Nat Res Cases and Special Laws Part 2

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty.
Christina Tan) 1
2ND EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
FOREST LAND
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in

his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge
of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,

all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their
parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA
NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA
SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors
and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented
by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN,
GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,
minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by
her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO,
MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed
SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO
and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented
by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA,
JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE,
all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors,
represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI
QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL
and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of

Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of
"inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and
"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77
which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff
is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared
for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon
proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment
of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 2

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich,
lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals
that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six
per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of
this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks
and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples
of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the
Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity,
with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately
the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural
plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism
of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of
multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the
purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and
the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has
led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as
well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some
sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained
no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8%
of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors
have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious
injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to
cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially
plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see,
use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust
for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection
by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with
the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto
attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel
the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that
is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful
flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines
had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's
is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that
is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6
June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional
policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based
on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause

of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs
is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12
July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain
that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause
of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting
the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not
only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled
that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their
children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment
based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
man's inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4
of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for
logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain
that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are
not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that

they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners
failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague
and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental
right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae."
Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents
submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for
a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or
other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to
have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of
due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of
a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in
the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as
hereinafter
expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the

created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised
and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent
Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint,
the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce
and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before
it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter
of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation
of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific

legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)

environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of
not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal

right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
The said right implies, among many other things, the

judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for
in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated
as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental

balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and
grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public
domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement
of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is
also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost
implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure,
for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and
the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to

the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires

that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
A cause of action is defined as:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a

sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on
the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge
of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present
and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,
and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its
goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal

right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the
truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for
the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only
issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid
down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss
on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We
find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the
reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as
the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need
to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for
they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to
raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated
and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer,
the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for
this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are
amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary
did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to
dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages
to the timber license holders because he would have forever
bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the

petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or
a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court
held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it
is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the
same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law
or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the nonimpairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless,
granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such
as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe
vs.
Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is
not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free
of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the
non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer
to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for,
save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet
existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to
renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No.
90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders
or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PAGKATIPUNAN v. CA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129682
March 21, 2002
NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAAGASPAGKATIPUNAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals nullifying the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Gumaca, Quezon2 which confirmed petitioners title over
the lots subject of the instant petition. Petitioners further seek
to annul and set aside the resolutions3 of the Court of
Appeals denying their urgent motion to recall the judgment
entered4 in the land registration case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in November 1960, petitioners predecessors-ininterest, spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia
Esquires, filed with the Court of First Instance of Gumaca,
Quezon an application for judicial confirmation and
registration of their title to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-174406
and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located in San
Narciso, Quezon.5
On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order
of default against the whole world, except spouses
Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo Medenilla who were given
ten (10) days to file their written opposition as regards Lot
No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406. Upon motion of petitioners
predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406 was removed
from the coverage of the application. The remaining parcel of
land covered by Lot No. 1 has an area of 3,804.261 square
meters.
On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance promulgated a
decision confirming petitioners title to the property. On
October 23, 1967, OCT No. O-12665 was issued in the
name of petitioners.1wphi1.nt
Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985,
the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Intermediate
Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings in LRC
Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 before the Court
of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon null and void, and to
cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12665 and titles
derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of

deeds to annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the
subject land as part of the public domain.6
The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land
registration case and of rendition of the decision on June 15,
1967, the subject land was classified as timberland under LC
Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF
Map No. LC-1180; hence inalienable and not subject to
registration. Moreover, petitioners title thereto can not be
confirmed for lack of showing of possession and occupation
of the land in the manner and for the length of time required
by Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
Neither did petitioners have any fee simple title which may
be registered under Act No. 496, as amended. Consequently,
the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction over
the res and any proceedings had therein were null and void.7
On the other hand, petitioners raised the special defenses of
indefeasibility of title and res judicata. They argued that due
to the lapse of a considerable length of time, the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon in the land registration
case has become final and conclusive against the Republic.
Moreover, the action for reversion of the land to the public
domain is barred by prior judgment.8
In a decision promulgated on June 27, 1986, the
Intermediate Appellate Court held that the land in question
was forestral land; hence not registrable. There was no
evidence on record to show that the land was actually and
officially delimited and classified as alienable or disposable
land of the public domain. Therefore, the Court of First
Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
application for registration and to decide the same.
Consequently, the action to declare null and void the June
15, 1967 decision for lack of jurisdiction did not prescribe.
The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner
and against respondents, and as prayed for:
(a) The Decision dated June 15, 1967 in LRC Case No. 91G, LRC Record No. N-19930 is hereby declared null and
void, and accordingly set aside;
(b) Original Certificate of Title No. O-12665, and Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-84439, T-93857 and T-117618
deriving therefrom, as well as any other derivative titles, are
declared null and void;
(c) The respondent Register of Deeds for Quezon Province
is ordered to cancel said titles; and
(d) The parcels of land covered thereby are ordered reverted
to the State.
Without pronouncement as to costs."9
On July 16, 1986, petitioners moved for the reconsideration

of the afore-cited decision10 reiterating that the land in
question was agricultural because it was possessed and
cultivated as such long before its classification as timberland
by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955. Petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of said land
for agricultural and cattle raising purposes as far back as the
Spanish regime. Following the doctrine in Oracoy v. Director
of Lands,11 private interest had intervened and petitioners
acquired vested rights which can no longer be impaired by
the subsequent classification of the land as timberland by the
Director of Forestry.
On August 20, 1986, the appellate court denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.12 On December 12,
1986, the decision of June 27, 1986 attained finality and
judgment was entered in the book of entries of judgments.13
On April 2, 1987, petitioners filed an urgent motion to set
aside entry of judgment on the ground that Atty. Cirilo E.
Doronila, petitioners counsel of record, was not furnished a
copy of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.14 In the absence of such notice, the decision
of the appellate court did not become final and executory.
On October 22, 1987, the Court of Appeals set aside and
lifted the entry of judgment in CA-G. R. SP No. 07115 and
directed the clerk of court to furnish petitioners counsel a
copy of the August 20, 1986 resolution.15
For petitioners inaction despite service of the August 20,
1986 resolution, the June 27, 1986 decision became final
and executory. On March 2, 1988, entry of judgment was
again made in the land registration case.
On September 4, 1995, Atty. Doronila withdrew his
appearance as counsel for petitioners.16
On April 1, 1996, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty.
George I. Howard, filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent
motion to recall the entry of judgment, 17 which was denied by
the appellate court on December 16, 1996.18
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on the
ground that it raised arguments already discussed and
resolved in the urgent motion to recall entry of judgment.19
Hence, the instant petition for review.20
Petitioners claim that their title to the land became
incontrovertible and indefeasible one (1) year after issuance
of the decree of registration. Hence, the Republics cause of
action was barred by prescription and res judicata,
proceedings having been initiated only after about 18 years
from the time the decree of registration was made. Contrary
to the appellate courts findings, the land is agricultural and
the inclusion and classification thereof by the Bureau of
Forestry in 1955 as timberland can not impair the vested
rights acquired by petitioners predecessors-in-interest who

have been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of the land in question since time immemorial
and for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application for registration in 1960. Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed grave error when it denied their motion to
set aside entry of judgment in the land registration case.
The petition lacks merit.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.21
Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of
the application for land registration and issuance of the
certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of
petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the
public domain, as per certification issued by the Bureau of
Forest Development on April 1, 1985, thus:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Vigo
Cantidang, San Narciso, Quezon, containing an area of
3,804.261 square meters as described in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-117618 x x x registered in the name of Spouses
Nestor E. Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Magas is verified to
be within the Timberland Block -B, Project No. 15-B of San
Narciso, Quezon, certified and declared as such on August
25, 1955 per BFD Map LC-1880. The land is, therefore,
within the administrative jurisdiction and control of the
Bureau of Forest Development, and not subject to
disposition under the Public Land Law.
[Sgd.]ARMANDO CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer22
This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the
proceedings before the court a quo on March 10, 1986,
when they confirmed that the land has been classified as
forming part of forest land, albeit only on August 25,
1955.23 Since no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands
not yet classified as disposable or alienable, the title issued
to herein petitioners is considered void ab initio.24
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also
states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.25 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.26
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the
land has been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or

other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain.27 Declassification of forest land is
an express and positive act of Government. 28 It cannot be
presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed
waived.29 It calls for proof.30
The court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners
based on the Republics failure to show that the land is more
valuable as forest land than for agricultural purposes, a
finding which is based on a wrong concept of what is forest
land.
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of
land of the public domain in the Constitution. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a
legal status, a classification for legal purposes. The "forest
land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land
with dense growths of trees and underbrush. However, the
cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest
do not automatically convert the land of the public domain
from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land.31
The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is
descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.32 A person
cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an
eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government
must first declare the forest land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.33
As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry:34
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of
land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of
the Public Land Act, which took effect on December 1, 1936,

expressly provided that only agricultural land of the public
domain are subject to acquisitive prescription, to wit:

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Section 48. x x x
SECOND DIVISION
(a) x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under abona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, except as against the Government, since July
twenty-six, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land either since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must
prove that the land is alienable public land.35 In the case at
bar, petitioners failed to do so.
Petitioners contention that the Republic is now barred from
questioning the validity of the certificate of title issued to
them considering that it took the government almost
eighteen (18) years to assail the same is erroneous. It is a
basic precept that prescription does not run against the
State.36 The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by
petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained
part of the patrimonial property of the State, which property,
as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable.37
In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err
when it set aside the June 15, 1967 decision of the courta
quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the
public domain. Since the land in question is unregistrable,
the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
same. Any proceedings had or judgment rendered therein is
void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment.
G.R. No. 127296 January 22, 1998

EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
CELSO A. FERNANDEZ, NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO,
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, J.F.
FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
LAGUNA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National
Power Corporation), respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, which was
reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
Decision 1 dated June 20, 1996 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 45466.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent court on November 15, 1996. 2
The facts show that on June 26, 1969, former President
Ferdinand
E.
Marcos
issued
Proclamation
No.
573 3withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside
as permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights,
certain parcels of the public domain denominated as follows:
Parcel No. 1. Magat River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 2 Chico River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 3 Abulug River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 4 Penaranda River Forest Reserve
Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied

petitioners motion to set aside the judgment rendered on
December
12,
1986,
in
the
land
registration
case.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No.
07115, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Parcel No. 5 Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve

Parcel No. 6 Ambayawan River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 7 Umiray River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 8 Kaliwa River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 9 Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 10 Barit River-Lake Buhi Forest Reserve
GORDULA v. CA
Parcel No. 11 Jalaur River Forest Reserve

They were primarily for use as watershed area. Their
development was to be undertaken by the Bureau of
Forestry, with the cooperation of, among other government
agencies, the National Power Corporation (Napocor).
Investigation conducted by this Office reveals that applicants

have sufficient ground to establish "priority rights" over the
areas claimed and that agricultural improvements introduced
thereon are not detrimental to the watershed.
Located in Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna with an area of

Twenty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Seven (29,707)
square meters, and bearing the following boundaries:
In view thereof, this Office interpose[s] no objection to the

application by the applicants contained in your letter dated
October 2, 1973.
North National Power Corporation
Very truly
South Road and Baldomero Halili
(Sgd.) R.R
West National Power Corporation
General M
East National Power Corporation

the parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners'
explicit admission, 4 within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot
River Forest Reserve.
More than three years after the land was segregated as part
of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, or on January
9, 1973, petitioner Edubigis Gordula, a native of Cavinti,
Laguna, filed with the Bureau of Lands, an Application 5 for a
Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several
others also filed free patent applications covering other
parcels of land in the area.
On February 5, 1973, petitioner Gordula declared the land
for taxation purposes in his name as shown in Tax
Declaration No. 0429.
The Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands referred the
free patent applications of petitioner Gordula, Fernandez,
and several others to Mr. Ravanal Ravanzo, then the
General Manager of the Napocor. Mr. Ravanzo responded
through the following letter:
On December 10, 1973, petitioner Gordula had the land

surveyed; Survey Plan No. F(IV-5) 949-D under his name
was approved by the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands. Thereafter, Mr. Amundo Munda, a Land Inspector of
the Bureau of Lands, conducted the requisite investigations.
On January 17, 1974, petitioner Gordula's Application for
Free Patent was approved. Free Patent No. 693 was issued
in his name.
On January 30, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Laguna
issued, on the basis of Free Patent No. 693, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1405 in the name of petitioner
Gordula.
He declared the land anew for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 6498. He paid its real estate taxes from
1975 to 1979.
In the meantime, respondent Republic, through the Napocor,
contracted the Certeza Surveying Company to survey the
area constituting the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve.
The survey plans were approved by the Regional Director of
the Bureau of Lands on October 27, 1975.
October 24, 1973

The Director
Regional Lands Office No. IV
757 Gen. Solano St.
San Miguel, Manila
Sir:
This refers to the Free Patent Application[s] of Manuel
Fernandez, et al., of Barrio Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna,
which were referred to this Office for clearance it having
been found that they are within the Caliraya-Lumot
Watershed Reservation under Proclamation No. 573 dated
June 26, 1969.
The said survey plans, as well as the Cadastral Map of

Talaongan and the Geological Plan of the Caliraya-Lumot
River Forest Reserve, show that petitioner Gordula's land is
located in the saddle area of the watershed recreation for the
hydro-electric reservoir.
On January 22, 1979, petitioner Gordula sold the land to
petitioner Celso V. Fernandez, Jr. for six thousand pesos
(P6,000.00). The Register of Deeds of Laguna cancelled
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and issued, in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-85445 in the name
of petitioner Fernandez, Jr. The latter declared the land for
taxation purposes in his name.
On March 12, 1979, Fernandez, Jr. executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the land in favor of petitioner Celso A.
Fernandez for six thousand five hundred pesos (P6,500.00).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-85445 was cancelled and

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85594 was issued on March
21, 1979 in the name of petitioner Fernandez.
preliminary injunction upon a bond of one hundred thousand

pesos (P100,000.00).
As approved by the Bureau of Lands in Psd-Plan 04-014230,

petitioner Fernandez subdivided the land into nine (9) lots.
On August 16, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102492 to 102500 in his
name covering the nine (9) subdivision lots.
On December 28, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in

favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision
states:
On August 29, 1985, he sold the lots to petitioner Nora Ellen

Estrellado for twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00).
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102492 to 102500 were
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-103404 to T-103412 were issued to petitioner
Estrellado.
On October 17, 1986, petitioner Estrellado mortgaged to
petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
four 6 (4) of the (9) lots. Another lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 103408, was sold to petitioner J.F.
Festejo Company, Inc. to whom was issued, in lieu of the
former, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106495.
On July 16, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 224 7 vesting in the Napocor
"complete jurisdiction, control and regulation" over the
"Caliraya-Lumot Watershed Reservation as covered by
Proclamation No. 573".
On July 26, 1987, Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security
Officer of the Cavinti reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum
to the President of the Napocor informing him of the fences
and roads being constructed in the saddle area, more
particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner Fernandez to
petitioner Estrellado.
On July 28, 1987, Mr. A. Coronado, the Manager of the
Cavinti reservoir complex, asked petitioner Fernandez to
remove all the improvements made in the Estrellado lots. In
reply, petitioner Fernandez claimed that the roads being
constructed would not adversely affect the reservoir area in
case of heavy floods because the Estrellado lots were
elevated at a height of around fifty (50) feet.
In view of petitioner Fernandez's, refusal, the Napocor
assigned two (2) security guards over the lot. The guards
ordered the construction workers to leave their posts and
barred their return without permission from the Napocor.
On October 18, 1987, petitioner Fernandez, as attorney-infact and counsel of petitioner Estrellado, wrote to the
President of the Napocor threatening to file a multi-million
damage suit if the guards were not removed within fifteen
(15) days.
On November 18, 1987, respondent Republic, through the
Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment
of Free Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. 8 On January 29, 1988, the trial court issued a writ of
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

defendants and against plaintiff:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff's complaint and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in this case;
(2) Ordering National Power Corporation to pay defendant
Celso A. Fernandez P300,000.00 as actual damages and
P30,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
With costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 9
Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, elevated the
case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled
against petitioners. It held, inter alia, viz:
The kernel and primal issue to be resolved by the Court is
whether or not Free Patent No. IV-5 (693) and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and all derivative titles
thereafter issued to the Appellees . . . are null and void. The
Appellant avers that the parcel of land covered by the
aforesaid Free Patent issued to Gordula is a portion of the
vast track of land reserved by former President Marcos as
permanent forest under Proclamation No. 573 dated June
26, 196[9] . . . and hence, non-disposable and inalienable,
pursuant to Section 88 in relation to Section 83 of
Commonwealth Act [No.] 141, as amended. In contrast the
Court a quo dismissed Appellant's complaint, in the light of
the exclusionary clause in Proclamation No. 573 . . . that the
setting up of the permanent forest reserves over the
Caliraya-Lumot Watershed area was "subject to private
rights" if there be any and the letter-clearance of the then
General Manager of [Napocor] . . . dated October 24, 1973,
interposing no objection to the Application for a free patent of
Manuel Fernandez, et al.
xxx xxx xxx
We are convinced, beyond cavil, that the parcel of land
subject of the Free Patent issued to Gordula on January 17,
1974 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405
issued on January 30, 1974 . . . as the two (2) parcels of
land purportedly purchased by the [Republic] from Perez and
Glorioso in 1941, were public disposable and alienable
lands before the issuance, by the former President, of
Proclamation No. 573, on June 26, 196[9] . . . The property
was, however, later reserved, under Proclamation No. 573,
as a permanent forest, on June 26, 196[9]. Since then, the

property became non-disposable and inalienable public land.
...
xxx xxx xxx
At the time Gordula filed his application for a Free Patent, on
January 9, 1973, the parcel of land . . . was already reserved
as a permanent forest under Proclamation No. 573. Since
the property was already a forest reservation as of June 26,
196[9], the same could no longer be disposed of or alienated
in favor of private individuals . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We do not agree with Appellees' and the Court a quo's pose
that Gordula's property was exempt from the application of
Proclamation No. 573 because, by express provision thereof,
the reservation was "subject to private rights, if there be any"
....
Appellees failed to adduce proof that, as of June 26, 196[9],
Gordula had acquired ownership or title to the aforesaid
property either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition
from the State by operation of law for that matter such as for
instance, alienable public land held by a possessor
personally, or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed period of
thirty (30) years, is converted into private property by mere
lapse of period ipso jure . . . . In the present recourse,
Gordula, as of 196[9], had been in possession of the
property for only [twenty-five (25) years] years since 1944
when he commenced, as can be gleaned from his
application . . . for a free patent, possession of the property.
The period of Gordula's occupancy after 196[9] should not
be tacked to the period from 1944 because by then the
property was not susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. . . .
The General Manager of the Appellant is not vested with

authority to allow the occupancy or acquisition, by private
individuals, of such properties, whether still needed by the
Appellant or not, reserved by the President of the Philippines
for permanent forests. Only the President or [the] Congress,
by statutory fiat, can revert the property to the disposable or
alienable portion of the public domain.
Anent Appellees' plea that they are buyers of the property in
good faith, they must harken to the Decision of the Supreme
Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 148 SCRA 480 that:
. . . even assuming that the transferees are innocent
purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived from
the titles of private respondents which were not validly
issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain,
may be cancelled. . . .
We do not agree with Appellees' claim that Appellant's suit
was barred by prescription and by the purported
indefeasibility of their title. Prescription, basically, does not
run against the State. The right of the State for the reversion
of unlawfully acquired property is not barred by prescription
nor by the perceived indefeasibility of Appellees' title for that
matter. . . . 10
Thus states the dispositive portion of the decision of
respondent appellate court:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed
Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another
Decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Free Patent No. IV-5-693 and Original Certificate of Title
No. P1405 issued under the name of Edubigis Gordula and
all derivative titles issued to the Appellees are hereby
declared null and void;
xxx xxx xxx

The Appellees cannot find refuge in the letter of the then
General Manager of [Napocor], Ravanal Ravanzo, on
October 24, 1973 . . . .
In the first place, Ravanzo made no explicit and unequivocal
statement, in said letter, that Gordula had priority rights to
the property. What he merely declared was that "applicants
have sufficient ground to establish priority rights over the
areas claimed . . ." . Even if it may be conceded, for the
nonce, that indeed, Ravanzo declared that Gordula had
priority rights over the property claimed by him, such
declaration is irrefragably erroneous. Munda and the Director
of Lands erred in recommending the approval of Gordula's
application in the same manner that the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in issuing the
patent to Gordula. But then, well-settled is the doctrine,
enunciated by the Supreme Court, in a catena of cases, that
the State cannot be bound and estopped by the errors or
mistakes of its agents or officials . . . .
2. The parcel of land covered by said titles is hereby

declared reverted to the Government under the jurisdiction,
control and supervision of the [Napocor] under Executive
Order No. 224 of former President Corazon C. Aquino;
3. The Appellees and all those acting for and in their behalf
are hereby prohibited from intruding into and disturbing the
Appellant of its possession and dominion of the subject
property; [and]
4. Appellees' counterclaims
pronouncement as to costs.
are
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
FIRST
No

RESPONDENT
COURT
OF
APPEALS
ERRED
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS WITHIN THE
LANDS BOUGHT BY THE NPC EITHER FROM
GERONIMO PEREZ ON MARCH 10, 1941 AND/OR FROM
CELERINO GLORIOSO ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1941;
SECOND
ON [sic] THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF PAGE 19 UP TO
PAGE 23, LAST PAGE OF THE DECISION, THE
RESPONDENT COURT WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF
THE CASE WHICH RESULTED [IN THE] REVERSAL OF
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT . . . ;
THIRD
THE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE
TRIAL COURT ARE IN CONFLICT WITH THE FINDINGS
OF THE RESPONDENT COURT CONCERNING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER EDUBIGIS
GORDULA HAD ACQUIRED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" ON THE
SUBJECT LAND,WHICH IS AN EXCEPTION UNDER
PROCLAMATION NO. 573. HENCE, THIS CASE IS A
QUESTION OF FACTS AND OF LAW . . . ;
FOURTH
THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS
WITHIN THE AREA OF PROCLAMATION NO. 573.
HOWEVER THE RESPONDENT [COURT] GRAVELY
ERRED TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT WENT TO THE EXTENT OF DISCUSSING ON
[sic] THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND INVESTIGATION
RELATIVE TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE TO
PETITIONER EDUBIGIS GORDULA AND AFTERWARD
DECLARED THAT GORDULA WHO HAS A TITLE ON THE
SUBJECT LAND HAS NOT ACQUIRED "PRIVATE RIGHTS"
ON THE LAND DESPITE OF [sic] THE FACT THAT SAID
RESPONDENT COURT IS ALREADY PRECLUDED FROM
DISCUSSING THE FACTS RELATIVE ON [sic] THE
ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE BY AUTHORITY OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, MORE SO ITS
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION IS [sic] AGAINST THE LAW,
JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS IS AGAINST THE RULING
IN ESPINOSA VS. MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA
VS.SINGSON ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL. 440; and
FIFTH
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THEN GENERAL MANAGER
RAVANZO OF NPC AND UNDERSECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN ISSUING THE PATENT TO
PETITIONER GORDULA. THIS IS AGAINST THE RULING
IN ESPINOSA VS. MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA
VS.SINGSON ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL. 440. 12
We affirm the Court of Appeals.
We start with the proposition that the sovereign people,

represented by their lawfully constituted government, have
untrammeled dominion over the forests on their native soil.
Forest lands, being the self-replenishing, versatile and allimportant natural resource that they are, need to be reserved
and saved to promote the people's welfare. By their very
nature 13 or by executive or statutory fiat, they are outside the
commerce of man, unsusceptible of private appropriation in
any form, 14 and inconvertible into any character less than of
inalienable public domain, regardless of their actual state, for
as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a
subsequent valid declassification. 15
Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated by this Court
in Director of Forestry vs. Munoz and consistently adhered to
in a long line of cases the more recent of which is Republic
vs. Court Appeals, that forest lands or forest reserves are
incapable of private appropriation, and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private properties.
This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined
not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution but also in the
1987 Constitution. 16
Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case
at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the heart of the CalirayaLumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573
classified as inalienable and indisposable. Its control was
vested in the NAPOCOR under E.O. No. 224.
Petitioners, however, contend that Proclamation No. 573
itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private
rights to the subject land.
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of
the title from the state. 17 The facts show that petitioner
Gordula, did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its
reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his
application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than
three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in
June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the CalirayaLumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private
ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve
for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights",
in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as
requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant
"had occupied and cultivated the property for so may number
of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the
corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the
government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is]
continuos, open and unmolested and recognized by the
government". 18 Prescinding from this premise, petitioners
urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from
1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year
possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula

the "private rights" recognized and respected in Proclamation
No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director
of Lands v. Reyes, 19 we held that a settler claiming the
protection of "private rights" to exclude his land from a
military or forest reservation must show ". . . by clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was
acquired by [any] . . . means for the acquisition of public
lands".
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has
complied with C. A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as
well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public
lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the
30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or
possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious
possession. 20
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however
long the period may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor. 21 The reason, to reiterate our
ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard to
public agricultural land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of
the same under claim of ownership for the required number
of years to constitute a grant from the State. 22
In the case at bar, petitioners have failed to comply with the
mandatory 30-year period of possession. Their 25-year
possession of the land prior to its reservation as part of the
Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve cannot be considered
compliance with C.A. No. 141, as amended. The Court has
no authority to lower this requirement for it cannot amend the
law.
Next, petitioners contend that their "private rights" have been
recognized by the government itself. They point to (1) the
letter dated October 24, 1973 of then NAPOCOR General
Manager, Ravanal Ravanzo, (2) the action of the Bureau of
Lands which after investigation, declared him qualified to
acquire the land; and (3) the Free Patent issued on January
17, 1974 by the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, by authority of the President of the Philippines.
Petitioners urge that the findings and conclusions of the
aforementioned government agencies and/or officers are
conclusive and binding upon the courts, as held in the cases
of Ortua
v. Singson
Encarnacion 23 and Espinosa
v. Makalintal. 24
The submissions are unconvincing.
In the first place, there is nothing in Espinosa

v. Makalintal that is relevant to petitioners' claims. On the
other hand, our ruling in Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion that
"a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a
question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed
by the courts," 25 was made subject to the categorical caveat
"in the absence of a showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake". 26
Undoubtedly, then General Manager Ravanzo erred in
holding that petitioner Gordula "ha[d] sufficient ground to
establish 'priority rights' over the areas claimed". This error
mothered the subsequent error of the Bureau of Lands which
culminated in the erroneous grant of a free patent on
January 17, 1974. The perpetration of these errors does not
have the effect of converting a forest reserve into public
alienable land. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable
of registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that
title.27 To be sure, the defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie
against the state in an action for reversion of the land
covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or
of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest land being
void ab initio. 28 Nor can the mistake or error of its officials or
agents in this regard be invoked against the
government. 29 Finally, the conversion of a forest reserve into
public alienable land, requires no less than a categorical act
of declassification by the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 30 There is
none such in this case.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is HEREBY DENIED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
MANGROVES
DIRECTOR v. VILLAREAL
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification
of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly
known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not
alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered
public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in
question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian,
Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on
January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including
the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner
and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove
land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention
between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps
or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and
therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it
is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal,
not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to
the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American
organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or
forest lands. This classification was maintained in the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935,
until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new
charter expanded the classification of public lands to include
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide
for other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced,

but with substantial modifications, in the present
Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the
charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands
were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was
provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest
lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were
first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for
alienation.
In
the
leading
case
of
Montano
v.
Insular
Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in
which grows various kindred plants which will not live except
when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the
mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which
exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated
by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal
lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so
regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases
cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters
flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation,
and they may be disposed of without impairment of the
public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition
of the law, the custom had grown of converting manglares
and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common
feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of
the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most
productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which
would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands
and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically
declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove
swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it
did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became
effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose
of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise
specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa
and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition,
the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when

two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of
Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish
translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos
forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and
that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.'
Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it.
The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English
but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or
aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director

of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the
mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The
decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial
court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species
grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for
firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into
public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do
not form part of the public domain.
xxx xxx xxx

The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or
nipa swamps does not change the general character of the
land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted
Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep.,
175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as
used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry'
under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902,
classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber,
mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public
lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which
vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial
court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they
are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully
established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de
Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more
than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative
Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous
Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the
land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as
shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition
of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest
lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of
Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was
merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the
Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries
or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is
also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp
lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when it held, again
through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885
cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding
that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of
forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees
classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a
mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many years, and therefore,
said land was already 'private land' better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.
The petition is without merit.
farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or
in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in

brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do
not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor
General's submission that the land in dispute, which he
described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not
private properties and so not registerable. This case was
decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels
there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should
resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove
swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially
belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to
implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of
the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for
more categories of public lands). The legislature having
made such implementation, the executive officials may then,
in the discharge of their own role, administer our public lands
pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy
prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture
if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or,
assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being
correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and
achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation
and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the
President of the Philippines the function of making periodic
classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands
from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what

lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of
the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the
lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition
shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which
such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasipublic uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
make the classifications provided for in this section, and may,
at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative
Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reservesRevocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the
Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department
Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest
reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation
declare the establishment of such reserves and the
boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall
not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in
the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by
proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest
reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation,
and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and
become part of the public lands as though such proclamation
had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural
purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest
reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by
the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following
conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as
comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as
defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we
have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The
statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less
noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not
been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and
so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the
Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove
swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. That determination having been made
and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we
have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining
to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering
only those lands over which ownership had already vested
before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective.
Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest
lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired
property right protected by the due process clause. So we
ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of
the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it
was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for
which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the
Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered
forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the
adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by
the private respondent in support of his application for
registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land
and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the
certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section
1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the
mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to
prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain,
however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not
have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as
forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual
because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was
not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited
law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to
determine whether forest land is more valuable for
agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its
declaration as agricultural land and release for private
ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands

of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are
released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other
purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and
dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of
the public domain while such lands are still classified as
forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or
other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis
of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after the forest land has been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest
land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were
agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers
of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and
of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no
convincing
evidence
of
the
existence
of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original
transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied.
Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion
posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of
property and that the land has been under the actual and
adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty
years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These
matters are not presumed but must be established with
definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private
respondent were practically the only basis used by the
appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the
land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not
sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership
in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless
cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not
established his right to the registration of the subject land in
his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the
legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains
unamended
up
to
now,
mangrove
swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the
Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership

until and unless they are first released as forest land and
classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private
respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned

and possessed by the late Salming Piraso and later by his
successors-in-interest, who are his children for a period of
more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown to
have a registerable title on the property which this Court
therefore confirms and affirms in accordance with the law.
Let the land so described in the technical description of the
survey made of the same and in accordance with the
corresponding plan be so registered. (p. 50, Rollo)
On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in
behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filed with the Court of
Firing Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration
No. N-287, covering the following describe property:
A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in
the Barrio of Ansagan Municipality of Tuba, Mountain
Province. Bounded in the, NE., along line 1-2 by property of
Sioco Carino (PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW.,
along lines 2-3-4-5 by public land, on the We, along lines 56-1 by property of Tunccalo. Containing an area of TWO
MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE (2,197,879)
SQUARE METERS. ... (p. 13, Rollo)
On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the
Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for
registration stating, among others:
REPUBLIC v. CA & CARANTES

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56948 September 30, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Director of Forest Development and the Director of
Lands, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA
CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING
PIRASO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet, Branch III, at La Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287,
Record No. 37205, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest

possess sufficient title to said parcel of land the same not
having been acquired by them either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information
title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;
That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
present application;
That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
(pp. 13-14, Rollo)
On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an
opposition to the application for registration on the following
grounds:
That the whole area applied for registration is within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929;
That the area sought to be registered is neither release for
disposition nor alienation; and that the herein applicant has
no registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in
fact or in law. (p. 14, Rollo)

After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration
court, as earlier stated, adjudicating the parcel of land to the
applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Government oppositor's having been denied, an appeal was
made to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
decision of the land registration court.
In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged
errors of the Court of Appeals:
A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF
REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS
WITHIN THE CENTRAL CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE:
B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE LAND BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
AND
THEIR
PREDECESSORS
INTEREST WAS NOT IN CONCEPT OF OWNER UNDER
SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND BEING
INALIENABLE;
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
LAND IS AGRICULTURAL BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT
FAILED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE
VALUABLE FOR FOREST PURPOSES;
D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROPERTY BECAME SEGREGATED FROM THE LAND
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ASSUMED THE
CHARACTER
OF
PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP
UPON
APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF
LAND IN 1925;
E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD
POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15 HECTARES OF
THE LAND APPLIED FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED
IN RULING THAT THEY HAD ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP
THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE REST
OF THE (219.7879) HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18,
Rollo)
The issues raised are:
1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public
forest within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve; and
2. Whether or not private respondents have established
registerable title over the land in question.
It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question
covered by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part of the public forests
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established
under Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry
Stimson dated February 16, 1929. On February 27, 1980, an
ocular inspection of said property was made by Land
Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands
together with representatives of the Bureau of Forestry, the
Land Registration Court, and the applicants for registration.
During the ocular inspection, the land was found to be rolling

and stony in nature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a report on April
17, 1970 stating among others, that the land is covered with
trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony is not
suitable for agricultural purposes.
The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester
Ricardo D. Zapatero, submitted to the Provincial Fiscal a
separate report dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the
whole area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
and that the same has not been released for agricultural
purposes by the Director of Forestry who had administrative
jurisdiction over the same.
The petitioner states that since the land in question is
indubitably part of the public forest and has not been
reclassified or released from the forest zone, the same can
not be the subject of registration either under Act 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, or under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner points out that
lands within the forest zone or within a duly established
reservation do not form part of the disposable portion of the
public domain nor can the same be alienated as said lands
are not capable of private appropriation or ownership and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert that same
into private property.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the private
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest, Salming
Piraso, had not acquired ownership over the land prior to its
classification as part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve use
there is no evidence on record that Salming Piraso had
possessed the property for any appreciable period prior to
1929 when the land became part of the Cordillera Forest
Reserve.
On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals show that the land
subject of application is not within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve and the same land applied for registration is
disposable and alienable. The private respondents, as
applicants, claim to have sufficiently shown by
preponderance of evidence that the land being applied for
registration had been possessed by Salming Piraso as far
back as 1915 when he and his workers planted the arable
portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other products and
raised cows on the other portion suited for pasture. The late
Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyor
Jose Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which
was approved by the then Director of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas
on March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was
promulgated only on February 16, 1929. They state that the
approval of the said survey by the government thru the
Director of Lands Jorge B. Vargas can only mean that said
land was no longer included in the overall survey of the
government as it was no longer part of the public land. As
applicants, they contend that they have possessed the land
applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse
against the whole world and continuously for more than thirty

(30) years before they filed the application over the land
which is agricultural and separate from the public domain.
We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled
rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long,
of convert them into private property (Vano vs. Government
of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry vs. Muoz, 23
SCRA 1183; Republic vs. De la Cruz 67 SCRA 221; Director
of Lands vs. Reyes & Azurin vs. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA
177; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701)
unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but
even then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to
the reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable
cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no
showing of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that
the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a
matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.
There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals which the government
oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the
reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General
Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the
lands covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into
forest lands. This is wrong. The land was not non-forest or
agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not
ease a classification from non-forest into forest land because
of the proclamation. The proclamation merely declared a
special forest reserve out of already existing forest lands.
The land was already forest or timber land even before the
proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso
and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a (219.7879)
hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person
cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an
eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government
must first declare the forest land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
The records positively establish that the land in question is
part of the public forest which the Executive formally
proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to
further preserve its integrity and to give it a status which is
more special for certain purposes than that of ordinary forest
lands.
One reason for the respondent court's decision finding a
registerable title for the private respondents is its observation
that the Government failed to show that the disputed land is
more valuable for forest purposes. The court noted a failure
to prove that trees are thriving in the land.
The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of

what is forest land. There is a big difference between "forest"
as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain in the
Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended; and Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution).
One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the
other is a legal status a classification for legal purposes.
The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of
wooded land with dense growths of trees and underbush.
However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of
virgin forest and not automatically convert the lands of the
public domain from forest or timber land to alienable
agricultural land.
As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75);
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classffied as forest land. The classification
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v.
Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And
in Republic v. Animas,(56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent
and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the
forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void at
initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government
is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and
to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes. (at p. 75)
On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the
questioned property was conducted by Land Inspector
Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands, together with
Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry,
Deputy Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as representative of
the land registration court, Fiscal Navarro and Andres
Carantes as representative of the applicant.
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report
dated April 17, 1970, which states, among others, that the

land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being
stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates
the claim of the private respondents that the land has been
cultivated since 1915.
More important, however, than the appearance of the land is
its status, as stated in the separate report dated April 6, 1970
submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by
Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero which declares that the whole
area applied for by the applicant fails within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been
released for agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry
who has administrative jurisdiction over the same. This has
not been successfully refuted. It has not been proved
erroneous.
Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report,
Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero stated that:
Q Do you know the land in question here in this case?
A I know, sir.
Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are
subject matters of land registration cases, have you
inspected this land in question also?.
A Yes, I inspected it, sir.
Q What is the purpose of your inspection?
A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of
the area if it falls within the reservation or within the alienable
or disposable area.
A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to

the Provincial Fiscal.
Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name
"Ricardo D. Zapatero", whose signature is that?
A That is mine, sir.
Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that
the land falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve,
how did you arrive at that conclusion?
A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the
applicant and because of the Bureau of Forestry map.
Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land
applied for?
A Yes, air.
Q So, you actually saw this land applied for?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the nature of this land applied for?
A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling
and there are certain enemies of plants inside the land, in
some area.
COURT:
Q What are the species of plants?
Q What is your finding, if any ?
A There are species of Binayuyu.
A My finding was that the area falls within the Central

Cordillera Forest Reserve.
Q That is for lumber?

A No, that is not.
Q Was that finding reduced into writing?

FISCAL BRAWNER:
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight
(68) of the records which for purposes of Identification, we
pray that the same be marked as Exhibit "A" for the
government oppositors, your Honor.
Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the

topography of the land applied for is generally stony, and
because of the Binayuyu species, the condition of the land is
not suited for agricultural purposes?
A Yes, sir.
COURT: As what?
Q What is the basis of that statement?
FISCAL BRAWNER: Rather as Exhibit "1"
COURT: Have it marked.
Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you
made?
A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination, we

believe that is not good for agricultural purposes. The land
applied for is more suited for pasture purposes. (pp. 203206, tsn., September 6,1971; Emphasis supplied)

The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and
Forester Zapatero support the contention of the petitioner
that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case of Ramos
v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have ousted:
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and
undoubtedly will be, Paid by the courts to the opinion of the
technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestry
matters.
There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate
court that the property in question was no longer part of the
public land when the Government through the Director of
Lands approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan (Plan
Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch
plan of real property even if approved by the Bureau of
Lands is no proof in itself of ownership of the land covered
by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 623).
The fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch plan or
a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which forms part
of the country's forest reserves does not convert such land
into alienable land, much less private property. Assuming
that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch plan,
such approval is nun and void. There must first be a formal
Government declaration that the forest land has been reclassified into alienable and disposable agricultural land
which may then be acquired by private persons in
accordance with the various modes of acquiring public
agricultural lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
land registration court which granted the private respondents'
application for registration of the land in question is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for land
registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MINERAL LANDS
UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES v. IAC
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69997 September 30, 1987
UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO,
GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO,
JESUS ASUNCION, MELENCIO ASUNCION and
BIENVENIDO ASUNCION, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition which seeks to set aside the decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the
dismissal of the petitioner's action for annulment and
cancellation of free patents granted to the private
respondents on the ground that the petitioner has no
personality to file an action for reversion, the lands involved
being public In character.
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted
the following mining patents on mineral claims located at
Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu Albay.
1. lode patent No. V-52 to John Canson, Jr., on mineral claim
known as "Catanduandes;"
2. lode patent No. V-48 to petitioner, on mineral claims
known as "Junior;"
3. lode patent No. V-53 to John Canson, Jr., on mineral
claims known as "Oas;"
4. lode patent No. V - 46 to petitioner on mineral claim
known as "Ester;"
5. lode patent No. V - 51 to Carlos Stilianopulos on mineral
claim known as "Jovellar;"

6. lode patent No. V - 49 to petitioner, in mineral claim known
as "Manila;"
7. lode patent No. V - 50 to Carlos Stilianopulos on mineral
claim known as "Polangui;" and
8. lode patent No. V - 47 to petitioner on mineral claim
known as "Ligao;"(pp. 5-7, Decision Annex 1, Petition)
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos
Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in
favor of the petitioner. The assignment of rights was
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on
December 2, 1959.
The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July
20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the Mining
Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on
September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry
of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of
Albay issued the respective original certificates of titles
pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John
Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.
Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free
patents were granted by the respondent Director of Lands
and the corresponding original certificates of titles were
issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay:
1. Free Patent No. 458143 dated October 3, 1968 and
corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH-12195 to appellee
Felix Detecio;
2. Free Patent No. 427824 dated November 21, 1968 and
Melencio Asuncion;
3. Free Patent No. 433318 dated January 10, 1969 and
Jesus Asuncion;
4. Free Patents No. 422847 dated November 11, 1968 and
No. 421947 dated October 28, 1969 and corresponding
Certificates of Title Nos. VH-12185 and 12186, respectively,
to appellee Maria Bernal;
5. Free Patent No. 408568 dated July 8, 1968 and
Gregorio Bolanos; and
6. Free Patent No. 0663 dated March 25, 1974 and the
Bienvenido Asuncion. (Rollo, pp. 200-201)
All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered
by the patents belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of patents against the private respondents and
prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for
properties over which original certificates of title had already
been issued in its favor be declared null and void.
The Director of Lands, who was impleaded as a formal
defendant, filed his answer alledging, among others, that the
petitioner has no personality to institute the cancellation
proceedings inasmuch as the government is the grantor and
not the petitioner, and it should be the grantor who should
institute the cancellation proceedings.
On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint. It ruled that since the disputed
properties form part of disposable land of the public domain,
the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor
General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and
that, therefore, the petitioner lacks personality to institute the
annulment proceedings.
The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court.
On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court. It ruled that the titles issued to the petitioner
cover mineral lands which belong to the public domain and
that these cannot be the subject of private ownership.
According to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land
Law, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead has the authority to institute an action on behalf of the
Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and for
reversion of their homesteads to the Government.
In this instant petition, the petitioner raises two issues: a)
Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law
when it ruled that the lands in question belong to the public
domain; and b) whether or not the appellate court erred in
discussing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner
had no personality to institute the same.
With regard to the first issue, the petitioner maintains that
since its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15,
1935, the date when the 1935 Constitution took effect, the
applicable law is the Philippine Bill of 1902 and that under
this Act, a valid location of a mining claim segregates the
area from the public domain. (Gold Creek Mining
Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259).
The Solicitor-General, on the other hand, argues that the
petitioner's mining patents covered by Torrens Titles were
granted only in 1962 by the President of the Philippines, by
authority of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the
then Constitution, except for public agricultural lands, natural
resources which includes all mineral lands, shall not be
alienated. (Art. XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution) Therefore,
what the mining patents issued in 1962 conveyed to
petitioner was only the ownership of, and the right to extract
and utilize, the minerals within the area covered by the
petitioner's Torrens Titles but not the ownership of the land
where the minerals are found.

We rule for the private respondents.
The petitioner has been beguiling, less than candid, and
inexplicably silent as to material dates in the presentation of
its case. Nowhere in the records of this petition is there any
mention of a date before November 15, 1935 as to when
essential acts regarding its mining claims were executed. It
is silent as to when the land was entered, measured, and
plotted; when the legal posts and notices were put up; when
the claim was registered with the mining recorder; whether or
not the annual amount of labor or development, and other
requirements under the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed.
These may have been complied with but not necessarily
before 1935.
A mere mention in the Torrens title that the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed is not sufficient. The
Philippine Bill provides the procedures for the perfection of
mining claims but not the dates when such procedures were
undertaken by any prospector or claimant. The same
procedures would have to be followed even after the Jones
Law of 1916 and the Constitution of 1935 were promulgated,
but subject to the restrictions of the fundamental law. The
petitioner has failed to state if and when new procedures,
different from the 1902 procedures, were provided by law to
give a little substance to its case. The petitioner is completely
and strangely silent about these vital aspects of its petition.
Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing
evidence that the locations of its mining claims were
perfected prior to November 15,1935 when the Government
of Commonwealth was inaugurated. In fact neither the
original complaint nor the amended one alleged the
perfection of petitioner's mining rights prior to November 15,
1935. All that petitioner offers as evidence of its claims were
the original certificates of titles covering mining patents
which embodied a uniform "WHEREAS" clause stating that
the petitioner "has fully complied with all the conditions,
requirements, and provisions of the Act of the United States
of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, ..." In the absence
of proof that the petitioner's claims were perfected prior to
the 1935 Constitution, the provision of the latter with regard
to inalienable lands of the public domain will apply.
Article XIII, Section I of the 1935 Constitution provides:
All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which
is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall
not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to

water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the at of the
grant. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at
bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on
mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in
favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or
utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the
free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in
favor of the private respondents granted to them the
ownership and the right to use the land for agricultural
purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.
There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that
it acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such acquisition
outside its purview and scope.
Every application for a concession of public land has to be
viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. (Director of
Lands v. Funtilar 142 SCRA 57, 69).
In the case at bar, although the original certificates of titles of
the petitioner were issued prior to the titles of the private
respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the
provisions of the Constitution which governed at the time of
their issuance prohibited the alienation of mineral lands of
the public domain.
In the case of Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), this Court
ruled that a grantee does not become the owner of a land
illegally included in the grant just because title has been
issued in his favor:.
A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had
no authority to do so (Knight v. Land Ass. 142 U.S. 161, 12
Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person
obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under
the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not
have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest,
the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title
alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See
Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)
Moreover, patents and land grants are construed favorably in
favor of the Government, and most strongly against the
grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant,
or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its
favor. (See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146,
156). Hence, as earlier stated, in the absence of proof that
the petitioner acquired the right of ownership over the
mineral lands prior to the 1935 Constitution, the titles issued

in its favor must be construed as conveying only the right to
extract and utilize the minerals thereon.
First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946; and Heirs of

Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez, 142 SCRA 252).
The appellate court did not likewise err in concluding that the
petitioner has no personality to institute the action below for
annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands
over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of
the inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the
Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring
an action for reversion. (See Sumail v. Judge of the Court of
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty.

THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 2

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 3

on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 4

the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 5

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal

The said right implies, among many other things, the

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 6

healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires

A cause of action is defined as:

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 7

welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 8

March 21, 2002

NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAAGASPAGKATIPUNAN, petitioners,

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 9

On July 16, 1986, petitioners moved for the reconsideration

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 10

converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 11

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 127296 January 22, 1998

Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied

Parcel No. 5 Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve

Parcel No. 11 Jalaur River Forest Reserve

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 12

Investigation conducted by this Office reveals that applicants

Located in Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna with an area of

In view thereof, this Office interpose[s] no objection to the

North National Power Corporation

South Road and Baldomero Halili

West National Power Corporation

East National Power Corporation

On December 10, 1973, petitioner Gordula had the land

October 24, 1973

The said survey plans, as well as the Cadastral Map of

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 13

preliminary injunction upon a bond of one hundred thousand

As approved by the Bureau of Lands in Psd-Plan 04-014230,

On December 28, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in

On August 29, 1985, he sold the lots to petitioner Nora Ellen

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 14

The General Manager of the Appellant is not vested with

xxx xxx xxx

2. The parcel of land covered by said titles is hereby

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 15

We start with the proposition that the sovereign people,

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 16

In the first place, there is nothing in Espinosa

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 17

for other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced,