended party, and that the latter is over 12 but under 18 years of age. In the event of a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved or established by the
evidence, the accused may only be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of
the offense charged included in that which is proved. The view that conviction for qualified seduction may not
be had on a charge of rape had already been expounded by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in People vs.
Ramires, 69 SCRA 144. For similar reasons, neither may the appellant be validly convicted of the crime of
simple seduction. As may be noted from the information filed against the appellant, there is likewise no
allegation therein of the elements of the good reputation of the offended party and of the latter being over 12
but under 18 years of age, which are essential for the commission of the crime simple seduction.
Pp. vs. Napoleon Subingsubing
Nov. 25, 1993
The verified complainant for rape contains allegations, sans averment on the use of force, which
impute the crime of qualified seduction. Any deficiency in the complaint is supplied by the supporting
affidavit, where complainant averred that the accused Napoleon Subingsubing, her uncle, who was living in
the same house as the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her. The accused took advantage of his
moral ascendancy if not dominance over the complainant. She was presumably a virgin. As already stated, the
accused was a domestic in relation to the complainant within the meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Apolinario Gonzales vs. CA
May 31, 1994
Rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. The elements of rape (1) that the offender
has had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act is accomplished (a) by using force or
intimidation, or (b) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the woman
is under twelve (12) years of age substantially differ from the elements of qualified seduction. The latter

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requires (1) that the offended party is a virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation;
(2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age; (3) that the offender has sexual
intercourse with her; and (4) that there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the
offender. While the two felonies have one common element, i.e., carnal knowledge of a woman, they
significantly vary in all other respects. Contrary to the assertion of accused-petitioner, the case of People vs.
Samillano (56 SCRA 573), did not hold that qualified seduction is necessarily included in rape; what this Court
has said is that one who is charged with rape may be found guilty of qualified seduction when the "verified
complaint for rape contains allegations which aver the crime of seduction."
Pp. vs. Benjamin Ortega
July 24, 1997
-Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning under
charges murder by means of stabbing.

an information that

Odon Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan

Nov. 14, 1994
There is no such thing as attempted violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. These
stages apply only to felonies under the RPC.
Can an accused held liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide if the information charges murder?
Pp. vs. Eutiquia Carmen, Et. Al.
G.R. No. 137268. March 26, 2001
The parents of a young boy, believing that their son is possessed brought him to a healer who
said she could exorcise the bad spirit. However the process of exorcism done through immersing the boy
head first into a drum of water resulted to his death. The accused, the healer and her assistants, were charged
with murder.
HELD:
In United States v. Divino, the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the
victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in petroleum around the
victim's feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the victim. The Court held the accused
liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was noted that the accused had no intention to
cause an evil but rather to remedy the victim's ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez, the Court ruled that the proper charge to file against a nonmedical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not possess the necessary
technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latter's death, was homicide through reckless
imprudence.
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a
quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense.
The fact that the information odes not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is
of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and
the result has proven beneficial to him
In People v. Fernando, the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial court. On
appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.

Can an information charging the accused with having sexually abused the victim be sufficient to justify a
conviction for rape?
People vs. Pedro Flores
December 27, 2002
The information:
That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West,
Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

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Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA
FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the herein accused with the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon
and all against her will
HELD
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital of facts in
the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not being an essential element
or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that matter
under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent which must be set forth in the
complaint or information with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
And even under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), accused-appellant cannot be held liable.
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
40 , issued pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610, defines "sexual abuse" by inclusion as follows:
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or 2) the
molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest with children. (Emphasis supplied)
From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase "sexually abuse" in the
criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that the complaint must contain a specific
averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase "sexual abuse" is not used
under R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an altogether separate offense. above-quoted Section 5
thereof enumerates the punishable acts that must be alleged in the complaint or information to hold an
accused liable, none of which is reflected, in the complaints at bar charging accused-appellant.
-The Supreme Court found the information to be VOID and DISMISSED the case.
Can an accused be convicted of illegal discharge of firearm if the charge is murder?
People vs. Geronimo Dado
Nov. 18, 2002
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victim's right
outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that said
wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioner's .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial
court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it
appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the
victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill
cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus
interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the
crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove
such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime
are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no
intention to kill that person. Though the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly
convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful
killing of a person.
In case of an acquittal may the accused be found CIVILLY LIABLE in the same criminal case?
Anamer Salazar vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 151931, Sept. 23, 2003
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case
where:
(a)

the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

(b)

where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;

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(c)

where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted.

Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him
On PROMULGATION
In the presence of the accused
Promulgation of judgment is one of the instances where the presence of the accused is required.
As provided, one of the exceptions is when the conviction is for a light offense.
What are light felonies?
Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both, is provided.
What about if the judgment is for acquittal?
Myla Paredes Et. Al. vs. Judge Jacinto Manalo
May 10, 1995
The delay in the promulgation of the decision in Crim. Case No. 1603 was ironically caused by
respondent Judge. We find that he acquitted complainants in the case. Such being the case, the presence of
accused was not necessary as the judgment was one of acquittal. Moreover, Sec. 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that if the accused fails to appear, the promulgation shall consist in the recording of
the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof served upon his counsel.
Yolanda Cruz vs. Filomeno Pascual
May 12, 1995
With regard to the absence of the accused during the promulgation of the judgment, we hold that
respondent Judge did not administratively err in proceeding with the promulgation. In a verdict of acquittal,
the presence of the accused is not indispensable since no appeal is necessary and the judgment become final
and executory immediately after promulgation. The reading of the sentence in open court to counsel for the
accused or giving a copy of the decision to the accused or his counsel is sufficient promulgation.
Is it necessary for the offended party to be notified?
Abraham Ramirez vs. Antonia Corpuz- Macandong
Sept. 26, 1986
Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of the
promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to notify the offended
party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a judge to do so.
The last paragraph was taken from the case of Pp. vs. Omar Mapalao May 14, 1991
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his
arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a)
The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

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NOTE: THE JUDGEMENT MUST BE PROMULGATED DURING THE
INCUMBENCY OF THE
JUDGE RENDERING THE DECISION
OTHERWISE IT WOULD NO LONGER BE A DECISION
PENNED
PERSONALLY AND DIRECLY BY THE JUDGE.
Pp. vs. CFI of QUEZON CITY
227 SCRA 457
Judge who penned the decision detailed to another branch of the RTC OF QC
- No violation because he belongs to the same court even if different branch.

TYPES OF PROMULGATION (Sec. 6)

1.

ORDINARY PROMULGATION- reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered.

2.

PROMULGATION OF CONVICTION IN A LIGHT FELONY- the judgment may be pronounced in the

presence of his counsel or representative.

3.

PROMULGATION BY CLERK OF COURT- When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

4.

PROMULGATION BY EXEC. JUDGE- If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment.

5.

PROMULGATION IN ABSENTIA- In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment
in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

Essential requisites of promulgation in absentia:

(a)

that the accused was notified of the scheduled date of promulgation

(b)

that despite such notice, he failed to appear;

(c)

that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and

(d)

that a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel.

If the accused fails to appear during promulgation despite notice and the judgment is read in the presence of
her counsel, will the failure of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket affect the validity of the
promulgation?
Marilyn C. Pascua vs. Court of Appeals
December 14, 2000
In the absence of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket, there can be NO VALID
PROMULGATION.
In the same case, will the fact that the accused subsequently received a copy of the decision cause the 15 day
period to appeal to begin to run?
We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does not in any way cure
an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in the criminal docket later, such piece-meal
compliance with the Rules will still not validate the May 5, 1998 promulgation which was invalid at the time it
was conducted. The express mention in the provision of both requirements for a valid promulgation in
absentia clearly means that they indeed must concur.
If the accused jumps bail, it amounts to an abandonment of his appeal and the judgment immediately
becomes final and executory.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004

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As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory.
Modification of judgment. (Sec. 7)
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. (7a)
NOTE: Prosecution cannot move for modification.
Pp. vs. Eladio Viernes
G.R. Nos. 136733-35. December 13, 2001
In 1985, Section 7 of Rule 120 was amended to include the phrase "upon motion of the accused"
effectively resurrecting the Ang Cho Kio ruling (95 Phil. 475) prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a
modification of a judgment of conviction.
Under this Rule, a judgment of conviction, before it became final, could be modified or set aside upon
motion of the accused. It obviously aims to protect the accused from being put anew to defend himself from
more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked in the original
trial. It does not however bar him from seeking or receiving more favorable modifications.
Significantly, the present Rules, as amended last year, retained the phrase "upon motion of the
accused,"
NOTE: EVEN IF FINALITY OF THE CRIM ASPECT IS ACCELERATED, THE CIVIL ASPECT WILL BECOME FINAL
ONLY AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 15 DAY PERIOD TO APPEAL.
Pp. vs. Pedro Santiago
June 20, 1989
Reiterated in
Palu-ay vs. CA, July 30, 1998
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense,
the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

RULE 121 - NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

New trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court
may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration. (Sec. 1, R 121)
At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final
1.

This Rule applies only to judgments of conviction- an acquittal is immediately final and executory.

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2.

Within fifteen days from the date of promulgation the accused can appeal. The period to appeal is
interrupted by the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for New Trial. The period will run
again from notice of the denial of the Motion. (A new 15 day period per the Neypes Ruling)

3.

If the accused files a Motion for New Trial or a Motion for Reconsideration, he waives the right against
double jeopardy. This means that the court can modify the judgment to a graver offense. E.G. Charged
with Murder Convicted of Homicide, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, judge modified the judgment to
murder.

4.

Distinctions between Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial and Modification of judgment.
BOTH can affect only judgments of conviction.
a)

Modification of judgment can be had only upon motion of the accused while Recon and New
Trial can also be at the courts own instance with the consent of the accused.

b)

In modification of judgment the original judgment stands while in a Motion for Recon or New
Trial, if it is granted, there will be an entirely new judgment.

Grounds for a new trial. (Sec. 2, R121)

That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial
This refers to instances where there was a serious breach of procedure that prejudiced the substantial
rights of the accused. Examples:
1.

The accused was forced to go into trial without counsel;

2.

The counsel for the accused turned out to be a fraud who is not actually a lawyer.

3.

A material witness for the accused was not allowed to testify on the basis on an
erroneous application of the rules.

4.

The court erroneously refused to issue subpoena to compel the attendance of a

material witness for the accused.

newly discovered evidence

Requisites:
Pp. vs. Alberto Tirona
Dec. 22, 1998
For newly discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial under paragraph (b) above, it is required that
i)
ii)
iii)

the evidence is discovered after trial;

such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and
the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that,
if admitted, would probably change the judgment.

Will the recantation of a witness through an affidavit of desistance be sufficient a new trial?
Gomez vs. IAC 135 SCRA 6
Pp vs. Eduardo Garcia
March 31, 1998
When confronted with an affidavit of recantation, courts are called upon to weigh countervailing
values in our legal and judicial system. A recantation, as a general rule, is not sufficient to warrant a new trial.
If it were otherwise, a new trial would be granted whenever an interested party succeeds in intimidating or
inducing any or some of the witnesses to retract after trial their testimony, thus, opening the door to endless
litigation. It is also injudicious to reject a testimony solely on the basis of such recantation, which may later
be repudiated, as this "will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses."
To warrant a new trial, Joylyn's affidavit of desistance must constitute a recantation and not a mere
withdrawal from the prosecution of the case. The Court en banc in Alonte, speaking through Mr. Justice Jose
C. Vitug, held that the complainant's affidavit of desistance did not constitute a recantation, because she did
not deny the truth of her complaint but merely sought to "be allowed to withdraw" and "discontinue" the case

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because she wished "to start life anew and live normally again." She never absolved or exculpated the
accused. In other words, a recantation of a prior statement or testimony must necessarily renounce the said
statement or testimony and withdraw it formally and publicly
Ground for reconsideration (Sec. 3, R121)
errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings
What are the grounds?
1.

court made a mistake in arriving at its decision

2.

decision is not in accordance with the law.

3.

decision not in accordance with the evidence.

Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. (SEC. 6, R121)

The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:
(a)

When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during
the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew.
The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b)

When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already
adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in
the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with the
evidence already in the record.

(c)

In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be
set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (6a)

RULE 122 - APPEAL

Who may appeal?( Sec. 1, R122)
. Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
(2a)
1.

Prosecution for as long as the accused will not be placed in double jeopardy.
GEN RULE: PROS. CANNOT APPEAL BECAUSE THE ACCUSED WILL BE PLACED IN
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
EXCEPTION E.G. - ACCUSED FILED MOTION TO QUASH ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION GRANTED BY COURT, PROS CAN APPEAL, NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
SINCE IT WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ACCUSED.

2.

The accused. (An appeal by the accused waives double jeopardy. Thus, if he was convicted
for homicide under a charge of murder and he appeals, the appellate court can convict him for
murder)

3.

Offended party insofar as the civil aspect is concerned. (Palu-ay vs. CA, July 30, 1998)

Pp. vs. Madali

Jan 16, 2001.
Rule 122, 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "(a)ny party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." It has been held that the word
"party" in the provision in question includes not only the government and the accused but other persons as
well, such as the complainant who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. The
complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime, unless of course he has reserved to
bring a separate civil action to recover the civil liability. Hence, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is that of a witness for the prosecution. Ordinarily, the appeal of criminal cases involves as
parties only the accused, as appellants, and the State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, as
the appellee. The participation of the private offended party would be a mere surplusage, if the State were
simply to seek the affirmation of a judgment of conviction. However, where the Office of the Solicitor General
takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainant's

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right to be heard on the question of award of indemnity and damages arises. In the interest of justice and
equity and to provide perspective for this appeal, therefore, the Court hereby allows in this case the
memorandum filed by complainant which is hereby admitted as part of the records of this appeal.
4.

bondsmen of the accused in relation to liability on the bond.

5.

employer in relation to subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the RPC

If the employee absconds or jumps bail and there is a judgment for civil liability, can the employer appeal?
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own
behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the
accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has
become final and executory.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation
erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained
finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be
enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence.
In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and
upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil
liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly
complied with
What is the remedy of the offended party if the court grants an accuseds motion to withdraw the
information ?
First Womens Credit Corp. Et Al vs. Hon. Rommel O. Baybay, Et Al
G.R. No. 166888, January 31, 2007
As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accuseds motion to
withdraw information and/or to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure instructs: Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed
in double jeopardy.
In availing of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, petitioners claim that they had no plain,
adequate and speedy remedy to question the MeTCs grant of the motion.
The records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC before respondents
were arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against appeal in case a criminal case is dismissed as the accused
would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply.
Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (Sec. 11, R122)
(a)
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
(b)
The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect
judgment or order appealed from.

the criminal aspect of the

(c)
Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final
be stayed as to the appealing party. (11a)

order appealed from shall

Withdrawal of appeal (Sec. 12 R122)

- Notwithstanding perfection of the appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, may allow the

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appellant to withdraw his appeal before the record has been forwarded by the clerk of court to the proper
appellate court as provided in section 8, in which case the judgment shall become final. The Regional Trial
Court may also, in its discretion, allow the appellant from the judgment of a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court to withdraw his appeal, provided a
motion to that effect is filed before rendition of the judgment in the case on appeal, in which case the
judgment of the court of origin shall become final and the case shall be remanded to the latter court for
execution of the judgment. (12a)
People vs. Ricardo Rio
G.R. No. 90294 Sept. 24, 1991
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It
continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an
accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had
signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal.
Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a
counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and
perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." Justice should
never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should
always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more circumspect
with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be
above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not
committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
SEC. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal - It shall be the duty of the
clerk of court of the trial court, upon filing of a notice of appeal to ascertain from the appellant, if
confined in prison, whether he desires the Regional Trial Court, Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him and to transmit with the record on a form to be prepared
by the clerk of court of the appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and of the
response of the appellant to his inquiry. (13a)

RULE 123 - PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

SECTION 1. Uniform Procedure. The procedure to be observed in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional
Trial Courts, except where a particular provision applies only to either of said courts and in criminal
cases governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. (1a)
1991 RULES OF SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Coverage as to Criminal Cases (Sec. 1 B)
B.

Criminal Cases:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

Violations of the rental law;
Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);
All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment
not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the
imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in the same
complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the
offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure.
Section 15 2nd Par.
Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his affidavit was
previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof.
Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr., vs. Judge Gaydifredo O. Ocampo

January 29, 1993

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In Orino vs. Judge Gervasio, the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute Resolution that even if a witness has
not priorly submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to testify in connection with a specific factual matter
relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor whose medical certificate is among the evidence on record may
be called to testify. This also applies to a Register of Deeds or Provincial Assessor in connection with official
documents issued by his office.

RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This Rule speaks of searches where a warrant is issued.
Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search and seizure may be
effected, to wit:
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES:
From the concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban
In the case of People vs. Florencio Doria
January 22, 1999
1.

Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a warrant for
dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such incidental search is,
however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended
to or made in a place other than the place of the arrest.
2.

The "Plain View" Doctrine

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer
is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said
officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is
otherwise subject to seizure.
3.

Search of Moving Vehicles

The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified by
practicability, viz.:
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form
in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of
the world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other
public place is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum
running,' which in itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but
a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private
premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The
baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from
those against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal
laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a
search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the
circumstances under which it is made."
4.

Customs Searches

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Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even without
warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a
judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to "enter, pass through or search any land,
enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law."
5.

Search With Consent

Waiver of any objection to the unreasonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized exception to

the rule against a warrantless search. The consent to the search, however, must be express, knowing and
voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescence is not valid, because such consent is not within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under
intimidating and coercive circumstances.
In People v. Lacerna, it was held that the otherwise prohibited intrusive search of appellant's plastic
bag was validated by the express consent of appellant himself, who was observed to be "urbanized in
mannerism and speech," and who moreover stated that he had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.
6.

"Stop and Frisk"

The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry v. Ohio.
The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial inquiries, approach
and restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check, the latter's outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion should be applied has been
laid down as follows:
". . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a crime, mere
suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a genuine reason, in accordance with
the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held
has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals and in Manalili v.
Court of Appeals. In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan
City Police, observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobbly
manner along the city cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular hangout of drug
addicts. Based on police experience, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of persons who were "high"
on drugs. The Court held that past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient
reason to stop the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they found in
the suspect's possession was held to be admissible in evidence.
Some cases where tipped information was sufficient to justify warrantless searches
From People vs. Samuel Valdez
March 3, 1999
In People v. Tangliben, two police officers and a barangay tanod were conducting surveillance mission
at the Victory Liner terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit
misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on
information supplied by informers. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red
travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. An informer pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying
marijuana. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when
the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The
police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest. Hence, faced with such onthe-spot tip, the police officers acted quickly as there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
In People v. Maspil, a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the
Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway
going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by informers that Maspil and
Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with
the policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1,
1986, a jeepney approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers
stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When
opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen
thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific
examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus conducted,

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as being incidental to lawful warrantless arrest and declared that Maspil and Bagking had been caught in
flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs.
In People v. Malmstedt, Narcom agents set up checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province in view
of reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. There was no reasonable time
to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained.
Accused's actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the inspection aboard the bus.
The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act
promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming
from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since
she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan
Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they
chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the
policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed
his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accusedappellant to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the
fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts
What is the extent of an allowable routine search at police or military checkpoints (part of Search of Moving
Vehicles) ?
Rudy Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
January 15, 2002
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
(1)
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;
(2)

simply looks into a vehicle;

(3)

flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;

(4)

where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;

(5)

where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual

(6)

where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

inspection; and

Examples of valid warrantless searches with consent:

Also from Rudy Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
January 15, 2002
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to
search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said search.
In People vs. Lacerna, the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who
asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the
consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech"
expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing
wrong.
In People vs. Cuizon, the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they
freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu.
In People vs. Montilla, it was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of
volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly
be construed as a clear waiver of his right.
In People vs. Omaweng, the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his
bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the policemen
asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a valid
consented search

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SECTION 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a)

Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b)

For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending. (n)
THIS IS AN ENTIRELY NEW PROVISION
Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with
an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on
a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.
Elizalde Malaloan, et al, vs. CA
G.R. No. 104879. May 6, 1994
Application for search warrant was filed with RTC of Caloocan and enforced/implemented in Quezon
City
HELD:
No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such
restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction,
there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period
is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the
warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not
become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other
hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days
but there is no
provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within
the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN MALALOAN
In relation to the authority of courts to issue warrants of arrest
1.

The Court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be
filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must
prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application
depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary
jurisdiction thereover.

2.

When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall
be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by
the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3.

Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion
to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by
the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during
the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress.
The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy
in the appropriate higher court.

4.

Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not
otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant

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shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the
necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5.

These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over
the criminal action. When the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such
court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants
incident to the criminal case.
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Subject of the offense;

Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)

Requisites for issuing a search warrant

Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
255 SCRA 438. March 29, 1996.
(1)

probable cause is present;

(2)

such presence is determined personally by the judge;

(3)

the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in
writing and under oath or affirmation;

(4)

the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and

(5)

the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized

ADD
(6)
1

the warrant is in connection with one specific offense

Probable Cause is present

Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA

Quintero vs. National Bureau of Investigation, et al.,
June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 467
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched
2.

Determined Personally by the judge

Abdula vs. Guiani

Feb. 18, 2000
Similar to the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest where jurisprudence clearly explains
that What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
3.

the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in
writing and under oath or affirmation;

Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. vs. Asuncion

May 19, 1999
Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary information and (3) supplementary
statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod, however, none of the
aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's
participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness
Bacolod and it turned out that even Bacolod testified only that he believed that the PICOP security guards had
no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must
testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.
HELD:

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"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive not merely routinary or proforma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash
the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application
4.

The Applicant And The Witnesses Testify On Facts Personally Known To Them;

Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. vs. Asuncion

May 19, 1999
-affidavits and hearsay testimony is not sufficient
5

The Warrant Specifically Describes The Place To Be Searched And The Things To Be Seized

Frank Uy, Et. Al, vs. BIR

G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000
As to place
Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu
City" while the body of the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St.,
Mandaue City."
The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Thus, in
Castro vs. Pabalan, where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as
Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the
writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City.
Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner
corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be
searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant's invalidation in this case.
As to things to be seized
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity, especially
since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The issuing
judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said photocopies instead of
merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a general description in a
warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The
failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description in a warrant. The use by the
issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash
register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts," "production record books/inventory
lists, stock cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial records," and "bank statements/cancelled
checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.
As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales invoices,"
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these
documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are unregistered. 36
Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that
a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking into consideration
the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could
have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. 37
Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to
the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice,
and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and
unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and
those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.

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6.

In Connection With One Specific Offense

GENERAL WARRANT OR SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT

SHOTGUN WARRANT
Tambasan vs. People,
246 SCRA 184, July 14 1995
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant
No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scattershot warrant" and totally null and void.
Kenneth Roy Savage vs. Aproniano Taypin, Et. Al
May 11, 2000
Search warrant issued in relation to alleged unfair competition (Intellectual Properties case)
No such crime under the Intellectual Properties Code that should be given retroactive effect to benefit
the accused.
No basis for the issuance of a warrant.
Paper Industries Corp. of the Phil. vs. Asuncion
May 19, 1999
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that Judge may be able
to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
marker
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to
the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer
or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant to
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. No
search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
Quintero vs. NBI
162 SCRA 467
NBI agents, armed with a search warrant, raided a house. There was a witness but the NBI agents
searched different rooms simultaneously.
This cannot be allowed because it defeats the purpose of having a witness. The witness cannot be in
all the places being searched at the same time.
People vs. Court of Appeals
Dec. 8, 2000
But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted the search
notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of his household
to act as witnesses to the search?
The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads:
"SECTION 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality."
Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule since the searchers were
justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondent's wife and maid

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refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the "Certification of Orderly Search" and the receipt
of the property seized signed by respondent's wife.
We find merit in the petitioner's argument that private respondent's wife had no justifiable reason to
refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance of
official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family, the witnessto-search rule allows the search to be made "in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality." There was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the
Paraaque court and the barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would
allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses.
SEC. 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time,
unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)
People vs. Court of Appeals
Dec. 8, 2000
The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows
an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that
the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the
warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition
were kept at private respondent's residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the
affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The
rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within
which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the
execution of a warrant. We have examined the application for search warrant, and the deposition of the
witnesses supporting said application, and find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of
Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not
abuse his discretion in allowing a search "at any reasonable hour of the day or night." Absent such abuse of
discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed, is not improper.
Mustang Lumber vs. CA 257 SCRA 430
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April
1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued
on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant
has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or
purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the
same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.
Validity of search warrant.
A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void. (Sec. 10 R126)
-Unlike a warrant of arrest, a search warrant has a DEFINITE LIFETIME.
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS:
1.
How should an accused challenge the admissibility of evidence derived from the implementation of a
search warrant?
2.

WHICH COURT should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a case where the court that
issued it is not the court with which the case is filed as a consequence of the service of the warrant?

A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted,
the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search warrant. However, if such court failed
to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved
by the latter court. (Sec. 14, R 126)
Can the court that issued the warrant entertain a motion to quash the warrant if the case is still pending
preliminary investigation?
Solid Triangle Sales Corp. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Et Al
November 23, 2001
Petitioners also argue that Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra,
while intended "to resolve conflicts of responsibility between courts," "does not expressly cover the situation

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where the criminal complaint is pending with the prosecutor." In such a case, petitioners submit, the public
prosecutor should be allowed to resolve the question of whether or not probable cause exists.
The Court finds this interpretation too contrived. Section 14, Rule 126 precisely covers situations like
the one at bar. Section 14 expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been
instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the search warrant may be prevented from
resolving a motion to quash or suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another
court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the
court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation
is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of
an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary
investigation

RULE 127 - PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES

SECTION 1. Availability of provisional remedies. The provisional remedies in civil actions,
insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed instituted
with the criminal action. (1a)
SEC. 2. Attachment. When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action as
provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the accused attached as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused in the following cases:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;

When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, officer of a
corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his employment as such,
or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to do so;
and
When the accused resides outside the Philippines. (2a)

What are the provisional remedies?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Preliminary AttachmentRule 57
Preliminary InjunctionRule 58
ReceivershipRule 59
ReplevinRule 60
Support Pendente Lite Rule 61

GROUNDS FOR ATTACHMENT IN CIVIL CASES:

(a)

In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and
exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict
against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;

(b)

In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his

own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent,
or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary
capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c)

In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or

converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed
of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person;

(d)

In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;

(e)

In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so,
with intent to defraud his creditors; or

(f)

In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on
whom summons may be served by publication. (1a)

Very Important

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Court MUST have jurisdiction over the person of the accused for it to act on applications for
provisional remedies.
Section 5 of Rule 57 provides, in part thus:
xxxx No levy on attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof shall be enforced
unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a
copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant's affidavit and bond, and the order
and writ of attachment, on the defendant within the Philippines.
The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply where the
summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the
defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the defendant is a nonresident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi in rem. (5a)
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
History
Originally covered by P.D. 1508 Katarungang Pambarangay Law replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter
VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160 The Local Government Code
Guidelines:
Guidelines in the implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay system were given by the Supreme
Court in Administrative Circular No. 14-93, dated July 15, 1993.
Applicability to Criminal Cases:
Applicable to all Criminal Cases Except:
1.

Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals
shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents (Sec. 1,
Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);

2.

Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences
to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

3.

Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a
fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

4.

Offenses where there is no private offended party;

5.

Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention (See Sec. 412 (b)(1), Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law);

Venue:
(a)

Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election
of the complaint.
(c)

All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real
property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where
such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution
is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise,
the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving
objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. (Section 409, RA 7160)
Procedure:

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(a) Who may initiate proceeding Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any individual who has
a cause of action against another individual involving any matter within the authority of the lupon may
complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the barangay.
(b)
Mediation by lupon chairman Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within
the next working day summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their
witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort
within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
(c)
Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall
be interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume
upon receipt by the complainant of the complainant or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to
file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not
exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
(d)
Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification The pangkat shall convene not
later than three (3) days from its constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman, to hear both
parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this
purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of parties and witnesses before it. In
the event that a party moves to disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias, interest,
or any other similar grounds discovered after the constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by
the affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be
decided upon, the resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.
e)
Period to arrive at a settlement The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement or resolution of the
dispute within fifteen (15) days from the day it convenes in accordance with this section. This period shall, at
the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for another period which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except
in clearly meritorious cases. (Section 410, RA 7160)
Can the absence of a prior referral to Barangay Conciliation be raised after arraignment? Is it jurisdictional?
Baares II vs. Balising G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal
trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government
Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the
law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
dismiss. The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the
causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases
as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their
arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners
on the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said
ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at present considering that the
same had already become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled by the
Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
SOME INTERESTING CASES
People of the Philippines, Et Al vs. Rafael Bitanga
G.R. NO. 159222, June 26, 2007
-

A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is NOT APPLICABLE against criminal cases.

Section 1 of Rule 47 provides thus This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in CIVIL ACTIONS of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner.
Moreover, Section 18 of Rule 124 excludes Rule 47 from the rules on civil procedure that are
suppletorily applicable to criminal cases, to wit:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42,
44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and
appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Rule.

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Is the failure to file an appellants brief a ground to dismiss the appeal of an accused?
GENERAL RULE:

YES

However, take note of:

Nio Masas y Milan vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 177313, December 19, 2007
Section 8 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. - The Court of Appeals may, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
the appeal. (emphasis supplied)
The provision is clear and unambiguous. Section 8 provides for an exception in the dismissal of appeal
for failure to file the appellants brief, that is, where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
FINAL IMPORTANT REMINDER
DO NOT FORGET TO REVIEW THE CODAL PROVISIONS. A LOT OF THESE PROVISIONS WERE NO
LONGER REPRODUCED IN THESE NOTES NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE UNIMPORTANT BUT BECAUSE NO
FURTHER EXPLANATION IS NEEDED.
-IT IS ALWAYS BETTER TO MASTER THE BLACK LETTER OF THE LAW

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