RUBIO et al. vs.

ALABATA
DOCTRINES:
Execution of Judgments
Revival of Judgments
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed
as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the date of entry of
judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the
lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from
the time the judgment becomes final
FACTS:
Rubio et al and respondent Alabata were parties in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of
heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the RTC. The case was decided in favour of the
petitioner.
Respondent elevated the RTC-43 case to the CA. She, however, later withdrew her appeal which
paved the way for the RTC-43 Decision to lapse into finality. The CA resolution granting respondents
motion to withdraw became final and executory on June 20, 1997. On August 20, 1997, the entry of
Judgment was issued and recorded in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments.
Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Petitioners claim that their counsel at PAO was
never informed that the entry of judgment had already been issued.
More than 10 years from the date when the RTC-43 decision was entered in the Book of Entries
of J udgments, petitioners found out that the said decision had become final and executory when their
nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment.
Petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment which was raffled to
RTC-42. On February 28, 2008, after respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, RTC-42
granted her Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners case for revival of judgment dismissed on the
ground of prescription. Petitioners sought reconsideration, but RTC-42 denied the motion.
ISSUE:
WON the court a quo erred in applying the rules on prescription.
HELD:
No.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing
party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is
reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court
within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final.
Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence
when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment. An action for revival of judgment is governed by
Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
However, the Court in this case relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of
judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way
possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules
of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules
will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will
not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so,
manifest wrong or injustice would result.

LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS.

DOCTRINES:
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for
damages beforethe court where the carrier is domiciled; 2. the court where the carrier
has its principal place of business; 3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by
which the contract has been made; or 4. the court of the place of destination.
A defendant who files a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person together with other grounds raised therein is not deemed to have appeared
voluntarily before the court.
FACTS:
Edna Diago Lhuiller filed a complaint for damages against British Airways before the RTC of
Makati. She alleged that upon embarking a flight with BA, she was treated badly and to top it off she was
discriminated and humiliated by the crew members in the presence of other passengers.
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent through Violeta
Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. Respondent, by way of special
appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case
and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United
Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Article 28(1)
Warsaw Convention,
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of
domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.
TC ordered the petitioner to file her comment/opposition. Instead of filing a
Comment/Opposition, she filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admint Formal Amendment to the
Complaint and Issuance of Alias Summons.
RTC Makati granted the respondents motion to dismiss. The RTC saying that: Being a
signatory thereto, the Philippines adheres to its stipulations and is bound by its provisions including the
place where actions involving damages to plaintiff is to be instituted, as provided for under Article 28(1)
thereof.
Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from the
tortious conduct committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil
Code on Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage,
petitioner asserts that she has the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.
ISSUE:
(1) WON Philippine Courts have jurisdiction.
(2) WON the Court has acquired jurisdiction when the respondent filed a motion to dismiss with
other grounds
HELD:
(1) NO.
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In Santos
III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The Republic of the Philippines is a
party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages
beforethe court where the carrier is domiciled; 2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of
business; 3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or 4.
the court of the place of destination.

A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and
not a venue provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for
damages must be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this
characterization is consistent with one of the objectives of the Convention, which is to regulate in a
uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air. Third, the Convention does not
contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the
phrase rules as to jurisdiction used in Article 32 must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last
sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as jurisdictions,
which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time when the damage occurred.
(2) NO.
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides: Sec.20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court.
What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is that the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to
have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

VILLENA vs. PAYOYO

DOCTRINES:
What determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained.
FACTS:
Payoyo and Novaline, Inc. Through its president Villena, entered into a contract for the delivery
and installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyos residence. Payoyo paid 50% down payment with an
agreement that the full amount be given upon delivery.
After repeated demands, Villena failed to comply with the contract prompting Payoyo to demand
cancellation and refund of the downpayments made. Payoyo sent another two demand letters to Villena,
but again, no compliance was made.
Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Villena. Villena
moved to dismiss the complaint for the failure to state the cause of action. He argued that there was no
ground to cancel the contract, thus, there was no basis for refund. TC denied his motion.
Villena filed a second motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but it was denied.
TC decided in favor of Payoyo.
Villena, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the TC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
HELD:
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction
of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs. Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of
contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific performance, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In the present case, the averments in the complaint show that Payoyo sought the cancellation of
the contracts and refund of the downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to
deliver the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then must
examine the facts and the applicable law to determine whether there is in fact substantial breach that
would warrant rescission or cancellation of the contracts and entitle the respondent for a refund. While the
respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or
cancellation of the contracts.

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS vs. HON. PABLO FORMARAN III

DOCTRINES:

Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee
Payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional
A real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property

FACTS:
Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents Tan and Obiedo, secured by a REM over 5 parcels of
land. When the petitioner was unable to pay the loan when it became due and demandable, Tan and
Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same.
In a MOA, respondents granted the petitioner an extension to settle its indebtedness and
condoned the interests. The MOA required that petitioner execute simultaneously by way of dacion en
pago.
After sometime, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan, Obiedo,
and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). The Complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
Petitioner paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of
the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to
Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, Tan filed an Omnibus Motion wherein he contended that RTC had no Jurisdiction
since the action involved real properties for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a),
not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took
effect on 16 August 2004.
Consequently, the RTC decreed on the matter of docket/ filing fees:
Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional docket fees
assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)
(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners did not pay the correct amount of docket fees.
HELD:
YES.
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), the Court
explicitly pronounced that [t]he court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair
market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In
contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it
sought in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as
they do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land from
respondents Tan and Obiedo. A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property; or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action
affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be
determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in
what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the
courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of
the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.

BULAWAN vs. AQUENDE

DOCTRINES:

The judgment may be annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered
A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered
therein for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the
litigation.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on the judgment where the CA granted Aquendes petition for
annulment of judgment.
Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages against Lourdes
Yap, claiming that she is the owner of the disputed lot having acquired it from the Yaptengco brothers,
who claimed to have inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. She further alleged that Yap claimed
ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of a TCT in the latters name.
Yap asserts ownership of the disputed property. She also mentioned that the trial court declared
that Yaptengco brothers simulated the PSD and that their claim on the lot was voit. Yap alos stated that
Lot No. 1634-B was sold by Yap Chin CUn to the Aquende family.
Trial court: favored Bulawan.
Court of Appeals: Yaps appeal was not granted. After sometime, the trial courts decision became
final and executory.
The Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the courts writ of execution. Aquende wrote a letter
to the RD questioning the TCs writ of execution against his property. He alleged that he received no
notice of such decision.
Aquende filed a third Party Claim against the writ of execution because it affected his property
and, not being a party in Civil Case No. 9040, he is not bound by the trial courts Decision. TC denied
Aquendes motions as they had lost jurisdiction to modify its Decision.
Aquende filed a petion for annulment of judgemnt before the CA on the grouds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. Aquende argued that there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan conveniently failed
to implead him despite her knowledge of the existing title in his name and, thus, prevented him from
participating in the proceedings and protecting his title..
The Court of Appeals declared that Aquende was an indispensable party who was adversely
affected by the trial courts Decision. The Court of Appeals said that the trial court should have
impleaded Aquende under Section 11, Rule 323 of the Rules of Court. Since jurisdiction was not properly
acquired over Aquende, the Court of Appeals declared the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision void.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred when it declared Aquende as an indispensable party?
HELD:
NO.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be
affected by the courts action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as
defendants.

In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals the Court ruled:

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the
joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under
any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is
precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled; What is essential is that he
can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and that he
would be adversely affected thereby.
During the proceedings before the trial court, the answers of Yap and the Register of Deeds
should have prompted the trial court to inquire further whether there were other indispensable parties who
were not impleaded. The trial court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or to
order Bulawan to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The burden to
implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties is placed on Bulawan and on the trial court,
respectively.